(a)Operation while under the influence or while having an elevated blood alcohol content. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if such person operates a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, or (2) while such person has an elevated blood alcohol content. For the purposes of this section, "elevated blood alcohol content" means a ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person that is eight-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight, except that if such person is operating a commercial motor vehicle, "elevated blood alcohol content" means a ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person that is four-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight, and "motor vehicle" includes a snowmobile and all-terrain vehicle, as those terms are defined in section 14-379. For purposes of this section, section 14-227b and section 14-227c, (A) "advanced roadside impaired driving enforcement" means a program developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration with the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Technical Advisory Panel, which focuses on impaired driving enforcement education for police officers, or any successor to such program; (B) "drug influence evaluation" means an evaluation developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the International Association of Chiefs of Police that is conducted by a drug recognition expert to determine the level of a person's impairment from the use of drugs and the drug category causing such impairment; (C) "drug recognition expert" means a person certified by the International Association of Chiefs of Police as having met all requirements of the International Drug Evaluation and Classification Program; and (D) "nontestimonial portion of a drug influence evaluation" means a drug influence evaluation conducted by a drug recognition expert that does not include a verbal interview with the subject.(b)Admissibility of chemical analysis. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, in any criminal prosecution for violation of subsection (a) of this section, evidence respecting the amount of alcohol or drug in the defendant's blood or urine at the time of the alleged offense, as shown by a chemical test of the defendant's breath, blood or urine, shall be admissible and competent provided: (1) The defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to telephone an attorney prior to the performance of the test and consented to the taking of the test upon which such analysis is made;(2) a true copy of the report of the test result was mailed to or personally delivered to the defendant within twenty-four hours or by the end of the next regular business day, after such result was known, whichever is later; (3) the test was performed by or at the direction of a police officer according to methods and with equipment approved by the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection and was performed in accordance with the regulations adopted under subsection (d) of this section; (4) the device used for such test was checked for accuracy in accordance with the regulations adopted under subsection (d) of this section; (5) an additional chemical test of the same type was performed at least ten minutes after the initial test was performed or, if requested by the police officer for reasonable cause, an additional chemical test of a different type was performed, including a test to detect the presence of a drug or drugs other than or in addition to alcohol, provided the results of the initial test shall not be inadmissible under this subsection if reasonable efforts were made to have such additional test performed in accordance with the conditions set forth in this subsection and (A) such additional test was not performed or was not performed within a reasonable time, or (B) the results of such additional test are not admissible for failure to meet a condition set forth in this subsection; and (6) evidence is presented that the test was commenced within two hours of operation. In any prosecution under this section it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the results of such chemical test establish the ratio of alcohol in the blood of the defendant at the time of the alleged offense, except that if the results of the additional test indicate that the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such defendant is ten-hundredths of one per cent or less of alcohol, by weight, and is higher than the results of the first test, evidence shall be presented that demonstrates that the test results and the analysis thereof accurately indicate the blood alcohol content at the time of the alleged offense.(c)Evidence of blood alcohol content. In any prosecution for a violation of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section, reliable evidence respecting the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood or urine at the time of the alleged offense, as shown by a chemical analysis of the defendant's blood, breath or urine, otherwise admissible under subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of this section, shall be admissible only at the request of the defendant.(d)Testing and analysis of blood, breath and urine. The Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall ascertain the reliability of each method and type of device offered for chemical testing of blood, of breath and of urine and certify those methods and types which the commissioner finds suitable for use in testing of blood, breath and urine, respectively, in this state. The Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall adopt regulations, in accordance with chapter 54, governing the conduct of chemical tests, the operation and use of chemical test devices, the training and certification of operators of such devices and the drawing or obtaining of blood, breath or urine samples as the commissioner finds necessary to protect the health and safety of persons who submit to chemical tests and to insure reasonable accuracy in testing results. Such regulations shall not require recertification of a police officer solely because such officer terminates such officer's employment with the law enforcement agency for which certification was originally issued and commences employment with another such agency.(e)Evidence of refusal to submit to test.(1) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of subsection (a) of this section, evidence that the defendant refused to submit to a blood, breath or urine test or the nontestimonial portion of a drug influence evaluation requested in accordance with section 14-227b shall be admissible provided the requirements of subsection (b) of said section have been satisfied. If a case involving a violation of subsection (a) of this section is tried to a jury, the court shall instruct the jury as to any inference that may or may not be drawn from the defendant's refusal to submit to such a test or evaluation.(2) In any prosecution for a violation of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section in which it is alleged that the defendant's operation of a motor vehicle was impaired, in whole or in part, by consumption of cannabis, as defined in section 1 of this act, the court may take judicial notice that the ingestion of cannabis (A) can impair a person's ability to operate a motor vehicle; (B) can cause impairment of motor function, reaction time, tracking ability, cognitive attention, decision-making, judgment, perception, peripheral vision, impulse control or memory; and (C) does not enhance a person's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.(f)Reduction, nolle or dismissal prohibited. If a person is charged with a violation of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, the charge may not be reduced, nolled or dismissed unless the prosecuting authority states in open court such prosecutor's reasons for the reduction, nolle or dismissal.(g)Penalties for operation while under the influence. Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall: (1) For conviction of a first violation, (A) be fined not less than five hundred dollars or more than one thousand dollars, and (B) be (i) imprisoned not more than six months, forty-eight consecutive hours of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner, or (ii) imprisoned not more than six months, with the execution of such sentence of imprisonment suspended entirely and a period of probation imposed requiring as a condition of such probation that such person perform one hundred hours of community service, as defined in section 14-227e, and (C) have such person's motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for forty-five days and, as a condition for the restoration of such license, be required to install an ignition interlock device on each motor vehicle owned or operated by such person and, upon such restoration, be prohibited for the one-year period following such restoration from operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning, approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 14-227j; (2) for conviction of a second violation within ten years after a prior conviction for the same offense, (A) be fined not less than one thousand dollars or more than four thousand dollars, (B) be imprisoned not more than two years, one hundred twenty consecutive days of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner, and sentenced to a period of probation requiring as a condition of such probation that such person: (i) Perform one hundred hours of community service, as defined in section 14-227e, (ii) submit to an assessment through the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch of the degree of such person's alcohol or drug abuse, and (iii) undergo a treatment program if so ordered, and (C) have such person's motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for forty-five days and, as a condition for the restoration of such license, be required to install an ignition interlock device on each motor vehicle owned or operated by such person and, upon such restoration, be prohibited for the three-year period following such restoration from operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning, approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 14-227j, except that for the first year of such three-year period, such person's operation of a motor vehicle shall be limited to such person's transportation to or from work or school, an alcohol or drug abuse treatment program, an ignition interlock device service center or an appointment with a probation officer; and(3) for conviction of a third and subsequent violation within ten years after a prior conviction for the same offense, (A) be fined not less than two thousand dollars or more than eight thousand dollars, (B) be imprisoned not more than three years, one year of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner, and sentenced to a period of probation requiring as a condition of such probation that such person: (i) Perform one hundred hours of community service, as defined in section 14-227e, (ii) submit to an assessment through the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch of the degree of such person's alcohol or drug abuse, and (iii) undergo a treatment program if so ordered, and (C) have such person's motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege permanently revoked upon such third offense, except that if such person's revocation is reversed or reduced pursuant to subsection (i) of section 14-111, such person shall be prohibited from operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning, approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 14-227j, for the time period prescribed in subdivision (2) of subsection (i) of section 14-111. For purposes of the imposition of penalties for a second or third and subsequent offense pursuant to this subsection, a conviction under the provisions of subsection (a) of this section in effect on October 1, 1981, or as amended thereafter, a conviction under the provisions of either subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this section, a conviction under the provisions of section 14-227m, a conviction under the provisions of subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 14-227n, a conviction under the provisions of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or a conviction in any other state of any offense the essential elements of which are determined by the court to be substantially the same as subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this section, section 14-227m, subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 14-227n or section 53a-56b or 53a-60d, shall constitute a prior conviction for the same offense.(h)Suspension of operator's license or nonresident operating privilege.(1) Each court shall report each conviction under subsection (a) of this section to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, in accordance with the provisions of section 14-141. The commissioner shall suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of the person reported as convicted for the period of time required by subsection (g) of this section. The commissioner shall determine the period of time required by subsection (g) of this section based on the number of convictions such person has had within the specified time period according to such person's driving history record, notwithstanding the sentence imposed by the court for such conviction. (2) The motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of a person found guilty under subsection (a) of this section who, at the time of the offense, was operating a motor vehicle in accordance with a special operator's permit issued pursuant to section 14-37a shall be suspended by the commissioner for twice the period of time set forth in subsection (g) of this section. (3) If an appeal of any conviction under subsection (a) of this section is taken, the suspension of the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege by the commissioner, in accordance with this subsection, shall be stayed during the pendency of such appeal.(i)Ignition interlock device.(1) The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall permit a person whose license has been suspended in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (C) of subdivision (1) or subparagraph (C) of subdivision (2) of subsection (g) of this section to operate a motor vehicle if (A) such person has served either the suspension required under said subparagraph (C) or the suspension required under subsection (i) of section 14-227b, and (B) such person has installed an approved ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned or to be operated by such person, and verifies to the commissioner, in such manner as the commissioner prescribes, that such device has been installed. For a period of one year after the installation of an ignition interlock device by a person who is subject to subparagraph (C) of subdivision (2) of subsection (g) of this section, such person's operation of a motor vehicle shall be limited to such person's transportation to or from work or school, an alcohol or drug abuse treatment program, an ignition interlock device service center or an appointment with a probation officer. Except as provided in sections 53a-56b and 53a-60d, no person whose license is suspended by the commissioner for any other reason shall be eligible to operate a motor vehicle equipped with an approved ignition interlock device.(2) All costs of installing and maintaining an ignition interlock device shall be borne by the person required to install such device. No court sentencing a person convicted of a violation of subsection (a) of this section may waive any fees or costs associated with the installation and maintenance of an ignition interlock device.(3) The commissioner shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to implement the provisions of this subsection. The regulations shall establish procedures for the approval of ignition interlock devices, for the proper calibration and maintenance of such devices and for the installation of such devices by any firm approved and authorized by the commissioner and shall specify acts by persons required to install and use such devices that constitute a failure to comply with the requirements for the installation and use of such devices, the conditions under which such noncompliance will result in an extension of the period during which such persons are restricted to the operation of motor vehicles equipped with such devices and the duration of any such extension. The commissioner shall ensure that such firm provide notice to both the commissioner and the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch whenever a person required to install such device commits a violation with respect to the installation, maintenance or use of such device.(4) The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to authorize the continued operation of a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device by any person whose operator's license or nonresident operating privilege is withdrawn, suspended or revoked for any other reason.(5) The provisions of this subsection shall apply to any person whose license has been suspended in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (C) of subdivision (1) or subparagraph (C) of subdivision (2) of subsection (g) of this section on or after January 1, 2012.(6) Whenever a person is permitted by the commissioner under this subsection to operate a motor vehicle if such person has installed an approved ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned or to be operated by such person, the commissioner shall indicate in the electronic record maintained by the commissioner pertaining to such person's operator's license or driving history that such person is restricted to operating a motor vehicle that is equipped with an ignition interlock device and, if applicable, that such person's operation of a motor vehicle is limited to such person's transportation to or from work or school, an alcohol or drug abuse treatment program, an ignition interlock device service center or an appointment with a probation officer, and the duration of such restriction or limitation, and shall ensure that such electronic record is accessible by law enforcement officers. Any such person shall pay the commissioner a fee of one hundred dollars prior to the installation of such device.(7) There is established the ignition interlock administration account which shall be a separate, nonlapsing account in the General Fund. The commissioner shall deposit all fees paid pursuant to subdivision (6) of this subsection in the account. Funds in the account may be used by the commissioner for the administration of this subsection.(8) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes to the contrary, upon request of any person convicted of a violation of subsection (a) of this section whose operator's license is under suspension on January 1, 2012, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may reduce the term of suspension prescribed in subsection (g) of this section and place a restriction on the operator's license of such person that restricts the holder of such license to the operation of a motor vehicle that is equipped with an approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 14-227j, for the remainder of such prescribed period of suspension.(9) Any person required to install an ignition interlock device under this section shall be supervised by personnel of the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch while such person is subject to probation supervision, or by personnel of the Department of Motor Vehicles if such person is not subject to probation supervision, and such person shall be subject to any other terms and conditions as the commissioner may prescribe and any provision of the general statutes or the regulations adopted pursuant to subdivision (3) of this subsection not inconsistent herewith.(10) Notwithstanding the periods prescribed in subsection (g) of this section and subdivision (2) of subsection (i) of section 14-111 during which a person is prohibited from operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning, approved ignition interlock device, such periods may be extended in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to subdivision (3) of this subsection.(j)Participation in alcohol education and treatment program. In addition to any fine or sentence imposed pursuant to the provisions of subsection (g) of this section, the court may order such person to participate in an alcohol education and treatment program or the pretrial impaired driving intervention program established under section 167 of this act, if such person was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or under the influence of both intoxicating liquor and any drug.(k)Seizure and admissibility of medical records of injured operator. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, evidence respecting the amount of alcohol or drug in the blood or urine of an operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident who has suffered or allegedly suffered physical injury in such accident, which evidence is derived from a chemical analysis of a blood sample taken from or a urine sample provided by such person after such accident at the scene of the accident, while en route to a hospital or at a hospital, shall be competent evidence to establish probable cause for the arrest by warrant of such person for a violation of subsection (a) of this section and shall be admissible and competent in any subsequent prosecution thereof if: (1) The blood sample was taken or the urine sample was provided for the diagnosis and treatment of such injury; (2) if a blood sample was taken, the blood sample was taken in accordance with the regulations adopted under subsection (d) of this section; (3) a police officer has demonstrated to the satisfaction of a judge of the Superior Court that such officer has reason to believe that such person was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both and that the chemical analysis of such blood or urine sample constitutes evidence of the commission of the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both in violation of subsection (a) of this section; and (4) such judge has issued a search warrant in accordance with section 54-33a authorizing the seizure of the chemical analysis of such blood or urine sample. Such search warrant may also authorize the seizure of the medical records prepared by the hospital in connection with the diagnosis or treatment of such injury.(l)Participation in victim impact panel program. If the court sentences a person convicted of a violation of subsection (a) of this section to a period of probation, the court may require as a condition of such probation that such person participate in a victim impact panel program approved by the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch. Such victim impact panel program shall provide a nonconfrontational forum for the victims of alcohol-related or drug-related offenses and offenders to share experiences on the impact of alcohol-related or drug-related incidents in their lives. Such victim impact panel program shall be conducted by a nonprofit organization that advocates on behalf of victims of accidents caused by persons who operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both. Such organization may assess a participation fee of not more than seventy-five dollars on any person required by the court to participate in such program.Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-227a
(1963, P.A. 616, S. 1; February, 1965, P.A. 219; 1967, P.A. 612, S. 1; 1969, P.A. 450, S. 4; 1971, P.A. 318; 741; P.A. 73-253, S. 4; P.A. 75-308, S. 1; P.A. 76-6, S. 1, 2; P.A. 77-340, S. 8; 77-614, S. 323, 610; P.A. 80-438, S. 2, 3; P.A. 81-144, S. 1, 2; 81-446, S. 2; P.A. 82-408, S. 2; P.A. 83-63, S. 1-3; 83-534, S. 1; 83-571, S. 4; P.A. 84-198, S. 3, 7; 84-429, S. 40; 84-546, S. 43, 173; P.A. 85-387, S. 1; 85-596, S. 1; P.A. 86-345; P.A. 88-85; 88-302; P.A. 89-110, S. 4; 89-314, S. 2, 5; P.A. 90-230, S. 21, 101; P.A. 91-407, S. 9, 42; P.A. 93-271, S. 2, 3; 93-302, S. 1 -3; 93-371, S. 2, 4, 5; 93-381, S. 9, 39; P.A. 94-60; May 25 Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-1, S. 18, 130; P.A. 95-257, S. 12, 21, 58; 95-314, S. 1; P.A. 99-218, S. 3, 4, 16; 99-255, S. 1; P.A. 00-196, S. 49, 50; P.A. 01-201, S. 1; P.A. 02-70, S. 69; May 9 Sp. Sess. P.A. 02-1, S. 108; P.A. 03-265, S. 1; 03-278, S. 47; P.A. 04-199, S. 31; 04-257, S. 101; P.A. 05-218, S. 28; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 05-3, S. 111; P.A. 06-147, S. 1; P.A. 09-187, S. 42, 62, 66; P.A. 10-110, S. 6, 45, 46; P.A. 11-48, S. 51, 52; 11-51, S. 134, 216, 217; P.A. 12-178, S. 2, 3, 6; P.A. 13-271, S. 51 -53; P.A. 14-228, S. 5; P.A. 16-126, S. 3.)
Amended by P.A. 21-0001,S. 117 of the Connecticut Acts of the 2021 Special Session, eff. 4/1/2022.Amended by P.A. 21-0001,S. 116 of the Connecticut Acts of the 2021 Special Session, eff. 4/1/2022.Amended by P.A. 16-0126, S. 3 of the Connecticut Acts of the 2016 Regular Session, eff. 10/1/2016.Amended by P.A. 14-0228, S. 5 of the Connecticut Acts of the 2014 Regular Session, eff. 7/1/2015. Cited. 154 Conn. 100. As a minor of 16 may be held accountable under statute for operating a motor vehicle while he is intoxicated, he will be held accountable for deciding to consume liquor also. Id., 648. Where defendant in intoxicated condition was found slumped over driving wheel of car stopped in middle of country road at night, jury could reasonably have concluded defendant was driver of car. 158 C. 117. Cited. 159 C. 547; 161 C. 200; 170 Conn. 140, 142; 174 C. 112, 115. Amendments in P.A. 85-387 and P.A. 85-596 entitled to concurrent effect. 199 C. 667. Cited. 200 C. 1; Id., 102; Id., 615; 203 C. 97, 98; 204 C. 507; Id., 514; Id., 521. Phrase "may not be suspended or reduced in any manner" applies to actions of Commissioner of Correction as well as those of sentencing court. 207 C. 412. Application of section to public parking area discussed; judgment of Appellate Court in 11 Conn.App. 644 reversed. Id., 612. Cited. 210 C. 446; 211 C. 389; 213 C. 74. Corroboration role in relation to crime that is conduct oriented discussed; State v. Tillman corpus delicti rule not applicable. 215 C. 189. Cited. 219 C. 752; 222 Conn. 672; 224 C. 29; Id., 730; 225 C. 921; 226 Conn. 191; 228 C. 758; 229 C. 31; Id., 51; Id., 228; Id., 824; 230 C. 572; 233 C. 524. A second conviction under section within a 10-year period is a felony because it carries with it a term of imprisonment of up to 2 years and does not fall within the motor vehicle violation exception to the definition of a criminal "offense" under Sec. 53a-24(a). 300 C. 144. Cited. 4 CA 461; 7 Conn.App. 748; 9 Conn.App. 686; 10 CA 265; 11 Conn.App. 122; Id., 338; Id., 342; 12 Conn.App. 294; Id., 338; Id., 427; 16 CA 156; Id., 165; Id., 172; Id., 358; Id., 472; Id., 497; 17 Conn.App. 100; Id., 209; Id., 250; Id., 376; 18 CA 602; 19 Conn.App. 594; 20 CA 348; Id., 691; 21 CA 138; Id., 210. Statute constitutes a "criminal law" within meaning of conditions of probation. 22 Conn.App. 108. Cited. Id., 142; 25 CA 605; 26 CA 101; Id., 331; Id., 716; Id., 805; 27 Conn.App. 225; Id., 346; Id., 370; 28 Conn.App. 708; Id., 733; 29 CA 512; Id., 582; 30 CA 36; Id., 108; Id., 428; Id., 917; 31 CA 669; Id., 797; 32 CA 553; 33 CA 107; Id., 242; Id., 501; 34 Conn.App. 557; Id., 655; 35 CA 631; 36 CA 76; Id., 710; 38 Conn.App. 8; judgment reversed, see 236 Conn. 18; Id., 661; 39 CA 11; 40 CA 359; 42 CA 10; Id., 589; 44 CA 40; Id., 702; 45 Conn.App. 12; Id., 102; Id., 225; Id., 577; Id., 722; Id., 804. Court rejected defendant's claim that statute is void for vagueness because an ordinary person has no ascertainable method for measuring his or her own blood alcohol level. 48 CA 635. Because defendant was charged with violation of both Subdivs. (1) and (2) of Subsec. (a), intoxilyzer results are admissible without defendant's request and are necessary to prove a violation of Subsec. (a)(2) pursuant to Subsec. (c). 51 Conn.App. 4. To establish probable cause, there must be a temporal nexus between the operation of a motor vehicle and the driver's being under the influence of liquor or drugs. 54 CA 127. Detention at roadside sobriety checkpoint did not constitute unreasonable seizure or violate defendant's due process rights. 56 CA 252. Pursuant to Sec. 54-193(b), charged violations of section were subject to a 1-year limitations period because they were not punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year. 61 CA 90. There was substantial evidence that police had probable cause to believe that plaintiff had violated section where plaintiff had slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, smelled of alcohol, admitted he had been drinking beer and police found empty beer bottles in automobile; administration of field sobriety tests and subsequent results are not required by statute and are not dispositive in finding probable cause to arrest for driving while intoxicated. 62 CA 571. Nothing in section prohibits evidence of consciousness of guilt based on defendant's refusal to take a breath test being considered in prosecution for assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle under Sec. 53a-60d. 63 CA 433. Arresting officer properly permitted to offer expert testimony on defendant's intoxication. 68 CA 119. To convict defendant of operating motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs pursuant to section, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant operated his motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or both. 79 CA 657. Section, as applied to defendant, does not violate ex post facto clause because it did not result in a second punishment for previous convictions, but rather enhanced current conviction on the basis of defendant's status as repeat offender; section does not violate such clause given that defendant was effectively put on notice of changes to statute, and therefore he is precluded from relying on previous 5-year look back period to prove that state's burden of proof was reduced or that he was deprived of a defense. 80 CA 589. Because all the evidence submitted to court was consistent with court's finding that defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, court had sufficient evidence to convict defendant of that offense. 93 CA 200. Starting car using a remote starter not considered first act to put vehicle in motion if person does not have the keys with him or her in the vehicle or if the whereabouts of the keys is unknown. 101 Conn.App. 709. Informant's report of erratic driver exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify "Terry" stop of driver for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, even though the police officer neither observed the errant driver nor knew informant's name. 103 CA 646. Defendant was ineligible for pretrial alcohol education program pursuant to Sec. 54-56g(f) because she was the holder of a commercial driver's license at the time she was charged with violating section. 110 CA 836. Legislature intended blood alcohol content evidence to be based solely on chemical testing and its admissibility to be contingent on the satisfaction of strict statutory criteria, e.g., the performance of multiple chemical tests administered by qualified law enforcement personnel within two hours of defendant's operation of the vehicle; permitting evidence in this behavioral prosecution case of a blood alcohol content derived from a subjective interpretation of defendant's performance on standard field sobriety tests, without using any of the approved methods and procedures, does great violence to the intent of this section. 177 CA 651. Where sample of blood was taken from defendant when he was unconscious in a hospital and could not consent, the results of the test of his blood are not admissible in evidence since such taking was in violation of his constitutional rights and was not authorized by this section or Sec. 14-227b. 26 CS 40. The word "test" refers to the chemical analysis of a sample of blood and not to a series of samples from different individuals. 32 CS 611. Cited. 33 CS 501; Id., 697; 34 CS 514. Where information charging violation referred to former statute, incorrect reference was an amendable defect and defendant was not misled or prejudiced by the error or placed in double jeopardy by the granting of the amendment. Id., 282. Violation is crime for purposes of defendant's eligibility for pretrial accelerated rehabilitation. 36 CS 527. Cited. 37 Conn.Supp. 767; Id., 834; Id., 864; 38 CS 675; Id., 689; 39 Conn.Supp. 285; 40 Conn.Supp. 505; Id., 512; 42 CS 306; Id., 602; 43 CS 77. Road controlled and maintained by town qualifies as a "public highway". 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 513. Where accused was found alone in his car with engine running and wheels spinning in loose gravel, trial court could correctly find he was "operating" the car. Id., 514. Instructions to the jury were not prejudicial to defendant when correction concerning the testimony of the state toxicologist was made by a supplemental charge. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 578. Where the penalty imposed is within the limits fixed by statute, it will not be disturbed on appeal unless there was an abuse of discretion. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 228. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 130; Id., 261, 263. The 6 conditions precedent apply only in cases of operation under influence of liquor and not drugs. Id., 303. State must prove that defendant charged with driving under the influence of liquor was exclusively under influence of liquor and not drug or drugs and liquor. Id., 364. Refusal to submit to a chemical sobriety test is inadmissible. Id., 470, 474, 475. Cited. Id., 503. Subsec. (a): Cited. 179 C. 377; 203 Conn. 305; 209 C. 806; 216 Conn. 172; 226 C. 470, 472; 227 Conn. 534; 231 C. 926; 233 C. 302. Administrative suspension of operator's license does not bar prosecution for violation of section. 235 C. 614. Defendant's act of inserting key into ignition, regardless of whether key was turned, constituted operation of a motor vehicle. 279 C. 546. Under 2005 revision, a person operates a vehicle when he uses a remote starter to start the engine and then sits in the driver's seat, thus taking the first act in a sequence of steps necessary to set in motion the motive power of a vehicle equipped with a remote starter. 291 C. 49. Cited. 11 CA 185; Id., 644; 15 CA 58. State not required to prove that defendant intended to move vehicle in order to prove operation under statute. 22 CA 88. Intent to move a vehicle not an element of operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence in violation of section. 24 CA 467. Cited. 25 CA 282; 27 CA 461; 29 CA 455; 30 Conn.App. 742; 33 CA 590; 34 Conn.App. 189; Id., 201; 36 CA 463; 40 Conn.App. 420; 46 Conn.App. 633. Proof of operation on public highway is question of fact and defendant Commissioner of Motor Vehicles made reasonable factual finding of such operation in case in which plaintiff was found seated in the driver's seat with seat belt on in his car on the shoulder of an interstate highway and the engine of the car was running. 48 CA 552. A person operates a motor vehicle when in the vehicle he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle. 50 CA 34. Defendant who was found unconscious behind wheel of car while engine was running could be deemed to have operated the vehicle for purposes of sustaining a conviction under section. 51 CA 782. Where defendant was found intoxicated, in the vehicle with the engine running and in a position to control the vehicle's movement, conviction under section was upheld. 60 CA 551. Evidence that defendant failed field sobriety tests and testimony of state toxicologist was sufficient to sustain conviction under section. 71 CA 497. It is inconceivable that legislature's broad umbrella of protection would insulate intoxicated persons from drunk driving laws pursuant to Subsec. because the parking area did not have zoning approval for 10 or more spaces; thus, a 9 space parking lot that regularly accommodates and is used by 10 or more cars satisfies requirements of statute. 76 CA 716. For purposes of finding violation under Subdiv. (1), the state of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor is not a fact on which the state is required to present expert testimony. 84 CA 519. A conviction under Subdiv. (1) is not inconsistent with an acquittal under Subdiv. (2). 98 CA 847. Defendant's action of inserting key into vehicle ignition is an act which alone or in sequence set in motion the vehicle's motive power and constituted operation of a motor vehicle within the meaning of Subsec. 102 CA 241. Trial court properly allowed defendant's statements as to his alcohol consumption and the results of field sobriety tests; police officer did not lack a reasonable, articulable suspicion to continue his investigation. 110 CA 41. Statute does not require the state to prove that defendant driver actually had difficulty driving the motor vehicle because of intoxicating liquor or drugs. 111 CA 315. Defendant's conviction for a violation of both Subdivs. (1) and (2) violated his right to be free of double jeopardy because they provide for different methods of proof of the same offense. Id., 466. Definition of "motor vehicle" in Sec. 14-212 applies and includes a moped. 112 Conn.App. 190. Court properly rejected defense allegation that proof of intoxication was caused solely by involuntary exposure to kerosene fumes in vehicle. 118 CA 556. Blood serum test results using a weight of alcohol to volume of blood ratio rather than a weight of alcohol to weight of blood ratio was sufficient to establish elevated blood alcohol content as defined in Subsec. 159 CA 137. Subsec. (b): Cited. 208 C. 812. Court declined "to formulate or adopt a behavioral definition of driving while impaired". 14 CA 216. Cited. 15 Conn.App. 58. Chemical analysis evidence of alcohol level not required to be reported as a percentage of weight and can be reported by volume and equipment that performed test must be approved by Department of Public Safety but is not required to satisfy criteria of regulations. 99 CA 563. State is required to establish as foundation for admissibility of chemical analysis evidence that test was performed with equipment approved by Department of Public Safety; it does not require that device satisfy criteria set forth in regulations. 106 CA 189. When evidence of amount of alcohol or drug in a defendant's blood or urine is excluded under section, then evidence of ratio, dependent upon amount, should also be excluded. 164 CA 406. Subdiv. (5) contains condition precedent to introduction of evidence concerning amount of alcohol in defendant's system as shown by chemical analysis of breath, i.e. that he be afforded additional chemical test. 34 CS 679. Requirements of this Subsec. apply only to prosecutions for violations of Subsec. (a), not to prosecutions under Sec. 53a-58a. 35 CS 511. Subdiv. (1): Defendant did not lack legal capacity to consent to the test merely because he was under a Probate Court conservatorship of his person and estate. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 47. Subdiv. (4): Defendant's claim that syringe used by physician to extract blood sample was a device used for the test and therefore had to be checked for accuracy had no merit. Id., 48. Subdiv. (4): Device referred to in Subdiv. is analysis equipment and not equipment used to collect blood sample. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 326. Subsec. (c): Cited. 180 C. 252. Rebuttable presumption as a permissive inference discussed. 41 CA 874. "Rebuttable presumption" under statute defined as a "permissive inference". 48 CA 391. Based on the stipulated facts and inferences thereon, trial court reasonably concluded that the urine tests were commenced within 2 hours of operation as required by section. 51 CA 790. Although jury instructions used rebuttable presumption language of statute, such instructions were harmless since court also instructed jury re reasonable inferences and provided examples. 71 CA 179. Subsec. (d): Does not proscribe admission of evidence that fails to satisfy regulatory requirements. 263 C. 390. Use of alcohol testing device measuring weight of alcohol per volume of breath rather than weight of alcohol per weight of blood as required by regulation did not require preclusion of test results, because Subsec. permits testing other than blood testing and does not require that testing device comply with regulatory requirements. 105 CA 59. Subsec. (e): Court's instruction that jury "may make any reasonable inference" was permissible with respect to defendant's refusal to submit to a Breathalyzer test. 84 Conn.App. 519. Where trial court repeatedly explained to jury that consciousness of guilt was a permissive inference that it could draw only if it determined that defendant had refused to submit to breath test, court's instruction was well within parameters of section; defendant had no constitutional right to counsel when asked to submit to a breath test, and evidence of defendant's refusal to submit to test was properly admitted despite defendant's request to speak to counsel at time of proposed breath test. 118 CA 654. Subsec. (f): Not unconstitutionally vague under U.S. Constitution as applied to defendant. 41 CA 7. Jury was not misled when trial judge's instructions identified a permissive inference and substantially complied with statutory language; applicability of possible negative inference not limited to violation of Subsec. (a)(1). 63 Conn.App. 433. Subsec. (g): Trial court has clear duty under Subsec. to adjudicate second part of two part information in all cases in which information filed. 271 C. 115. Is constitutional and does not violate defendant's right to have a jury decide questions of fact as the question of whether New York's and Connecticut's drunk driving statutes are substantially similar is a question of law properly left to the court. 276 C. 503. Imposition of enhanced penalties for third time offense under Subsec. requires only third violation of Subsec. (a), and does not require previous conviction as second time offender. 90 CA 177. Enhanced penalties apply to a subsequent conviction only if the earlier conviction occurred before date of the conduct underlying subsequent violation. 118 CA 725. Statute does not require that prior convictions take place at separate times to trigger imposition of enhanced penalties; defendant's claim of improper conviction as third time offender rather than second time offender because her two prior convictions were entered on the same day was unavailing. 140 CA 347. Subdiv. (3): Certified records of prior convictions that indicated defendant's name, date of birth, operator's license number and address were sufficient evidence of prior convictions for purposes of Subdiv. 146 Conn.App. 701. Court case abstract without the case disposition and fingerprint card is, as a matter of law, insufficient evidence of prior conviction for defendant to be charged as a third time offender. 156 CA 792. Subsec. (h): Subdiv. (3): Enhanced penalties apply to third conviction when only one of two prior convictions occurred within 5 years of the present conviction. 210 C. 573. Cited. 234 C. 918. Subdiv. (3) imposes enhanced penalties on those whose third violation of Sec. 14-227a(a) occurs within the 5-year period, regardless of when that conviction occurs; judgment of Appellate Court in 38 Conn.App. 8 reversed. 236 Conn. 18. Person sentenced to mandatory minimum sentence not entitled to "good time credit" or "employment credit". 17 CA 827. Administrative suspension of driver's license by Department of Motor Vehicles and prosecution by the court of underlying offense of driving while intoxicated does not violate separation of powers provision of state constitution. 51 Conn.App. 4. Statute providing for imposition of enhanced penalties when a person is convicted of a third offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor within ten years of prior conviction of the same offense does not require that the third conviction be within 10 years of all prior convictions. 70 CA 565. Subsec. (j): Requirement of a search warrant does not eliminate consent as a means of securing test results. 65 CA 634. Subsec. (k): Medical record was properly admitted as evidence re results of blood alcohol test; absence of specific admissibility standards in regulations indicates that commissioner, having been specifically authorized by legislature, determined no specific rules or procedures were necessary for samples collected and analyzed for medical diagnostic testing. 138 CA 420. Subsec. (l): Cited. 42 CA 589. Does not govern admissibility of blood alcohol tests taken at out-of-state hospitals and is permissive in nature. 57 CA 484. Court satisfied that hospital's internal policy of having registered nurse draw blood from patients who are admitted and fact that emergency room was staffed with two registered nurses show that requirements of Subsec. have been met. 61 Conn.App. 90.
See Sec. 14-111(b), (h) re suspension or revocation of operator's license. See Sec. 14-111g re operator's retraining program. See Sec. 14-112(a) re proof of financial responsibility. See Sec. 14-219b re limitation of municipal liability. See Sec. 14-227b re implied consent to blood, breath or urine tests.