Opinion
EP-05-CA-0461-FM.
March 14, 2006
ORDER
Before the Court is "Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings" [Rec. No. 9]. Plaintiffs have not filed a response to Defendant's Motion. After considering the Motion, law and pleadings, the Court is of the opinion that "Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings" [Rec. No. 9] should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part for the following reasons.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Plaintiff, Leslie Wickel ("Wickel") brought this action in the 327th District Court of El Paso County on October 17, 2005. As outlined in the complaint [Rec. No. 1], Wickel alleges he was an employee of Defendant, Knight Transportation, Inc. ("Knight"). On October 10, 2003, Wickel e-mailed his intent to terminate his employment. Wickel also informed Knight that he would return the truck used in his employment to Knight's office in Phoenix, Arizona shortly.
On October 16, 2003, Wickel returned the company truck to Knight's office in Phoenix, Arizona. The same day, safety officer Ryan Gott informed Plaintiff that he had been selected for a random drug test. Wickel informed Mr. Gott that he had ended his employment at Knight and therefore need not take the drug test. The following day, October 17, 2003, Knight posted notice of its alleged termination of Plaintiff for refusing to submit to a drug test. On December 15, 2003, Wickel learned of Knight's publication that Plaintiff had failed a drug test, which was false. Wickel asserts that due to Knight's negligence, Plaintiff's employment record was damaged and Plaintiff has been unable to find suitable employment for over two years. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant committed gross negligence entitling him to punitive damages. His claim for damages also include lost wages, earning capacity, injury to reputation and mental anguish.
Defendant removed this action based on diversity jurisdiction and brought the instant motion alleging Plaintiff's claims are barred by a one-year statute of limitation and by the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.
II. Legal Standard
A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim are analyzed under the same legal standard. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999). A district court may not dismiss a complaint under 12(b)(6) unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Manguno v. Prudential Prop. and Casualty Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir. 2002). '[T]he question therefore is whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved on his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief." Gregson v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 2003). Thus, the Court examines the complaint to determine whether it states any valid claim for relief taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolving every doubt in the plaintiff's behalf. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
It should be noted that Plaintiff need not plead every element of a claim to overcome a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint will be deemed inadequate only if it fails to (1) provide notice of circumstances which give rise to the claim, or (2) set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of the claim or permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. If a complaint is ambiguous or does not contain sufficient information to allow a responsive pleading to be framed, the proper remedy is a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Finally a complaint, which contains a "bare bones" allegation that a wrong occurred and which does not plead any of the facts giving rise to the injury, does not provide adequate notice.Benal v. Freeport-McCorman, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). A claim is not inadequate because an element thereof is omitted, so long as the element can be fairly inferred from the pleading as a whole. Walker v. South Central Bell Tele. Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990).
III. Analysis
Defendant's motion argues that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for two reasons. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim should be construed as a claim for defamation which has a one year statute of limitation that Plaintiff failed to meet. Second, Defendant argues that Plainitff's claim is barred by the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.
When analyzing a motion for judgment on the pleadings the Court must examine whether the complaint has stated any claim for relief even if the elements of the claim are not enumerated. See Gregson v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 2003); Benal v. Freeport-McCorman, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). A complaint is adequate if it provides notice of the circumstances that give rise to the claim. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). The circumstances giving rise to the complaint were outlined above. In summary, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant falsely published to a third party that Plaintiff failed a drug test resulting in a damaged employment record and the inability to obtain work for two years. Plaintiff seeks damages for lost wages, loss of earning capacity, mental anguish and injury to reputation amongst others. As Defendant aptly acknowledges, Plaintiff does not allege the general requirements of negligence. Furthermore, the events outlined in the complaint do not provide notice of circumstances giving rise to a claim for negligence nor can the elements of negligence be inferred from the circumstances as alleged. Thus, although Plaintiff's complaint pleads negligence and gross negligence, the circumstances giving rise to the events show that Plaintiff's claim is one for defamation or business disparagement also known as injurious falsehood. Defamation and business disparagement can be defined by the following:
If the damages alleged are primarily personal and general — e.g. injury to personal reputation, humiliation or mental anguish — then the cause of action is one for libel or slander . . .
A claim for business slander or disparagement is appropriate when a plaintiff alleges interference with commercial or economic relations. The general elements of a claim for business disparagement are publication by the defendant of the disparaging words, falsity, malice, lack of privilege and special damages. . . .
An action for injurious falsehood or business disparagement is similar in many respects to an action for defamation. Both involve the imposition of liability for injury sustained through publication to a third party of a false statement affecting the plaintiff. The two torts, however, protect different interests. The purpose of an action for defamation is to protect the personal reputation of the injured party, whereas the purpose of an action for injurious falsehood or business disparagement is to protect the economic interests of the injured party against pecuniary loss. More stringent requirements have always been imposed on the 'plaintiff seeking to recover for injurious falsehood in three important respects — falsity of the statement, fault of the defendant and proof of damage.'
Pecuniary loss refers to loss that has been realized or liquidated, as in the case of specific loss of sales. Further, the communication must play a substantial part in inducing others not to deal with a plaintiff, with the result that special damage, in the form of the loss of trade or other dealings is established.Newsome v. Brod, 89 S.W.3d 732, 734-35 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist], 2002) (citations omitted).
Taking the facts as true and in the light most favorable to Defendant, it does not appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. The circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's complaint suggest he has a claim for both defamation and business disparagement. However, the statute of limitations for each action is not the same. The statute of limitations for defamation is one year while business disparagement has a two year statute of limitations. Newsome, 89 S.W.3d at 735. Because the latest possible time that Plaintiff could have become aware of his injury was December 15, 2003 and Plaintiff did not file this action until October 17, 2005, his claim for defamation is barred by the one year statute of limitations. Therefore, to the extent that he seeks damages relating to this claim, they too are barred. However, Plaintiff's claim which is construed as a claim for business disparagement was timely filed within the two year statute of limitations.
Regarding Defendant's second argument, the Texas Workers' Compensation act is the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained by an employee in the course and scope of his employment resulting from an employer's negligence. TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 408.001; See Payne v. Galen Hosp., 28 S.W.3d 15, 18 (Tex. 2000). "Injury" as defined by the statute is "damage or harm to the physical structure of the body and a disease or infection naturally resulting from the damage or harm." Id. § 401.011(26). Plaintiff's complaint does not allege that he suffered any physical injury or damage to the structure of his body. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that because of the damage to his employment record he has not been able to obtain work for over two years. Thus, Plaintiff does not have a compensable injury enabling him to bring an action for damages under the Texas Workers Compensation Act. Therefore, the Act as the exclusive remedy for physical injuries due to employer's negligence, does not bar Plaintiff's complaint from being brought.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that "Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings" [Rec. No. 9] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED for Plaintiff's causes of action for negligence, gross negligence and defamation. The sole remaining cause of action is for business disparagement.