Opinion
AANCV156018220S
12-14-2015
Karen Reilley, Executrix of the Estate of Alphonse Lemansk v. Jo-Ellen Albanese
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
Barry K. Stevens, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 13, 2015, the plaintiff, Karen Reilley, filed a five-count complaint alleging undue influence, incapacity, intentional interference with an inheritance, breach of a fiduciary duty, and fraud against the defendant, Jo-Ellen Albanese. Pending before the court, is the defendant's motion to strike count three of the complaint. Count three alleges the following facts. The plaintiff is the daughter and sole heir of Alphonse Lemanski, the plaintiff's decedent. On June 6, 2013, the plaintiff's decedent executed a will devising all of his assets to the plaintiff. Prior to December 9, 2014, and December 16, 2014, the plaintiff's decedent named the plaintiff as beneficiary of his Cantella & Co., Inc., investment accounts. At all relevant times, the plaintiff was aware of these presumed inheritances because the plaintiff's decedent informed her that she was the beneficiary. According to the complaint, the defendant unduly influenced the plaintiff's decedent to purchase items for her and her family and to grant her access and use of his bank accounts and credit cards. The defendant ingratiated herself into a position of confidence with the plaintiff's decedent and unduly influenced the plaintiff's decedent to change the beneficiary of his assets from the plaintiff, the natural object of his bounty and estate, to herself and to purchase items and expend monies for and on behalf of herself, all to the detriment of the plaintiff. The acts of the defendant negligently, and, or intentionally, willingly, and knowingly interfered with the plaintiff's right and expectation of inheriting said assets.
On April 21, 2015, the plaintiff, as matter of right pursuant to Practice Book § 10-59, amended the complaint to insert the prayer for relief and to correct the spelling of the plaintiff's name from " Karen Riley" to " Karen Reilley." The rest of the complaint remained the same.
The specific allegations of the complaint include the following claims. On December 2, 2013, the defendant unduly influenced the plaintiff's decedent to make her the beneficiary of his Sikorsky Federal Credit Union account. On December 9, 2013 and December 16, 2013, the defendant unduly influenced the plaintiff's decedent to change the beneficiary of his Cantella & Co., Inc., investment accounts from plaintiff to herself. During the period of January 2014 through August 2014, the defendant unduly influenced the plaintiff's decedent to make payments on her behalf from his bank account to Kohl's for purchases that the defendant alone incurred. On February 22, 2014, the defendant used her durable power of attorney to add Michael Kiro, her son, to the title of the plaintiff's decedent's Honda Civic previously solely owned by the plaintiff's decedent. On March 6, 2014 and March 28, 2014, the defendant unduly influenced the plaintiff's decedent to make payments on her behalf from his bank account to Kubota Tractors for purchases she alone incurred. On August 8, 2014, the defendant used her durable power of attorney to add herself to the title of the plaintiff's decedent's Honda CRV previously solely owned by the plaintiff's decedent.
On June 9, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to strike the third count of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because intentional interference with an inheritance is not a viable claim in Connecticut. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike on June 26, 2015. For the following reasons, the motion to strike is denied.
DISCUSSION
" The proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is to make a motion to strike prior to trial." Gulack v. Gulack, 30 Conn.App. 305, 309, 620 A.2d 181 (1993). " The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d 640 (2011). " In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293. " A motion to strike is the proper procedural vehicle . . . to test whether Connecticut is ready to recognize some newly emerging ground of liability . . . [W]hen the motion to strike is being used to test a new cause of action, a trial court should permit the plaintiff to develop a factual basis for the claim . . . Sometimes legal questions require a factual setting within which to be decided. Just because we have a pleading device called a motion to strike it [should not] be regarded as a straightjacket preventing a proper testing of new legal theories." Hart v. Hart, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV-14-6007918-S (May 11, 2015, Calmar, J.) (60 Conn. L. Rptr. 399, 400, ).
The defendant argues that the third count of the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because intentional interference with an inheritance is not a recognized cause of action in Connecticut. Specifically, the defendant argues that there is no appellate authority ratifying the existence of this cause of action, and the trial courts should not recognize it in the absence of appellate guidance. The plaintiff argues that intentional interference with an inheritance is a recognized cause of action in Connecticut. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the majority of Connecticut trial court decisions have recognized the claim and its elements.
The plaintiff also argues that support for the cause of action is found in Hall v. Hall, 91 Conn. 514, 100 A. 441 (1917). There, the Supreme Court indicated a possible inclination to recognize the new cause of action. The court did not decide whether intentional interference with an inheritance is a viable cause of action because the plaintiff pleaded additional fraud related allegations that the court determined where dispositive. " Of course while dicta is not binding precedent, it is persuasive authority and can influence a lower court's decision. The Superior Court cases . . . that discuss Hall do not rely on Hall as binding precedent, but instead mention Hall in order to demonstrate that the Supreme Court, if it does address the issue, may recognize interference with an expected inheritance as a valid cause of action." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Hart v. Hart, supra, 60 Conn. L. Rptr. 402.
" While Connecticut case law reveals no hard and fast test that courts apply when determining whether to recognize new causes of action; a number of guiding principles can be found. The first relevant guideline is that courts look to see if the judicial sanctions available are so ineffective as to warrant the recognition of a new cause of action. Second, courts are mindful of growing judicial receptivity to the new cause of action; taking into account the judicial trend . . . [T]he ultimate decision comes down to a matter of judgment in balancing the competing interests involved." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Delprete v. Senibaldi, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-11-6024795-S (December 23, 2013, Nazzaro, J.) (57 Conn. L. Rptr. 311, 312).
The trial courts disagree as to whether intentional interference with an inheritance is a viable claim in Connecticut. " The majority of trial court decisions considering this issue have held that intentional interference with an inheritance is a viable claim in Connecticut." Eder v. Eder, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-13-6036446 (June 10, 2014, Nazzaro, J.) (58 Conn. L. Rptr. 347, 350). These courts have reasoned that intentional interference with an inheritance is similar to tortious interference with a contractual right, a well recognized cause of action in Connecticut. Bocian v. Bank of America, N.A., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-06-4019877-S (December 8, 2006, Rittenband, J.T.R.) (42 Conn. L. Rptr. 483, 484-85). " The essential elements of [tortious interference with a contractual right] include, of course, the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship and that the defendant(s), knowing of that relationship, intentionally sought to interfere with it; and, as a result, the plaintiff claimed to have suffered actual loss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stancuna v. Schaffer, 122 Conn.App. 484, 488, 998 A.2d 1221 (2010). Like tortious interference with a contractual right, " interference with an expected inheritance focuses on the defendant's knowledge of a beneficiary's expected inheritance and tortious conduct resulting in damages to the beneficiary." Hart v. Hart, supra, 60 Conn. L. Rptr. 404.
The majority has also relied on the Supreme Court's endorsement of causes of actions recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts in determining the elements of this claim. DePasquale v. Hennessey, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-10-6007472-S (August 27, 2010, Peck, J.) (50 Conn. L. Rptr. 605). The Depasquale court has stated: " Section 774B of the Restatement Second of Torts, an authority often relied on by our appellate courts in outlining the contours of tort law in our state, provides for a claim of tortious interference with an inheritance under circumstances similar to those of the more established cause of action of tortious interference with contract or business expectancy. Section 774B, which is entitled Interference with Other Forms of Advantageous Economic Relations, provides: 'One who by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift.' . . . Comment (a) to § 774B provides that '[t]his section represents an extension to a type of noncontractual relation of the principle found in the liability for intentional interference with prospective contracts.' . . . The similarity of the elements of a cause of action for tortious interference with a business expectancy and a cause of action for interference with an expectancy of inheritance, coupled with the Second Restatement's adoption of the latter claim, furthers this court's conviction that interference with expectancy of inheritance is likely to be recognized by our appellate courts as a valid cause of action in the foreseeable future." (Citations omitted.) Id., 607.
Accordingly, the majority has determined that the elements of intentional interference with an inheritance are: " 1) an expected inheritance or gift; 2) knowledge by the defendant of the expectancy; 3) tortious conduct by the defendant [interfering with this expectancy]; and 4) actual damage suffered by the plaintiff as a result." Vechiola v. Fasanella, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-10-5029378-S (February 7, 2013, Radcliffe, J.) (55 Conn. L. Rptr. 525, 527). " [I]n an action for interference with expectancy of inheritance, the plaintiff is required to allege that the defendant prevented the plaintiff from receiving an inheritance by fraud, duress, or other tortious means ." (Emphasis in original.) Dugan v. Estate of Mariani, supra, 59 Conn. L. Rptr. 67. The court agrees with the majority of the cases that have addressed this issue and concludes that intentional interference with an inheritance is a viable claim in Connecticut.
The defendant primarily relies on Eder v. Eder, supra, 58 Conn. L. Rptr. 349 which holds that intentional interference with an expected inheritance is not a viable claim in Connecticut. Accord, Moore v. Brower, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X01-CV-05-40110227-S (June 14, 2006, Munro, J.) . Eder emphasizes that there is no appellate authority on this matter and that " it is uncertain, without appellate consideration, what the contours and scope of the tort would, and should, be." Eder v. Eder, supra, 58 Conn. L. Rptr. 350. More specifically, the Eder court explained that because there is no appellate authority on this issue, the trial courts lack the benefit of an " exhaustive and comprehensive" analysis by the appellate courts. Thus the court reasoned that it would be difficult for trial courts to determine the elements and the scope of remedies for the cause of action of intentional interference with an inheritance. Moreover, it would be " unclear where, if at all, the court should draw the line cutting off remote interests held by remote beneficiaries." Id., 349-50.
This reasoning was rejected in Hart v. Hart, supra, 60 Conn. L. Rptr. 399. The Hart court stated: " [T]his court recognizes that neither the Appellate Court nor the Supreme Court has formally recognized interference with an expected inheritance as a cause of action. However, the fact that the appellate level courts have not discussed and ruled on the issue does not mean that the action is not valid. Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court has the power to recognize a new cause of action, however, the Superior Courts are first to encounter these issues and must make a determination that will potentially be addressed by the Supreme Court." Id., 404. The court then provided compelling reasons for a Superior Court to allow the cause of action of intentional interference with an inheritance to stand on a motion to strike. The court explained, " One whole purpose of motions to strike is to determine whether our jurisdiction should or should not recognize new causes of action. Also appellate courts will often not be best positioned to determine whether our courts should recognize a new cause of action if trial courts by granting motions to strike do not allow full factual records to be developed . . . In short, simply because the tort has not yet been recognized at the appellate level does not mean the appellate courts would not find a valid cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., quoting Falconieri v. Choquette, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-96-0383034-S (September 26, 1996, Corradino, J.) . The court finds Judge Calmar's reasoning in Hart v. Hart, supra, 60 Conn. L. Rptr. 399, persuasive.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike is denied and the plaintiff's objection to the motion is sustained.