Opinion
No. TTD CV-07-5001248-S
May 7, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT EDWARD LANG'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on March 24, 2005 at the intersection of Route 198 and Route 6 in Chaplin. The plaintiff, Stacey Prior, claims that defendant Samantha Lang failed to properly negotiate her turn onto Route 6, entered the plaintiff's lane, and collided head-on with the plaintiff's vehicle. In the First Count of the Second Amended Complaint, the plaintiff claims that Samantha was negligent in a number of respects, including operating her vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In the Second and Third Counts, the plaintiff claims that Samantha's operation of her vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol constituted recklessness under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-295 and common-law recklessness.
In the Fourth Count, the plaintiff alleges that defendant Edward Lang, Samantha's father, is liable for the plaintiff's injuries under the family car doctrine. The plaintiff alleges that Edward rented the vehicle that Samantha was driving twelve days before the accident and that Samantha was living in the family home in Middlefield, Connecticut at the time of the accident. It is further alleged that Edward rented the vehicle for the general use and convenience of the family.
In the Fifth Count, the plaintiff alleges that Edward is liable for the plaintiff's injuries because he negligently entrusted the rented vehicle to Samantha. In particular, the plaintiff alleges that Edward was negligent in that he had actual or constructive knowledge that Samantha "had a habit of driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs" when he made the decision to entrust the rented car to her twelve days before the accident occurred.
Edward Lang originally moved for summary judgment as to the Fourth and Fifth Counts. As to the Fourth Count, he claimed that the family car doctrine did not apply because the undisputed facts showed that Samantha was not living in the family home at the time of the accident and because the doctrine had never been applied to a vehicle that had been rented on a "short term" rental, as opposed to a long term lease. After reviewing additional evidence recently submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to Edward's motion though, counsel for Edward informed the court at oral argument that Edward Lang was withdrawing his motion as to the Fourth Count. Thus, the court will consider the motion as withdrawn and will not address it further.
As to the Fifth Count, Edward Lang claims entitlement to summary judgment on two bases. First, he claims that because he was not the owner of the car, but merely a renter, and because the rental agreement identified Samantha as an authorized driver, as a matter of law he could not and did not "entrust" the rented vehicle to her. Second, he claims that because he had not seen Samantha the day of the accident he had no knowledge that she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol and had no idea that she would drive in such a condition that day. He also points to the fact that she had a valid driver's license from the State of Connecticut when he rented the vehicle for her use and that she was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol at that time.
In response, the plaintiff argues that ownership of the vehicle is not an element of the tort of negligent entrustment. Instead, the issue is whether Edward had "sufficient control" over the vehicle. The plaintiff claims that the evidence at least creates an issue of material fact as to Edward's control over the rental car. Further, the plaintiff argues that whether Edward was negligent is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on summary judgment because there is evidence that Edward knew that Samantha had a substance abuse problem and had a history of operating vehicles under the influence, including as recently as February 2005. Further, the plaintiff claims that the evidence shows that Edward was aware of Samantha's abuse of alcohol just one week before he rented the vehicle at issue. Based on this evidence, the plaintiff claims that there is at least a material issue of fact as to whether Edward was negligent in entrusting the rented vehicle to Samantha on March 12, 2005.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD CT Page 7741
"In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact," Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 787 (2009). (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)DISCUSSION
Connecticut has recognized the tort of negligent entrustment of an automobile for over 75 years. In Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 520, 165 A. 678 (1933), the Supreme Court held that:
When the evidence proves that the owner of an automobile knows or ought reasonably to know that one to whom he entrusts it is so incompetent to operate it upon the highways that the former ought reasonably to anticipate the likelihood of injury to others by reason of that incompetence, and such incompetence does result in such injury, a basis of recovery by the person injured is established.
As the above quote makes clear, the Supreme Court discussed this tort as applied to the owner of the vehicle. It is true, as the defendant notes, that no Connecticut appellate court has discussed whether the tort could be extended to non-owners. However, numerous decisions of the Superior Court applying Greeley, have consistently held that ownership is not a necessary element of the tort. See, e.g., Jordan v. Sabourin, 1996 Conn.Super. LEXIS 3085 (Conn.Super.Ct., Nov. 22, 1996) (Hurly, J.); Jordan v. Amaker, 2008 Conn.Super. LEXIS 243 (Conn.Super.Ct., Jan. 29, 2008) (Bellis, J.); Butova v. Bielonko, 2007 Ct.Super. 19484 LOIS (Conn.Super.Ct., Nov. 9, 2007) (Bentivegna, J.); Griffin v. Larson, 2004 Ct.Super. 12028 LOIS (Conn.Super.Ct., Aug. 18, 2004) (Lager, J.); Morin v Keddy, 1993 Ct.Super. 8736 LOIS (Conn.Super.Ct. Oct. 25, 1993) (Hennessey, J.). Instead, relying on the Restatement of Torts, as the Supreme Court did in Greeley, courts since that decision have focused on whether the defendant had sufficient control over the vehicle to be held liable. As the court in Morin noted, there is nothing in the Restatement that requires that the defendant be the owner of the vehicle. The Restatement instead focuses on whether the instrument through which the harm was caused was in the "control" of the defendant. Morin, 8736 LOIS at 4-6. This court agrees with the reasoning and conclusions reached in the cases set forth above.
Thus, the question here is whether Edward had sufficient control over the rental car, even though he was not the owner of it. He argues that he did not because the car was, from the time it was rented until the accident occurred, in Samantha's exclusive possession. Further, he argues that the rental car company designated Samantha as an authorized driver under the rental agreement, thereby taking away Edward's ability to control Samantha's right to use the vehicle. Finally, the defendant argues that because the car was rented pursuant to a short term rental agreement there is a lack of control that would typically be present in a long term lease. Relying on Auth v. Wesley, 2007 Conn.Super. LEXIS 1551 (Conn.Super.Ct., Jun. 14, 2007) (Graham, J.), the defendant claims that this distinction is dispositive.
The court disagrees with each of these arguments. The first two arguments reflect a misunderstanding of the plaintiff's claim. The facts that Samantha may have had exclusive possession of the vehicle after it was rented and was authorized to drive the vehicle are not dispositive. The plaintiff alleges that Edward entrusted the rental car to Samantha on March 12, 2005 by renting it for her. The plaintiff has presented evidence that Samantha could not have rented the vehicle but for Edward's assistance in doing so. In fact, the rental agreement identifies the renter as "Edward Lang." Plaintiff's Exhibit A. Further, where Samantha is listed as an additional authorized driver, the agreement specifically provides that she "is under my control and direction to drive vehicle for me and on my behalf." Edward signed the agreement specifically acknowledging this statement. Id. In addition, Edward agreed that "I am responsible for [her] acts while [she is] driving and for fulfilling terms and conditions of this rental agreement." Id. Significantly, Samantha is not a party to the rental agreement.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the fact finder at trial could conclude that by renting the vehicle in his own name and taking responsibility for Samantha's actions while driving the car, Edward had sufficient control over it. It was his decision to acquire the car, and then his decision to turn it over to his daughter. The fact that she maintained exclusive possession of it until the accident occurred merely means that the fact finder could find that Edward entrusted her with the vehicle for the entire time from March 12 until the accident twelve days later.
Further, the defendant's reliance on Auth is misplaced. Auth was not a negligent entrustment case. It involved a claim brought under the family car doctrine. As noted above, the defendant has withdrawn his motion as to that theory. Whether a short term lease is sufficient to create liability under that doctrine (and the court fails to see why it would not be) is irrelevant to the issue of control under a negligent entrustment theory. In fact, courts have consistently held that a claim for negligent entrustment may go forward where the entrusting person's interest in the vehicle is less than Edward's leasehold interest here. See, e.g., Jordan v. Sabourin, supra, (entrusting party borrowed car from third party), Griffin v. Larson, supra, (same). Again, the issue is not the defendant's ownership interest or even legal right to the vehicle but whether he is exercising control over the vehicle at the time he entrusts it to another. In this case, the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to control.
The defendant argues that he is also entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed facts show that he did not know that his daughter was under the influence of drugs or alcohol on the date of the accident and further show that he had no knowledge that she was operating the rented vehicle in such a state at the time of the accident. Further, according to the defendant, he had no reason to think that Samantha was not competent to drive when he rented the vehicle on March 12, 2005. On that day, she had a valid Connecticut driver's license and was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
In support of this argument, the defendant relies heavily on Rangel v. Parkhurst, 64 Conn.App. 372, 779 A.2d 1277 (2001). In Rangel, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident with the defendants' son. The plaintiff sought to hold the defendants liable for making alcohol available to their son and allowing him to store it in their house when they knew or had reason to know that he would drive an automobile while intoxicated. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendants had negligently entrusted a motor vehicle to their son by assisting him in obtaining and maintaining his vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment in the defendant's favor and the appellate court affirmed.
The defendant here argues that he is in much the same position as the defendants in Rangel. He did not provide alcohol to his daughter, did no more entrust her with a vehicle than did the defendants in Rangel, and did nothing to encourage his daughter to drive while intoxicated.
The court disagrees with the defendant's reading of Rangel. It provides virtually no guidance regarding the plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim here. In fact, neither the appellate court nor the trial court in Rangel spent much time discussing the plaintiff's negligent entrustment theory. Instead, the opinions of both courts focus almost exclusively on the plaintiff's theory that the defendants negligently provided alcohol to their son. 64 Conn.App. at 376-83. Here, the plaintiff has asserted no such claim.
The only mention of the negligent entrustment claim in Rangel is in a footnote where the court noted that "it was not disputed that [defendants' son] owned the automobile he was operating at the time of the collision with the plaintiff's automobile." Id. at 375, fn 3. The court went on to note that "moreover, the plaintiff offered no evidence" in support of her negligent entrustment theory. Id.
The facts of this case are much different. Samantha was not the owner of the vehicle she was driving at the time of the accident. In addition, as noted above, here the plaintiff has provided evidence to support her claim that Edward had sufficient control such that the fact finder could find that he entrusted the vehicle to Samantha.
The defendant also relies on a number of Superior Court decisions to argue that as a matter of law, Edward's actions here were not negligent. In Shah v. Brooks, 1999 Ct.Super. 13267 LOIS (Conn.Super.Ct., Sep. 27, 1999) (Lavine, J.), the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant liable for entrusting his car to a driver whose license had been previously suspended, who had previously received a speeding ticket and who had previously totaled his car in a one-car accident. The driver also had cerebral palsy. The court denied the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy because the defendant had no duty to investigate the driver's driving record before lending him the car. Further, the evidence in that case showed that the earlier accident involved the driver sliding on an icy road. Finally, the driver's cerebral palsy did not render him incompetent because the state had given him a driver's license despite that condition. Id. at 3. Based on this, the court found that there was insufficient evidence presented to show that the defendant had reason to believe that the driver was not competent. Similarly, in Griffin v. Larson, supra, and Donati v. Sullivan, 2007 Ct.Super. 13832 LOIS (Conn.Super.Ct., Aug. 7, 2007) (Stengel, J.), both courts granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment because there was no evidence whatsoever that the defendant knew or should have known that the driver to whom their car was entrusted was incompetent to drive.
In Butova v. Bielonko, supra, John J. Butova was killed in a one-car accident involving a vehicle in which he was a passenger. His father, as administrator of his estate, claimed that the accident that killed his son was the result of defendant's son's drunk driving. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently entrusted the vehicle involved in the accident to his son because he knew or should have known that his son might be drinking and driving that evening. After an extensive evidentiary hearing at which it heard from several witnesses, the court denied the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy. The court did so for two reasons. First, the court noted that the defendant had placed restrictions on his son's use of the vehicle, and that his son "did not have carte blanche with the car." Id. at 12. In particular, the defendant had told his son that he was not to drink and drive. Further, the court noted that on the night in question the defendant had reason to believe that the decedent would be driving.
Second, the court noted that although the defendant knew that his son had in the past engaged in under age drinking, he did not know that he would be drinking that night. Further, there was no evidence of prior incidents of drinking and driving. Id.
The defendant here claims that he is in the same position as the defendants in the cases above. In particular, he claims that like the defendant in Butova, although he may have known of his daughter's past history, he was not aware of any possible drinking and driving on the night of the accident. Further, like the defendant in Shah, he claims that he was entitled to rely upon his daughter's valid driver license when he rented the vehicle for her.
The court finds that this case is distinguishable from the cases relied upon by the defendant. Further, the defendant's focus on what he knew on the night of the accident misses the mark.
First, unlike in Griffin and Donati, here the plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether the defendant knew that the person to whom he was entrusting the vehicle was incompetent to drive. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, at the time Edward rented the vehicle and entrusted it to Samantha on March 12, 2005 he knew the following facts:
1. On March 16, 2002 Samantha was arrested for driving under the influence;
2. In August 2004 Samantha was admitted to a six-week alcohol treatment program at Silver Hills after she had been drinking heavily at the defendant's residence in the summer of 2004;
3. On February 7, 2005 the Middlefield police found Samantha intoxicated while in possession of a motor vehicle; she was hospitalized as a result of that incident; the Aftercare Instructions signed by the defendant on February 8, 2005 in connection with Samantha's release from the hospital make explicit reference to substance abuse;
4. On March 5, 2007 Samantha was asked to leave her Middletown apartment because of drunk and disorderly behavior.
Based on these facts, the fact finder could reasonably conclude that the defendant knew that Samantha had a serious problem with alcohol, and as recently as one month earlier had been behind the wheel of a car while intoxicated. Further, the fact finder could conclude that just one week prior to when the defendant rented the vehicle for her, Samantha was so intoxicated and disruptive that she was thrown out of her apartment. Based on these facts, the fact finder could reasonably conclude that on March 12, 2005 the defendant had knowledge that Samantha was not competent to drive.
The above facts also distinguish this case from Shah and Butova. In Shah, there was no evidence that the defendant knew of the driver's history. Nor was that history as troubling as the history presented by the plaintiff here. Samantha's history of at least two times driving while intoxicated, including once just one month prior to the defendant renting her a vehicle, along with the evidence of her repeated abuse of alcohol is a far cry from an accident on an icy road and a speeding ticket. Further, here, given what he knew of Samantha's behavior, the defendant had reason to question his daughter's competence despite her valid driver's license.
This case is also materially different from Butova. There, the court relied upon the fact that the defendant had placed restrictions on his son's right to use the vehicle in question. Here, there is no evidence of any restrictions. Unlike the driver in Butova, the evidence here suggests that Samantha had carte blanche over operation of the vehicle from the time it was rented on March 12, 2005. Further, the court noted in Butova that there was no history or prior incidents. Here, the plaintiff has presented such evidence.
It is also worth noting that the court in Butova had the benefit of a full evidentiary hearing at which a number of witnesses testified about the driver's actions and the defendant's knowledge or lack thereof. Thus, the court was able to assess the credibility of the witnesses when making its factual determinations. There has been no such hearing on the defendant's motion here. Instead, the defendant has relied upon his affidavit, deposition testimony and that of his daughter. On key issues though, including whether the defendant was aware that Samantha was still drinking after leaving Silver Hills, the plaintiff has presented substantial evidence that calls into question both the substance of the defendants' testimony and his credibility.
Finally, any reliance on the Butova court's finding that the defendant there did not know that his son would be drinking that night is misplaced. The issue here is not what the defendant knew on March 24, 2005, but what he knew on March 12, 2005 when he rented the vehicle and turned it over to Samantha. While there is no evidence that Samantha was intoxicated that day, the plaintiff has presented evidence that the defendant knew that she was a habitual drinker, who on both February 7, 2005 and March 5, 2005 could not control her behavior while intoxicated. Such knowledge is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that Samantha was not competent to drive when he rented the car for her. See, e.g. Drozdzal v. Griffith, 2005 Ct.Super. 14064, 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 247 (Conn.Super.Ct., Nov. 7, 2005) (Keller, J.).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create triable issues of fact as to her claim against Edward Lang for negligent entrustment. Consequently, the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the Fifth Count is denied.