Summary
In Godfred, that court noted that the Assistant District Attorney described her efforts to obtain and share the required discovery prior to filing her COC.
Summary of this case from People v. SolomonidisOpinion
No. CR-005088-22BX
12-19-2022
ADA LaToya Stephens, Office of the Bronx District Attorney, for the People. Marissa Balonon-Rosen, Esq., The Bronx Defenders, for the Defendant.
ADA LaToya Stephens, Office of the Bronx District Attorney, for the People.
Marissa Balonon-Rosen, Esq., The Bronx Defenders, for the Defendant.
Michael J. Hartofilis, J.
Defendant is charged with violations of VTL article 1192. The instant motion seeks orders from the Court as follows: (i) dismissing the information pursuant to CPL §§ 245.20 [1][a][ii] and 245.20 [2] for the People's failure to timely comply with the discovery obligations, or alternatively granting a hearing to determine the facts and conclusions of law regarding this issue; (ii) suppressing all observations of police and evidence obtained as the result of Defendant's warrantless arrest without probable cause, or alternatively a Mapp/Dunaway hearing. The People oppose the motion in its entirety. In determining the issues herein, the Court has reviewed the motion papers and the court file and has determined that the motion can be decided based on the submissions and the court file. (see People v Allard, 28 N.Y.3d 41 [2016]; People v Lomax, 50 N.Y.2d 351 [1980]).
Background
On March 27, 2022, NYPD Officer Christopher Alvarado witnessed Defendant collide with multiple parked cars and observed that Defendant exhibited indicia of alcohol intoxication. After a chemical test of his breath registered a blood alcohol level of.25%, Defendant was arrested and arraigned on charges of four violations of article 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, including Aggravated Driving While Intoxicated.
Defendant filed this motion on October 17, 2022. No trial date has yet been set.
COC Challenge
On June 24, 2022, the eighty-eighth day after arraignment, the People filed their certificate of compliance with discovery obligations ("COC") and a statement of trial readiness ("SOR"). On June 30 and July 1, 2022, the People shared additional discovery (a portion of the IDTU video, activity logs and roll call information for involved officers) and filed a supplemental COC.
Thereafter, on September 8, 2022, defense counsel notified the assigned ADA regarding the following missing discovery: (i) part of the IDTU video; (ii) accident and aided reports; (iii) photographs, if any; (iv) completed translator form; (v) underlying court documents for police officer lawsuits; (vi) underlying documents for substantiated and unsubstantiated misconduct allegations; (vii) CCRB history; and (viii) correct contact info for a police witness.
On September 29, 2022, the People shared with Defendant photographs taken at the scene, remainder of the IDTU video, corrected contact information for a police witness, two accident reports, IDTU officer license, and activity log. The prosecutor also served and filed with the court a letter setting forth the efforts they made to obtain and provide the missing discovery.
CPL § 245.50 [1][a] now requires the People to explain for the court the reasons for the delay in sharing any late-disclosed items.
Defendant asserts that a speedy trial dismissal of the case is required due to the delayed sharing of discovery within the timelines provided in CPL § 245.10 [1][a][ii] and § 30.30 [1][b], and the alleged incomplete disclosure of impeachment material under § 245.20 [1][k][iv]. In opposition, the ADA affirms that the delayed disclosure was due to the many police personnel who responded to the scene, as well as "technical errors" (mentioned without elaboration) which thwarted discovery disclosure efforts. The prosecutor has described her efforts to obtain and share the required discovery prior to filing her COC. She had sent nine emails to different NYPD members requesting required materials; her continued efforts to obtain the complete IDTU video included going up the chain of command to contact the NYPD Lieutenant. The ADA demonstrated that when counsel alerted her to the missing items more than two months later, she promptly investigated and provided the items missing items. There is no evidence that the ADA knew of or intentionally withheld any required materials that were not timely provided. (see, e.g., People v Cooper, 71 Misc.3d 559 [Erie County Court, 2021]["the People may not withhold known material and information and expect the court to accept a COC and SOR"]).
No clear appellate guidance exists yet to resolve the contradictory trial court decisions regarding the propriety of dismissing a criminal case for insufficient or untimely disclosure of required automatic discovery under the 2020 statutory scheme. The Court has considered the rules of statutory construction, available legislative history and intent of article 245, pre-existing jurisprudence regarding discovery violations, and the express terms of the statute.
Rules of Statutory Construction
In interpreting statutes, courts are mandated to "ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature." (Statutes §§ 92[a]; 98; 111; see People v Mitchell, 38 N.Y.3d 408, 411 [2022]; Riley v County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 455, 463 [2000]). While the "statutory text is the clearest indicator of legislative intent," (Statutes § 94; Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp v Spitzer, 7 N.Y.3d 653, 660), courts cannot "slavishly follow" the text, as all "interlocking provisions of a statute must be harmonized" to give a "sensible practical overall construction which is consistent with and furthers" the enactment's scheme and purpose. (Statutes §§ 97, 111; Long v Adirondack Park Agency, 76 N.Y.2d 416, 420 [1990]; Vink v DHCR, 285 A.D.2d 203, 209-210 [1st Dep't 2001]; 207 Realty Assocs., LLC v. NYS DHCR, 22 Misc.3d 509, 515 [Sup Ct NY County 2008]; People v Kramer, 45 Misc.3d 458, 464 [Just Ct Village of Massapequa Park 2014]). Courts are thus mandated to reject statutory language "which leads to conclusions inconsistent with purpose of the statute, or consequences irreconcilable with its spirit and reason." (Id.; Le Drugstore Etats Unis, Inc. v New York State Bd. of Pharmacy, 33 N.Y.2d 298, 302 [1973]; Astman v Kelly, 2 N.Y.2d 567, 572 [1957]; People v Kramer, 45 Misc.3d at 464). "Language, however strong, must yield to what appears to be the intention, and that is to be found, not in the words of the particular section alone, but by comparing it with other parts or provisions of the general scheme of which it is a part." (Hayden v Pierce, 144 NY 512, 516 [1895]).
The passage of article 245 did not vitiate the rules of statutory construction. Courts always have been required to "look at the general scope and design of the law, the evil to be remedied or the benefit attained, and so to construe the law as to accomplish the object the Legislature has in view." (In re Cooper, 22 NY 67 [1860]). Courts must never interpret a statute "to produce a public mischief or to promote injustice." (Hayden v Pierce, 144 NY, at 516).
Legislative Intent and History of Article 245
Criminal discovery rules always have evinced "a legislative determination that the trial of a criminal charge should not be a sporting event where each side remains ignorant of facts in the hands of the adversary until events unfold at trial." (People v Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d 222, 226 [1980]). Prior to 2020, discovery procedures were cumbersome, outdated, and inefficient, resulting in defendants being blindsided by late disclosure of important evidence on the eve of trial. (People v Leonardo, 75 Misc.3d 1237 (A) [Crim Ct Queens County 2022]; People v Adrovic, 69 Misc.3d 563, 571 [Crim Ct Kings County 2020]). The old restrictive rules also "inhibit[ed], at great taxpayer cost," defendants' ability to reach reasonable pre-trial dispositions of their cases precisely because they lacked sufficient early access to the evidence against them. (2019 NY Senate-Assembly Bill S1716, A1431, NY Committee Reports 1/17/2019 and 1/31/2019).The purpose of and justification for article 245 was specifically to eliminate "trial by ambush;" to remedy the above inequities by mandating earlier and broader discovery obligations by the prosecution, increasing efficiency in prosecutions and fairness to both sides. (Id.). CPL article 245 seeks to ensure that defendants and their attorneys can "intelligently investigate, secure and use any potentially exculpatory evidence, fairly weigh a guilty plea offer, or develop an appropriate trial strategy." (Id.). Article 245 simply effectuates long-standing legislative and constitutional goals of evidence sharing: enabling defendants to make better-informed trial and plea decisions, minimizing tactical and often unfair advantages to one side, and increasing to some degree the opportunity for an accurate determination of guilt or innocence. (People v Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d 222, 226 [1980]).
Because this statute is remedial, it "should be liberally and not narrowly construed" (Morgan v Hedstrom, 164 NY 224, 231 [1900]). It was not meant to encourage gamesmanship by defendants seeking to create "an inescapable trap for the diligent prosecutor who professionally, assiduously and in good faith attempts to comply" with their new procedures. (People v Erby, 68 Misc.3d 625, 633 [Sup Ct Bronx County 2020]). Instead, the rules seek not to punish unintentional or harmless non-compliance, but to ensure that defendants get a fair trial. (People v Florez, 74 Misc.3d 1222 (A),*7 [Sup Ct Nassau County 2022]).
The structure of CPL article 245 demonstrates the Legislature's recognition that the reality of discovery in a criminal case is an ongoing process among independent stakeholders, built upon the good faith and due diligence of the People, and presupposing a continuing flow of communication between law enforcement, the People, and defendants. (see, e.g., People v Bruni, 2021 NY Slip Op 21076, at*3 [County Court, Albany County, 2021]). These foundations align with longstanding criminal procedure precedent. (see, e.g., People v Martinez, 71 N.Y.2d 937 [1988] [adverse inference instruction given where People failed to preserve missing notes of officer]; People v Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 553 [1987] [where evidence is in the People's possession but not timely provided to the defense, "the violation constitutes per se error requiring reversal, and good faith or inadvertence on the part of the prosecutor is of no moment."]).
Appellate Discovery Jurisprudence pre-article 245
The "overriding concern" for courts "fashioning an appropriate response to the prosecution's wrongful failure to preserve evidence" has always been "to eliminate any prejudice to the defendant while protecting the interests of society." (People v Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d 516 [1984]). In Kelly, the Court of Appeals held that a trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing charges on the ground that People had wrongfully failed to preserve evidence, since less extreme remedies "were clearly available," and "the drastic remedy of dismissal should not be invoked where less severe measures can rectify the harm done by the loss of evidence." (Id., at 520-521). Preclusion or dismissal is only an appropriate sanction for discovery violations where a constitutionally protected right is implicated. (People v Jenkins, 98 N.Y.2d 280 [2002]; People v Patterson, 78 N.Y.2d 711, 717 [1991]; People v Lewis, 44 A.D.3d 422, 423 [1st Dep't 2007]; People v Vieweg, 155 A.D.3d 1305 [3d Dep't 2017]).
Existing discovery jurisprudence was not abrogated by the passage of article 245 and remains binding on this Court. Article 245 incorporates existing foundations into a new set of rules designed to modernize discovery and increase fairness, efficiency, and transparency in criminal prosecutions. (https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s1716); for example, CPL § 245.80 [2] now requires that the Court determine whether "after considering all other remedies, dismissal is appropriate and proportionate to the prejudice suffered by the party entitled to disclosure."
Interpretation of CPL article 245
Defendant argues that speedy trial dismissal here is required because some items of discovery were not provided prior to the People's filing of their COC and SOR, and the speedy trial period has now run. The rationales for this oft-asserted position are that the statute requires "all items and information" to be disclosed prior to the filing of the COC; that the running of the speedy trial clock is a function independent of the sanctions permitted under CPL § 245. 80, and that prejudice is not a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of the COC and the timeliness of the SOR. (see, e.g., People v Figueroa, 76 Misc.3d 888 [Crim Ct Bronx County 2022]; People v Cartagena, 76 Misc.3d 1214 (A) [Crim Ct Bronx County 2022]; People v Darren, 75 Misc.3d 1208 (A) [Crim Ct NY County 2022]; People v Adrovic, 69 Misc.3d 563, 574 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2020]). The Court disagrees for the following reasons, and to the extent that other courts have reached these conclusions, the court declines to follow them.
If the phrase "all items and information" in § 245.20 [1] was truly intended to mean every item in the case, there would be no need for provisions granting exceptions thereto, or requiring a flow of information (§ 245.55), a continuing duty to disclose (§ 245.60), or a range of appropriate sanctions for delay or omissions. (People v Nelson, 67 Misc.3d 313, 315 [Franklin County Ct 2020]). Had such been the Legislature's intention, the statute simply needed to provide that until and unless the People have shared every document in the case, they should not file a COC and may not announce readiness for trial. (People v Askin, 68 Misc.3d 372, 378-79 [Nassau County Ct 2020]). But this the Legislature did not do. Every provision of the statute must be presumed to serve an intended purpose, and no rule of statutory construction permits segregation of a few words from the context of a statute. (Albano v Kirby, 36 N.Y.2d 526, 530 [1975]). Therefore, to dismiss cases based on the literal interpretation of "all items and information" renders superfluous article 245's qualifying provisions and violates the mandate to harmonize all sections of the law in such way as to carry out the specific remedial legislative intent thereof while avoiding "public mischief and injustice." (Hayden v Pierce, 144 NY, at 516).
See, e.g., provisions: extending the People's time to provide exceptionally voluminous materials (§ 245.10 [1][a][iv][B]); permitting supplemental COCs (§ 245. 50 [1-a]); prescribing continuing discovery obligations (§ 245.60); permitting the validation of a COC and SOR if some items are lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable (§ 245.50 [3]); prohibiting adverse consequences for late or incomplete disclosure if compliance was reasonable and the COC filed in good faith after exercising due diligence (Id.); and the availability of sanctions for failure to comply with article 245 which are proportionate to any demonstrated prejudice. (§ 245.80).
This is not to say that the court disagrees that "the People's obligation to provide discovery, and to certify compliance with that obligation, is not relieved by an absence of prejudice to the defendant." (People v Adrovic, 69 Misc.3d 563, 574 [Crim Ct Kings County 2020]). However, it cannot be said that a prejudice analysis is prohibited in a court's evaluation of the People's discovery compliance and readiness. (cf., People v Trotman, 2022 NY Slip Op. 51181(U) [Crim Ct Queens County 2022], People v Webb, 77 Misc.3d 1202 (A)[Crim Ct Queens County 2022]). The criminal justice reforms directly link CPL articles 30 and 245, and they must be read together. CPL § 30.30 [5] now requires courts to evaluate the People's 30.30 trial readiness declaration relative to their discovery compliance under CPL § 245.20 [1]. (People v Darren, 75 Misc.3d 1208 (A); People v Bruni, 71 Misc.3d 913, 917 [Albany County Ct 2021]). But this is not a zero-sum analysis: CPL § 245.50 [3] permits the court to certify the People's timely declaration of readiness despite full compliance, and § 245.50 [1] permits the discretionary imposition of a wide range of sanctions for non-compliance, depending on the prejudice wrought to the defendant as a result. Read together as they must be, these provisions clarify that the Legislature clearly did not intend for the confluence of articles 30 and 245 to lead courts to disregard appellate precedent and prevent judges from exercising their discretion to evaluate the consequences of delayed discovery. Such strict liability, piecemeal interpretation is without support in discovery policy and jurisprudence and leads to sweeping dismissal of cases for every omitted item, irrespective of whether a less draconian sanction could adequately permit a defendant to utilize the evidence.
If the People have demonstrated reasonable diligence to attain discovery compliance which is reasonable under the unique circumstances of each case and filed their COC thereafter in good faith that they have shared all required material in their possession, article 245 permits courts to deem the COC valid and the SOR timely - as reasonable under the circumstances - even if some items are "lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable." (245.50 [1], [3]). In such event, the court shall impose a remedy or sanction that is appropriate and proportionate to the prejudice suffered by the party entitled to disclosure. (CPL § 245.80 [1][a]).
Moreover, because the two statutes are directly linked, it is not a sensible or cohesive interpretation of the discovery scheme to hold that "the running of the speedy trial clock is not an "adverse consequence" under § 245.50 [3] to justify dismissing cases in every instance for the People's delayed compliance with required discovery. (cf., People v Vargas, 76 Misc.3d 646 [Crim Ct Bronx County 2022] [internal citations omitted]). Unquestionably, there is no greater "adverse consequence" to the prosecution of a criminal case than its dismissal. (People v Bruni, 71 Misc.3d 913, 919-20; People v Nelson, 67 Misc.3d 313).
Dismissal of a case for non-constitutional discovery violations far in advance of trial is simply not a prudent exercise of discretion for the People's failure to provide every single piece of information related to the subject matter of a case, regardless of its relevance or materiality, and irrespective of whether a less draconian sanction could adequately permit a defendant to utilize the evidence. Such a result eviscerates the remedial scheme of the discovery reforms, violates construction mandates, and disregards both legislative intent and history of article 245 and controlling appellate precedent on discovery violations. Moreover, when courts dismiss cases absent any demonstrated prejudice to a defendant, it is unfair not only to individual complainants but betrays the trust of the community at large. Such dismissals undermine the stated policy of fairness to both sides and the truth-seeking purpose of the criminal justice system, resulting in the public mischief and injustice about which the Court of Appeals warned over 100 years ago. (Hayden v Pierce, 144 NY 512 [1895]). To the extent other trial court decisions have held otherwise, this Court finds they are in direct contravention of the foregoing principles and declines to follow them.
The delayed discovery in this case
Defense counsel's email to the prosecutor on September 8, 2022 resulted in the prosecutor's follow up with the NYPD for the following additional materials and the prompt sharing thereof as soon as they came into her actual possession: remainder of the IDTU video, corrected email address for police officer; accident reports, photos, and IDTU officer license and activity log. Had defense counsel alerted the prosecutor of the potentially missing materials "as soon as practicable," as required by CPL § 245.50 [4][b], the Court is confident the items would have been shared sooner.
The ADA also noted that technical problems thwarted her efforts at full compliance, as well as did the large number of police personnel involved. Technical failure resulting in discovery gaps through no fault of the People will not invalidate a COC where there is reasonable diligence and good faith demonstrated, as the Court finds here. (People v Arefin, CR-008714-20KN [Crim Ct Kings County 2021] [Kitsis, J]). In circumstances where the prosecution is aware of but has not yet obtained automatic discovery, article 245 permits a court to modify the time for discovery or make a finding of exceptional or special circumstances. (§§ 245.50 [3]; 245.70]). Where a defendant challenges the validity of a COC and/or an SOR, or seeks dismissal pursuant to CPL § 30.30, the prosecution's failure to obtain a prior judicial ruling does not prevent the court from making a timing modification or finding of exceptional or special circumstances after the fact. (People v Pealo, 71 Misc.3d 337 [Monroe County Ct 2021]). The Court finds that the short delay in full discovery compliance of the above items here was the result of unique circumstances.
As such, it does not invalidate the validity of the COC and SOR.
Impeachment Material
Defendant asserts that the People failed to provide him with (i) underlying documents for settled litigation; (ii) underlying documents for IAB, CPI and CCRB investigations for police officers Christopher Murphy and Christopher Alvarado.
Initially, the court notes that material which is not imputed to the People's constructive possession but is equally accessible to both sides in a criminal case is outside the scope of the timing requirements of automatic discovery under article 245. The CCRB is not a law enforcement agency, and its records are not imputed to be in either the constructive or actual possession of the People. CCRB records are available to the public via an open database. As such, unless the People are already in possession of any CCRB documents for testifying officers, their disclosure responsibilities do not extend to that agency's records. (People v Altug, 70 Misc.3d 1218 (A) [Crim Ct NY County 2021]; People v Kelly, 71 Misc.3d 1202 (A) [Crim Ct NY County 2021]). The same conclusion is reached regarding underlying documents of lawsuit settlements, as court documents are always accessible to the public unless sealed.
Though the law is unsettled as to the People's obligation to disclose unsubstantiated misconduct allegations investigated by the NYPD IAB, this Court has previously held that they must be shared. However, exonerated or unfounded allegations need not be disclosed. (People v Montgomery, 74 Misc.3d 541 [Sup Ct NY County 2022]; People v Randolph, 69 Misc.3d 770 [Sup Ct Suffolk County 2020]). Nor does either CPL § 245.20[1][k][iv] or the repeal of CRL § 50-a automatically entitle Defendant to the entirety of a police officer's "CPI" or central personnel file, aside from information related to the subject matter of the case which tends to impeach the police witness' credibility. (People v Akhlaq, 71 Misc.3d 823, 826 [Sup Ct NY County 2021]).
The form of disclosure of impeachment material is not specified in the statute and is subject to a wide range of interpretation. Defendants are entitled to detailed information about allegations of misconduct so they can understand the specific nature and degree of the misconduct alleged, determine its relevance to a particular defense, and prepare arguments as to its use on cross-examination at hearing and trial. (People v Castellanos, 72 Misc.3d 371 [Sup Ct Bronx County 2021]). But this court is not prepared to hold that summaries of impeachment material are never permissible and does not find the holding in Matter of Jayson C., 200 A.D.3d 447 [1st Dep't 2021]), to be inconsistent with this determination. Clearly a simple list summarizing disciplinary history without details is insufficient to discharge the People's disclosure obligations. The Court finds persuasive the decision in People v Akhlaq, which held that the sharing of the following type of summaries of misconduct allegations were detailed enough to meet required discovery compliance:
Jayson C. held that CPL § 245.20[1][k][iv] applies to Family Court proceedings, and that providing a mere list of testifying officers' disciplinary history denied the juvenile defendant's right to equal protection of the laws. (200 A.D.3d 447 [1st Dep't 2021]).
Appended to the People's certificate of compliance are documents that contain descriptions of misconduct for each testifying prosecution witness for whom such records exist. That information is culled from Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) files, Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) files, Police Department personnel files, and civil lawsuits. For each such witness, the People provide the officer's name and tax identification number, the date of the allegation, and the source of the information - IAB, CCRB, the personnel file, and/or a civil lawsuit. In addition, they provide a narrative of the allegation, including the precise nature of the misconduct and a general description of the individual who made the allegation. Also provided are the investigative steps taken by the Bureau, Board, or Department. Details regarding the result of any investigation or departmental trial, including punishment meted out, from suspension, to forfeiture of vacation days, to imposition of a command discipline, are also included.(People v Akhlaq, 71 Misc.3d 823, **2 [Sup Ct NY County 2021]). In this case, The Court was not provided with a copy of the shared impeachment material, and so it cannot ascertain whether the People's compliance with § 245.20 [1][k][iv] is complete.Nonetheless, as the law continues to evolve, it is clear to the Court that the People have exercised due diligence in their efforts to obtain the IAB records and acted in good faith on their understanding of the law in providing summaries. To any extent that the shared Giglio material did not include the above information, the People are ordered to disclose additional information.
Based on the prosecutor's described efforts, the rules of statutory construction, the legislative history and intent of article 245, and existing appellate precedent, the Court finds that the People's discovery compliance efforts were diligent, the disclosures were reasonable under the circumstances, and their COC was filed in good faith. No trial date has yet been set for this matter, and Defendant has failed to articulate any prejudice due to the claimed delay and omissions. Therefore, the Court holds that the People's COC and their declaration of trial readiness are valid and timely, and no adverse consequences or sanctions against the People are indicated.
Suppression motions
The Court finds that sufficient grounds have been set forth to raise issues of fact which warrant a hearing on the issues of probable cause to arrest, voluntariness of Defendant's statements, accuracy of the refusal warnings, and admissibility of any prior bad acts or convictions. Defendant's suppression motion is granted only to the extent that a combined Dunaway/Mapp hearing is ordered to be held before trial, as well as a Sandoval/Ventimiglia hearing.
Other motions
Defendant's reservation of rights to file additional motions is also denied subject to CPL § 255.20 [3] for leave to file upon good cause shown.
Conclusion
Defendant's motions to invalidate the People's COC and to dismiss the information on speedy trial grounds is denied. Combined Dunaway/Mapp and Sandoval/Ventimiglia hearings are ordered to be held before trial.
SO ORDERED.