Opinion
2023-CA-1093-MR
09-13-2024
WILLIAM "BILL" VAUGHN APPELLANT v. JOYCE L. VAUGHN; JOHN DOE; AND THE WILLIAM E. VAUGHN AND JOYCE L. VAUGHN IRREVOCABLE TRUST APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Michael C. Wilson Flatwoods, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Ralph T. McDermott Flatwoods, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE BRIAN CHRISTOPHER MCCLOUD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 18-CI-00464
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Michael C. Wilson
Flatwoods, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ralph T. McDermott
Flatwoods, Kentucky
BEFORE: ACREE, EASTON, AND McNEILL, JUDGES.
OPINION
McNEILL, JUDGE:
AFFIRMING
William Vaughn ("Bill") appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his negligence claim against his mother, Joyce Vaughn ("Joyce"), for injuries he sustained while in her service. We affirm.
In 2017, Joyce owned a commercial office building in Greenup County that she leased to the state. Following complaints of a water leak, Joyce asked Bill if he would check the building's roof. Bill agreed and retrieved an extension ladder stored on the property. The ladder had been modified to shorten it, so it was missing the rubber non-slip "feet" at the bottom. As Bill ascended, the ladder "kicked back" and he fell, incurring significant injuries.
Bill filed a complaint in Greenup Circuit Court alleging Joyce was negligent in supplying him with a defective ladder. Subsequently, Joyce moved for summary judgment, arguing that Bill was an independent contractor; therefore, her only duty was to warn of (1) hidden or latent defects; (2) that she knew about; and (3) Bill did not know about, citing Auslander Properties, LLC v. Nalley, 558 S.W.3d 457, 467 (Ky. 2018). Because Bill knew the ladder was modified, she owed him no duty.
Bill responded Auslander was inapposite; it was a premises liability case based upon a defect or dangerous condition on real property, whereas his claim was based upon Joyce's negligence in supplying him with defective equipment, citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 392 (1965). Ultimately, the court granted the motion, finding Bill was an independent contractor. Because Bill was aware of the ladder's defective condition, Joyce breached no duty to warn. Bill filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate which was denied. This appeal followed.
Joyce moved for summary judgment twice, and it was denied twice. The second time, the court found Bill was either an invitee or gratuitous servant, and Joyce owed him a "duty of care to provide reasonably safe premises and instrumentalities to accomplish the requested favor." Joyce subsequently moved for reconsideration and the court granted the motion.
"[T]he standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether the circuit judge correctly found that there were no issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Phelps v. Bluegrass Hosp. Management, LLC, 630 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Ky. 2021) (citation omitted). Further, "[t]he existence of a duty is a question of law." Bramlett v. Ryan, 635 S.W.3d 831, 835 (Ky. 2021) (citation omitted).
Bill argues that the circuit court erred in determining that he was an independent contractor rather than an invitee. Further, he argues summary judgment was improper considering Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Soc., Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 911 (Ky. 2013), as corrected (Nov. 25, 2013). Both the circuit court's order and Bill's appellate brief focus on premises liability law. However, we are persuaded by Bill's prior argument to the circuit court that this case is governed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 392 concerning a supplier of chattel.
Premises liability is generally concerned with either a condition on the land or use of the land by a possessor. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 341A (1965). Bill does not allege he was injured because of a condition or activity on Joyce's land but because of a defective chattel (a ladder) on the premises, furnished by Joyce. Thus, the relevant standard is supplied by Chapter 14 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "Liability of Persons Supplying Chattels for the Use of Others," specifically section 392. See Lloyd v. Lloyd, 479 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Ky. 1972) (holding that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965) applied rather than premises liability law under similar circumstances). While the circuit court applied the wrong legal analysis, we agree with its conclusion that Joyce was not negligent as a matter of law, and therefore we find no error in its grant of summary judgment in her favor.
Section 392 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
One who supplies to another, directly or through a third person, a chattel to be used for the supplier's business purposes is subject to liability to those for whose use the chattel is supplied, or to those whom he should expect to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by person for whose use the chattel is supplied
(a) if the supplier fails to exercise reasonable care to make the chattel safe for the use for which it is supplied, or
(b) if he fails to exercise reasonable care to discover its dangerous condition or character, and to inform those whom he should expect to use it.
"This Section states the rule under which a peculiar liability is imposed upon one supplying chattels for another's use because of the fact that the use is one in which the supplier has a business interest." Id. at cmt. a. Those supplying chattel to others for a use in which the supplier has a business interest must not only warn of known dangers in connection with the use of the chattel but also make reasonable efforts to discover its dangerous condition. Id. Comment e. to section 392 explains what it means to supply chattel for one's business purpose:
One who employs another to erect a structure or to do other work, and agrees for that purpose to supply the necessary tools and temporary structures, supplies them to the employees of such other for a business purpose. . . . On the other hand, if it is understood that the person who is to do the work is to supply his own instrumentalities, but the person for whom the work is to be done permits his own tools or appliances to be used as a favor to the person doing the work, the tools and appliances are supplied as a gratuity and not for use for the supplier's business purposes.
Thus, the Restatement distinguishes between situations where a supplier agrees to supply the tools necessary to further a business purpose and where the tools are supplied as a favor to those doing the work. See Bogard v. Mac's Restaurant, Inc., 530 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ind.Ct.App. 1988) ("Restatement § 392 comment e makes clear that the affirmative duty to inspect stems from the supplier's promise to furnish the necessary tools in furtherance of its business purpose; where use of the chattel is permissive, the chattel is supplied gratuitously and not in furtherance of the supplier's business purpose.").
Under the facts of this case, Bill's use of the ladder was permissive and not for Joyce's business purposes. Joyce did not employ Bill, nor did she agree to supply him with the tools to locate the water leak. Joyce specifically testified she did not direct Bill on how to check for the leak on the roof or tell him to use the ladder. This was simply a case of a mother asking her son for help. Bill knew about the ladder and chose to use it, as he had in the past.
We acknowledge that there was also no understanding that Bill would use his own tools to fix the leak, as mentioned in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 392 cmt. e. However, we think it is more significant that Joyce did not agree to supply the tools, as that is the situation under which section 392 contemplates a duty would arise. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 392 cmts. a and e (noting that liability is imposed under section 392 "because . . . the use is one in which the supplier has a business interest[,]" and that tools are supplied for a business purpose when "[o] ne who employs another to [do] . . . work . . . agrees for that purpose to supply the necessary tools[.]").
In sum, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 392 provides the appropriate legal analysis for determining the scope of Joyce's duty, rather than premises liability law. However, because the ladder was not supplied for a business purpose, Joyce owed no duty to inspect the ladder or warn of its dangerous condition, and the circuit court did not err in granting Joyce's motion for summary judgment.
The Greenup Circuit Court's order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.