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concluding the severity of the intrusion was "minimal" where the officer "grabbed [the plaintiff] while she stood atop two steps at the doorway entrance, took her 'down to the ground hard and fast,' and put a knee in her back" but did not use "additional force, such as kicks or punches"
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21-35213
03-24-2022
BRANDY MARIE SANDOVAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SETH MELVIN, Winston Police Department, Defendant-Appellee, and SERGEANT TURNER, Defendant.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court No. 6:19-cv-00712-YY for the District of Oregon Youlee Yim You, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Before: SILVERMAN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Brandy Marie Sandoval appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Officer Seth Melvin violated her constitutional rights by using excessive force when arresting her. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Sandoval failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Melvin's use of force was unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances. See id. (setting forth objective reasonableness standard for excessive force determinations); Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 817 (9th Cir. 2018) ("We may infer from the minor nature of a plaintiff's injuries that the force applied was minimal."); Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 871-72, 876 (9th Cir. 2011) (balancing the intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment rights against the government's interest in that intrusion).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.