Opinion
3:24-CV-0035 (LEK/ML)
06-11-2024
JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. DANIEL L. SEIDEN, Judge; BINGHAMTON CITY COURT; ADAM WAGE, Assistant District Attorney; BROOME CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; RANDALL STURTZ, Police Officer; and BINGHAMTON POLICE DEP'T, Defendants.
JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, Pro Se
JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, Pro Se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge
The Clerk has sent this pro se Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) together with an amended application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Dkt. No. 7) filed by Jamil Abdul Muhammad (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. For the reasons discussed below, I (1) grant Plaintiff's amended IFP application (Dkt. No. 7), and (2) recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be (1) accepted in part for filing, and (2) dismissed (a) in part with leave to amend, and (b) in part without leave to amend.
I. BACKGROUND
Liberally construed, Plaintiff's Complaint asserts that his rights were violated by Defendants Daniel L. Seiden, Binghamton City Court, Adam Wage, Broome County District Attorney's Office (“Defendant DA”), Randall Sturtz, and Binghamton Police Department (“Defendant BPD”) (collectively “Defendants”), who were involved in New York State criminal charges that were brought against Plaintiff. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.)
The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
The Complaint alleges that on August 23, 2023, Plaintiff was falsely charged with harassment and criminal obstruction of breathing and an order of protection was issued against him. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) The Complaint alleges that after Plaintiff was arrested, he was not read his Miranda rights; he was handcuffed to a steel pole attached to a wall, which caused “tremendous pain” because of Plaintiff's “legal disabili[ies].” (Id.) The Complaint alleges that while handcuffed to the wall pole, Plaintiff urinated himself. (Id.)
The Complaint alleges that before arresting Plaintiff, the investigating officers failed to check the alleged victim-Plaintiff's wife-for bruises, consider her mental health status or mental state, or take into consideration whether she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) The Complaint alleges that the order of protection that was issued at Plaintiff's arraignment rendered him effectively “homeless for 2 months and 21 days while on S.S.I. medical disability until [the criminal] case was dismissed.” (Id.)
The Complaint alleges that “the prosecution attempted on several occasions by phone and closed door meetings to coerce [Plaintiff's] wife . . . to maintain and press charges against [Plaintiff], as she continued to maintain [Plaintiff's] innocence on these matters.” (Id.) Included with the Complaint is an “Affidavit of Truth” by Plaintiff that alleges that Defendant Wage threatened to charge Plaintiff's wife with making a false statement to the police if she did not pursue the criminal charges against Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 1 at 11.) Plaintiff alleges that he studied at Farmingdale State University in Long Island, New York for business administration and that during his studies, he took a course in psychology. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff alleges that “even though [he didn't] obtain a degree in Psychology [he is] very aware of Mental Health and can be if the courts allow [him] to be an expert witness or learned witness in the field of Psychology” about his wife's mental health symptoms and experiences. (Id.)
The Complaint alleges that ultimately, the criminal charges against Plaintiff were dismissed. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.)
Based on these factual allegations, the Complaint appears to assert the following six causes of action: (1) a claim that Defendants maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) a claim that Plaintiff endured cruel and unusual punishment while confined after arrest in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) a claim that Plaintiff was discriminated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (4) a claim that Plaintiff was discriminated against in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (5) a claim that Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 241; and (6) a claim that Defendants violated N.Y. Penal Law § 195.00. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) In addition, the Complaint mentions the Fifth Amendment, Seventh Amendment, and Ninth Amendment as grounds for relief. (Id.)
As relief, Plaintiff seeks $100,000,000.00 in damages from each Defendant. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7-8.) Plaintiff appears to request that criminal and civil violations be imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241 and N.Y. Penal Law § 195.00. (Dkt. No. 1 at 8.)
On March 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Supplement to Complaint.” (Dkt. No. 8.) The Supplement contains 75-pages of documents that appear to have little, if anything, to do with this matter. (See generally Dkt. No. 8.) For example, the Supplement contains, among other things, a copy of Plaintiff's Certificate of Birth (Dkt. No. 8 at 25), a Judgement of Entry of Change of Name from an Ohio State Court in 1993 (id. at 26), print outs from Plaintiff's Fidelity IRA account (id. at 28), a 22-page Monthly Report to Federal Reserve Banks (id. at 37-58), and various United States Code sections (id. at 59-71, 73-75).
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 15(d) “[o]n motion and reasonable notice, the court may . . . permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Plaintiff failed to file a motion to supplement. In addition, the “Supplement” filed by Plaintiff does not relate to events that occurred after the Complaint was filed on January 9, 2024.
Plaintiff also filed an amended application to proceed IFP. (Dkt. No. 7.)
II. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $405, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed IFP status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's amended IFP application (Dkt. No. 7), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's amended application to proceed IFP is granted. (Id.)
The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of IFP status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that section, however, as making IFP status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Plaintiff is reminded that, although his IFP application has been granted, he is still required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF COMPLAINT
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Harkins v. Eldridge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974); see Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (a district court “may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); see also Pflaum v. Town of Stuyvesant, Columbia Cnty., N.Y., 11-CV-0335, 2016 WL 865296, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016) (Suddaby, C.J.) (finding that the Court had the power to address and dismiss additional theories of the plaintiff's retaliation claim sua sponte because those theories were so lacking in arguable merit as to be frivolous).
In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The requirement that a plaintiff “show” that he or she is entitled to relief means that a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 [2007]). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . requires the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense....[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).
“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
IV. ANALYSIS
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that the Complaint be (1) accepted in part for filing, and (2) dismissed (a) in part with leave to amend, and (b) in part without leave to amend.
A. Claims Seeking Criminal Charges
Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241 and N.Y. Penal Law § 195.00 cannot proceed.
There is no private right of action to enforce state or federal criminal statutes. See generally Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”); see also Walker v. CIBC Ltd., 20-CV-1337, 2021 WL 3518439, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2021) (Hummel, M.J.) (“It appears plaintiff is either seeking the criminal prosecution of an individual or individuals or a law enforcement investigation, which is beyond this Court's jurisdiction.”), report-recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 3204860 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 2021) (McAvoy, J.); McFadden v. Ortiz, 12-CV-1244, 2013 WL 1789593, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2013) (D'Agostino, J.) (holding that “there is no private right of action to enforce either state or federal criminal statutes.”).
As a result, I recommend dismissal of Plaintiff's claims that are premised on alleged violations of federal or state criminal laws. See Polinski v. Oneida Cnty. Sheriff, 23-CV-0316, 2023 WL 2988753, *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2023) (Lovric, M.J.) (citing inter alia, Hall v. Sampson, 21-CV-4839, 2022 WL 2068248, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2022) (holding that the plaintiff cannot bring criminal charges against the defendants through a private lawsuit and that claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241 do not give rise to a civil cause of action); Walthour v. Herron, 10-01495, 2010 WL 1877704, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (recognizing no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 241)) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's claims pursuant to the New York State Penal Law and 18 U.S.C. § 241), report and recommendation adopted by, 2023 WL 3344060 (N.D.N.Y. May 10, 2023) (Hurd, J.), appeal dismissed by 2023 WL 8357375 (2d Cir. Oct. 12, 2023).
B. Claims Pursuant to the ADA
The ADA “forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title I of the statute; public services, programs, and activities, which are the subject of Title II; and public accommodations, which are covered by Title III.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516-17 (2004). In addition, “Title V of the ADA, sometimes referred to as the ‘retaliation provision,'” prohibits retaliation against individuals “engaged in activity protected by the ADA.” Griffiths v. Saint Josephs Hosp., 22-CV-0199, 2022 WL 1271533, at *3 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2022) (Dancks, M.J.) (citing Chiesa v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 638 F.Supp.2d 316, 323 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Hurd, J.)), report and recommendation adopted by, 2022 WL 1265761 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2022) (Hurd, J.).
“[T]here is no individual liability under the ADA.” Gomez v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 191 F.Supp.3d 293, 302-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's ADA claim against Defendants Seiden, Wage, and Sturtz, be dismissed with prejudice.
With respect to Plaintiff's ADA claim against Defendants Binghamton City Court, DA, and BPD, I recommend that it be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Based on the facts alleged, Plaintiff could not proceed with a claim under Title I of the ADA, which addresses employment discrimination, because he has not alleged that he was employed by Defendants. 42 U.S.C. § 12117; see Mary Jo C. v. New York State and Local Retirement Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 169 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Title I of the ADA expressly deals with th[e] subject of employment discrimination ....”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Title III of the ADA is “not applicable to public entities” and thus, is inapplicable here where Defendants Binghamton City Court, DA, and BPD are public entities. Morales v. New York, 22 F.Supp.3d 256, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing cases). Moreover, Title IV of the ADA does not appear to be applicable to Plaintiff's claims because Title IV prohibits disability discrimination in telecommunications. See Genco v. Sargent & Collins LLP, No. 18-CV-0107, 2018 WL 3827742, at *3, n.5 (W.D.N.Y. June 4, 2018). Lastly, Title V of the ADA, sometimes referred to as the “retaliation provision,” also does not appear applicable because Plaintiff does not allege that he engaged in activity protected by the ADA, that Defendants were aware of that activity, or any causal connection between the allegedly adverse actions that Defendants took against him and the protected activity. See Chiesa v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 638 F.Supp.2d 316, 323 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Hurd, J.).
To establish a prima facie violation under Title II of the ADA or the RA, a plaintiff must show: “that 1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; 2) [defendants are] entit[ies] subject to the acts; and 3) he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from [defendants'] services, programs, or activities or [defendants] otherwise discriminated against him by reason of his disability.”Rivera v. Quiros, 23-CV-0227, 2024 WL 363193, at *6 (D. Conn. Jan. 31, 2024) (quoting Wright v. New York State Dep't of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016)). There are “three available theories” of discrimination that can be used to establish the third prong of an ADA claim: “(1) intentional discrimination (disparate treatment); (2) disparate impact; and (3) failure to make a reasonable accommodation.” Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2009).
The undersigned finds that although Plaintiff has adequately alleged, at least for purposes of this review, that he is a qualified individual with a disability and Defendants are entities subject to the acts, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead that Defendants “denied [him] the opportunity to participate in or benefit from public services, programs, or activities, or has otherwise discriminated against him, by reason of his disability rather than a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.” Tsuma v. Costello, 22-CV-0067, 2022 WL 1036819, at *8 (D. Conn. Apr. 6, 2022). More specifically, Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. See Franks v. Eckert, 18-CV-0589, 2020 WL 4194137, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. July 21, 2020) (“Although [the p]laintiff has alleged he was denied some of his requested reasonable accommodations, there are no facts in the Amended Complaint to suggest that [the d]efendants refused to allow [the p]laintiff to participate in any program or activity because of his disability”); see also Rosado v. Herard, 12-CV-8943, 2014 WL 1303513, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2014) (dismissing ADA claims where the plaintiff failed to “plead[ ] facts demonstrating that he was denied access to therapeutic group sessions because of a disability”). Instead, Plaintiff asserts that he suffers from physical disabilities, and that he was mistreated by employees of Defendants DA, BPD, and Binghamton City Court, but fails to allege that he was mistreated because of his physical disabilities. See Moran v. Deamelia, 17-CV-0422, 2017 WL 2805160, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2017) (Hummel, M.J.) (“Although [the] defendants may have been aware of [the] plaintiff's alleged disabilities because his underlying discrimination complaint against his former employer filed with the NYSDHR appears to have been based, in part, on his disabilities, he offers not even a scintilla of proof that the alleged misconduct was ‘motivated' by his major depressive disorder and ADHD.”), report and recommendation adopted, 17-CV-0422, 2017 WL 2804941 (N.D.N.Y. June 28, 2017) (McAvoy, J.). Indeed, there are no facts to suggest that Defendants were even aware of his disability. See, e.g., Costabile v. New York Dist. Council of Carpenters, 17-CV-8488, 2018 WL 4300527, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2018) (dismissing the plaintiff's discrimination claim under the ADA because he failed to allege that the defendants were aware of his disability, and, thus, “fail[ed] to plead even a barebones claim of disability discrimination”). Moreover, Plaintiff does not identify what public services, programs, or activities he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from. See Cordero v. Semple, 696 Fed.Appx. 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (affirming the dismissal of an ADA claim because the plaintiff “did not allege that his conditions prevented him from participating in any programs or activities”). It is, therefore, recommended that Plaintiff's ADA claim against Defendants DA, BPD, and Binghamton City Court be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
C. Claims Pursuant to Title VI
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. To state a claim under Title VI, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant discriminated against him on the basis of race, color, or national origin; (2) the discrimination was intentional; and (3) the discrimination was a substantial and motivating factor for the defendant's actions. See Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) (“Title VI itself directly reach[es] only instances of intentional discrimination,” not disparate impact).
“Title VI does not provide for individual liability.” Sherman v. Yonkers Pub. Schs., 21-CV-7317, 2023 WL 137775, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2023) (citing Bayon v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Buffalo, 98-CV-0578, 2001 WL 135817, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2001)). As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's Title VI claim against Defendants Seiden, Wage, and Sturtz, be dismissed with prejudice.
With respect to Plaintiff's Title VI claim against Defendants Binghamton City Court, DA, and BPD, I recommend that it be dismissed because the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of race.
The Complaint alleges that “[a]s an African American [Plaintiff] was faced with [r]acial [d]iscrimination as all black men are violent and [an o]rder of protection was taken out against [him].” (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.)
This sole conclusory allegation-that because Plaintiff is Black, that he must have been discriminated against-fails to plausibly suggest that Plaintiff was discriminated on the basis of race. See Grillo v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 291 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Even if [plaintiff's] highly dubious claim that he was unfairly singled out for punishment by the instructors is credited, [plaintiff] has done little more than cite to his alleged mistreatment and ask the court to conclude that it must have been related to his race.”); Varughese v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 12-CV-8812, 2015 WL 1499618, at *42 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015) (“fallacy” for the plaintiff to conclude: “I belong to a protected class; something bad happened to me at work; therefore, it must have occurred because I belong to a protected class”); Rissman v. Chertoff, 08-CV-7352, 2008 WL 5191394, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2008) (“In essence, plaintiff alleges that because he was yelled at [by his supervisors], this must have been because [of his protected status]. Such conclusory and speculative statements are insufficient.”).
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiffs' Title VI claim against Defendants Binghamton City Court, DA, and BPD be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
D. Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be accepted in part for filing and denied in part.
1. Claims Against Defendant Seiden
Judges are absolutely immune from suit for claims seeking damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before [a] judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “[E]ven allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209. Judicial immunity does not apply when a judge takes action outside his or her judicial capacity, or when a judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles 502 U.S. at 11-12; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). However, “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Plaintiff asserts claims that appear to arise from the efforts of Defendant Seiden, in his capacity as a judge in Binghamton City Court. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Defendant Seiden is therefore immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity. As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Seiden in his individual capacity be dismissed based on the doctrine of judicial immunity.
Moreover, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Seiden in his official capacity be dismissed pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. See Sundwall v. Leuba, 28 Fed.Appx. 11, 12 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing K & A Radiologic Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Health, 189 F.3d 273, 278 (2d Cir. 1999)) (holding that “state officers, if sued in their official capacities, are immunized from suit by private citizens under the Eleventh Amendment.”); King v. New York State, 23-CV-3421, 2023 WL 5625440, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2023) (citing Thomas v. Martin-Gibbons, 857 Fed.Appx. 36, 37 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of pro se Section 1983 claims against the State of New York and a state court judge in his official capacity based on Eleventh Amendment immunity)) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state officials acting in their official capacities, including state court judges.”); Aron v. Becker, 48 F.Supp.3d 347, 366-67 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (McAvoy, J.) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims against a state court judge in his official capacity based on the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
2. Claims Against Defendant Binghamton City Court
New York State is immune from suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking either legal or equitable relief, under the Eleventh Amendment. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984); see Ognibene v. Niagara Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 03-CV-0678, 2003 WL 24243989, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2003) (“To the extent the plaintiff names various state courts as defendants and seeks either legal or equitable relief against them under § 1983, they are immune from such suit under the Eleventh Amendment.”). As an agency or arm of the State of New York, Defendant Binghamton City Court is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Bonilla v. Connerton, 15-CV-1276, 2016 WL 2765287, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016) (Peebles, M.J.) (recommending dismissal of the claims to the extent that they seek monetary damages against the “Binghamton City Court” as barred by the Eleventh Amendment), report and recommendation adopted by, 2016 WL 2760373 (N.D.N.Y. May 12, 2016) (Kahn, J.); see also Mercado v. Town of Goshen, 20-CV-5399, 2020 WL 5210949, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2020) (“Plaintiff sues the ‘Orange County Court,' which is part of the New York State Unified Court System. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against this Defendant under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity and because these claims are frivolous.”); Curto v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 07-CV-529S, 2008 WL 11357852, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2008) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims against the “New York State Unified Court System, 8th Judicial District Buffalo City Court” as barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Saint-Fleur v. City of New York, 99-CV-10433, 2000 WL 280328, *2 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 14, 2000) (collecting cases) (“State courts, as arms of the State, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.”); Fields v. Walthers, 94-CV-1659, 1997 WL 204308 at *2 (N.D.N.Y. April 5, 1997) (Pooler, J.) (“For Eleventh Amendment purposes, governmental entities of the state that are considered ‘arms of the state' receive Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).
3. Claims Against Defendant Wage
To the extent that the Complaint is construed against Defendant Wage in his official capacity, I recommend that it be dismissed based on the doctrine of immunity set forth in the Eleventh Amendment. A claim against Defendant Wage in his official capacity is essentially a claim against Defendant DA. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir. 2007)(“An official capacity suit against a public servant is treated as one against the governmental entity itself.”). For the reasons set forth below in Part IV.D.4., I find that Defendant Wage, in his official capacity, is immune from a suit for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus, recommend dismissal.
To the extent that the Complaint is construed against Defendant Wage in his individual capacity, I recommend that it be accepted in part for filing and dismissed in part for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
a. Malicious Prosecution
To prove a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) that the defendant initiated a prosecution against the plaintiff, (2) that the defendant lacked probable cause to believe the proceeding could succeed, (3) that the defendant acted with malice, and (4) that the prosecution was terminated in the plaintiff's favor.” Posr v. Court Officer Shield # 207, 180 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Out of an abundance of caution, mindful of the Second Circuit's instruction that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be liberally construed, see, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191, and without expressing an opinion as to whether Plaintiff can withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, I recommend that a response be required to Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment against Defendant Wage in his individual capacity.
b. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
“The Eighth Amendment protects against cruel and unusual punishment. These protections of the Eighth Amendment only apply to a person who has been criminally convicted and sentenced; they do not apply to the conduct of police officers in connection with the investigation and arrest of suspects prior to conviction and sentencing.” Spicer v. Burden, 564 F.Supp.3d 22, 31-32 (D. Conn. 2021). Hence, “[a] pretrial detainee's claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement are governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).
Here, the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant Wage was involved in the conditions of Plaintiff's confinement. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) The Complaint alleges that after arrest Plaintiff was subject to unsatisfactory conditions of confinement and Defendant Wage become involved with Plaintiff's criminal charges at the time of arraignment. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Based on the allegations contained in the Complaint, upon Defendant Wage's involvement with Plaintiff, he was no longer incarcerated. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7 [alleging that Plaintiff was essentially “homeless the entire time totaling 2 months and 21 days.”].) Hence, the Complaint fails to allege the personal involvement of Defendant Wage in the allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's cruel and unusual punishment claim against Defendant Wage in his individual capacity be dismissed.
4. Claims Against Defendant DA
To the extent Plaintiff seeks money damages against Defendant DA, those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Drawhorne v. Aloise, 23-CV-1278, 2023 WL 8188396, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2023) (Dancks, M.J.) (citing Best v. Brown, 19-CV-3724, 2019 WL 3067118, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 2019) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim against the Office of the Queens County District Attorney as barred by the Eleventh Amendment); D'Alessandro v. City of New York, 713 Fed.Appx. 1, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]f a district attorney or an assistant district attorney acts as a prosecutor, she is an agent of the state, and therefore immune from suit in her official capacity.”); Rich v. New York, 21-CV-3835, 2022 WL 992885, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (“[A]ny claims Plaintiff may raise against the DA Defendants in their ‘official capacity' would be precluded by immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”); Gentry v. New York, 21-CV-0319, 2021 WL 3037709, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 14, 2021) (Lovric, M.J.) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant assistant district attorneys in their official capacities-which were effectively claims against the State of New York-as barred by the Eleventh Amendment) adopted by, 2021 WL 3032691 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2021) (Suddaby, C.J.)). Therefore, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Defendant DA be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); Drawhorne, 2023 WL 8188396, at *3.
5. Claims Against Defendant Sturtz
“Dismissal is appropriate where a defendant is listed in the caption, but the body of the complaint fails to indicate what the defendant did to the plaintiff.” Cipriani v. Buffardi, 06-CV-0889, 2007 WL 607341, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007) (Kahn, J.) (citing Gonzalez v. City of New York, 97-CV-2246, 1998 WL 382055, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1998)); see also Crown v. Wagenstein, 96-CV-3895, 1998 WL 118169, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1998) (mere inclusion of warden's name in complaint insufficient to allege personal involvement); Taylor v. City of New York, 953 F.Supp. 95, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same).
The Complaint names Sturtz as a defendant, but the body lacks any allegations of wrongdoing by this individual. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) As a result, I recommend that the claims against Defendant Sturtz be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
6. Claims Against Defendant BPD
Defendant BPD is merely a department of a municipality, and thus, is not amenable to suit. See White v. Syracuse Police Dep't, 18-CV-1471, 2019 WL 981850, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2019) (Peebles, M.J.) (citing Krug v. Cnty. of Rennselaer, 559 F.Supp.2d 223, 247 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J.); Turczyn ex rel. McGregor v. City of Utica, 13-CV-1357, 2014 WL 6685476, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2014) (Sharpe, J.); Hoisington v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 55 F.Supp.2d 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Under New York law, a department of a municipal entity is merely a subdivision of the municipality and has no separate legal existence. Therefore, municipal departments like the Department of Social Services are not amenable to suit and no claims lie directly against the Department.”)) (“Although a municipality is subject to suit pursuant to section 1983, see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), a municipal . . . department does not have the capacity to be sued as an entity separate from the municipality in which it is located.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 974824 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2019) (Suddaby, C.J.). As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant BPD be dismissed because it is not an entity amenable to suit.
Even if Plaintiff's claims against Defendant BPD were liberally construed as against the City of Binghamton, I would recommend that they be dismissed. There is no basis for municipal liability alleged in the Complaint. Plaintiff essentially complains of a discrete incident, during which an officer or individual employed by Defendant BPD did not act properly. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) There is no indication that Plaintiff can assert a policy or custom which would support municipal liability based on these facts. In addition, none of Plaintiff's allegations reflect a failure to train or “deliberate indifference” to the rights of persons who would come into contact with employees of the City of Binghamton.
E. Additional Legal Grounds Listed
The Complaint also mentions the Fifth Amendment, Seventh Amendment, and Ninth Amendment. Based on my review, the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting any claims pursuant to these legal bases.
“The Fifth Amendment protects against compulsory self-incrimination by forbidding the introduction of coerced statements into evidence at trial.” Harris v. Doe, 24-CV-0151, 2024 WL 1344697, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2024). Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required and instead, were developed as a means to protect the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. Harris, 2024 WL 1344687, at *3. “Although failure to give Miranda warnings may be reason to preclude evidence against a defendant at a criminal trial, ‘the failure to give Miranda warnings does not create liability under § 1983.'” Spicer v. Burden, 564 F.Supp.3d 22, 30 (D. Conn. 2021) (quoting Neighbour v. Covert, 68 F.3d 1508, 1510 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam)); see Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment only forbids introduction of coerced statements at trial, so failure to provide Miranda warnings does not violate suspect's constitutional rights and “cannot be grounds for a § 1983 action”).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The Seventh Amendment preserves “the right to trial by jury” for certain cases brought in federal court. U.S. Const. amend. VII. Since the federal judiciary determines the extent to which a litigant in federal court may try his or her case before a jury, see e.g., Messa v. Goord, 652 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2011), persons acting under the color of state law (i.e., those persons who may be named as defendants in a § 1983 action) generally lack the capacity to violate the Seventh Amendment. See Kampfer v. Argotsinger, 18-CV-0007, 2020 WL 906274 at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2020) (The Seventh Amendment does not “provide a [. . .] cause of action cognizable under § 1983.” (citation and quotation omitted)). As a result, I recommend that “‘Plaintiff's citation to the Seventh Amendment [be construed] as support for h[is] request for a civil jury trial,' rather than as an independent basis for relief.” Kampfer, 2020 WL 906274, at *10 (citing White v. City of New York, 13-CV-7156, 2014 WL 4357466, at *8 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2014)).
“The Ninth Amendment cannot serve as the basis for a § 1983 claim.” Rodriguez v. Burnett, 22-CV-10056, 2024 WL 1466880, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2024) (citing Lloyd v. Lee, 570 F.Supp.2d 556, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).
See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim”-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.
Here, better pleading could not cure the deficiencies described above with respect to the following claims: (1) malicious prosecution claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Seiden, Binghamton City Court, Wage in his official capacity, DA, and BPD; (2) conditions of confinement claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Seiden, Binghamton City Court, Wage in his official capacity, DA, and BPD; (3) ADA claim against Defendants Seiden, Wage, and Sturtz; (4) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act claim against Defendants Seiden, Wage, and Sturtz; and (5) claims pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 195.00 and 18 U.S.C. § 241. As a result, I recommend that those claims be dismissed without leave to replead.
Out of an abundance of caution and in deference to Plaintiff's pro se status, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend the following claims to cure the defects as stated above: (1) malicious prosecution claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Sturtz; (2) conditions of confinement claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Wage in his individual capacity and Defendant Sturtz; (3) ADA claim against Defendants DA, BPD, and Binghamton City Court; and (4) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act claim against Defendants DA, BPD, and Binghamton City Court.
If Plaintiff chooses to avail himself of an opportunity to amend, such amended pleading must set forth a short and plain statement of the facts on which he relies to support any legal claims asserted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). In addition, the amended complaint must include allegations reflecting how the individual(s) named as Defendant(s) are involved in the allegedly unlawful activity. Finally, Plaintiff is informed that any amended complaint will replace the existing Complaint, and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original, and renders it of no legal effect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's amended IFP application (Dkt. No. 7) is GRANTED; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court ACCEPT FOR FILING the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) to the extent that it asserts a malicious prosecution claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Wage in his individual capacity; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) to the extent that it asserts the following claims: (1) malicious prosecution claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Sturtz; (2) conditions of confinement claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against (a) Defendant Wage in his individual capacity, and (b) Defendant Sturtz; (3) ADA claim against Defendants DA, BPD, and Binghamton City Court; (4) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act claim against Defendants DA, BPD, and Binghamton City Court, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) to the extent that it asserts the following claims: (1) malicious prosecution claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Seiden, Binghamton City Court, Wage in his official capacity, DA, and BPD; (2) conditions of confinement claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Seiden, Binghamton City Court, Wage in his official capacity, DA, and BPD; (3) ADA claim against Defendants Seiden, Wage, and Sturtz; (4) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act claim against Defendants Seiden, Wage, and Sturtz; and (5) claims pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 195.00 and 18 U.S.C. § 241, because it seeks relief from individuals who are immune from such relief, and is otherwise frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report.[] Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).