Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-101
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 103; P.A. 80-442, S. 21, 28; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 2.)
Cited. 161 C. 283; 172 Conn. 74; 174 Conn. 500; 190 C. 496; 205 C. 456; 207 Conn. 412; 210 Conn. 199; 216 Conn. 563; 220 C. 112; 222 Conn. 331; 227 Conn. 32; 229 Conn. 691. Cited. 1 Conn.App. 724; 6 CA 24; 8 CA 491; 13 Conn.App. 133; 19 Conn.App. 245; 24 Conn.App. 563; 29 Conn.App. 704; 30 Conn.App. 416; 35 Conn.App. 107; Id., 714; 46 CA 118. There was sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that defendants took steak knives to arm themselves during the burglary and thus committed burglary in the first degree. 52 CA 149. Jury was within its right to conclude that defendant, armed with dangerous instrument, entered apartment unlawfully with intent to commit a robbery, but once inside, did not do anything which constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in a robbery or that he abandoned his attempt. 87 Conn.App. 251. Subsec. (a): Cited. 170 Conn. 162; 175 Conn. 398. Subdiv. (1): Presence of a tire iron used to break into an apartment is insufficient by itself to satisfy statutory definition in Sec. 53a-3(7) to support finding of attempted burglary in first degree; potential for injury considered only in conjunction with circumstances of actual or threatened use. 177 Conn. 140. Cited. 178 C. 564; 180 Conn. 481, 482; Id., 557. Subdiv. (2): A lesser included offense of felony murder. Id., 599. Cited. 182 Conn. 366; 185 Conn. 211; 186 Conn. 599; 188 Conn. 372; Id., 574; 189 Conn. 383; Id., 611; 190 Conn. 104; 194 C. 241; 196 C. 157; Id., 225; 197 Conn. 413; 199 Conn. 62; 200 Conn. 9; Id., 586; 203 C. 159; 204 Conn. 714; 205 Conn. 61; Id., 485; 209 Conn. 416; 214 Conn. 132; 216 Conn. 282; Id., 367; 217 C. 419; 219 Conn. 269; 221 Conn. 430; Id., 447; Id., 685; 223 Conn. 41; Id., 243; Id., 299; 225 Conn. 524; 227 Conn. 32, 48; Id., 616, 622; 228 Conn. 234; 230 Conn. 351; 232 Conn. 455; 235 C. 802; 241 Conn. 702; Id., 784; 242 Conn. 445; Id., 523. Utility room in rear of gas station convenience store in which defendant sexually assaulted and murdered victim, being a separate room and structurally distinct from the convenience store that could be reached only through gas station's garage bay area and not open to the public, reasonably could have been found to be a separate "building" under statute. 252 C. 274. Trial court correctly permitted jury to consider charge of burglary in the third degree as lesser included offense of burglary in the first degree; state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting defendant for burglary in the first degree. 275 C. 192. Subdiv. (2): Conspiracy to commit a reckless act is not a cognizable crime in this state because it is legally impossible to conspire to commit or achieve an unintentional or reckless act. 305 Conn. 101, but see 318 Conn. 1. Cited. 6 Conn.App. 667; Id., 697; Id., 701; 8 CA 631; 9 Conn.App. 79; Id., 208; 10 CA 176; 12 CA 662; 13 Conn.App. 554; 14 CA 67; Id., 657; 15 Conn.App. 342; 16 Conn.App. 184; Id., 318; Id., 455; 17 Conn.App. 391; 19 Conn.App. 179; Id., 618; 21 Conn.App. 244; 23 Conn.App. 692; 24 Conn.App. 556; 25 Conn.App. 428; Id., 565; 26 Conn.App. 641; 27 Conn.App. 73; Id., 786; Id., 794; 30 CA 68; 31 Conn.App. 312; 34 Conn.App. 751; judgment reversed, see 233 Conn. 211; 35 Conn.App. 279; 36 CA 774; 38 Conn.App. 481; Id., 531; 39 CA 45; 40 CA 60; 41 Conn.App. 255; Id., 317; Id., 817; 42 Conn.App. 78; 44 Conn.App. 307; 45 CA 187; Id., 261. Direct evidence of an entry is not required when evidence is such that the trier of fact reasonably could infer that something defendant did inside the building could not have been done without first entering the building. 78 Conn.App. 646. Crimes of burglary in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. (1) and burglary in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. (2) each contain an element the other does not; to convict defendant under Subdiv. (1), state had to prove that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and that he was armed with a dangerous instrument; to convict defendant under Subdiv. (2), state had to prove that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building with the intent to commit a crime therein and that in the course of committing the crime, he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly inflicted bodily injury on another person; Subsec. does not require state to prove that defendant forcibly entered the building or that defendant was in possession of stolen property. 96 CA 421. Trial court reasonably concluded that defendant injured the victim while in immediate flight from the commission of a burglary even though evidence demonstrated that defendant struck the victim beyond the property line of the residence where the burglary occurred. 132 CA 718.