Opinion
2020-SC-0232-DG
09-30-2021
Craig BRAMLETT and Stephanie M. Cline, as Co-Administrators of the Estate of Landon Bramlett, Deceased; Craig Bramlett, Individually; and Stephanie M. Cline, Individually, Appellants v. Arnold J. RYAN Jr. and Pam Ryan, Appellees
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: Kevin C. Burke, Louisville, Jamie K. Neal, Burke Neal PLLC, Mark A. Weis, Romines Weis & Young PSC, Louisville. COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: Jonathan C. Shaw, Porter, Banks, Baldwin & Shaw, PLLC, Paintsville.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: Kevin C. Burke, Louisville, Jamie K. Neal, Burke Neal PLLC, Mark A. Weis, Romines Weis & Young PSC, Louisville.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: Jonathan C. Shaw, Porter, Banks, Baldwin & Shaw, PLLC, Paintsville.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON
Craig Bramlett and Stephanie Cline, individually and as co-administrators of the Estate of Landon Bramlett, brought a tort action in circuit court against A.J. and Pam Ryan alleging negligent operation of their residential swimming pool, negligent supervision, and gross negligence resulting in the wrongful drowning death of Landon Bramlett, which occurred at a pool party hosted by the Ryans at their home. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Ryans, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
We accepted discretionary review to determine the applicability of the common law distinctions of licensee and invitee in identifying the scope of duty owed by the Ryans to Landon Bramlett.
Upon finding that a property owner owes a reasonable duty of care to a guest whom the owner invites onto the owner's property to participate in an activity, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Ryans. We remand the case to the trial court for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
We use the term "property owner" throughout our discussion of this topic. This term is meant to encompass any possessor of land, no matter the type of leasehold held. It is not our intention to disturb the existing statutory, legal, and contractual divisions of liability shared between the owner and lessee of a property.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.J. and Pam Ryan hosted a pool party and cookout at their home for their son's youth baseball team. A.J. coached the team, which was made up of seven and eight-year-old boys. Thirteen team members, some team members’ siblings, and most of the children's parents or guardians attended the party.
Seven-year-old Landon Bramlett, a member of the team, attended the pool party, accompanied by Rob Clements, his step-grandfather. During the party, Landon drowned in the pool. No one at the party witnessed Landon's drowning, but his body was identified in the water, he was removed from the pool, and several coaches attempted to administer CPR, but they were unable to resuscitate Landon. At the time Landon drowned, Clements was away from the pool and getting a drink on the nearby patio.
The Bramletts filed suit against the Ryans in circuit court, alleging negligence in the Ryans’ failure to comply with certain Kentucky Administrative Regulations regarding the operation and maintenance of their pool. The suit also included a claim of negligent supervision of invitees as well as gross negligence resulting in the wrongful death of Landon Bramlett.
Many of the facts surrounding Landon's death are disputed by the parties, including, but not limited to, Landon's ability to swim, the level of supervision provided by the Ryans during the party, whether the children were engaging in horseplay in and around the pool, and Clements's ability to see Landon from the patio. During discovery, the Ryans and the Bramletts provided conflicting expert testimony regarding the duty owed by the Ryans as pool owners.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Ryans, finding that the Ryans owed no duty to warn Landon of the danger posed by swimming in the pool and finding that the Ryans fulfilled any duty they owed to supervise and control the conduct of the children present. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, finding that the Ryans owed a general duty of care to Landon and neither breached that duty or assumed any additional duties.
II. ANALYSIS
The Bramletts argue that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in the face of genuine disputes of material fact and conflicting expert testimony. The Bramletts also argue that the courts below applied the wrong scope of duty to the Ryans as hosts of a pool party at their home, classifying Landon as a licensee rather than an invitee.
The Ryans respond that they fulfilled their duty to Landon as a licensee on their property and that, in the face of allegedly undisputed evidence, conflicting testimony from experts cannot form the basis of a dispute of material fact on which a motion for summary judgment may be defeated. We agree with the Bramletts that the grant of summary judgment was improper, and we find that the Ryans owed a duty of reasonable care to Landon as a guest at the pool party.
We begin our analysis by considering whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the Ryans. Summary judgment is an extraordinary remedy a court must cautiously apply, taking care not to substitute such a judgment for a trial on the merits of the case. Instead, summary judgment may only be used to conclude litigation in which, as a matter of law, it would be impossible for the non-moving party to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his or her favor.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc. , 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1991).
Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose , 683 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Ky. 1985).
Therefore, we must consider whether the trial court was correct in its determination that no disputes of material fact existed and that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining the existence of such facts, the trial court must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. In this case, the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the Bramletts, resolving all reasonable doubts in their favor.
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03.
Steelvest , 807 S.W.2d at 480.
Id.
Summary judgments do not involve findings of fact, so this Court reviews the trial court's grant of such a motion de novo. On appeal, the standard of review for a summary judgment is whether disputes of material fact exist and whether the movants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this case, we will first consider if disputes of material fact exist as to the conditions and circumstances surrounding Landon Bramlett's death, such that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was improper.
3D Enters. Contracting Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Sewer Dist. , 174 S.W.3d 440, 445 (Ky. 2005).
Peterson v. Foley , 559 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Coomer v. CSX Transp. Inc. , 319 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Ky. 2010) ).
The existence of a duty is a question of law. As such, we review de novo the lower courts’ decision regarding the duty owed to Landon by the Ryans, giving no deference to the lower courts’ conclusions.
Mason v. City of Mt. Sterling , 122 S.W.3d 500, 505 (Ky. 2003).
Commonwealth v. Love , 334 S.W.3d 92, 93 (Ky. 2011) ; Pathways, Inc. v. Hammon s, 113 S.W.3d 85, 89 (Ky. 2003).
A. Disputes of Material Fact
The movant bears the burden of showing no genuine dispute of material fact. The scope of duty placed on a premises owner necessarily impacts the facts material to a dispute regarding the liability associated with the premises. But regardless of the scope of the Ryans’ duty, the record contains innumerable disputes of fact. These disputes include the ability of a seven-year-old to appreciate the danger of a swimming pool, whether running and horseplay were taking place among the children at the pool party, whether Landon's step-grandfather could see Landon from where he stood, and, perhaps most importantly, whether Landon was able to swim and, in turn, the Ryans’ knowledge of Landon's ability or lack of ability to swim. Even if the court applied the lowest possible duty requirement to the Ryans, these disputed facts have the potential to be material to the jury's determination of whether this duty was fulfilled.
Steelvest , 807 S.W.2d at 482.
The order granting summary judgment acknowledges that very few facts were not in dispute. The order simply lists a series of bare-bones, undisputed facts and then proceeds to analyze whether the standard of care was met.
In ruling this way, the trial court misapplied the standard for summary judgment. The applicable standard is not that sufficient facts are alleged to draw an inference or conclusion in favor of the movant, but that no material facts are disputed such that there is only one legally sufficient conclusion to be drawn from the facts—that being the conclusion urged by the movant. In this case, those disputed facts that the trial court omits from its order could certainly be sufficient to convince a reasonable jury that the Ryans breached their duty, whatever it may be, to Landon Bramlett. Because disputes of material fact are present in the account of both the circumstances and conditions surrounding Landon's death, summary judgment was not appropriately granted in this case.
On appeal, the Ryans argue that the facts of the case are undisputed and that the only dispute arises from the conflicting expert testimony provided by the parties. As such, they conclude that summary judgment is appropriate. In response, the Bramletts contend that even in the face of undisputed facts, the presentation of differing expert testimony regarding those undisputed facts may constitute a dispute of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment, citing to this Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Thomas Heavy Hauling, Inc. , 889 S.W.2d 807, 808 (Ky. 1994). But the statement relied upon from Thomas is dicta, the Court in that case having found that the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment waived any assignment of error committed by the trial court in granting summary judgment to either party in the face of conflicting expert opinions.
We also distinguish the facts of the present case from those in Nazar v. Branham , 291 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 2009), in which this Court held that summary judgment was inappropriate in a medical-negligence case with undisputed facts and conflicting expert opinions regarding the surgeon's standard of care. Indeed, in cases like Nazar , in which an element of the claim, like a standard of care, can only be established by expert testimony, conflicting expert testimonies on that element will constitute sufficient grounds on which a motion for summary judgment may be denied.
B. Duty Arising from Hosting Activities
At common law, the duty a property owner owed to an entrant to his or her property depended upon the classification of that entrant as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. Since the adoption of these distinctions, both the way these classifications are defined as well as the duty owed to each class have evolved significantly.
Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co. v. Stacy , 291 Ky. 325, 164 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Ky. 1942).
The need to distinguish a trespasser from one with permission to access a property first arose in Kentucky law in the context of injuries arising from railway accidents. Initially, a railroad owed no affirmative duty of care to prevent the injury of a person trespassing upon railroad tracks or a licensee—a person who had a right to be on or near the tracks. Instead, the railroad only owed a duty to make reasonable effort to prevent injury or danger once the presence of the trespasser or licensee was discovered.
Kentucky Cent. R. Co. v. Gastineau's Adm'r , 83 Ky. 119 (Ky. 1885).
Thornton v. Louisville N.R. Co. , 70 S.W. 53, 54 (Ky. 1902)
Id.
As early as 1903, however, this Court began to recognize the need for a distinction between an individual simply traversing a property with the property owner's consent (a licensee) and an individual present on the premises at the explicit or implicit invitation of the property owner to do business or otherwise benefit the property owner. This third category of entrant was deemed an invitee, and, with regard to such an invitee, the Court assigned to the property owner a duty "to use ordinary care and diligence to keep the premises in a safe condition ...." The Court further described this duty, in the case of dangerous premises, as one to give "visitors sufficient warning of the danger to enable them, by the use of ordinary care, to avoid it."
Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Wilder , 72 S.W. 353, 354 (Ky. 1903).
Id.
Id.
Although this trichotomy provided a reliable rule for railroad liability, the categories did not translate well when applied in other contexts. Courts have experienced unique difficulty in applying the classifications to social guests visiting a property to participate in an activity. Distinguishing guests as either licensees or invitees has proven particularly challenging for the court because the mutuality of benefit between a property owner and a guest required for an invitee is difficult to demonstrate in the context of a social visit. Because the benefit received by a property owner in hosting a guest is not easily quantified in the way an economic or business profit is measured, the distinction created by mutuality of benefit is not useful in distinguishing a licensee from an invitee in a social context. The result of this difference in relational dynamics leads to unpredictability for both property owners and entrants and often leads to inequitable results.
Lexington Country Club v. Stevenson , 390 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Ky. 1965).
In addition to the Court's difficulty in applying the classifications of licensee and invitee, lower courts have also varied in the application of a duty as a matter of law or as a question of fact. At some points, this Court has held that the classification of a guest is a question of fact on which duty is predicated, placing the responsibility for classifying an entrant on the jury. In other cases, we have held that duty is a question of law and the existence of that duty is a question exclusively to be decided by the court, thus requiring the court to classify an entrant in order to rule on the existence of a duty.
Smith v. Smith , 563 S.W.3d 14, 18-19 (Ky. 2018).
Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons , 113 S.W.3d 85, 89-90 (Ky. 2003).
In allowing the court to decide predicate questions of fact that determine whether a guest is an invitee or a licensee, the purview of the jury is diminished. For example, in Scifres v. Kraft , both the trial court and the Court of Appeals performed factual analyses in order to determine if the circumstances of an accident in a pool constituted a dangerous condition such that the homeowner owed a duty of reasonable care to the guests swimming. This decision was reached by weighing the testimonies provided by the two parties and assigning credibility to one party over the other—traditional functions of the jury.
916 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Ky. App. 1996).
Ross v. Commonwealth , 531 S.W.3d 471, 477 (Ky. 2017) ; 57A Am. Jur. 2D Negligence § 20 (2021).
In Smith v. Smith , this Court recognized the limited role the court should play in the determination of facts upon which duty is assigned. In that case, the intent behind and purpose of a mother's visit to her daughter's home were in dispute. The decision of the factual dispute was dispositive in the determination of the daughter's duty to the mother. In that case, we remanded the case to the trial court so the factual question of the mother's intent and purpose could be resolved by the jury before making an assignment of duty and considering whether that duty was breached. However, the difficulty in applying our common-law trichotomy to social guests is only further complicated by asking juries to shoehorn guests into obsolete categories that are unrepresentative of present relationship dynamics and legal expectations.
Id.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 330 (1965), note h, section 3.
Beginning with Hardin v. Harris in 1974, this Court has recognized the need for a distinction among guests to a property outside the three classes provided at common law. In that case, the Court recognized and distinguished an injury sustained from a dangerous condition on a property from an injury sustained from a dangerous activity taking place on a property. Where the latter occurs, the relevant inquiry is whether the property owner exercised reasonable care toward a guest known to be present on the premises where a dangerous activity is taking place.
507 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Ky. 1974).
Id.
Id. at 175-76.
In Perry v. Williamson , this Court considered the "off-the-rack" nature of the classifications and remarked
An enlightened legal system does not reason backward from labels, to decide whether a duty of reasonable care exists. It reasons forward from circumstances, using foreseeability, the gravity of the potential harm, and the possessor's right to control his property, to decide what is reasonable conduct in the circumstances and what is negligence.
824 S.W.2d 869, 875 (Ky. 1992).
Just such an analysis, considering foreseeability, gravity of harm, and the level of control of the property, is necessary in a case like the one at hand to determine the reasonableness of the conduct of the Ryans.
Valuing both clarity and predictability, this Court affirms our decision in Hardin in that a property owner owes a reasonable duty of care to guests invited to his property to participate in an activity. Where in Hardin the dangerousness of the activity conducted was determined by the trial judge as a dispositive indicator of a duty of reasonable care owed by the property owner to a guest, now the jury should be instructed to consider the dangerousness of the activity being conducted as a factor in their assessment of the property owner's reasonableness.
Although this Court's opinion in Hardin did not expressly define what constitutes an activity for the purposes of this rule, the Court's use of broad language—"activities conducted on the premises"—has been properly interpreted by both this Court and the Court of Appeals to encompass a wide range of possible circumstances, including children swimming in a pool, Grimes v. Hettinger , 566 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. 1978), adults swimming in a pool, Scifres v. Kraft , 916 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. App. 1996), riding ATVs, Mathis v. Lohden , No. 2007-CA-00824-MR, 2008 WL 399814 (Ky. App. Feb. 15, 2008), and driving people in a car, Helton v. Montgomery , 595 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. App. 1980).
The determination of the existence of a duty is still a legal question for the court to determine. But the court need only consider 1) if the property owner invited or ratified the presence of the guest on the premises, and 2) if the guest was injured or harmed in the course of or as a result of an activity taking place on the premises. If both requirements are met, the property owner owes a duty of reasonable care to the guest as a matter of law.
This assignment of a duty of reasonable care is in line with our long history of applying a common-law "universal duty of care" in contexts outside of the common-law trichotomy. This Court has not interpreted the term "universal" in a literal sense but instead has applied this duty in situations dictated by public policy, statutory and common law, and foreseeability. The foreseeability of harm associated with ownership of a swimming pool and hosting children in such a pool is just such a circumstance in which our common-law "universal duty of care" is applicable. The rule set out in Hardin is merely an extension of this longstanding common-law application of a duty of ordinary care prescribed when harm is foreseeable.
T & M Jewelry, Inc. v. Hicks ex rel. Hicks , 189 S.W.3d 526, 531 (Ky. 2006).
Id.
In this case, it is undisputed that the Ryans invited Landon to their home to swim and that Landon's death occurred while swimming. As such, as a matter of law, the Ryans owed a duty of reasonable care to Landon. With the scope of the Ryans’ duty determined, the determination of breach of such duty should be left to the discretion of the jury.
C. Implications for Comparative Fault
The existence of a duty must be established before breach may be considered and fault for the resulting damages may be apportioned. If duty is established, the jury must determine if a breach of such duty occurred. If breach is found to have occurred, the jury is permitted to assign fault to the property owners or others as they see fit. Since Kentucky's adoption of comparative fault, the open-and-obvious doctrine no longer acts as a bar to recovery, but instead is a factor to be weighed in assigning fault to the parties. If the Ryans decide, as they proposed at oral argument, to join as parties to the suit more attendees at the pool party, the jury will be provided the opportunity to assign fault to those additional parties. Any duty that Clements owed to Landon as his guardian and any potential breach could be considered in the jury's apportionment of fault. Additionally, the question of A.J. and other coaches undertaking additional duties of supervision and whether those duties were breached is a question of fact to be resolved by the jury.
Carter v. Bullitt Host, LLC , 471 S.W.3d 288, 297 (Ky. 2015).
Importantly, we reaffirm this Court's longstanding position that a pool itself is not a dangerous or hazardous condition. Instead, the activities conducted in and around a pool may create a dangerous or hazardous condition, depending upon the circumstances. The jury should weigh the evidence presented to decide if the conditions surrounding Landon's death constituted a dangerous condition and consider that factor in determining whether the Ryans failed to take reasonable care to ensure Landon's safety.
Hanners v. City of Ashland , 331 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Ky. 1959).
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
All sitting. All concur.