Opinion
CR-19-0113
12-16-2020
John Michael WOODRUFF v. STATE of Alabama
S. Randall Horton, Birmingham, for appellant. Steve Marshall, att'y gen., and Laura I. Cuthbert, asst. att'y gen., for appellee.
S. Randall Horton, Birmingham, for appellant.
Steve Marshall, att'y gen., and Laura I. Cuthbert, asst. att'y gen., for appellee.
MINOR, Judge.
In this appeal, we address whether the definition of "conviction" in § 15-20A-4(4), Ala. Code 1975, part of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("the ASORCNA"), includes a municipal-court conviction appealed to a circuit court for a trial de novo. For the reasons below, we hold that it does.
Facts and Procedural History
The Alabaster Municipal Court convicted John Michael Woodruff on April 4, 2018, of indecent exposure. Woodruff appealed for a trial de novo in the Shelby Circuit Court. See Rule 30.1(a), Ala. R. Crim. P. In May 2018, while Woodruff's appeal was pending, a Shelby County grand jury indicted Woodruff for failing to register under § 15-20A-10(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, part of the ASORCNA.
Two months later, Woodruff moved to dismiss the indictment. Citing Rule 30.1(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., Woodruff argued that, because he had perfected his request for a trial de novo, he did not have a "conviction" as that term is defined in § 15-20A-4(4). The State responded, arguing that Woodruff's interpretation of Rule 30.1 and § 15-20A-4(4) was wrong. Several months later, the circuit court denied Woodruff's motion to dismiss.
Woodruff also asserted that he had not been told he had to register under the ASORCNA.
In November 2019, Woodruff, under a negotiated agreement, pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, see § 15-20A-10, Ala. Code 1975. Woodruff reserved for appeal the issues raised in his motion to dismiss the indictment. The circuit court sentenced Woodruff to 10 years’ imprisonment, but the court suspended that sentence and placed Woodruff on 2 years’ probation.
The State erroneously argues on appeal that Woodruff did not reserve any issues for appeal. The parties attached to the guilty plea a five-page document outlining the issues Woodruff reserved for appeal. (C. 126.) At the beginning of the guilty-plea hearing, the circuit court acknowledged that Woodruff had reserved those issues for appeal. (R. 51.)
Discussion
On appeal, Woodruff argues: (1) the definition of "conviction" in § 15-20A-4(4) does not include his municipal-court conviction because he had appealed that conviction to the circuit court for a trial de novo, and (2) the indictment was defective because it did not allege facts showing that Woodruff knowingly violated the ASORCNA.
I.
Woodruff pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under § 15-20A-10(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. That subsection provides:
"Immediately upon release from incarceration, or immediately upon conviction if the adult sex offender is not incarcerated,
the adult sex offender shall appear in person and register all required registration information with local law enforcement in each county in which the adult sex offender resides or intends to reside, accepts or intends to accept employment, accepts or intends to accept a volunteer position, and begins or intends to begin school attendance."
(Emphasis added.) Section 15-20A-4(4) defines a "conviction" for purposes of the ASORCNA as
"[a] verdict or finding of guilt as the result of a trial, a plea of guilty, a plea of nolo contendere, or an Alford plea regardless of whether adjudication was withheld. Conviction includes, but is not limited to, a conviction in a United States territory, a conviction in a federal or military tribunal, including a court martial conducted by the Armed Forces of the United States, a conviction for an offense committed on an Indian reservation or other federal property, a conviction in any state of the United States or a conviction in a foreign country if the foreign country's judicial system is such that it satisfies minimum due process set forth in the guidelines under Section 111(5)(B) of Public Law 109-248. Cases on appeal are deemed convictions until reversed or overturned."
The following principles guide our interpretation of a statute:
"In determining the meaning of a statute, this Court looks to the plain meaning of the words as written by the legislature. As we have said:
" ‘ "Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect." ’
" Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala. 1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992) ); see also Tuscaloosa County Comm'n v. Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass'n, 589 So. 2d 687, 689 (Ala. 1991) ; Coastal States Gas Transmission Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 524 So. 2d 357, 360 (Ala. 1988) ; Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Hartselle, 460 So. 2d 1219, 1223 (Ala. 1984) ; Dumas Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 431 So. 2d 534, 536 (Ala. 1983) ; Town of Loxley v. Rosinton Water, Sewer, & Fire Protection Auth., Inc., 376 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 1979). It is true that when looking at a statute we might sometimes think that the ramifications of the words are inefficient or unusual. However, it is our job to say what the law is, not to say what it should be. Therefore, only if there is no rational way to interpret the words as stated will we look beyond those words to determine legislative intent. To apply a different policy would turn this Court into a legislative body, and doing that, of course, would be utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. See Ex parte T.B., 698 So. 2d 127, 130 (Ala. 1997)."
DeKalb Cnty. LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 275–76 (Ala. 1998). A straightforward reading of § 15-20A-4(4) includes Woodruff's municipal-court conviction for indecent exposure. A conviction in a municipal court is "[a] verdict or finding of guilt" in a "state of the United States" § 15-20A-4(4). And that unambiguously includes a case on appeal: "Cases on appeal are deemed convictions until reversed or overturned." (Emphasis added.)
Woodruff does not dispute that a conviction for indecent exposure is listed in § 15-20A-5(9) as subjecting a defendant to the requirements of the ASORCNA. Section 15-20A-5(9) provides:
"Indecent exposure, as provided by Section 13A-6-68, provided that on a first conviction or adjudication of a sex offense, the sex offender is only subject to registration and verification pursuant to this chapter. On a second or subsequent conviction or adjudication of a sex offense, if the second or subsequent conviction or adjudication does not arise out of the same set of facts and circumstances as the first conviction or adjudication, the sex offender shall comply with all requirements of this chapter. A juvenile sex offender adjudicated of a violation of indecent exposure is presumed to be exempt from this chapter after the juvenile has been counseled on the dangers of the conduct for which he or she was adjudicated delinquent unless the sentencing court makes a determination that the juvenile sex offender is to be subject to this chapter."
The record does not show if this was Woodruff's first conviction for indecent exposure.
The phrase "includes, but is not limited to," which precedes the list of jurisdictions from which a "conviction" may arise under § 15-20A-4(4), shows that the list is nonexhaustive. See, e.g., Bonds v. State, 205 So. 3d 1270, 1275 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) (" ‘ "In another context, this Court explained that the word ‘ "including" is not to be regarded as limitational or restrictive, but merely as a particular specification of something to be included or to constitute a part of some other thing.’ Sims v. Moore, 288 Ala. 630, 635, 264 So. 2d 484, 487 (1972) (emphasis added). ‘ "Including" is not a word of limitation, rather it is a word of enlargement, and in ordinary significance also may imply that something else has been given beyond the general language which precedes it.’ Id. (emphasis added)." ’ Bon Harbor, LLC v. United Bank, 53 So. 3d 82, 93 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Southeastern Meats of Pelham, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 895 So. 2d 909, 913 (Ala. 2004) ). Cf. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 132 (2012) (‘[T]he word include does not ordinarily introduce an exhaustive list ....’).").
Woodruff argues, however, that an appeal of a municipal-court conviction "is not an appeal in the common-sense meaning, but merely a defendant's request for his constitutional right to a jury trial." Based on that, he argues "that the last sentence of § 15-20A-4(4), ‘cases on appeal are deemed convictions until reversed or overturned,’ does not apply to a perfected request for a trial de novo." (Woodruff's brief, pp. 8-9.)
In support of his position, Woodruff cites Rule 30.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., Ex parte Sorsby, 12 So. 3d 139 (Ala. 2007), § 15-20A-40(g), Ala. Code 1975, and certain dictionary definitions of "appeal" and "trial de novo." Those authorities, however, do not give Woodruff a right to relief.
Rule 30.1(a) provides:
"A defendant convicted of an offense in a municipal court or a district court shall have the right to appeal the judgment, within fourteen (14) days of the date of the judgment or the denial of a timely filed post-judgment motion, to the circuit court for a trial de novo."
(Emphasis added.) In Ex parte Sorsby, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a defendant who appeals from a guilty-plea conviction in a municipal or district court for a trial de novo in the circuit court does not have to reserve any issues for appeal or move to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court stated: "The appellate authority of the circuit court provided by statute [see, e.g., §§ 12-12-70(b) and (d), 12-12-71, and 12-11-30, Ala. Code 1975,] allows for an appeal from the district or the municipal court to the circuit court for a trial de novo." 12 So. 3d at 148. The Court reasoned that applying rules such as the requirement in Rule 14.4(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., that a defendant reserve an issue for appeal or the requirement in Rule 26.9(b)(4), Ala. R. Crim. P., that a defendant move to withdraw his guilty plea before proceeding with a trial de novo in the circuit court would limit the statutory jurisdiction of the circuit court—something the Supreme Court lacks the authority to do through its rulemaking power. Id.
In discussing a trial de novo, the Supreme Court stated:
"A trial de novo is ‘[a] new trial on the entire case—that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law—conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance.’ Black's Law Dictionary 1544 (8th ed. 1990). In Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Lancaster, 121 Ala. 471, 473–74, 25 So. 733, 735 (1899), this Court stated:
" ‘[After appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace] the case is to be tried in the circuit court de novo; or, in other words, as if no trial had ever been had, and just as if it had originated in the circuit court. The appeal when taken operates to annul and vacate the entire judgment of the justice of the peace, and not a part only of the judgment. The judgment of the justice cannot upon the trial in the circuit court be looked to as a matter of evidence or of estoppel. "The judgment of the justice is not reversed or affirmed; but a new, distinct, and independent judgment, as may be required by the merits shown on the trial, is rendered by the city or circuit court." Abraham v. Alford, 64 Ala. 281 [(1879)] ; Harsh et al. v. Heflin, 76 Ala. 499 [(1884)].’
"(Final emphasis added.) At the district court level, whether Sorsby is found guilty following a bench trial, stipulates to the facts as alleged by the State in order to be found guilty, or pleads guilty, review in the circuit court is by trial de novo without any consideration being given to the prior proceedings in the district court."
12 So. 3d at 146. Relying on this language from Ex parte Sorsby, Woodruff argues that the appeal of his municipal-court conviction did away with that conviction and that he thus had no duty to register under the ASORCNA. Woodruff's reliance on Ex parte Sorsby, however, is misplaced.
As stated above, Ex parte Sorsby turned on the Alabama Supreme Court's understanding that it could not use its rulemaking power to limit the statutory jurisdiction of the circuit court to conduct a trial de novo. Had the challenged requirements in Ex parte Sorsby been statutorily created, the Court presumably would have ruled differently. That is, the legislature could have done by statute what the Court could not do by rule. And the requirements of the ASORCNA and the definition of "conviction" in § 15-20A-4(4) at issue are contained in statutes, not court rules. Woodruff does not explain how those requirements limit a circuit court's ability to conduct a trial de novo. But even if those requirements limit the circuit court's jurisdiction to conduct a trial de novo, the limitations on the rulemaking authority of the Alabama Supreme Court do not apply to the legislature.
Ex parte Sorsby also did not turn on the sentence quoted from Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Lancaster, 121 Ala. 471, 473–74, 25 So. 733, 735 (1899), that an appeal for a trial de novo "operates to annul and vacate the entire judgment of the justice of the peace, and not a part only of the judgment." And changes in the law since the Alabama Supreme Court made that statement in 1899 show that it is no longer an accurate description of what happens to a municipal court's judgment of conviction when a defendant appeals to the circuit court for a trial de novo. In Hulsey v. State, 866 So. 2d 1180 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003), this Court examined the circumstances under which the circuit court could dismiss a defendant's appeal for a trial de novo. This Court explained that an appeal for a trial de novo does not vacate the judgment of the municipal court for all purposes:
"The trial court erred in granting the State's motion to dismiss Hulsey's appeal to the circuit court for a trial de novo. ‘Except as provided in Section 12–12–72[, Ala. Code 1975,] and in subsection (e) of Section 12–15–120, [Ala. Code 1975,] all appeals from final judgments of the district court shall be to the circuit court for trial de novo.’ § 12–12–71, Ala. Code 1975. The statute and rule governing an appeal from a municipal or district court for a trial de novo provide for dismissal of the appeal only upon the appellant's request or upon the appellant's failure to appear for trial. See Rule 30.5(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., and § 12–14–70(e) and (g), Ala. Code 1975. We can find no authority permitting the dismissal of a de novo appeal on motion of the State other than for failure of the appellant to appear at trial. ‘ " ‘The plain wording of both § 12–14–70 [(e) and (g), Ala. Code 1975,] and Rule 30.5(b) [, Ala. R. Crim. P.,] supports the appellant's contention that the circuit court has authority to dismiss a de novo appeal only when the defendant fails to appear for trial.’ " ’ Mayes v. State, 710 So. 2d 537, 538 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (failure to appear at ‘plea day’) (emphasis omitted) (quoting McLemore v. State, 686 So. 2d 492, 493 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996), quoting in turn Riddle v. State, 641 So. 2d 1316, 1318 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) ).
"Moreover, upon proper dismissal of the appeal to the circuit court, the cause is to be remanded to the lower court ‘for enforcement of the lower court judgment.’ Rule 30.5(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.; see § 12–12–70(e) and (g), Ala. Code 1975; Gormandy v. City of Mobile, 830 So. 2d 52 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) ( Rule 30.5, Ala. R. Crim. P., must be understood to be mandatory and not permissive); Ex parte Hilburn, 591 So. 2d 8, 12 (Ala. 1991) (de novo appeal to the circuit court was dismissed for failure to appear and the cause remanded to the municipal court).
"Additionally, until the trial de novo begins in the circuit court an appellant retains the right to submit to the lower court's ruling.
" ‘[A] defendant, in an appeal from a conviction in the municipal court or district court for a trial de novo in the circuit court, has the right, prior to the empaneling of a jury or to the production of evidence in the circuit court, to submit to the judgment of the municipal court through the dismissal of his appeal and the reinstatement of the original judgment.’
" Ex parte Hilburn, 591 So. 2d at 12.
"Thus, although ‘ "[a] trial de novo means that the slate is wiped clean and a trial in the Circuit Court is had without any consideration being given to prior proceedings in another court," ’ Ex parte Dison, 469 So. 2d 662, 665 (Ala. 1984) (quoting Yarbrough v. City of Birmingham, 353 So. 2d 75, 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) ), [overruled on other grounds, City of Dothan v. Holloway, 501 So. 2d 1136 (Ala. 1986),] an appeal for a trial de novo does not mean that the slate is thrown away."
Hulsey v. State, 866 So. 2d 1180, 1185–86 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (emphasis added). See also Ex parte Hilburn, 591 So. 2d 8, 10-12 (Ala. 1991) (discussing the legislative history of § 12-14-70, Ala. Code 1975, and the effect of a circuit court's dismissal of an appeal from a municipal-court judgment).
The use of the word "cases" in § 15-20A-4(4) also conflicts with Woodruff's position. Under § 15-20A-4(4), "[c]ases on appeal are deemed convictions until reversed or overturned." (Emphasis added.) Thus, even if Woodruff were correct that the appeal of a municipal-court conviction "vacates" or "annuls" the municipal judgment of conviction, the case on appeal still exists. And, under § 15-20A-4(4), the "case" is "deemed" a conviction for purposes of the ASORCNA. Black's Law Dictionary 266 (11th ed. 2019) defines "case" as "[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy at law or in equity < the parties settled the case>." Black's Law Dictionary 523 defines "deem" as: "To treat (something) as if (1) it were really something else, or (2) it has qualities that it does not have < although the document was not in fact signed until April 21, it explicitly states that it must be deemed to have been signed on April 14>."
Black's Law Dictionary 523-24 (11th ed. 2019) also states:
" ‘ "Deem" has been traditionally considered to be a useful word when it is necessary to establish a legal fiction either positively by "deeming" something to be what it is not or negatively by "deeming" something not to be what it is ....’ G.C. Thornton, Legislative Drafting 99 (4th ed. 1996)."
(Emphasis added.)
Woodruff's reliance on § 15-20A-40(g) and certain definitions of "appeal" and "trial de novo" is unavailing. Woodruff quotes the definition of "appeal" as "[t]he complaint to a superior court of an injustice done or error committed by an inferior one, whose judgment or decision the court above is called upon to correct or reverse" and the definition of "trial de novo" as "[a] new trial on the entire case—that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law—conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance." Woodruff argues: "In light of those ... definitions [of appeal and trial de novo], it is even more abundantly clear that the Alabama legislature did not seek to include municipal convictions where a trial de novo has been perfected, when one looks at [ § 15-20A-40(g) ] ...." (Woodruff's brief, p. 9.)
Woodruff includes a reference to Black's Law Dictionary for this definition of "appeal." The definition appears to be from the Internet Web site www.thelawdictionary.org, not from Black's Law Dictionary. Immediately preceding the definition that Woodruff quotes is the phrase "in civil practice." Woodruff also omits from the definition the sentence, "[A]ppeal is sometimes used to denote the nature of appellate jurisdiction, as distinguished from original jurisdiction, without any particular regard to the mode by which a cause is transmitted to a superior jurisdiction." See http://www.thelawdictionary.org/appeal (last accessed December 14, 2020).
Subsection 15-20A-40(g), a part of the ASORCNA, provides: "For the purpose of this section, the term conviction or adjudication shall mean a final conviction or adjudication, regardless of whether the conviction or adjudication is on appeal." (Emphasis added.) Unlike the definition of "conviction" in § 15-20A-4(4), this definition includes the adjective "final." Woodruff argues that the inclusion of "final" shows that the legislature did not intend for a municipal-court conviction on appeal to be subject to the ASORCNA.
But the definition in § 15-20A-40(g) is limited to that section—i.e., section 40 of Chapter 20A of Title 15. Among other things, that section imposes a duty on clerks to "forward a certified copy of a sex offender's adjudication or conviction to the Alabama State Law Enforcement Agency within 30 days of receipt of the order of adjudication or conviction," § 15-20A-40(b), Ala. Code 1975, and imposes certain requirements on the Alabama State Law Enforcement Agency, see § 15-20A-40(d) - (e). Section 40 does not impose any particular requirement on an individual like Woodruff who has been convicted of a sex offense. Whatever difference in meaning the legislature intended by including "final" in the definition of "conviction" in 15-20A-40(g), that section does not apply to Woodruff and does not support Woodruff's argument.
The definition of "conviction" in § 15-20A-4(4), however, applies generally to the entire chapter—i.e., Chapter 20A of Title 15–which includes the section of the ASORCNA that Woodruff violated, § 15-20A-10(a)(1). That section applies "immediately upon conviction if the adult sex offender is not incarcerated." (Emphasis added.) As stated above, the definition of conviction in § 15-20A-4(4) plainly includes a municipal-court conviction, even if that conviction—or the "case" that led to it—is on appeal.
Woodruff also briefly argues that the definition of "conviction" in § 15-20A-4(4) is unconstitutional as applied to him under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Woodruff offers little in support of this argument. In any event, it lacks merit.
Woodruff presented these issues in a pro se motion for a judgment of acquittal he filed after the circuit court had denied the motion to dismiss that Woodruff's counsel filed. Out of caution, we address those issues, but we question whether they are properly before us. Cf. Trimble v. State, 157 So. 3d 1001, 1006 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) ("[D]isregarding a defendant's pro se pleading or motion is not generally subject to criticism when the defendant is represented by counsel. See Pardue v. State, 571 So. 2d 320, 329-30 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), reversed on other grounds, 571 So. 2d 333 (Ala. 1990).... [C]ourts in other jurisdictions have held that a defendant is not entitled to file pro se pleadings or motions when represented by counsel. See Hutchinson v. Florida, 677 F.3d 1097, 1107 (11th Cir. 2012) ; Martin v. State, 797 P.2d 1209, 1217 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (‘The trial court therefore has the authority to require a defendant who is represented by counsel to act through counsel.’). See also cases cited in Salser v. State, 582 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The only exception to this rule applies to pro se motions requesting discharge of counsel. See Finfrock v. State, 84 So. 3d 431, 433-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).").
" ‘In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, we "approach the question with every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity, and seek to sustain rather than strike down the enactment of a coordinate branch of the government." ’ Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 159 (1991) (quoting Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9, 18 So. 2d 810, 815 (1944) ). Overcoming that presumption is a heavy burden, which is borne by the party challenging the validity of the statute. Densmore v. Jefferson County, 813 So. 2d 844, 856 (Ala. 2001) ; Jefferson County Bd. of Health v. City of Bessemer, 293 Ala. 237, 301 So. 2d 551 (1974).
"....
" ‘Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed. 2d 67 (1999). However, ‘ "[m]ere difficulty of ascertaining its meaning or the fact that it is susceptible of different interpretations will not render a statute ... too vague or uncertain to be enforced." ’ Scott & Scott, Inc. v. City of Mountain Brook, 844 So. 2d 577, 589 (Ala. 2002) (quoting City of Birmingham v. Samford, 274 Ala. 367, 372, 149 So. 2d 271, 275 (1963) ). ‘[F]ew words possess the precision of mathematical
symbols, most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity with which legislators can spell out prohibitions.’ Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340, 72 S. Ct. 329, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952). ‘Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded. Nor is it unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.’ Id. (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
"Moreover, ‘[a] statute is not vague when the meaning of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.’ Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 125, 389 A.2d 341, 347 (1978) (emphasis added)."
Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. Racing Ass'n, Inc., 960 So. 2d 599, 615-16 (Ala. 2006).
Woodruff has not shown that the definition of "conviction" in § 15-20A-4(4) is unconstitutionally vague. As shown above, the plain meaning of the language in § 15-20A-4(4) includes a conviction in municipal court. Section 15-20A-4(4) unambiguously includes "cases on appeal," which includes a "case" appealed from municipal court to circuit court. Woodruff has no right to relief.
II.
Woodruff challenges the factual basis of his guilty plea. He argues the State did not provide an adequate factual basis for the allegation that he "knowingly" violated the ASORCNA.
In support of this claim, Woodruff makes two arguments. First, he argues that no one told him he had to register under the ASORCNA while his appeal was pending in the circuit court. He cites § 15-20A-9(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, which imposes a duty on a "responsible agency" to "inform the adult sex offender of his or her duty to register and, instruct the adult sex offender to read and sign a form stating that the duty to register has been explained."
Section 15-20A-4(22) defines "responsible agency" as
"[t]he person or government entity whose duty it is to obtain information from a sex offender and to transmit that information to the Alabama State Law Enforcement Agency, police departments, and sheriffs. ... For a sex offender being released from a municipal jail, the responsible agency is the chief of police of that municipality."
Second, Woodruff cites an apparent disagreement between the Shelby County District Attorney and the Office of Prosecution Services in their respective opinions about whether Woodruff had to register as a sex offender pending Woodruff's appeal of his municipal conviction for a trial de novo in the circuit court, and he argues that the disagreement between those entities shows that he could not have knowingly violated the ASORCNA. Woodruff does not assert that he knew about that disagreement or that he relied on it to make a decision not to register under the ASORCNA.
Section 12-17-230, Ala. Code 1975, established the Office of Prosecution of Services "to assist the prosecuting attorneys throughout the state in their efforts against criminal activity." § 12-17-230(b).
Woodruff bases this claim on this statement in the State's response to his motion to dismiss:
"[O]ut of a sense of ethical duty and honesty, the State will acknowledge that it has consulted with the Office of Prosecution Services, specifically individuals in that office responsible for its division dealing with sexual offense, and that those individuals concur with [Woodruff] in his assessment that a conviction on appeal from a municipal court is not a conviction. However, the argument of these individuals is not grounded in any [caselaw] or statute that would address this issue outright, and is instead the result of their statutory interpretation. Thus, the State believes its position is the most logical interpretation of this statute in question ...."
(C. 34.)
As our opinion holds, the definition of "conviction" in § 15-20A-4(4) unambiguously includes Woodruff's municipal-court conviction. Thus, any disagreement between the Shelby County District Attorney and the Office of Prosecution Services is irrelevant.
These challenges to the factual basis of his guilty plea are not properly before us. Although Woodruff reserved these issues when he pleaded guilty, he did not present them to the circuit court and obtain an adverse ruling on them before he pleaded guilty. See, e.g., Teasley v. State, 704 So. 2d 104, 105 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) ("[T]he failure to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea is not jurisdictional; therefore, such a failure must be raised in the trial court ... or it is not preserved.").
In Mitchell v. State, 913 So. 2d 501, 505 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005), this Court explained the need to both preserve and reserve an issue for appeal:
"Reserving the right to appeal an issue is not the equivalent of preserving an issue for appellate review. To preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue must be timely raised and specifically presented to the trial court and an adverse ruling obtained. The purpose of requiring an issue to be preserved for review is to allow the trial court the first opportunity to correct any error. See, e.g., Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So. 2d 793 (Ala. 2003). To reserve an issue for review, a defendant must express his or her intention, before the guilty plea is entered, to appeal the issue in question. Because a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects occurring before the entry of the plea, by entering a guilty plea a defendant is presumed to have abandoned all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the plea unless he or she expressly conditions the plea on the right to appeal the issue in question by expressly reserving it before entry of the plea. See, e.g., Prim v. State, 616 So. 2d 381 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). Reserving an issue for appeal avoids the waiver effect of the guilty plea, but it does not preserve the issue for appellate review. Thus, in the guilty-plea context, an issue relating to a defect occurring before the entry of the plea must be both preserved by a timely and specific motion and/or objection and an adverse ruling from the trial court and reserved for appeal before the entry of the plea."
Because the record does not show that Woodruff preserved his challenges to the factual basis of his guilty plea, they are not properly before us. Mitchell, supra.
Conclusion
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Windom, P.J., and McCool and Cole, JJ., concur. Kellum, J., concurs in the result.