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holding that dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing was on the merits and "the dismissed claims were finally determined"
Summary of this case from Sims v. City of MadisonvilleOpinion
No. 14-05-00055-CV
Memorandum Opinion filed March 16, 2006.
On Appeal from the 280th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2004-18090.
Affirmed.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices YATES and ANDERSON.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Joyce Wolter appeals the trial court's dismissal of her case against appellees for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failing to post bond as a vexatious litigant. She also appeals the trial court's designation of her as a vexatious litigant. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Wolter is a former member, trustee, and elder of Heights Presbyterian Church ("H.P.C."). H.P.C. is a member church within the Presbytery of New Covenant, which is part of the denominational Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). The Presbyterian Church is a hierarchical organization governed by a three-part constitution. The second part of the constitution is the Book of Order, which establishes representative governing bodies within the church.
In the mid-1990s, H.P.C. received a $1,000,000 bequest from a deceased member, John Fakes. Around 2001, H.P.C.'s governing body decided to sponsor the Independent Heights Project (the "Heights Project"), a Housing and Urban Development ("H.U.D.") project benefitting low-income senior citizens. Wolter, who opposed sponsorship of the Heights Project, accused several defendants of converting $600,000 from the Fakes fund and financially obligating H.P.C. to the Heights project. Instead of seeking relief from the Presbyterian ecclesiastical courts, Wolter filed suit in the 280th District Court of Harris County through her son John WorldPeace, an attorney who was subsequently disbarred. In her suit, Wolter made multiple claims against a number of defendants, most of whom were H.P.C. members. The majority of Wolter's claims were based on alleged violations of the Book of Order by members of H.P.C.
In her eleventh amended original petition, Wolter claimed several defendants "converted and embezzled $600,000 of the Fakes bequest and illegally obligated Heigths [sic] Presbyterian Church (HPC) to the Independence [sic] Heights Project (IHP)[,] a corrupt HUD project." Specifically, she claimed certain defendants purchased property in "a depressed, high crime, Black neighborhood which runs rampant with prostitution" and obligated H.P.C. to build a low-income retirement home there without the authority required by the Book of Order. According to Wolter, one of the defendants then called "an illegal, by church rules, special session meeting" to vote on the Heights Project. Consequently, Wolter decided to file suit as a then-trustee of H.P.C.
Wolter asserted claims for various acts of fraud and conspiracy, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, DTPA violations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, and breach of contract. She also sought the removal of a trustee and sanctions for "frivolous and groundless" acts of defendants and their attorneys.
Because Wolter's lawsuit disrupted the church, H.P.C. created an ad hoc administrative commission to investigate her claims. The commission retained an accounting firm to perform a financial review of H.P.C. and also conducted its own review of H.P.C.'s minutes and financial records for the preceding nine years. In addition to the financial review, the commission interviewed several church members, including Wolter. Based on this investigation, the commission determined that no money had been converted and that H.P.C. was not contractually obligated to finance the Heights Project. Thereafter, on September 16, 2003, the trial court dismissed all of Wolter's claims except her slander claims against two church members. In doing so, the trial court noted H.P.C. had its own procedure for dealing with Wolter's claims, the dismissed claims were probably beyond its jurisdiction, and Wolter probably lacked standing on those claims. The remaining slander claims were set for trial on April 7, 2004 and then dismissed for want of prosecution when Wolter failed to appear. However, Wolter subsequently refiled her entire lawsuit pro se, including the claims dismissed on September 16, 2003. Appellees filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that Wolter's claims were not subject to resolution in courts because they were ecclesiastical and also filed a motion to declare Wolter a vexatious litigant. After a hearing on August 20, 2004, the trial court granted appellees' plea to the jurisdiction on all but two claims, declared Wolter a vexatious litigant, and ordered her to post a $10,000 security bond by October 20, 2004 to continue with her remaining claims. When Wolter failed to timely post bond, the trial court dismissed her entire case. Wolter filed a motion for new trial that was overruled by operation of law, and this appeal followed.
The trial court noted that since filing her claim, Wolter had been removed as a trustee at H.P.C. and consequently "no longer has this thin claim to standing."
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
In her first issue, Wolter claims the trial court erred in granting appellees' plea to the jurisdiction. She argues the trial court had jurisdiction over her claims against the church because they relate to financial and not doctrinal matters.
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea seeking to defeat a plaintiff's claims regardless of merit by challenging a court's jurisdiction to hear the subject matter of the dispute. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000); Lacy v. Bassett, 132 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). When deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court looks to the plaintiff's petition and accepts its allegations as true but may also consider evidence relevant to resolving jurisdictional issues. Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555. To prevail, the defense must show that, even if all allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings are true, an incurable jurisdictional defect remains on the face of the pleadings that deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Brenham Hous. Auth. v. Davies, 158 S.W.3d 53, 56 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). We review de novo the trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Parks Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of Religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. Therefore, among other things, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). Although wrongs may exist in the ecclesiastical setting that the church administration may be unable to remedy, the preservation of free exercise of religion overshadows any inequities that may result from liberal application. Williams v. Gleason, 26 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). If the matter cannot be resolved without delving into a religious controversy, the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604. Further, in determining whether a suit is ecclesiastical or instead concerns property rights, torts, or criminal conduct, we look to the substance and effect of the plaintiff's petition rather than how the claims are labeled. See Williams, 26 S.W.3d at 59.
This case ultimately concerns whether H.P.C. members properly followed procedures prescribed by the Book of Order when they involved H.P.C. in the Heights Project. This is true despite Wolter's attempt to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction by framing her claims in civil terms. See id. Wolter's claims, viewed substantively and considering the effect of their resolution by a civil court, relate to how and when H.P.C. may spend its resources and are thus ecclesiastic in nature. We can neither resolve them nor accommodate Wolter's request to parse the Presbyterian Book of Order into secular and ecclesiastical components without delving into a religious controversy. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 604. Thus, we find that Wolter's claims are beyond the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we overrule Wolter's first issue.
VEXATIOUS LITIGANT
In her second and third issues, Wolter claims the trial court erred in declaring her a vexatious litigant and requiring her to post a security bond on her remaining claims pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. A trial court may designate a plaintiff a vexatious litigant if the defendant shows there is no reasonable probability the plaintiff will prevail in her suit and the plaintiff repeatedly attempted to relitigate issues in propria persona after those issues were finally determined against her. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 11.054 (Vernon 2002). We review a trial court's determination that a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant for abuse of discretion. See Nabelek v. Johnson, No. 04-03-00269-CV, 2005 WL 762944, at *2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Apr. 6, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.); Forist v. Vanguard Underwriters Ins. Co., 141 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
Litigating in propria persona is synonymous with litigating pro se. See Spiller v. Spiller, 21 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
Wolter contends that the trial court's dismissal of her claims for want of prosecution was not an adjudication of her rights and that merely refiling her claims cannot be the basis for declaring her a vexatious litigant. However, when the trial court dismissed all but Wolter's slander claims on September 16, 2003, it commented as follows:
The court is further convinced that there is no good faith claim that any money has been stolen, but rather a creative pleading on Plaintiff's part complaining that she does not like the way the money was spent. The Court has become convinced that it has no jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff's claims, and that such claims amount only to a question of whether it was a good idea or a bad idea for the church to get involved in a certain project.
This was a dismissal with prejudice of all but Wolter's slander claims, meaning the merits of the dismissed claims were finally determined. See Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 640 (Tex. 2004) ("[A] dismissal constitutes a final determination on the merits of the matter actually decided."). Nevertheless, Wolter refiled all her claims in propria persona on July 16, 2004. Considering the trial court's previous dismissal and its concurrent comments, we find it did not abuse its discretion in designating Wolter a vexatious litigant.
Wolter also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring her to file a security bond before proceeding with her lawsuit. However, in her brief Wolter provides no authority or argument for this issue; therefore, she waived it for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h) ("The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record."); McMahan v. Greenwood, 108 S.W.3d 467, 485 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (finding appellant waived claim by failing to present argument or authority on appeal). Accordingly, we overrule Wolter's second and third issues.
Even if Wolter had not waived this issue, the trial court, upon declaring Wolter a vexatious litigant, was required to order her to post security for appellees' benefit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 11.055(a) (Vernon 2002).
We affirm the trial court's judgment.