Opinion
X04HHDCV126032459S
12-15-2016
Mary Givens v. St. Adalbert Church et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY NORWICH ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESAN CORPORATION (#257)
David M. Sheridan, J.
The defendant Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation has moved for summary judgment as to all counts against it, asserting that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because 1) it did not owe a legal duty to the plaintiff, and 2) because the plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
The parties were heard at argument on June 6, 2010 and have agreed to grant the court an extension of time within which to decide the motion. This matter is scheduled to commence jury selection on March 21, 2017, and presentation of evidence on April 18, 2017. Familiarity with the facts, legal authority and arguments made by the parties is presumed and, in the interests of expediting this decision, will not be generally repeated.
Specifically, as to the absence of a legal duty, the defendant makes two arguments.
First, the defendant contends that there is no admissible evidence to support an inference that the Norwich Diocese knew of Father Ramsay's alleged propensity for sexual misconduct. Only those facts and documents as would be admissible in evidence at trial may be considered by a court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See Nash v. Stevens, 144 Conn.App. 1, 15, 71 A.3d 635, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 915, 76 A.3d 628 (2013). The defendant contests the admissibility Exhibit 2 to the plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment (an " addendum" page from an August 1973 letter written by Father Ramsay, produced from the records of the defendant Diocese, and marked as " Diocese 168"), arguing that it is inadmissible hearsay to which no exception applies.
Although Exhibit 2 may be a hearsay document, it is nevertheless within the court's discretion at trial to admit the document under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. " A statement that is not admissible under any of the foregoing exceptions is admissible if the court determines that (1) there is a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement, and (2) the statement is supported by equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability that are essential to other evidence admitted under traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule." Conn. Code Evid. 8-9.
" Reasonable necessity" is established by showing that " unless the hearsay statement is admitted, the facts it contains may be lost, either because the declarant is dead or otherwise unavailable, or because the assertion is of such a nature that evidence of the same value cannot be obtained from the same or other sources." State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 665, 491 A.2d 345, 354 (1985). Clearly, Father Ramsay's death and the passage of time have rendered the use of the hearsay statement reasonably necessary. The arguments of the parties do not suggest that comparable evidence may be secured from other sources. Therefore, the court must consider whether the statement had the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability.
Several aspects of this statement lend support to its reliability. It is a writing, made at or very near the time of the events in question, by a declarant with personal knowledge of the events described therein. To some degree, statements within the document are against the declarant's interest. In recognition of this, the declarant wrote the " addendum" to the recipient with the desire that it be shared with his employer only " if the subject came up." In the document, the declarant consciously admits that he has knowingly disobeyed an express prohibition of his employer (and tries to rationalize that disobedience), which he now fears will lead to severe disciplinary consequences. Under those circumstances, it is unlikely that the declarant would have any motive to fabricate the central fact underlying the communication, i.e., that his employer had expressly forbidden him from traveling overseas in the company of two minors.
For these reasons, the court concludes that Exhibit 2 to the plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment would be admissible at trial under the residual hearsay exception and may be considered in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. That exhibit presents the following facts: In July and August of 1973, circumstances arose that caused the Vicar General of the Norwich Diocese, Paul St. Onge, to forbid Father Ramsay from traveling to Scotland with two unaccompanied male minors. One was apparently a former altar boy; another was a child of Ramsay's cousin. Despite the directive, Ramsay took the trip with the two minors. Upon his return, he was apparently met with extreme disapproval by the Vicar General and the Bishop. He wrote to a fellow priest and expressed a fear of being " canned" over the incident, denied that anything " reprehensible" had occurred, and accused the Vicar General that insinuated that " evil took place" of having a " dirty mind."
This evidence is sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether the Norwich Diocese knew of Father Ramsay's alleged propensity for inappropriate conduct with minors. A jury could reasonably infer that the Vicar General's prohibition against unaccompanied travel with minors arose, in some degree, from a concern about the potential for sexual misconduct with those minors.
The defendant's second argument as to legal duty is that there is no evidence that would show that the Norwich Diocese was Father Ramsay's supervisor, employer, or master while he taught at St. Adalbert Church. Absent evidence of knowledge and control, there can be no duty under either § 317 or 302B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: " A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them; if (a) the servant (i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or (ii) is using a chattel of the master; and (b) the master (i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and (ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control." 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317, p. 125 (1965).
In August of 1977, Father Ramsay was considering retirement. In response to questions raised by Father Ramsay about his retirement, Rev. Thomas R. Bride, Chancellor of the Norwich Diocese, wrote to Father Ramsay that there would be " no problem for ministry in one of your classmate's parish . . . also no problem in tentatively committing yourself to a teaching program now." The evidence suggests that the Diocese continued to exercise some degree of control over the activities of Father Ramsay, even after the date of his " retirement."
The fact of Father Ramsay's seeking and obtaining permission to begin a " teaching program" in another parish, coupled with the degree of control--however slight--that the Diocese continued to exert over Father Ramsay after leaving active employment, is sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether the Norwich Diocese was Father Ramsay's supervisor, employer, or master while he taught at St. Adalbert Church.
These are triable issues of fact that must be decided by the jury and are sufficient to preclude the entry of summary judgment based upon the absence of a legal duty to the plaintiff.
The defendant also argues that the plaintiff's claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations in either C.G.S. § 52-584 and/or C.G.S. § 52-577. The court is not persuaded. The applicable statute of limitations in this matter is C.G.S. § 52-577d. That statute provides: " Notwithstanding the provisions of section 52-577, no action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor, including emotional distress, caused by sexual assault may be brought by such person later than thirty years from the date such person attains the age of majority." It is undisputed that the plaintiff reached the age of majority on August 10, 1982. This action was commended by service of process on June 4, 2012. The plaintiff filed this claim prior to the expiration of the thirty-year limitation period; therefore, her claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.