In an action for breach of an obligation for which a third person is answerable over pursuant to this article or Article 4 of this title, the defendant may give the third person notice of the litigation in a record, and the person notified may then give similar notice to any other person who is answerable over. If the notice states (i) that the person notified may come in and defend and (ii) that failure to do so will bind the person notified in an action later brought by the person giving the notice as to any determination of fact common to the two litigations, the person notified is so bound unless after seasonable receipt of the notice the person notified does come in and defend.
Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 3-119
Oklahoma Code Comment
1. This Section is pre-revision Section 3-803. No cases were decided under the pre-revision Section. The pre-revision Oklahoma comment noted that the Section did not displace Oklahoma procedural provisions on joinder of parties.
2. It is important to note that this Section, like other similar provisions in sub sections 2-607(5) and 2A-516(4), should not be considered as involving jurisdiction, but rather as involving a matter of agreement. In many cases, of course, a defendant in a suit on a negotiable instrument who, if found liable, will have an action against another party, such as in the case of successive indorsers, will be able to obtain jurisdiction over the party who is answerable to the defendant and, if the vouching letter sent under this Section is rejected, an impleader action will follow. Indeed, in many cases, there will be no need for the vouching or impleading process at all, as the plaintiff will sue not only the defendant, but also the party answerable over to the defendant. In some cases, however, where the plaintiff cannot or does not sue all concerned, and the defendant has no jurisdiction to implead, the vouching process is available and useful. But is the vouching process then effective against a third party who rejects it; that is, does it bind that party to jurisdiction that would not otherwise exist in an unconstitutional manner?
The vouching process, properly understood, is not legal process. The liable parties on a negotiable instrument should be understood not only to promise to pay if any necessary conditions are met, but also to either defend parties to whom they will be liable if those parties are sued for payment, or to be bound by the result of any such suit. It is this concept that makes the judgment obtained against the defendant binding on the party liable over to the defendant who has been tendered and has refused the defense; that party is precluded, not because the court has jurisdiction over the party, but because that party agreed to defend or be bound. Thus, to enforce that agreement, the defendant will have to further obtain jurisdiction over and sue the bound party. Vouching cases normally involve offering judgments of one state in the courts of another, not because that judgment binds the defendant in the new suit, but because it is evidence of the terms of the agreement by which that party is bound. See, e.g., under Article 2, Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1990).