Wis. Stat. § 893.89
Wis. Stat. § 893.89
Bleachers at a high school football stadium qualified as an "improvement to real property" for purposes of this section because they were a permanent addition to real property that enhanced its capital value, involved the expenditure of labor and money, and were designed to make the property more useful or valuable. That an improvement can be removed without harming the real property will not necessarily indicate that the item is not an improvement to real property. The more pertinent inquiry is whether the item can be readily dissembled and moved. Kohn v. Darlington Community Schools, 2005 WI 99, 283 Wis. 2d 1, 698 N.W.2d 794, 03-1067. This section does not violate article I, section 9, the right to remedy clause of the Wisconsin Constitution nor the guarantees of equal protection in the federal and state constitutions. Kohn v. Darlington Community Schools, 2005 WI 99, 283 Wis. 2d 1, 698 N.W.2d 794, 03-1067. This section bars safe place claims under s. 101.11 resulting from injuries caused by structural defects ten [now seven] years after a structure is substantially completed, as opposed to safe place claims resulting from injuries caused by unsafe conditions associated with the structure. Mair v. Trollhaugen Ski Resort, 2006 WI 61, 291 Wis. 2d 132, 715 N.W.2d 598, 04-1252. The evident purpose of sub. (4) (b) is to give a party who has bargained for a warranty or guarantee the benefit of the warranty or guarantee period before the exposure period begins to run. The common council is the only entity authorized by statute to act on behalf of a city. Sub. (4) (b) does not need to explicitly state that a municipality must take "official action," because the only manner in which a municipality may lawfully act is already established by the statutes that govern it. Sub. (4) (b) does not extend to an "unofficial" warranty or guarantee that is unenforceable and does not provide an equitable estoppel exception to the running of the statute. Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2009 WI App 108, 320 Wis. 2d 519, 770 N.W.2d 761, 08-2812. When the design and construction of city streets caused a water drainage problem, the city's failure to alter the streets to remedy the problem was a not failure to "maintain" the streets under sub. (4) (c). The applicable common meaning of "maintenance" in this context is the labor of keeping something in a state of repair. Here there was no factual submission showing that the city did or failed to do something with respect to keeping the streets in repair that caused the water damage. Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2009 WI App 108, 320 Wis. 2d 519, 770 N.W.2d 761, 08-2812. The warranty specified in sub. (4) (b) is an express warranty; this means an implied warranty is not enough. City officials, such as employees and individual members of the common council, cannot, through representations that problems will be solved, bind the city to resolve those problems unless they act or make their representations with the authority to bind the city. Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2010 WI 59, 326 Wis. 2d 155, 785 N.W.2d 398, 08-2812. When an improvement to real property creates a nuisance, a party has ten [now seven] years from the substantial completion of that improvement to bring suit. Sub. (4) (c) applies when an improvement to real property is completed, but the owner or occupier is negligent in the maintenance, operation, or inspection of it, thus causing damage. It does not apply to proper maintenance of an improvement when it is the improvement itself that causes injury. Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2010 WI 59, 326 Wis. 2d 155, 785 N.W.2d 398, 08-2812. An easement agreement that expressly stated that the defendant sewer district agreed to construct and maintain an intercepting sewer in good order and condition and to indemnify and save harmless the plaintiff from all loss or injury to its property and persons due to such construction was an express warranty under Hocking. Cianciola, LLP v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 2011 WI App 35, 331 Wis. 2d 740, 796 N.W.2d 806, 10-0087. This section provides that persons involved in improvements to real property may not be sued more than ten [now seven] years after substantial completion of a project. The statute does not extend the time for bringing lawsuits that are otherwise time-barred by statutes of limitations. This section is a catch-all provision that imposes a time limit on many lawsuits relating to property improvements that are not otherwise time-barred within ten years after substantial completion. If a cause of action is time-barred by a statute of limitations before it would be barred under this section, that statute of limitations applies. Kalahari Development, LLC v. Iconica, Inc., 2012 WI App 34, 340 Wis. 2d 454, 811 N.W.2d 825, 11-0643. This section applies to claims against subsequent owners who were not involved in the actual improvement to the property. Expanding the class of claims exempt from the statute of repose under sub. (4) (c) to include not only unsafe conditions, but also structural defects of which an owner has notice, would effectively swallow the rule because every improvement that is negligently designed could be considered an ongoing nuisance that the owner or operator negligently maintains by failing to correct. Crisanto v. Heritage Relocation Services, Inc., 2014 WI App 75, 355 Wis. 2d 403, 851 N.W.2d 771, 13-1369. "Damages" in sub. (4) (d) means legally actionable damages. Peter v. Sprinkmann Sons Corp., 2015 WI App 17, 360 Wis. 2d 411, 860 N.W.2d 308, 14-0923. The purpose of this section is to protect contractors who are involved in permanent improvements to real property. Daily repairs are not improvements to real property as that phrase is used in this section. Peter v. Sprinkmann Sons Corp., 2015 WI App 17, 360 Wis. 2d 411, 860 N.W.2d 308, 14-0923. Although the accident in this case occurred well after the ten-year [now seven-year] exposure period had expired, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings that the defendant concealed and misrepresented changes in construction, thus triggering the fraud exception to the statute of repose. Wosinski v. Advance Cast Stone Co., 2017 WI App 51, 377 Wis. 2d 596, 901 N.W.2d 797, 14-1961. The builder's statute of repose may not be avoided by arguing that a hazard such as an uneven floor or inclined surface should be discovered by a property owner and either fixed or marked. If this logic were followed, a duty to inspect and warn would render the statutory exposure period meaningless because a plaintiff could always allege that a defendant should have inspected its premises and either fixed or warned of any alleged defect. Soletski v. Krueger International, Inc., 2019 WI App 7, 385 Wis. 2d 787, 924 N.W.2d 207, 17-2063. The mere fact that a plaintiff is engaged in general maintenance at a defendant's facility does not trigger the builder's statute of repose's maintenance exception under sub. (4) (c). An improvement to real property must have been negligently maintained to trigger the exception. Soletski v. Krueger International, Inc., 2019 WI App 7, 385 Wis. 2d 787, 924 N.W.2d 207, 17-2063. A defect is structural if it arises by reason of the materials used in construction or from improper layout or construction. In this case, the presence of airborne asbestos during the original construction of the power plants was a hazardous condition inherent in those structures by reason of their design or construction. The plaintiff's safe place claims under s. 101.11 are therefore based on an injury caused by a structural defect, and the construction statute of repose bars the plaintiff's claims. Nooyen v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 2020 WI App 9, 390 Wis. 2d 687, 939 N.W.2d 621, 19-0289. The maintenance exception under sub. (4) (c) applies when damages occur as the result of an owner or occupier's failure to maintain the improvement itself, not when the owner or occupier has failed to maintain a safe workplace. Nooyen v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 2020 WI App 9, 390 Wis. 2d 687, 939 N.W.2d 621, 19-0289. A plaintiff alleging that he or she developed mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos does not have a legally cognizable claim until he or she is actually diagnosed. Although the plaintiff in this case was allegedly exposed to asbestos between 1970 and 1973, he was not diagnosed with mesothelioma until 2016 and therefore did not have a claim until that time. Accordingly, the circuit court properly applied the version of the statute that was in effect at the time of the plaintiff's diagnosis. Nooyen v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 2020 WI App 9, 390 Wis. 2d 687, 939 N.W.2d 621, 19-0289.