Opinion
6:20-cv-01706-CL
07-21-2022
DON ACE WATSON, Plaintiff, v. C/O A. SCHRAEDER; C/O J. CONAWAY; and C/O P. HERNANDEZ, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
MARK D. CLARKE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a former inmate at Lincoln County Jail (LCJ), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that jail deputies used excessive force against him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when they brought him into LCJ for booking. Am. Compl. 4 (ECF 13). Defendants move for summary judgment on grounds that they used a reasonable amount of force to complete their pat down of plaintiff during the booking process. See Mot. 916 (ECF 32).
For the following reasons, defendants' motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
On August 13, 2020, plaintiff was arrested by Officer Johnson on charges of menacing and harassment stemming from a domestic disturbance. Plaza Decl. Ex. 4 (ECF 33). After the arrest, Officer Johnson transported plaintiff to LCJ. When Officer Johnson arrived at LCJ with plaintiff, Corpl. Hernandez, Deputy Schraeder, and Deputy Conaway met them in the sally port in response to Officer Johnson calling LCJ dispatch and requesting assistance. Hernandez Decl. ¶¶ 3-4. (ECF 34).
The Amended Complaint refers to defendants as, “C/O Hernandez”, “C/O Schraeder”, and “C/O Conaway”. Am. Compl. 4 (ECF 13). For consistency and to avoid confusion, the court will use defendants' individual position titles and refer to them as, Corpl. Hernandez, Deputy Schraeder, and Deputy Conaway. The court will collectively refer to defendants as, “deputies” or “deputy defendants.”
While plaintiff was in Officer Johnson's vehicle in the sally port, he answered the deputies' questions and had his temperature taken as part of LCJ covid protocols. Id. at ¶ 4. Next, Corpl. Hernandez, Deputy Schraeder, and Deputy Conaway escorted plaintiff to the “pat down wall” in the booking area. Id. at ¶ 6. Officer Johnson accompanied the deputies from the sally port to the pat down wall, and she remained with the deputies until they placed plaintiff in a cell; Officer Johnson's body camera recorded video and audio of all events in question and shows that the three deputy defendants and plaintiff were in the sally port for about two minutes and were in the booking area by the pat down wall for about four minutes. See Plaza Decl. Ex. 3 at 00:02:1800:09:04 (ECF 33). As the deputies guided plaintiff from the sally port into an elevator and into the booking area, plaintiff told the deputies, “you don't need to fucking tell me where to go,” and referred to them as “motherfucker” and “you fucking piece of shit.” Id. at 00:04:28-00:04-40. One deputy can be heard saying to plaintiff, “stop”, and, “do me a favor and knock this off.” Id. As they entered the booking area, a deputy said, “okay, you see the blue wall? Can you face it for me?” Id. at 00:05:17. At the pat down wall (which is made of brick and painted blue), the deputies positioned plaintiff's body and head to face the wall as he verbally protested, “fuck you”, several times. Id. at 00:05:23.
Plaintiff states that he was “angry” and “really upset” because, “[c]oming into jail I was being hurt as the handcuffs were way to [sic] tight and the officers were being very forcefull [sic].” Am. Compl. 7 (ECF13). Plaintiff alleges that, at the pat down wall, Deputy Schraeder “put me in a chokehold” and “bent and placed her knee on my neck just like the George Floyd incident”. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Conaway was “cranking my arms up”, id. at 7, and “was tearing religious jewelry of [sic] me and placed me in a hogtie position using excessive force throughout the time.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that Corpl. Hernandez was “smashing my face, head into the concrete floor and wall”. Id. at 7.
Defendants dispute plaintiff's allegations and submit video and audio evidence from three sources: (1) Officer Johnson's body camera, see Plaza Decl. Ex. 3 at 00:02:18-00:09:04 (video and audio) (ECF 33); (2) the body camera of Deputy Ben Cloud who was in the booking area when plaintiff was brought in, see Cloud Decl. Ex. 1 at 00:00:02-00:04:15 (video and audio) (ECF 35); and (3) a stationary jail camera in the booking area. See Hernandez Decl. Ex. 1 at 00:03:40-00:07:37 (video only) (ECF 34).
The evidence shows that the following occurred: At the booking wall, two deputies held plaintiff's head and upper arms against the wall while plaintiff verbally protested and yelled profanities. After one deputy said, “knock it off,” plaintiff said, “you're the one hurting me”, “you're gonna push me, hurt me? Smash my face into a wall?” Plaza Decl. Ex. 3 at 00:05:3100:05:39 (ECF 33). As one deputy attempted to conduct a pat down of plaintiff, plaintiff yelled, “fuck you” several times and tried to turn toward them. Id.; Cloud Decl. Ex. 1 at 00:00:1700:00:27 (ECF 35). When deputies attempted to remove some of plaintiff's rings, he became “furious”, Plaza Decl. Ex. 1 at 15 (Deposition of Don Ace Watson); plaintiff got “very loud”, “tried to turn around”, tried to “close his hand around Deputy Conaway's hand[,]” and was “able to position his body and turn toward Deputy Schraeder and Conaway.” Hernandez Decl. ¶ 8 (ECF 34). Plaintiff yelled, “don't fucking try to take my rings off . . . you will not . . . those are religious.” Plaza Decl. Ex. 3 at 00:05:57-00:06:04 (ECF 33). As plaintiff protested, he again attempted to turn toward the deputies. Id. At that point, Corpl. Hernandez “made the decision to use [plaintiff's] momentum and take him down to the ground.” Hernandez Decl. ¶ 9 (ECF 34); Plaza Decl. Ex. 3 00:06:09-00:06:13 (ECF 33).
Once plaintiff was on the ground, two deputies held him still as one deputy continued to remove jewelry. Cloud Decl. Ex. 1 at 00:00:26-00:01:54 (ECF 35). Plaintiff continued to protest with loud expletives and referred to his martial arts training. Id. Plaintiff was asked to stop resisting and asked if he would like to get off the floor; Corpl. Hernandez told him, “we have a restraint chair we could use, but we really don't want to do that to you; I'd rather just stand you back up, take your cuffs off, and put you in a cell.” Plaza Decl. Ex. 3 at 00:06:54-00:06:59 (ECF 33). After Corpl. Hernandez said, “I will help you stand up,” plaintiff accepted the assistance and was guided back to the booking wall. Id. at 00:07:30-00:07:59. Upon returning to the booking wall, plaintiff suddenly hit his own head against the wall. Id. at 00:08:11. Deputy Conaway quickly put her hand up to his forehead, and another deputy told him, “we'll get you in the cell with some blankets so you can take a nap, you don't have to fight us like this.” Cloud Decl. Ex. 1 at 00:02:30-00:02:34. Deputies removed two necklaces from plaintiff before escorting him from the pat down wall into a holding cell. Id. at 00:02:35-00:03:09. Plaintiff “kicked the cell door and yelled for several hours” before falling asleep. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 11 (ECF 34).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted when the record shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material of fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth but may only determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2002). An issue of fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
When a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 250. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposing party must, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts which show there is a genuine issue for trial. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. In assessing whether a party has met its burden, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1995).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Hart, Deputy Schraeder, and Deputy Conaway used “excessive force” against him at the LCJ pat down wall in violation of his constitutional rights. Am. Compl. 5 (ECF 13). Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims because the record shows that they used minimal force to gain plaintiff's compliance during a brief pat down, and because there is no evidence that plaintiff suffered injuries from the deputies' actions. Mot. 9-16 (ECF 32).
The Amended Complaint asserts violations of “US constitution 1st, 4th, 5th, 8th, and 14th, Or. const. Act [sic] I § 9th and 16th.” Am. Compl. 5 (ECF 13). However, plaintiff only alleges facts that could support a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff does not explain what rights were allegedly violated under the other constitutional provisions cited, and none are apparent. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on those unspecified claims.
Plaintiff did not file an opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment. However, his failure to respond “does not excuse [defendants'] affirmative duty under Rule 56 to demonstrate [their] entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, where plaintiff “fails to respond to a fact asserted in the motion [for summary judgment]” the court is permitted “to ‘consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion.'” Garcia v. United States, No. 3:18-CV-00176-HZ, 2022 WL 1102595, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 12, 2022) (citing Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2)); see also, Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2007) (“because [the plaintiff] failed to present any evidence in opposition to [the defendants'] motion for summary judgment, she has failed to demonstrate that there are any genuine issues of material fact in dispute”).
I. Excessive Force Standards
“The Fourth Amendment's proscription against ‘unreasonable . . . seizures' protects suspects from excessive force during police booking procedures.” Holmes v. Cnty. of Orange, No. 816CV00867JLSJCG, 2017 WL 11632298, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2017) (citing Pierce v. Multnomah Cty., 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1006 (1996) (“the Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations on the treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up until the time such arrestee is released or found to be legally in custody based upon probable cause for arrest”)); see also Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit has “determined that the Fourth Amendment sets the ‘applicable constitutional limitations' for considering claims of excessive force during pretrial detention”) (citing Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043).
In evaluating a Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force, courts ask “‘whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.'” Glenn v. Washington Cnty., 673 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). This inquiry “‘requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.'” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). “‘The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.'” Id. Reasonableness therefore “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, ‘rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.'” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)).
II. Excessive Force Analysis
To start, “we must consider the amount of force and the extent to which that force intruded on [plaintiff's] Fourth Amendment rights.” Marquez v. City of Phoenix, 693 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). Plaintiff alleges defendants did the following: (1) Deputy Schraeder “put me in a chokehold” and “bent and placed her knee on my neck just like the George Floyd incident”; (2) Deputy Conaway was “cranking my arms up” and “was tearing religious jewelry of [sic] me and placed me in a hogtie position”; and (3) Corpl. Hernandez was “smashing my face, head into the concrete floor and wall[.]” Am. Compl. 4-7 (ECF 13). Although “the nonmoving party's version of events is generally accepted as true at the summary judgment stage, ‘[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.'” Alston v. Cnty. of Sacramento, No. 218CV02420TLNCKDPS, 2020 WL 6801941, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 7365024 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2020), reconsideration denied, 2021 WL 428646 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2021) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). That is the case here.
The three videotapes on record directly contradict plaintiff's claims and show that no deputy defendant put a knee on plaintiff's neck or made any contact with his body that could be described as choking, cranking, tearing, hogtying, or smashing. Instead, the videos of the events at the pat down wall show two deputies doing little more than holding plaintiff's head and body in place while a third deputy attempts to pat down plaintiff who can be heard protesting and swearing repeatedly at the deputies. As one of the deputies attempted to remove some of plaintiff's jewelry, plaintiff became increasingly agitated and yelled, “don't fucking try to take my rings off.” Plaza Decl. Ex. 3 at 00:05:57-00:06:04 (ECF 33). At that point, the videos show plaintiff trying to turn away from the wall and confirm that Corpl. Hernandez “use[d] [plaintiff's] momentum [to] take him to the ground.” Hernandez Decl. 2 (ECF 34); see Plaza Decl. Ex. 3 at 00:06:09-00:06:12; Cloud Decl. Ex. 1 at 00:00:18-00:00:25 (ECF 33). Once plaintiff was on the floor, he continued to yell profanities and demanded, “let me go,” as one deputy continued to remove his jewelry while the other two deputies kept a hand on plaintiff's back, one on his head, another at his wrists, and one holding his foot to keep his leg in a bent position. Id. at Cloud Decl. Ex. 3 at 00:00:28-00:02:19. As plaintiff continued to swear and protest loudly, one deputy spoke to him calmly, explaining that they would rather not use the restraint chair and offering to help plaintiff to his feet. Plaza Decl. Ex. 3 at 00:06:54-00:06:59 (ECF 33). After plaintiff accepted the offer of help, a deputy assisted plaintiff to a standing position and guided him back to the pat down wall. Cloud Decl. Ex. 3 at 00:02:19-00:02:23. As plaintiff approached the brick wall, he suddenly struck his own head against the wall, and a deputy immediately lifted her hand to his forehead as if to protect plaintiff from further selfinjury. Id. at 00:02:24-00:02:29.
In light of the undisputed video evidence, plaintiff's “version of events cannot reasonably be accepted as true.” Alston, 2020 WL 6801941, at *5. That is, plaintiff's allegations are “so utterly discredited by the video recording that no reasonable jury could believe that characterization of events.” Id. There is also no evidence in the record that deputy defendants injured plaintiff in any way or used more than limited force when they held plaintiff against the wall, conducted a brief pat down, attempted to remove his jewelry, used a controlled takedown maneuver, held him on the floor, removed more of his jewelry, and helped him to a standing position. In sum, the deputy defendants' “use of force against [plaintiff] was minimal, with a low risk of causing harm.” Alston, 2020 WL 6801941, at *6; see Cox v. Booking Staff, No. 1:17-CV-00520-JR, 2018 WL 3404055, at *3 (D. Or. May 21, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3393239 (D. Or. July 12, 2018) (deputies used “minimal force” during the “booking search and removal process” when they “force[d] plaintiff to lie face down on the mattress” after the plaintiff “resisted” and “did not cooperate with [deputies]”); see also, Sandoval v. Officer Melvin of Winston Police Dep't, No. 6:19-CV-00712-YY, 2021 WL 920858, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 10, 2021), aff'd sub nom. Sandoval v. Melvin, No. 21-35213, 2022 WL 883744 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2022) (an officer used a “minimal” level of force as part of an arrest where he “grabbed” the sleeve of a resisting, noncompliant suspect, “pulled” her out a doorway, and used a “takedown” maneuver to bring her to the ground); cf. Robinson v. City of San Jose, No. 19-CV-06768-NC, 2021 WL 4222133, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2021) (rejecting the defendants' claim that the “level of force used [in the takedown] was minimal and reasonable” where the plaintiff suffered a broken arm, a black eye, and lacerations and where a genuine dispute existed as to the plaintiff's compliance with the defendants' orders).
The court acknowledges plaintiff's allegations that he “was bleeding from handcuffs to [sic] tight” and that deputies “together injured my neck, face, head, knee, and tore my hernia open causing me excruciating pain.” Am. Compl. 7 (ECF 13). However, plaintiff submitted no proof of physical injury, the record includes no indication that plaintiff sought or received medical care, and plaintiff does not contest Corpl. Hernandez's statement that “[n]o injuries were reported from the deputies or [plaintiff] from this incident.” Hernandez Decl. ¶ 12 (ECF 34).
Turning to “the government's interest in the use of force[,]” Alston, 2020 WL 6801941, at *6, district courts in this circuit have recognized that jail deputies have a “compelling interest being able to complete [the] booking [process] without resistance, passive or otherwise.” Alston, 2020 WL 6801941. Moreover, “the Supreme Court has recognized that searches of inmates entering a jail or prison are justified to prevent the introduction of contraband, which can be concealed in clothing and shoes.” Cox, 2018 WL 3404055, at *3 (citing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 327 (2012) (“[p]olicies designed to keep contraband out of jails and prisons have been upheld in cases decided since Bell[v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 553 (1979)]”)). It is also well established that courts must defer to “‘policies and practices that in th[e] judgment' of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.'” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 540, 547). These principles make it clear that the deputy defendants had a “legitimate interest in keeping [plaintiff] under control and . . . ensuring that []he presented no danger to [the deputies, himself], or others” during the booking process. Sheehan v. Bay Area Rapid Transit, No. 14-CV-03156-LB, 2016 WL 777784, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016).
In weighing the deputies' legitimate interests against the minimal force they used against plaintiff, it is also clear that the deputies acted reasonably in all respects and did not use excessive force against plaintiff. See Alston, 2020 WL 6801941, at *7 (noting that video evidence and the record as a whole made it clear that “the force used [against the plaintiff] was not severe, and the intrusion on his rights was minimal” and concluding that the deputy's “use of force under these circumstances was objectively reasonable”); see also Cox, 2018 WL 3404055, at *3 (finding that the video evidence “wholly refutes plaintiff's allegations that he was ‘stomped on,' dragged, or picked up by his handcuffs,” noting that the plaintiff “did not cooperate, and the deputies used minimal force[,]” and holding, “[t]o the extent deputies used some force against plaintiff, that force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances”).
Because there is no question that Corpl. Hernandez, Deputy Schraeder, and Deputy Conaway used minimal force against plaintiff to complete their pat down procedures, and there is no evidence that they caused plaintiff any injury, plaintiff's claims must fail. Even looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could not find that deputy defendants acted unreasonably or used excessive force against plaintiff in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Deputy defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment. See Alston, 2020 WL 6801941, at *7 (granting summary judgment to a jail deputy where his use of force during booking procedures was “minimal, with a low risk of causing harm”); see also Cox, 2018 WL 3404055, at *3 (“the deputies used reasonable force under the circumstances and summary judgment should be granted on this claim”), cf. Jennings v. Fuller, 659 Fed.Appx. 867 (6th Cir. 2016) (affirming the denial of summary judgment for a jail officer where video evidence showed the officer “smashed [the plaintiff] against a concrete wall, slammed him onto a metal bench, and then pinned him to the ground” in a manner that constituted a “gross overreaction” to the plaintiff “remov[ing] his left hand from the wall during a booking room pat down”).
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF 32) should be GRANTED.
This Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due no later than fourteen (14) days after the date this recommendation is filed. If objections are filed, any response is due within fourteen (14) days after the date the objections are filed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6. Parties are advised that the failure to file objectionswtfhin the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Y1st, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).