Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-100
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 102; P.A. 74-186, S. 10, 12; P.A. 79-570, S. 7; P.A. 92-260, S. 40; P.A. 05-234, S. 8; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 4.)
Cited. 191 Conn. 180; 195 C. 598; Id., 611; 209 Conn. 322; 210 C. 199; 216 Conn. 367. Failure of court to define the phrase "enters unlawfully" misled jury. 6 CA 24. Cited. 30 Conn.App. 95; judgment reversed, see 228 Conn. 147; 35 Conn.App. 714; 39 CA 1; 44 Conn.App. 62. Subsec. (a): Cited. 188 Conn. 542, 218 Conn. 273; 240 Conn. 708; 242 Conn. 523. Cited. 14 Conn.App. 119; 22 CA 440; 34 CA 823; 38 CA 231; 43 Conn.App. 488. Although it is true that the crime of burglary in the second degree requires the element of a "dwelling" as opposed to "building", statute defines "dwelling" as a type of building "which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present"; an individual apartment, within an apartment home, while a dwelling, also is a separate building. 76 CA 779. Subdiv. (1): Under the ordinary definition of a "building", one's home is clearly a building. 78 CA 610. State does not need to furnish valid certificate of occupancy or prove specific ability to occupy if structure in question falls within ordinary meaning of building. 106 CA 295. Subdiv. (2): Evidence was sufficient to find that the breezeway constituted part of the family's "dwelling". 125 CA 529. Subdiv. (1): Trial court properly determined that shed was a "building" for purposes of section. 151 CA 732. Subsec. (b): Cited. 8 CA 528; 19 Conn.App. 179; 24 CA 563; 42 CA 507. Defendant's presence in an apartment that was not his own, his attempts to evade police and his flight were sufficient evidence from which jury could infer that he had entered apartment unlawfully. 66 CA 357. Restaurant was not open to the public at time defendant entered and management office was a separate area not open to public and defendant was not licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon premises. 74 CA 607.