C.r.c.p. 62

As amended through Rule Change 2024(18), effective October 2, 2024

Rule 62 - Stay of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment

(a) Automatic Stay; Exceptions; Injunctions; Receiverships. Except as stated herein, no execution shall issue upon a judgment nor shall proceedings be taken for its enforcement until the expiration of 14 days after its entry; provided that an interlocutory or final judgment in an action for an injunction or in a receivership action shall not be stayed during the period after its entry and until an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the provisions of section (c) of this Rule govern the suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting of an injunction during the pendency of an appeal.

(b) Discretionary stay. In its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment:

(1) pending the disposition of a motion for post-trial relief made pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59;

(2) pending a motion for relief from a judgment or order made pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60;

(3) during the time permitted for filing of a notice of appeal; or

(4) during the pendency of a motion for approval of a supersedeas bond.

(c) Injunction Pending Appeal. When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the trial court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party.

(d) Stay upon Appeal. When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay from the trial court subject to the exceptions contained in section (a) of this Rule. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing the notice of appeal or of procuring the order allowing the appeal, as the case may be. The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by the court.

(e) Stay in Favor of the State of Colorado or Municipalities Thereof. When an appeal is taken by the State of Colorado, or by any county or municipal corporation of this state, or of any officer or agency thereof acting in official capacity and the operation or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be required from the appellant unless otherwise ordered by the court.

(f) There is no section (f).

(g) Power of Appellate Court Not Limited. The provisions in this Rule do not limit any power of the appellate courts or of a justice or judge thereof to stay proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of an appeal or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered. (See Rule 8, Colorado Appellate Rules.)

(h) Stay of Judgment as to Multiple Claims or Multiple Parties. When a court has ordered a final judgment under the conditions stated in Rule 54(b), the court may stay enforcement of that judgment until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is entered.

C.r.c.p. 62

Source: (b) amended and adopted, effective November 16, 1995; (a) amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b).

Committee Comment

The 1988 amendment to C.R.C.P. 62(b) is a change to make that section fully consistent with the changes made to C.R.C.P. 59. The post-trial relief features of C.R.C.P. 50 and 52(b) were brought into C.R.C.P. 59. As a result, those Rules (50) and (52) no longer bear on post-trial relief and need not be referenced in C.R.C.P. 62.

Annotation I. General Consideration. Law reviews. For article, "Amendments to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure", see 28 Dicta 242 (1951). For article, "Judgment: Rules 54-63 ", see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 581 (1951). For article, "Obtaining a Supersedeas Bond", see 23 Colo. Law. 607 (1994). For article, "Bonds in Colorado Courts: A Primer for Practitioners", see 34 Colo. Law. 59 (March 2005). No power is lodged in any court to stay an order of discharge in a "habeas corpus" proceeding, as such action would defeat the very purpose of "habeas corpus". Geer v. Alaniz, 137 Colo. 432, 326 P.2d 71 (1958). Generally, court may not impair creditor's right to enforce judgment. As a general rule, a court may not stay execution and thereby impair or destroy the statutory right of a judgment creditor to enforce collection of its judgment against nonexempt property of the judgment debtor. First Nat'l Bank v. District Court, 652 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1982). Right to enforce may be statutorily limited. The substantive right of a judgment creditor to enforce collection of the judgment may be statutorily limited, as by § 7-60-128 . First Nat'l Bank v. District Court, 652 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1982). Effect of stay on certain statutory requirements. The stay of execution provided for in this rule has no effect on the requirement that a transcript of judgment be issued on payment of the fee pursuant to § 13-32-104(1)(g). Rocky Mt. Ass'n of Credit Mgt. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 344, 565 P.2d 1345 (1977). Applied in Ireland v. Wynkoop, 36 Colo. App 206, 539 P.2d 1349 (1975). II. Automatic Stay. Under section (a) of this rule, a judgment order dividing property is automatically stayed and unenforceable for a period of 10 (now 15) days following its entry. Sarno v. Sarno, 28 Colo. App. 598, 478 P.2d 711 (1970). Section (a) is inapplicable to temporary custody order the mother was found to have violated. Order was not subject to fifteen-day automatic stay. In re Adams, 778 P.2d 294 (Colo. App. 1989). A forcible medication administration order is not the type of action contemplated by section (a) and is thus not automatically stayed for 14 days after entry. People ex rel. Strodtman, __ P.3d __ (Colo. App. 2011). III. Stay on Motion. Unless stayed by the court, a judgment may be executed upon before a new trial motion is decided. Oman v. Morris, 28 Colo. App. 124, 471 P.2d 430 (1970). IV. Injunction. Effect of section (c) is to protect rights of parties. Section (c) of this rule authorizes the trial court to enter orders which preserve the status quo, or otherwise protect the rights of the parties pending appeal, but does not give the trial court authority to enter an order which alters the rights granted, or created by the original order. Rivera v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 34 Colo. App. 152, 529 P.2d 1347 (1974). By virtue of this rule, a trial court can, in its discretion, suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction, so long as an appellate court has not granted a supersedeas. Woitchek v. Isenberg, 151 Colo. 544, 379 P.2d 392 (1963). Injunctive power of the court has been long recognized. At least since 1887, it has been recognized statutorily that trial courts can more speedily, economically, and satisfactorily consider applications for injunctive relief in actions which are pending in an appellate court. Woitchek v. Isenberg, 151 Colo. 544, 379 P.2d 392 (1963). An obvious reason for recognizing the court's injunctive power is that trial courts are equipped to conduct the trial process. Woitchek v. Isenberg, 151 Colo. 544, 379 P.2d 392 (1963). But injunctive proceedings may not be invoked to bring about a forfeiture of a property right. Injunction and forfeiture cannot be equated; they are separate and distinct concepts. Woitchek v. Isenberg, 151 Colo. 544, 379 P.2d 392 (1963). V. Stay Upon Appeal. Annotator's note. Since section (d) of this rule is similar to § 428 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, relevant cases construing § 428 have been included in the annotations to this rule. A trial court retains jurisdiction in order to enforce a judgment it has rendered where defendant does not move for stay of execution or file a supersedeas bond. Oman v. Morris, 28 Colo. App. 124, 471 P.2d 430 (1970). Where a defendant fails to take these affirmative steps necessary in order to prevent the trial court from making a final disposition of the case in accordance with its findings, no error is committed by a trial court in entering a final decree confirming a title after an appeal has issued. Failure of defendant to stay the execution means that the trial court retains jurisdiction, and its actions subsequent to the issuance of the notice of appeal are fully within its powers. Oman v. Morris, 28 Colo. App. 124, 471 P.2d 430 (1970). Effect of trial court's failure to rule on motion. In foreclosure action, where motion for stay under section (d) of this rule and for waiver of the supersedeas bond requirement had been filed in the trial court but not determined at time of appeal, and where a request for stay under C.A.R. 8 had not been filed in the court of appeals, title to secured property vested in certificate holder and appeal was moot. Mount Carbon Metro. Dist. v. Lake George Co., 847 P.2d 254 (Colo. App. 1993). Stay may be issued before or after appeal filed. The trial court may issue a stay either before or after a notice of appeal is filed. Odd Fellows Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. City of Englewood, 667 P.2d 1358 (Colo. 1983). The filing of a supersedeas bond is a prerequisite for obtaining an order staying execution of judgment pending appeal under paragraph (d) of this section. Muck v. District Ct., 814 P.2d 869 (Colo. 1991). The issuance of a writ of "supersedeas" is the consideration for the giving of a "supersedeas" bond. Buchhalter v. Solomon, 78 Colo. 227, 241 P. 718 (1925). There can be no "supersedeas" where one cannot furnish bond therefor. Riant Amusement Co. v. Bailey, 80 Colo. 65, 249 P. 7 (1926). A "supersedeas" writ may not be granted on an invalid bond. Buchhalter v. Solomon, 78 Colo. 227, 241 P. 718 (1925). Trial court erred in entering an order staying all proceedings relative to enforcement of family support order without requiring appellant to file supersedeas bond. Muck v. District Ct., 814 P.2d 869 (Colo. 1991).

For directed verdicts, see C.R.C.P. 50; for motions for post-trial relief, see C.R.C.P. 59; for when bond not required, see C.A.R. 8(c); for stays pending appeal, see C.A.R. 8; for judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties, see C.R.C.P. 54(b).