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dismissing debtor's unexhausted claims because the court could not consider claims never raised with the Secretary of Education
Summary of this case from Chambers v. Soc. Sec. Admin.Opinion
Case No. 3:18-cv-1614-MJF
2019-12-30
Michelle COTTRELL, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
Michelle Cottrell, Pace, FL, pro se. Herbert Stanley Lindsey, US Attorney, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant.
Michelle Cottrell, Pace, FL, pro se.
Herbert Stanley Lindsey, US Attorney, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant.
ORDER
Michael J. Frank, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Michelle Cottrell accrued over $150,000 in student-loan debt in pursuit of graduate degrees. Cottrell brought this action in an attempt to discharge that debt based on her inability to obtain a salary commensurate with the debt she incurred—a circumstance she characterizes as an "inability to benefit" from the education she received. Because Cottrell does not have a private right of action for discharge of her student-loan debt, and because she has not shown that there is a final agency action that is subject to judicial review, this court must dismiss this action without prejudice.
Upon consent of the parties, this case was referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and enter a final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. (Doc. 26).
I. Background
A. Statutory and Regulatory Structure of Student Loan Discharges
The Department of Education ("DOE") is an executive-branch agency that Congress created in 1979 through the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668 (1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401 - 3508 ). The DOE establishes policy for, administers, and coordinates most federal assistance for education. Title IV of the Higher Education Act ("HEA") authorizes the federal government to provide financial assistance to students of higher education. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070, et seq. As part of the Federal Family Education Loan Program and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program application process, an educational institution must certify to the DOE that an applicant for an education loan is eligible to receive the loan. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e)(1)(i) ; 34 C.F.R. § 668.32.
To qualify for federal educational financial assistance under either loan program, a student must attend an eligible institution and must have a high school diploma or recognized equivalent. If the student lacks a diploma, the institution must demonstrate the student has an ability to benefit ("ATB") from the education or training that she would receive using the financial aid. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a), (d). The particulars of how a school must demonstrate that the student has an ATB have changed over the years. A student, however, generally must pass a standardized test to demonstrate an ability to benefit. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(d) ; 34 C.F.R. § 668.32(e).
When a school falsely certifies the applicant's eligibility for a loan, the Secretary of Education must discharge the loan. 20 U.S.C. § 1087(c) ; 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e)(1)(i)(A) (providing for discharge of loans under Federal Family Education Loan Program); 34 C.F.R. § 685.215(a)(1)(i) (providing for discharge of loans under William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program if a school falsely certifies a student's eligibility for a loan). Other circumstances warranting administrative discharge of a loan are death, total and permanent disability, attendance at a school that closes during the borrower's course of study, and unpaid refunds by a school. 20 U.S.C. § 1087 ; see also 34 C.F.R. § 682.402 ; 34 C.F.R. § 685.215.
B. Factual Background
The relevant facts are taken from Cottrell's verified petition, documents attached to her petition, and Cottrell's original Loan Discharge Application. See Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd , 941 F.3d 504, 511 (11th Cir. 2019) ("In deciding whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, we normally consider all documents that are attached to the complaint or incorporated into it by reference."). The court credits as true specific, well-pleaded allegations in Cottrell's petition that either do not appear in an exhibit or that contradict conclusory statements in an exhibit. Gill , 941 F.3d at 514 ("When a complaint contains specific, well-pleaded allegations that either do not appear in the attached exhibit or that contradict conclusory statements in the exhibit, we credit the allegations in the complaint."). When an allegation of the petition is general and conclusory, and an exhibit contradicts the allegation, the information in the exhibit is assumed to be true. Gill , 941 F.3d at 514 ("[W]hen exhibits attached to a complaint contradict the general and conclusory allegations of the pleading, the exhibits govern.").
Although the Loan Discharge Application and loan servicing agency's communication were not included with Cottrell's petition, this court may consider them as incorporated into the petition by reference. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. , 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) ; Saunders v. Duke , 766 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014) ; Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc. , 116 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997). Courts may consider documents incorporated by reference when: (1) a plaintiff refers to a document in her complaint; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff's claim; (3) its contents are not in dispute; and (4) the defendant attached the document to its motion to dismiss. Financial Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc. , 500 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007) ; see also Saunders , 766 F.3d at 1271.
In August 1991, Cottrell began attending Indiana State University, after graduating from Terre Haute South Vigo High School. (Doc. 1-1 at 8). Cottrell subsequently earned both her Bachelor of Science and Master of Education degrees from Indiana State University on August 14, 1998, and May 9, 2009, respectively. (Doc. 20-1 at 10-11). In May of 2009, Cottrell enrolled in Capella University— located in Minneapolis, Minnesota—in pursuit of a doctoral degree in education. (Doc. 1-1 at 10; Doc. 20-1 at 1). On December 31, 2012, Cottrell earned a post-master's certificate in college teaching from Capella. (Doc. 20-1 at 12). During Cottrell's tenure at Capella, the university increased tuition and modified the coursework and experiential learning requirements for the doctoral degree Cottrell was pursuing. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). In April of 2015, Cottrell ceased attending Capella University without obtaining her doctorate. (Doc. 20-1 at 1, Doc. 1-1 at 10-11).
Cottrell financed her graduate education by obtaining loans from the DOE. On July 7, 2008, while pursuing her Master of Education degree at Indiana State University, Cottrell's first Federal Stafford Loan was disbursed. (Doc. 1-1 at 13-14). From 2008 through May 19, 2015, approximately twenty-two loans were drawn on Cottrell's account, leaving Cottrell with a balance in excess of $150,000. (Doc. 1-1 at 13-14). Cottrell is currently on an Income-Based Repayment Plan that requires no current payment. (Doc. 1-1 at 2, 13-15; Doc. 22 at 1). Cottrell also has not defaulted on her loans. (Id. ).
The loans were drawn under the Federal Family Education Loan Program and then consolidated under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program.
On August 18, 2017, Cottrell submitted a Loan Discharge Application: False Certification (Ability to Benefit) (OMB No. 1845-0058) to her student loan servicing agency, FedLoan.org. (Doc. 20-1 at 1). In this application to discharge her student-loan debt, Cottrell asserted that: (1) she did not have a high school diploma or General Education Development ("GED") credential while enrolled at Indiana State University and Capella University; (2) she was not given an ability to benefit test; (3) she did not complete a developmental or remedial program at either school; and (4) she did not complete six credits of coursework before a loan had been disbursed. (Doc. 20-1 at 1-2). Cottrell did not answer the question on the application form that required her to state whether she received a GED before completing the program. (Doc. 20-1 at 1). These facts, according to Cottrell, warranted discharge of her student-loan debt.
On August 31, 2017, the loan servicing agency responded to Cottrell's application by advising her that she was "not eligible" for a loan discharge based on a false certification. (Doc. 20-2). The loan servicing agency instructed Cottrell to: (1) complete a separate application for each school from which she sought a discharge; (2) make sure she answered all the questions on the form; (3) provide proof that she did not have a high school diploma or GED prior to enrolling; (4) provide proof that she was not given an ability to benefit test; and (5) provide evidence that she did not complete 6 credit hours prior to the loan disbursement. (Doc 20-2). Cottrell alleges that eventually the loan servicing agency recommended that she seek relief in court rather than submit the additional applications. (Doc. 22 at 2). Specifically, Cottrell alleges:
I have already filled out available other public ways to have the debt discharged but they have specific things like you need to not have graduated from high school, etc. attached to the forms like the Capella example; this is why the FedLOan.org suggested I seek relief through a court since all the specifics are different for each person and my situation is not likely that I would be so unlucky to not have a salaried job and be at least in a comfortable way of life with a means to pay for this length of time.
(Doc. 22 at 2).
On June 14, 2018, Cottrell filed a "Petition For An Order to Discharge School Loan Debt" in the Circuit Court for the First Judicial Circuit in Escambia County, Florida. (Doc. 1-1). Her petition names the DOE as the Defendant and is a mere three pages in length. It does not cite a single statute or regulation and fails to state what law purportedly affords her the right to have her student loan debt discharged. On August 6, 2018, the DOE removed this action to this court. (Doc. 1). The DOE subsequently moved to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. (Doc. 20).
II. Standard
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is governed by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is plausible on its face where "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1955 ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (citation omitted). The pleader is not entitled to relief "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ). A court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quotation and citation omitted). "Bare assertions" that amount to nothing more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of a claim "are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." Id. at 681, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (quotation and citation omitted). Courts hold a pro se complaint to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and accordingly construe it "liberally." Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd. , 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
III. Discussion
The DOE argues that this action should be dismissed on two primary bases: (1) Cottrell's allegations—that she has been unable to obtain employment suitable to repay her loans even with diligent effort—do not state a plausible claim for judicial discharge (or even administrative discharge) of her student-loan debt; and (2) this court lacks jurisdiction to review Cottrell's allegations of false certification of ability to benefit, because Cottrell failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. (Doc. 20).
A. Cottrell's Allegations of Financial Hardship Fail to State a Plausible Claim for a Court-Ordered Discharge of Her Debt
Cottrell seeks to compel the DOE to discharge her student-loan debt on the ground that she has not obtained employment with an income level sufficient to repay the debt. As discussed above, 20 U.S.C. § 1087 requires the DOE to administratively discharge a borrower's liability on a loan only in specific circumstances. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087. Section 1087 does not require discharge for lack of sufficient income or lack of suitable/anticipated employment. Id.
More importantly, neither 20 U.S.C. § 1087, nor the DOE's regulations, creates a private right of action to discharge student-loan debt. Labickas v. Arkansas State Univ. , 78 F.3d 333, 334 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that no private right of action is implied under Title IV of the Higher Education Act for student borrowers); L'ggrke v. Benkula , 966 F.2d 1346, 1348 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that Title IV of the Higher Education Act does not create a private cause of action); In re Barton , 266 B.R. 922, 924 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001) (holding that there is no private right of action under 20 U.S.C. § 1087, and 20 U.S.C. § 1087 provides the exclusive administrative remedy); Green v. United States , 163 F. Supp. 2d 593, 598 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (holding that "there simply is no private right of action under the" Higher Education Act); Morgan v. Markerdowne Corp. , 976 F. Supp. 301, 319 (D. N.J. 1997) ("The express language of the HEA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, do not ‘create a private cause of action, and there is nothing in the Act's language, structure or legislative history from which a congressional intent to provide such a remedy can be implied.’ ") (quoting L'ggrke , 966 F.2d at 1348 ); Moy v. Adelphi Inst., Inc. , 866 F. Supp. 696, 705 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the Higher Education Act neither expressly nor impliedly provides plaintiffs with a private right of action).
Cottrell's allegations do not state a plausible cause of action against the DOE for discharge of her student-loan debt. The DOE is entitled to dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Cottrell Failed to Exhaust Her Administrative Remedies to the Extent She Claims a False Certification of Ability to Benefit
Cottrell's petition does not make an explicit assertion of false certification, but her allegations repeatedly reference, as a basis for discharge, her alleged lack of "Ability to Benefit." (Doc. 1-1 at 1). This court lacks jurisdiction to review any claim of false certification, because Cottrell has not exhausted her administrative remedies.
"The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law." Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 88, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2384, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (quoting McKart v. United States , 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 1662, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) ). Under this doctrine, "no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." Woodford , 548 U.S. at 88-89, 126 S. Ct. at 2385 (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. , 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S. Ct. 459, 463, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938) ); see also Mason v. Cont'l Grp., Inc. , 763 F.2d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 1985) ; Kobleur v. Grp. Hospitalization & Med. Servs., Inc. , 954 F.2d 705, 712 (11th Cir. 1992) ; N.B. by D.G. v. Alachua Cty. Sch. Bd. , 84 F.3d 1376, 1378 (11th Cir. 1996).
Exhaustion of administrative remedies protects administrative agency authority, allows an agency to utilize its expertise, prevents "premature interruption of the administrative process," and promotes efficiency. McKart , 395 U.S. at 193, 89 S. Ct. at 1662 ; see Woodford , 548 U.S. at 89, 126 S. Ct. at 2385. "Exhaustion gives an agency ‘an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court,’ and it discourages disregard of the agency's procedures." Woodford , 548 U.S. at 89, 126 S. Ct. at 2385 (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan , 503 U.S. 140, 145, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 1086, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) ) (alterations adopted). The policy of exhaustion "is particularly viable where an established scheme of decision making might be undermined by permitting circumvention of administrative procedures." Wallace v. Lynn , 507 F.2d 1186, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Regarding the efficiency engendered by the exhaustion requirement, "[c]laims generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than ... in federal court. In some cases, claims are settled at the administrative level, and in others, the proceedings before the agency convince the losing party not to pursue the matter in federal court." Id. Additionally, "where a controversy survives administrative review, exhaustion of the administrative procedure may produce a useful record for subsequent judicial consideration." Id. (quoting McCarthy , 503 U.S. at 145, 112 S. Ct. at 1086 ). "Where relief is available from an administrative agency, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to pursue that avenue of redress before proceeding to the courts; and until that recourse is exhausted, suit is premature and must be dismissed." Reiter v. Cooper , 507 U.S. 258, 269, 113 S. Ct. 1213, 1220, 122 L.Ed.2d 604 (1993) ; see Myers , 303 U.S. at 50-51, 58 S. Ct. at 463-64.
This exhaustion requirement applies to litigants who are seeking to discharge student-loan debt. See Jones v. Dept. of Educ. , No. 09-Civ-00088 (BSJ), 2010 WL 10092765, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2010) ; In re Scholl , 259 B.R. 345, 349 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001) ; United States v. Wright , 87 F. Supp. 2d 464, 466 (D. Md. 2000) ; In re Bega , 180 B.R. at 644 ; United States v. Bertucci , No. CIV. A. 00-0078, 2000 WL 1234560, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2000). A district court's authority to address student-loan debt arises only to the extent it is empowered to review agency action. A district court's review of an agency's decision is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), which permits courts to set aside the decision of an administrative agency only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). To determine whether an agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious, a court must consider whether it was "based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been clear error of judgment." Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council , 490 U.S. 360, 378, 109 S. Ct. 1851, 1861, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe , 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S. Ct. 814, 823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) ). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, federal courts may review agency action only when authorized by statute or when the agency action is final. 5 U.S.C. § 704 ; Dalton v. Specter , 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S. Ct. 1719, 1724, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) ; Franklin v. Massachusetts , 505 U.S. 788, 796, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2773, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992) ; United States Steel Corp. v. Astrue , 495 F.3d 1272, 1280 (2007) ; Wilderness Soc'y v. Alcock , 83 F.3d 386, 388 n.5 (11th Cir. 1996). In the absence of final agency action or a statute making preliminary actions reviewable, a federal court lacks the power to review a claim. Bennett v. Spear , 520 U.S. 154, 177-78, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1168, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) ; Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman , 336 F.3d 1236, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2003) ; Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Norton , 324 F.3d 1229, 1240 (11th Cir. 2003).
The relevant regulations make clear that, when a borrower seeks to discharge her obligations under a federal student loan based on a "false certification by a school of a borrower's eligibility for a loan," the borrower first must avail herself of the administrative process outlined in 34 C.F.R. § 682.402. Thus, a borrower "must submit to the holder of the loan a written request and a sworn statement." 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e)(3). Upon receipt of the request, the guaranty agency will evaluate the request, in light of the information it possesses as well as information available from other sources. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e)(7)(i).
If the guaranty agency denies the application for discharge, the borrower is considered to be in default on the loans, unless the borrower submits a written statement to the agency within 30 days stating that the borrower: (1) acknowledges the debt; or (2) requests the Secretary of Education to review the agency's decision. 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e)(7)(iii)(A)-(B). If the Secretary of Education determines that the discharge ought to be granted, the Secretary will reimburse the holder of the loan and will discharge the "borrower's obligation with respect to the loan." 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e)(1)(i). If the borrower is dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary, only then would the borrower be entitled to file a claim for judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. ; see e.g. , De La Mota v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. , 412 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2005) ; Higgins v. Spellings , 663 F. Supp. 2d 788, 789-90 (W.D. Mo. 2009).
Here, Cottrell filed a Loan Discharge Application with her loan servicer requesting discharge of her student loans based on a false certification. (Doc. 20-1 at 1-2). The loan servicing agency denied Cottrell's application and advised Cottrell that she was "not eligible" for loan discharge due to false certification. The loan servicing agency instructed Cottrell to: (1) complete a separate application for each school she requested discharge for; (2) answer all the questions as instructed; (3) provide proof that Cottrell did not have a high school diploma or GED prior to enrolling; (4) provide proof that she was not given an "Ability to Benefit" test; and (5) provide proof she did not complete six credit hours prior to the loan disbursement. (Doc 20-2). At that point, Cottrell neither resubmitted her application (as directed) with the required proof nor appealed the denial to the Secretary of Education.
Cottrell submitted one discharge application asserting only false certification as the basis for discharge. To the extent she now proposes other bases for discharge, she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to these claims insofar as she failed to raise them in her application or in an appeal to the Secretary of Education.
The letter from the loan servicing agency to Cottrell states: "If you are not eligible [you] can provide additional evidence or information to us that you believe will entitle you to have your loan discharged, please resubmit your application with any additional information for reconsideration. For your reference, we have included the eligibility criteria for this discharge on the back of this letter."
Because Cottrell did not resubmit her application as directed, she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See Jones , 2010 WL 10092765, at *5-7 (dismissing the plaintiff's claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when plaintiff failed to submit a loan discharge application and a certification document). When a borrower seeks to discharge her obligations under a federal student loan, the borrower must avail herself of the administrative process outlined in 34 C.F.R. § 682.402. Additionally, because Cottrell did not appeal the denial of discharge to the Secretary of Education, this court does not have a final decision from the Department of Education to review. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e) ; 20 U.S.C. § 1087 ; Bennett , 520 U.S. at 177-78, 117 S. Ct. at 1168 (explaining that agency action is final, and thus subject to judicial review, when the action marks "the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process" and when the action determines "rights or obligations"). Because federal courts can review only a final decision of the Secretary of Education, this court cannot review Cottrell's unexhausted claims that she never raised with the Secretary of Education. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. ; 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a)(2) ; Higgins , 663 F. Supp. 2d at 789-90 ; De La Mota , 412 F.3d at 77.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and this case must be dismissed without prejudice. Jones v. Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S. Ct. 910, 921, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (noting that failure to exhaust administrative remedies can result in "dismissal for failure to state a claim"); Whatley v. Smith , 898 F.3d 1072, 1082 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting that an action may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim when the parties do not dispute that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies); Albino v. Baca , 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (where a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint, a district court may dismiss for failure to state a claim).
If Cottrell filed for bankruptcy, it is possible she could seek a hardship discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B). This court, however, offers no opinion on the merits of such a claim, which Cottrell would need to pursue in the bankruptcy court.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, it is ORDERED:
1. Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 20) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff's "Motion for Order of Relief of Full Balance of Debt Provided" (Doc. 24) is DENIED.
3. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice to any civil action that Plaintiff may initiate after she exhausts her administrative remedies.
4. The clerk of the court is instructed to CLOSE the case file.
SO ORDERED this 30th day of December, 2019.