Opinion
March 6, 2001.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.), entered October 8, 1999, which, to the extent appealed from, granted defendants' summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's first through sixth causes of action and dismissing the tenth causes of action against all defendants except defendant Weber's W. 27th St. Corp., and denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on liability on its first cause of action as against defendants Fred Weber, Susan Weber and Tori Realty, unanimously affirmed, with one bill of costs.
Samuel E. Kramer, for plaintiff-appellant.
Harold Z. Frechter, for defendants-respondents.
Before: Nardelli, J.P., Williams, Tom, Lerner, Friedman, JJ.
We find no basis for holding any defendant other than the tenant of record liable for breach of the lease. There is no valid cause of action for tortious interference with the lease, since the Bronx real estate corporation, one of the alleged tortfeasors, is not a stranger to the contract (see, Fisher v. Maxwell Communications Corp., 205 A.D.2d 356, 358), and the other alleged tortfeasors, the individual defendants, acted in their official capacity as principals of the tenant (see, Vardi v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 136 A.D.2d 453, 455). Further, economic self-interest is a defense to plaintiff's tortious interference claim, since there is no evidence of malice or fraudulent or illegal means (see, MTI/The Image Group v. Fox Studios E., 262 A.D.2d 20, 23-24). Even if we were to find that plaintiff reasonably relied on representations by defendants, the merger clause in the lease precludes claims based on those alleged representations (see, Kindler v. Newsweek, Inc., 277 A.D.2d 159, 717 N.Y.S.2d 56). Further, the fraud claims must fail because there is no evidence that the individual defendants made the alleged representation with a then-present intent not to carry out the supposed promise (see, Sone v. Tsumura, 222 A.D.2d 231, 232), or a then-present intent to deceive plaintiff (see, Arias v. Women in Need, Inc., 274 A.D.2d 353, 354). Plaintiff's argument that this Court should convert purported subleases (the existence of which plaintiff denies) into de facto assignments for the purpose of creating new parties to the lease is made for the first time on appeal, and might have been factually countered if made before the motion court, and we have therefore not reached it (see, Reliance Natl. Ins. Co. v. Sapiens Intl. Corp., 243 A.D.2d 406). In any event, the claim is without merit. We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.