Opinion
6:23-cv-01278-TJM-TWD
11-27-2023
KEVIN DRAWHORNE, Plaintiff, v. M. ALOISE et al., Defendants.
KEVIN DRAWHORNE, Marcy Correctional Facility.
KEVIN DRAWHORNE, Marcy Correctional Facility.
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a complaint submitted by pro se plaintiff Kevin Drawhorne (“Plaintiff”) alleging M. Aloise, Melinda Katz, Commissioner Davis, and The People of the State of New York violated his civil rights. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff, who is currently in the custody of New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) at Marcy Correctional Facility in Marcy, New York, has not paid the filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 2.)
II. IFP APPLICATION
“28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in a federal court without prepayment of the filing fee that would ordinarily be charged.” Cash v. Bernstein, No. 09-CV-1922, 2010 WL 5185047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010). “Although an indigent, incarcerated individual need not prepay the filing fee at the time of filing, he must subsequently pay the fee, to the extent he is able to do so, through periodic withdrawals from his inmate accounts.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) and Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 2010)).
Upon review, Plaintiff's IFP application demonstrates economic need. (Dkt. No. 2.) Because Plaintiff has met the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and has filed the inmate authorization form required in this District, he is granted permission to proceed IFP. (Dkt. Nos. 2, 3.)
III. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action against Melinda Katz, M. Aloise, Commissioner Davis, and The People of the State of New York on October 13, 2023. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Court takes judicial notice Melinda Katz is the District Attorney of Queens County and M. Aloise is a judge in the New York Supreme Court 11th Judicial District in Queens County, New York.
DA Melinda Katz, https://queensda.org/team/da-katz/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2023).
Michael Aloise, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/MichaelAloise (last visited Nov. 27, 2023).
Plaintiff has filed a threadbare complaint devoid of details. Plaintiff claims on January 5, 2023, Judge Aloise “violated” his rights “throughout the court proceedings.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) He further alleges he was deprived “from [h]aving good counsel and being full[y] able to crossexamine [his] defendant(s).” Id. Moreover, he “was never able to see [his] discovery nor attend [his] grand Jury.” Id. Plaintiff claims he was “fully coerced” into taking a plea and never given a chance to create “a good defense.” Id. According to Plaintiff, his attorney was “aware of all violations and still never objected to it.” Id. Finally, DA Katz “acted out of color by stating wrongful facts of the case.” Id. On February 23, 2023, Plaintiff's motions for a hardship hearing and to defer surcharges were denied. Id.
Plaintiff's first claim states on April 4, 2022, DA Katz violated his Fourteenth, Eighth, and Second Amendment rights by “not allowing” Plaintiff to testify at the Grand Jury, speak freely in court, and “not able to make a defense.” Id. at 5.
Plaintiff's second claim states Judge Aloise would not allow Plaintiff to obtain new counsel. Id. He then states he was coerced into making a plea, but it is unclear if he is alleging Judge Aloise, DA Katz, or both coerced him into doing so. Id.
Plaintiff's third claim states The People of the State of New York violated Plaintiff's rights by “not allowing [him] to be [] able to build a defense in his case” that he could “fight.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff requests $15 million for violations of his constitutional rights, including “due process,” “unlawfully imprisonment,” “duress,” mental anguish, and pain and suffering. Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
The Court shall dismiss a complaint in a civil action if the Court determines it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) “To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. Cty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993).
Moreover, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
B. The People of the State of New York
To the extent Plaintiff seeks money damages against The People of the State of New York, which the Court construes as claims against the Queens County District Attorney's Office, those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Best v. Brown, No. 19-CV-3724, 2019 WL 3067118, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 2019) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim against the Office of the Queens County District Attorney as barred by the Eleventh Amendment); see also D'Alessandro v. City of New York, 713 Fed.Appx. 1, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]f a district attorney or an assistant district attorney acts as a prosecutor, she is an agent of the state, and therefore immune from suit in her official capacity.”); Rich v. New York, No. 21-CV-3835, 2022 WL 992885, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (“[A]ny claims Plaintiff may raise against the DA Defendants in their ‘official capacity' would be precluded by immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”); Gentry v. New York, No. 21-CV-0319 (GTS/ML), 2021 WL 3037709, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 14, 2021) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant assistant district attorneys in their official capacities-which were effectively claims against the State of New York-as barred by the Eleventh Amendment) adopted by, 2021 WL 3032691 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2021). Therefore, the Court recommends Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against The People of the State of New York be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A.
C. Commissioner Davis
“The standard set forth in Twombly and affirmed in Iqbal requires more than mere conclusory statements; rather, it demands sufficient factual allegations against a defendant to reasonably lead to the discovery of illegal conduct.” Johnson v. Gonzalez, No. 9:14-CV-0745 LEK/CFH, 2015 WL 1179384, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2015) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56). “It is well-settled that ‘where the complaint names a defendant in the caption but contains no allegations indicating how the defendant violated the law or injured the plaintiff, a motion to dismiss the complaint in regard to that defendant should be granted.'” Dove v. Fordham Univ., 56 F.Supp.2d 330, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citation omitted).
The Court notes Plaintiff lists Commissioner Davis as a defendant in the caption of his complaint but fails to assert any allegations against him or her. Id. at 1, 3; see Johnson, 2015 WL 1179384, at *6; Jaffer v. Chemical Bank, No. 93-CV-8459, 1994 WL 392260, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 1994) (holding “[w]hen a complaint's caption names a defendant but the complaint does not indicate that the named party injured the plaintiff or violated the law, the motion to dismiss must be granted”); Serrano v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, No. 12-CV-1592, 2013 WL 6816787, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims against two defendants who were listed as parties in the complaint and in the caption, but not elsewhere in the complaint).
Therefore, the undersigned recommends dismissing the claims against Commissioner Davis without prejudice.
D. DA Katz
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue DA Katz, she is likely protected by prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors are immune from civil suit for damages in their individual capacities for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 (“[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.”). In addition, prosecutors are immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009).
While the Court recognizes the issue of venue as it relates to claims against DA Katz and Judge Aloise arising out of Plaintiff's criminal proceedings in Queens, New York, a transfer of those claims would be futile. See Robinson v. New York State Corr., No. 9:19-CV-1437 (DNH/TWD), 2020 WL 1703669, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2020).
In short, absolute prosecutorial immunity covers “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). This includes “the decision to bring charges against a defendant, presenting evidence to a grand jury, and the evaluation of evidence prior to trial.” Moye v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 316, 2012 WL 2569085, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Immunity even extends to the falsification of evidence and the coercion of witnesses, the knowing use of perjured testimony, the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information, the making of false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings, and conspiring to present false evidence at a criminal trial. See Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1981); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.34; Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 (1991); Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994).
Moreover, “‘[w]hen prosecuting a criminal matter, a district attorney in New York State, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, represents the State not the county.'” Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 536 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1014 (1989)); see also Rich, 2022 WL 992885, at *5 n.4 (“[A]ny claims Plaintiff may raise against the [District Attorney] Defendants in their ‘official capacity' would be precluded by immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”); Gentry, 2021 WL 3037709, at *6 (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant assistant district attorneys in their official capacities-which were effectively claims against the State of New York-as barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
Plaintiff's threadbare allegations in the complaint do not clarify the context of his claims. For instance, Plaintiff complains DA Katz violated his Fourteenth, Eighth, and Second Amendment rights by not allowing him to testify at the Grand Jury, speak freely in court, or make a defense. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) He also appears to allege DA Katz coerced him into taking “a Bid.” Id. Nevertheless, Plaintiff appears to complain DA Katz violated his rights while performing her official duties as a prosecutor. Simon, 727 F.3d at 171. Because Plaintiff's allegations against DA Katz relate to non-investigative actions she has taken in her official capacity as a prosecutor, she is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Simon, 727 F.3d at 171; see, e.g., Matthews v. Cty. of Cayuga, No. 5:17-CV-1004 (MAD/TWD), 2018 WL 2926272, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 8, 2018) (dismissing claims against prosecutor on initial review because of prosecutorial immunity). Thus, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against DA Katz fail as a matter of law.
Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against DA Katz be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A.
E. Judge Aloise
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue Judge Aloise, judges are immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). This is true however erroneous an act may have been, and however injurious its consequences were to the plaintiff. Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”). This immunity applies to state court judges who are sued in federal court pursuant to Section 1983. Pizzolato v. Baer, 551 F.Supp. 355, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Pizzolato v. City of New York, 742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983).
Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). The only two circumstances in which judicial immunity does not apply is when he or she acts “outside” his or her judicial capacity and when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. Again, while not entirely clear, to the extent Plaintiff complains of any wrongdoing related to a criminal proceeding, Judge Aloise would be entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Judge Aloise be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED; and it is further
Plaintiff should note that although his IFP application has been granted, he will still be required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims against Commissioner Davis be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims against The People of the State of New York, DA Katz, and Judge Aloise be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and ReportRecommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).