Opinion
Case No. 2D19-4643
04-21-2021
Amy L. WRIGHT, Appellant, v. Sarah NORRIS, individually and OBO, S.R., D.R., and S.D., children, Appellee.
Louise Hanaoka of Louise Hanaoka, LLC, Punta Gorda, for Appellant. No appearance for Appellee.
Louise Hanaoka of Louise Hanaoka, LLC, Punta Gorda, for Appellant.
No appearance for Appellee.
NORTHCUTT, Judge.
Sarah Norris obtained a final injunction for protection against stalking directed to Amy Wright. We reverse because the injunction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence.
Norris petitioned for the injunction pursuant to section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2019), alleging, inter alia, that Wright had defamed her character online and sent false messages to her business associates. At the evidentiary hearing on the petition, Norris testified that several years earlier Wright yelled at her in a Walmart. She also asserted that Wright made internet posts alleging that Norris was a drug dealer and a stripper. Norris knew of these posts because "a lot of people let [her] know." Norris complained that text messages were sent to her phone through applications that shielded the sender's phone number. She claimed to know that Wright sent the messages because the father of one of Norris's children, who also fathered one of Wright's children, received the same messages within five or ten minutes. Norris did not testify to the content of the text messages that she received, and the trial court sustained Wright's hearsay objection to the content of the messages sent to her child's father. Norris also testified that Wright made what she considered a threatening Facebook post, although it was not directed at a particular person.
As this court observed in Branson v. Rodriguez-Linares, 143 So. 3d 1070, 1071–72 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) :
Stalking occurs when a person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks" another. § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). Cf. § 784.048(3) (aggravated stalking occurs when a person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person and makes a
credible threat to that person" (emphasis added)).
"Cyberstalk" means to engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1)(d).
The emails or messages that Wright allegedly sent to third parties, such as Norris's business associates, did not constitute cyberstalking because they were not addressed to Norris herself. See Scott v. Blum, 191 So. 3d 502, 504–05 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Wright's online posts also did not meet the definition of cyberstalking because they were not directed at a specific person. See Horowitz v. Horowitz, 160 So. 3d 530, 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
Because Norris did not testify to the content of the text messages Wright allegedly sent (which Norris also could not authenticate as having been sent by Wright), we cannot, and the trial court could not, conclude that they constituted cyberstalking. See Poindexter v. Springer, 898 So. 2d 204, 207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("Without a record or an adequately developed transcript describing what was contained in the letter, and without a finding by the trial court, there is no way for this court to determine whether, as Springer insists, Poindexter was sending her 'threatening, menacing' letters in the literal sense or whether that is simply her interpretation of his threats to sue her."). Finally, Norris's testimony that Wright yelled at her in a Walmart a few years earlier simply was insufficient to support issuance of the injunction. See Gill v. Gill, 50 So. 3d 772, 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("[A]n isolated incident of domestic violence that occurred years before a petition for injunction is filed will not usually support the issuance of an injunction in the absence of additional current allegations.").
Because the injunction was unsupported by competent, substantial evidence, we reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate the injunction.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
SILBERMAN and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.