Opinion
Civil Action No. CCB-03-CV-2123
January 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff in this case, Ms. Jane Ann Williams, has sued the Board of Trustees of Frederick Community College ("FCC" or "the College") and various associated individuals alleging gender-based discrimination and retaliation during her tenure as an employee of the College. Counts one and two of her five-count First Amended Complaint (docket no. 3) are directed at the College itself; they allege violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and assert claims to compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest. The third count alleges violations of the United States Constitution by the individual members of the College's Board of Trustees and by senior officers who supervised Ms. Williams; in this count, Ms. Williams seeks compensatory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The fourth count asserts a state-law claim of defamation against one of the senior officers, Trenton Hightower, and the fifth alleges violations of the Maryland state constitution on the part of the board members and officers named in count three.
Ms. Williams filed her initial complaint on July 21, 2003. (Docket No. 1.) She later filed a Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (docket no. 3), which the court granted by paperless order on September 9, 2003 (docket no. 5). The memorandum accompanying that motion refers to a "second amended complaint," but this reference appears to be in error, as Ms. Williams has amended her complaint only once.
The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a motion to strike. (Docket Nos. 10 13.) The individual defendants seek dismissal of the third, fourth, and fifth counts on grounds that they fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted. The College seeks a ruling rejecting certain possible theories of liability under counts one and two. All the defendants seek to strike paragraphs of the complaint alleging that Mr. Hightower was engaged in a sexual relationship with one of Ms. Williams's subordinates-an allegation that the defendants claim may be stricken under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) because it is false and "scandalous." For the reasons that follow, the court will grant the first motion in part, deny the second motion, and grant the motion to strike.
BACKGROUND
According to the complaint, Ms. Williams was an employee of Frederick Community College between April 24, 2000 and December 13, 2002. (Compl. ¶ 6.) As Director of Information Technology Training in the Continuing Education and Customized Training ("CE/CT") Division, she reported to Doug Holt, the Associate Vice President of Adult and Continuing Education Programs, who in turn reported to Howard Smith, the Vice President for the CE/CT Division. ( Id. ¶¶ 9, 12.) While the President of the College, Dr. Patricia Stanley, who oversaw Mr. Smith's work, was a woman, all the senior officers of the CE/CT Division-Smith, Holt, and a third vice president, Trenton Hightower-were male. Ms. Williams alleges that her predecessor quit because the work environment was "hostile to women." ( Id. ¶ 8.)
Ms. Williams's work appears to have been satisfactory during her first year. Holt and Smith recommended Ms. Williams for two service awards in March and April 2001. ( Id. ¶ 11.) In June 2001, she received an excellent performance evaluation. ( Id.) Mr. Smith refused, however, to permit Ms. Williams to report formally to him, rather than Mr. Holt, though she worked primarily with Mr. Smith. The effect, Ms. Williams alleges, was to "ensure and maintain the status of three male vice presidents leading the CE/CT division." ( Id. ¶ 13.)
In the fall of 2001, Ms. Williams attempted to discipline a subordinate named Judy DeLuca, who, according to Ms. Williams, was involved in a sexual relationship with Mr. Hightower, the third CE/CT vice president. ( Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Ms. Williams claims that Hightower, Holt, and the FCC management "retaliated" against her because of her management of Ms. DeLuca. ( Id. ¶ 17.) In September 2001, Mr. Holt allegedly told a job candidate to inquire as to whether Ms. Williams was a "Flaming Bitch or not" before transferring to a position under Ms. Williams's supervision. ( Id. ¶ 18.) In February 2002, two days after meeting with Ms. Williams to discuss Ms. DeLuca's alleged performance problems, Mr. Holt issued a "letter of record" indicating that Ms. Williams would be removed from her supervisory responsibilities for a one-month period. ( Id. ¶ 21.) Ms. Williams alleges that Ms. DeLuca was being "rewarded for her sexual relationship with Hightower." ( Id. ¶ 17.) At some point (the complaint does not indicate when), Mr. Holt allegedly told Ms. Williams she would need "to 'lose her husband' in order to keep her job." ( Id. ¶ 22.)
As will be discussed in more detail below, the defendants deny that Mr. Hightower and Ms. DeLuca were romantically involved.
On March 21, 2002, Ms. Williams complained to Mark Farley, the FCC Vice President of Human Resources, who initiated an investigation. ( Id. ¶ 22.) Mr. Holt allegedly admitted to Mr. Farley that he made the "flaming bitch" comment, but claimed that he was "only joking." ( Id. ¶ 23.) After meeting with Mr. Farley and Dr. Stanley, the FCC President, Mr. Holt "was forced to write a letter of apology to Williams." ( Id. ¶ 24.) The letter was to remain in Mr. Holt's file for one year, at which point it would be destroyed unless there had been further misconduct. ( Id. ¶ 25.) Ms. Williams herself met with Dr. Stanley on April 25, 2002. ( Id. ¶ 26.) Dr. Stanley allegedly "threatened [Ms. Williams] for being outspoken," and referred to the three male vice presidents as "handsome hunks." ( Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Dr. Stanley advised Ms. Williams that the College would be making "changes to [Ms. Williams's] programs" ( id. ¶ 26), but Ms. Williams was excluded from subsequent discussions regarding the planned reorganization ( id. ¶ 28.) Ms. Williams complained to Mr. Parley about Dr. Stanley's conduct during the meeting ( id. ¶ 27), and on June 19, 2002, she filed a formal retaliation complaint ( id. ¶ 34).
On July 1, 2002, the College demoted Ms. Williams to part-time status, stripping her of health insurance coverage and tuition remission benefits. ( Id. ¶¶ 27, 43.) From then on, she reported to Mr. Hightower as well as Mr. Holt. ( Id.) Ms. Williams applied for several full-time positions for which she alleges she was qualified, but she was denied each one. ( Id. ¶¶ 37-38.) She also applied for adjunct teaching positions, again to no avail. ( Id. ¶ 39.)
On August 21, 2002, Ms. Williams received her first negative performance evaluation. ( Id. ¶ 45.) Mr. Holt gave her the lowest score possible. ( Id.) On September 10, 2002, Mr. Hightower and Ms. DeLuca "publicly made direct disparaging remarks about [Ms. Williams] during a division wide meeting, including calling her a liar." ( Id. ¶ 46.) In October 2002, Mr. Hightower entered Ms. Williams's office and "treated her disrespectfully," accusing her of "not doing work." ( Id. ¶ 50.) At some point during this period, the FCC management "disciplined" Ms. Williams "for approaching other female employees to substantiate her claim of retaliation and the events of the meeting." ( Id. ¶¶ 47-48.) Ms. Williams alleges that another employee was also disciplined for discussing the incident with Ms. Williams. ( Id. ¶ 49.)
On December 13, 2002, FCC terminated Ms. Williams, purportedly because she had not reported for work. ( Id. ¶ 51.) According to the complaint, FCC had previously agreed with Ms. Williams's attorney that Ms. Williams could resign in exchange for three months' paid leave, but the College allegedly changed its demands, requiring that Ms. Williams waive her right to sue the College for gender discrimination. ( Id. ¶ 51-52.) Ms. Williams alleges that she was "summarily terminated" when she refused to accept the waiver. ( Id. ¶ 52.)
ANALYSIS I.
The first motion under consideration is a motion to dismiss counts three, four, and five under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion has been brought by the twelve individual defendants named in the complaint: Dr. Stanley, Mr. Smith, Mr. Holt, Mr. Hightower, and the eight members who serve on FCC's Board of Trustees along with Dr. Stanley.
"The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). When ruling on such a motion, the court must "accept the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true," and "construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). Consequently, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted only when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. In addition, because the court is testing the legal sufficiency of the claims, the court is not bound by the plaintiff's legal conclusions. See, e.g., Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that the "presence . . . of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)" when the facts alleged do not support the legal conclusions); Labram v. Havel, 43 F.3d 918, 921 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice because the plaintiff's alleged facts failed to support her conclusion that the defendant owed her a fiduciary duty at common law).
A.
The defendants' first argument is that the complaint fails to allege any actionable wrongdoing on the part of the board members. The court agrees. Ms. Williams's allegations relate entirely to the conduct of her supervisors, Mr. Holt, Mr. Smith, Mr. Hightower, and Dr. Stanley. While it may be reasonable to suppose that the Board of Trustees was involved in the restructuring of Ms. Williams's department, there is nothing in the complaint to support the inference that any of the board members, apart from Dr. Stanley, were aware of the impact on Ms. Williams, much less intended to discriminate against her or deprive her of rights. Without such personal involvement, these defendants may not be liable in an individual capacity for the constitutional infractions alleged against them in counts three and five. See, e.g., Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 494 (4th Cir. 1990) (denying claims where there was no basis for respondeat superior liability and "no record evidence establishe[d] that any of the named defendants were personally involved with these incidents of alleged constitutional deprivations").
In addition, all the individual defendants are immune from liability for damages in their official capacities. Because a Maryland community college and its board of trustees are state agencies, see Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 763 A.2d 209, 230 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2000), the Eleventh Amendment precludes an unconsented federal court suit seeking damages or other retrospective remedies against FCC officials. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot County, 262 F. Supp.2d 608, 612 (D. Md. 2003); Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 430 (4th Cir. 1995); Regents of the Univ. of Col. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). The only remedy that this court has jurisdiction to impose on these officers in their official capacity is an injunction, if proved appropriate, barring future violations of federal law. See Lewis, 262 F. Supp.2d at 612.
While the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that state sovereign immunity does not preclude damages actions in state court based on state constitutional violations, see, e.g., Baltimore Police Dept. v. Cherkes, 780 A.2d 410, 436-37 (Md. 2001); Okwa v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 140 (Md. 2000), the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from adjudicating state law claims against state officers sued in their official capacity. See Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (holding that Eleventh Amendment principles preclude federal courts from enjoining state officers based on state law); Lewis, 262 F. Supp.2d at 611-14 (dismissing claims against individual state officers in their official capacities where the claims derived in part from state constitutional law).
Accordingly, counts three and five will be dismissed with respect to the eight board members other than Dr. Stanley in their personal capacities, and those counts will be dismissed with respect to all the individual defendants in their official capacities, except to the extent that count three seeks a prospective injunction.
B.
As to the remaining individual-capacity claims against Dr. Stanley, Mr. Smith, Mr. Hightower, and Mr. Holt, the defendants argue that Ms. Williams's allegations fail to indicate violations of any of the federal constitutional provisions cited in count three, namely, the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.
The defendants' First Amendment argument is persuasive: whereas the employment decisions of a public entity may infringe free speech rights if they impact speech on matters of public concern, Ms. Williams's complaints fall within the category of "personal grievances, complaints about conditions of employment, or expressions about other matters of personal interest" that do not receive First Amendment protection. McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). The due process claims also appear deficient: Ms. Williams has not alleged that Maryland law gave her the sort of "legitimate claim of entitlement" to her job that creates a protectible liberty or property interest under the Due Process Clause. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544, 553 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting an at-will public employee's claims to a property interest in her job); Pittman v. Wilson County, 839 F.2d 225, 226-29 (4th Cir. 1988) (same).
The equal protection claim, however, is another matter. Because gender-based decisions receive heightened scrutiny under the federal constitution, see, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996), it may be possible to assert equal protection claims against individual officers under § 1983 in tandem with a discrimination claim against a public employer under Title VII. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has interpreted these provisions to permit parallel claims. See, e.g., Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 804 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Because [the plaintiff] failed to establish that the defendants violated his rights under Title VII, his similar claims brought under sections 1981 and 1983 must also fail."); Gairola v. Va. Dept. of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985) (indicating that the elements of a prima facie claim are identical under Title VII and § 1983). As will be explained below, Ms. Williams has stated viable Title VII claims against the College. Thus, it is conceivable that the supervisors who were responsible for the College's actions may be liable under § 1983, and count three may not be dismissed as to these officers of the College.
C.
With respect to counts four and five, the state law claims, the defendants argue for dismissal on the grounds that Ms. Williams failed to comply with the notice requirements of Maryland's Local Government Tort Claims Act ("LGTCA"), Md. Code Ann., Cts. Jud. Proc. § 5-304 (2002). This argument is persuasive with respect to the defamation count but not the claims under the Maryland constitution.
The Eleventh Amendment does not appear to pose any barrier to federal court adjudication of these state law claims with respect to the defendants in their individual capacities. See Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1992); cf. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 111 n. 21 (distinguishing individual-capacity suits against officers claiming federal sovereign immunity).
Under the LGTCA, which applies to "all torts without distinction, including intentional and constitutional torts," Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 688 A.2d 448, 456 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1997); see also Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447, 466 n. 19 (Md. 1995), "an action for unliquidated damages may not be brought against a local government or its employees unless [a specified form of notice] is given within 180 days after the injury." Cts. Jud. Proc. § 5-304. The statute defines the term "local government" to include community colleges such as FCC. See Cts. Jud. Proc. § 5-301(d)(9). Thus, Ms. Williams should have provided notice to the FCC's "corporate authorities" either in person or by certified mail, Cts. Jud. Proc. § 5-304(b)(1), and "compliance with the notice provision should [have been] alleged in the complaint as a substantive element of the cause of action," Lyles v. Mongomery County, 162 F. Supp.2d 402, 404-05 (D. Md. 2001) (citing Madore v. Baltimore County, 367 A.2d 54, 56 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1976)). Despite failure to comply with the LGTCA's express terms, the requirements of the statute may be deemed satisfied when there has been "such communication that provides the State requisite and timely notice of facts and circumstances giving rise to the claim." Moore v. Norouzi, 807 A.2d 632, 643 (Md. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).
Apparently conceding that she has not delivered or mailed a formal notice, Ms. Williams makes two arguments to excuse her default. First, Ms. Williams contends that the statute does not apply in her case because she has alleged that the defendants "acted with malice or outside the scope of employment." (Pl.'s Resp. at 5.) The court is aware of no authority for such an exception to the LGTCA, and Ms. Williams has pointed to none; the one case she cites, Lee v. Cline, 814 A.2d 86 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002), cert. granted, 821 A.2d 370 (Md. 2003), deals instead with a claim of governmental immunity. See id. at 101-02. In the LTGCA context, there is "no exception to the notice requirement when a person is sued for conduct arising out of the person's employment." Lyles, 462 F. Supp.2d at 405 (rejecting the suggestion that no notice was required because the defendant employees were "alleged to have been acting outside the scope of their authority").
Ms. Williams's second argument is more compelling. Although she did not deliver a notice in person or send one by certified mail to the Board of Trustees, Ms. Williams argues that she gave adequate notice of her claims by filing EEOC charges in January 2003, just one month after her termination and five months after her demotion. Given that Ms. Williams's equal protection theory parallels her Title VTI claims, the EEOC documents appear adequate with respect to at least this claim. See Faulk v. Ewing, 808 A.2d 1262, 1272 (Md. 2002) ("The notice requirements [of the LGTCA] are intended to apprise a local government of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation. . . . Where the purpose of the notice requirements is fulfilled, but not necessarily in a manner technically compliant with all of the terms of the statute, this Court has found such substantial compliance to satisfy the statute.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, considering that Ms. Williams has asserted parallel claims under the federal constitution that are not subject to the LGTCA, there appears to be little reason to dismiss these claims prior to discovery. Accordingly, count five will not be dismissed.
The court will, however, dismiss the defamation count. The EEOC documents did not effect substantial compliance with the LGTCA with respect to this claim. Ms. Williams's EEOC affidavit stated simply, "Trenton Hightower and Judy Deluca publicly made disparaging remarks about me during a division wide meeting"; "Trenton Hightower accused me of lying in a very public venue"; and "Judy Deluca made inappropriate comments to me, not once, but twice in the meeting." (EEOC Aff. ¶¶ 48-49, Pl.'s Resp., Ex. C.) Reading these allegations in the context of an EEOC discrimination charge, College officials would likely have assumed that they related to Ms. Williams's claims of workplace bias and hostility, rather than an independent claim of defamation. Indeed, it is doubtful these allegations suffice to state a claim of defamation at all. See, e.g., Murray v. United Food Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 305-06 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that "loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language expressing a mere opinion may not fairly be viewed as being defamatory") (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the College had no reason to investigate potential liability under a defamation theory, and the purpose of the LGTCA would not be served by allowing Ms. Williams's claim to proceed. See Faulk, 808 A.2d at 1272. Count four must be dismissed.
II.
The defendants' second motion addresses the claims against the College rather than the individual defendants. The College has styled this motion as a request for "partial judgment on the pleadings," rather than a motion to dismiss, but "the distinction is one without a difference," because motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) are reviewed according to the same standard as motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Burbach Broadcasting Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06 (4th Cir. 2002).
The defendants alternatively characterize their motion as a motion for summary judgment, but "[a]s a general rule, summary judgment is appropriate only after adequate time for discovery." Evans v. Techs. Applications Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). The parties have yet to conduct any discovery in this case.
The College's own brief concedes that this motion, considering counts one and two as a whole, fails to meet the standard for dismissal under Rule 12(c) or 12(b)(6). In the defendants' words, "FCC readily acknowledges that plaintiff has pled the minimum under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 to state a claim of gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII (Counts I and II) as to some alleged conduct of FCC employees. . . . FCC's Motion clearly stated that it was an effort to narrow the issues in dispute and to weed out certain portions of the First Amended Complaint that fail to state a claim." (Def.'s Reply at 1-2.) While the defendants' motivation for this effort is understandable, at this stage an assessment of each particular allegation in isolation would not be a fruitful application of the motion to dismiss. Evidence of remarks made by decision-makers, for example, may be relevant to motive or state of mind even if the remark is not independently actionable. As long as Ms. Williams has alleged facts entitling her to relief under some Title VII theory, the court will allow her claims to go forward. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) ("A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.").
This is not to say, of course, that Ms. Williams may seek discovery regarding matters that are irrelevant to her claims.
Ms. Williams's allegations are sufficient at this stage. To begin with count one, the discrimination claim, Ms. Williams's allegation that similarly-situated male employees were not demoted as she was appears adequate to state a prima facie claim under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803-06 (1973). See Adams v. Giant Food, Inc., 225 F. Supp.2d 600, 603 (D. Md. 2002) (indicating that a prima facie claim of discrimination requires proof that (1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class, (2) her job performance was satisfactory, and (3) she suffered an adverse job action, whereas (4) similarly-situated employees outside the protected class did not). Furthermore, Ms. Williams's complaint suggests that direct evidence of discrimination may exist, making McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting unnecessary: Dr. Stanley's "handsome hunks" comment and the warning about being "outspoken," if not also Mr. Holt's "flaming bitch" remark, could be understood as derogatory statements related to the decision to demote Ms. Williams- a form of evidence that the Fourth Circuit has indicated may support discrimination claims. See Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 608 (4th Cir. 1999). In any event, the defendants have conceded that the claim based on the reorganization leading to Ms. Williams's change to part-time status is not suitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss. (Def.'s Mot. at 3 (describing the "downgrading of plaintiff's position" as one of a "handful of claims . . . that sufficiently affected the terms of her employment to raise an issue of federal law").) For all these reasons, count one will not be dismissed.
The allegations also appear adequate to support the retaliation claim in count two. Ms. Williams may state a prima facie case on this theory if she proves that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) the adverse action and the protected activity were causally connected. See Adams, 225 F. Supp.2d at 603. Ms. Williams's formal complaint in June 2002, if not her earlier communications with Mr. Farley, satisfies the first element. See Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 543-44 (4th Cir. 2003). Even assuming, as the College argues, that Ms. Williams's resignation was too far removed in time and circumstance to satisfy the second and third elements, Ms. Williams has alleged other adverse actions that occurred in close proximity to her complaint, including her demotion to part-time status, the denial of health coverage and tuition remission, and the denial of full-time positions for which she applied. See Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prima facie case requires evidence of "an adverse effect on the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment"). Her claim in count two may go forward based on these allegations.
III.
Finally, all the defendants have joined a motion to strike allegations in paragraphs 15, 17, and 19 of the complaint that relate to the purported sexual relationship between Mr. Hightower and Ms. DeLuca. The defendants deny the existence of any such relationship and urge the court to strike these allegations under Rule 12(f) on grounds that they are impertinent and scandalous. In this posture, the court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true-and, moreover, must credit counsel's representation, on pain of Rule 11 sanctions, that he has a reasonable factual basis to support the allegations. As for the relevance of the alleged relationship, however, favoritism based on a sexual relationship does not give rise to a claim under Title VII. See, e.g., Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1996). Indeed, Ms. Williams appears to concede as much in her opposition when she notes that "favoritism to a paramour does not constitute a per se violation of Title VII" but argues that the allegations "capture Hightower's dislike of Williams and his ill will and malice toward her." (Pl.'s Opp'n at 8.) While the coercion of sexual favors in exchange for job benefits may violate the statute, see Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998), the most Ms. Williams has alleged is that her immediate superior, Mr. Holt, told her she should "lose her husband" if she wanted to keep her job. The alleged relationship between a different male superior (Mr. Hightower) and female subordinate (Ms. DeLuca) is of little or no relevance to this allegation, and in light of the potential for unfair prejudice and embarrassment, particularly to a non-party, the court will grant the motion to strike any allegation of a sexual relationship between Mr. Hightower and Ms. DeLuca.
Accordingly, that aspect of the relationship between Mr. Hightower and Ms. DeLuca may not be the subject of discovery.
A separate Order follows.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby Ordered that:
1. The individual defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike (docket no. 10) will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART;
2. all claims in the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (docket no. 3) will be DISMISSED under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) as to all the individual defendants in their official capacities, except insofar as count three seeks injunctive relief against prospective violations of federal law;
3. all claims will be DISMISSED under Rule 12(b)(6) as to the defendants Doris White, George Littrell III, Rick Weldon, Denise Hall Brown, Dixie J. Miller, William Poffenbarger, Brad W. Young, and Deborah Voso in their individual capacities;
4. count four of the complaint will be DISMISSED under Rule 12(b)(6);
5. all references to the alleged sexual relationship between Judy DeLuca and the defendant Trenton Hightower in the First Amended Complaint ( see Compl. ¶¶ 15, 17, 19) will be STRICKEN under Rule 12(f);
6. the defendant Board of Trustees of Frederick Community College's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (docket no. 13) will be DENIED; and
7. copies of this Order and the accompanying Memorandum shall be SENT to counsel of record.