Opinion
HHDCV156061558S
07-28-2016
Merland McKnight aka M. Robert McKnight v. Old Ship of Zion Missionary Baptist Church et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Nina F. Elgo, J.
Before this court is a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Progressive Community Baptist Church (Progressive), who is being sued by the plaintiff, Merland McKnight aka M. Robert McKnight (McKnight). The plaintiff was previously employed as a minister with Old Ship of Zion Missionary Baptist Church, which had dissolved and was reincorporated as Progressive. Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-72 and § § 52-552e and 52-552f, the plaintiff seeks lost wages and benefits which he claims the defendant has wrongfully withheld. The defendant's motion to dismiss is premised upon the claim that the ministerial exception under the first amendment of the United States constitution deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff argues that the ministerial exception does not apply in this case and thus the court has jurisdiction to hear this case. By order of this court, the parties submitted briefs to address, pursuant to footnote four in the United States Supreme Court's decision of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012), whether or not the ministerial exception implicates subject matter jurisdiction and if so, whether these issues must be addressed via a motion for summary judgment, as opposed to a motion to dismiss. Having reviewed the briefs of the parties and the relevant case law, this court concludes that, irrespective of the substantive merits of the defendant's ministerial exception claim, it does have subject matter jurisdiction and denies the motion to dismiss.
" A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007).
" When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
" Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). " Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531-32, 46 A.3d 102 (2012). " [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). " Once the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before [the court] can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n.6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003). " It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Novak v. Levin, 287 Conn. 71, 79, 951 A.2d 514 (2008).
The origins of the ministerial exception are derived from the first amendment of our United States constitution which provides in relevant part that " Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., supra, 132 S.Ct. 702; U.S. Const., amend. I. " The establishment clause prevents the government from appointing ministers, and the free exercise clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own." Id., 703. In recent years, litigation of child sexual abuse claims as well as employment and employment discrimination claims in the context of religious institutions has spawned a body of federal and state jurisprudence wrestling with this doctrine. See e.g. Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 23 A.3d 1192 (2011); Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, 120 Conn.App. 666, 994 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 901, 3 A.3d 74 (2010); Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 98 Conn.App. 646, 911 A.2d 319 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911, 916 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 886, 128 S.Ct. 206, 169 L.Ed.2d 144 (2007); Givens v. St. Adalbert Church, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-12-6032459-S (July 25, 2013, Sheridan, J.) (56 Conn.L.Rptr. 585, ); Doe No. 2 v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X07-CV-12-5036425-S (July 8, 2013, Dubay, J.) (56 Conn.L.Rptr. 460, ); Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 1994); Patsakis v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 339 F.Supp.2d 689 (W.D.Pa. 2004); Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 463 Mass. 472, 975 N.E.2d 433 (2012).
With respect to their arguments on the motion to dismiss, both parties rely on Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 301 Conn. 759; and the United States Supreme Court decision Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra, 132 S.Ct. 694. In Hosanna-Tabor, the court defined the parameters for determining whether an employee of a religious institution, whose responsibilities may include ministerial aspects, may be barred from bringing an employment discrimination action against her employer. Determining that the plaintiff, a parochial school teacher and commissioned minister, was a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception and that her employment discrimination action was thus barred, the court also specifically expressed " no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits." Id., 710.
In this case, because this matter deals with the undisputed fact that he is a minister, the defendant insists that the court's holding in Hosanna-Tabor dictates that the action is barred and should be dismissed because this court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. In contrast, the plaintiff points to the language in Hosanna-Tabor in which the court refrained from addressing whether other types of lawsuits, like this action making a claim for wages and benefits, are similarly barred. The plaintiff further argues that the determination of whether the plaintiff's wages and benefits have been wrongfully withheld simply does not implicate the type of entanglement concerns identified by the court in employment discrimination cases such as Hosanna-Tabor .
Following its review of Hosanna-Tabor, this court determined that our U.S. Supreme Court had already spoken on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction relative to the ministerial exception. Acknowledging a split of authority in the Courts of Appeal, the court plainly stated: " [w]e conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar. That is because the issue presented by the exception is 'whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief, ' not whether the court has 'power to hear [the] case.'" Id., 709 n.4. Mindful that this court must indulge every presumption in favor of jurisdiction, this court specifically ordered that the parties address whether or not footnote four of the Hosanna-Tabor decision required that this court find that it has subject matter jurisdiction. If so, the court would be unable to dismiss the action even if the defendant's analysis of the underlying issue is correct.
In its brief to the court, the defendant insists that this court is not bound by the Supreme Court's commentary and points to Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 301 Conn. 769, which observed that " [w]hen the ministerial exception applies, it provides the defendant with immunity from suit and deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In its own footnote fourteen, however, the Dayner Court also acknowledged the split of authority among the federal courts and even cited to the debate among academics as to whether the issue implicates jurisdiction or must be raised as an affirmative defense. The difficulty with the latter, as noted by Dayner, is that " the very act of litigating a dispute that is subject to the ministerial exception would result in the entanglement of the civil justice system with matters of religious policy, making the discovery and trial process itself a first amendment violation." Id., 770-71. In citing Dayner, the defendant argues that this court is bound by Connecticut law since our state is free to grant greater protections than is afforded by the United States constitution. Dayner, however, does not stand for that proposition. In fact, the Dayner court interpreted the ministerial exception doctrine within the context of the first amendment of the United States constitution and duly considered federal and state authority interpreting it, including the Hosanna-Tabor case and the fact that it was currently before the United States Supreme Court upon the granting of its petition for certiorari. Moreover, the Dayner court's reference in footnote fourteen to the split of authority as to subject matter jurisdiction operates as a caveat and acknowledgement that the issue is far from settled.
In subscribing to the view that the ministerial exception is subject matter jurisdictional in nature, the court in Dayner acknowledged the split among federal courts as to whether the ministerial exception is a jurisdictional bar or a defense on the merits. See Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 301 Conn. 770 n.14. The court also noted that " the United States Supreme Court recently granted the defendant's petition for certiorari to appeal from the Sixth Circuit's decision in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School, [597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 565 U.S. 171, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012), ] to resolve a circuit split as to the application of the primary duties test to nonordained employees." Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 301 Conn. 778 n.19; see also id., 770 n.14 and accompanying text.
The only authority the defendant cites in its reference to this theory does not reference the ministerial exception doctrine. For example, the defendant points to State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 594 A.2d 917 (1991), and Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977), which address provisions of our state constitution, which has only been vaguely referenced in the defendant's supplemental brief to this court.
The only Connecticut case since Hosanna-Tabor that has even touched on the issue is Buscetto v. Saint Bernard High School, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-11-6011089 (July 25, 2014, Devine, J.) (58 Conn.L.Rptr. 764, ). In that case, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the related--but distinct--excessive entanglement doctrine. Relying on footnote four, the plaintiff countered that the defendant's excessive entanglement claim involved the ministerial exception, which operates as an affirmative defense. The court rejected this argument, but did so because, " although the plaintiff argued that the ministerial exception is properly pleaded only as an affirmative defense, the defendant has not explicitly raised the ministerial exception but has only argued that excessive entanglement bars the court's inquiry." Id., 773, . Moreover, while two other Superior Court cases were decided after Hosanna-Tabor, the courts stated that the exception implicates subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Dayner; there was no discussion of footnote four and the argument did not appear to be before the court. See Givens v. St. Adalbert Church, supra, 56 Conn.L.Rptr. 585, at *2; Doe No. 2 v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 56 Conn.L.Rptr. 460, at *7. Thus, the defendant's reliance on these cases as persuasive authority to find lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this case is without merit.
In addition, other state court jurisdictions which have squarely addressed the issue have ruled that they were bound by footnote four of Hosanna-Tabor . For example, in concluding that the ministerial exception was a jurisdictional bar, our Supreme Court in Dayner cited to only two state court decisions, one of which was Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, 436 Mass. 574, 766 N.E.2d 820 (2002). See Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 301 Conn. 769-70. In Williams, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that, under the Massachusetts rules of practice, the ministerial exception was properly raised in a motion to dismiss because it implicated jurisdiction. See Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, supra, 436 Mass. 577 n.2. After Hosanna-Tabor, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court revisited this issue in Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination; supra, 463 Mass. 472; and held that, " [t]o the extent that we had held under the [f]irst [a]mendment that courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to decide employment disputes involving a minister and a church, the [c]ourt's decision in Hosanna-Tabor overruled that holding." Id., 478.
The Texas Court of Appeals also considered itself bound by the Hosanna-Tabor court's statement that the ministerial exception does not implicate jurisdiction. Citing footnote four, the court stated that " [t]he [c]hurch moved only on the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional bar and did not move for summary judgment as to this affirmative defense. Accordingly, the trial court erred to the extent that it concluded it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over [the plaintiff's] claims under the ministerial exception." Shannon v. Memorial Drive Presbyterian Church U.S., 476 S.W.3d 612, 625 (Tex.App. 2015, cert. denied). The Kentucky Supreme Court similarly relied on footnote four to hold that the ministerial exception was not jurisdictional, and explained that, in practice, the exception operated similarly to the qualified immunity doctrine. See Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 607-09 (2014).
Finally this court is not persuaded that the court's declaration in Hosanna-Tabor that the ministerial exception is not a jurisdictional bar to a cause of action implicates only federal civil rules of procedure. In observing that the application of the exception determines " whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief, not whether the court has power to hear [the] case, " the Court characterizes the essence and substantive nature of the claim.
For all the foregoing reasons, this court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction and denies the motion to dismiss.