Opinion
No. 09-5010398
November 12, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (NO. 102.1) AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (NO. 104)
At issue is the defendant's motion for summary judgment #102.1 and the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment #104. For the reasons stated below, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied.
BACKGROUND
By complaint dated February 2, 2009, the plaintiff, Scott Vandale, "brings this action pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47-31 to quiet title in [the property known as 14 Downer Street, Pawcatuck, Stonington, Connecticut] by having the [Department of Social Services] Lien declared to be void and of no further force and effect." The Department of Social Services for the defendant, State of Connecticut, filed on or about July 23, 2003, a lien against the property, "recorded in Volume 524, Page 82 of the [Stonington] Land Records . . . to secure assistance payments made to Natale Ballato under the authority of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-79 and/or 17b-93." The plaintiff seeks "[a]n order quieting title to the Property by declaring the Lien void and of no effect" and any other equitable relief deemed just by this Court.
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts. Natale Ballato passed away on January 25, 2004. On or about September 21, 2004, the plaintiff acquired the property in question by purchasing "the half interest . . . [owned] by the Estate of Natale Ballato and the half interest owned by Josephine Bright . . . by virtue of a deed recorded in Volume 562, page 715 of the Office of the Town Clerk of the Town of Stonington . . ." "On or about June 1, 2004 . . . the Estate of Natale Ballato, gave notice to the State of Connecticut, Department of Social Services of Mr. Ballato's death, and requested the State to forward any claim against the Estate relating to the Lien for its review. On or about July 15, 2004, the Department of Administrative Services gave the Estate notice that it would not be filing a claim against the Estate. On or about July 3, 2008, the State of Connecticut Department of Social Services made demand on the Estate's representative for payment of the amounts secured by the Lien. Plaintiff made demand on the State of Connecticut to release the Lien as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-355 for failure by the State of Connecticut to assert a claim against the Estate within 90 days after notice to the State pursuant to such statute. The State of Connecticut has refused to release the Lien, and continues to seek to recover on the claim secured by the Lien."
On April 27, 2009, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in support thereof. On June 9, 2009, the plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in support thereof as well as in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The defendant filed a memorandum in reply to the plaintiff's opposition as well as in opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on July 6, 2009. The matter was heard at short calendar on July 13, 2009.
DISCUSSION
Practice Book § 17-49 "provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barrett v. Montesano, 269 Conn. 787, 791-92, 849 A.2d 839 (2004). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988).
In its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argues that General Statutes § 45a-355 is improperly relied upon by the plaintiff because it only prohibits the Department of Administrative Services from pursuing a claim against the probate estate and also because the statute does not seek to erase a real property lien otherwise established by statute. The defendant submits an authenticated affidavit of Carol Veronick, Public Assistance Consultant in the Department of Social Services, to support its claim of the amount due and owing under the public assistance lien in question and the defendant's act of filing a certificate of lien on such. The defendant also submits several authenticated documents from the Department of Social Services related to Natale Ballato's public assistance, including the certificate of lien.
In his memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment and in support of his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argues that § 45a-355 "bars the State from maintaining the claim on which the lien at issue is based, so the lien is invalid." The plaintiff submits a notarized affidavit of attorney Linda Kidder and an authenticated June 1, 2004 letter from attorney Kidder to the Department of Social Services requesting "any claim the State . . . may have against the estate . . ." (Plaintiff's Exhibit A; Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) The plaintiff also submits an authenticated July 15, 2004 letter from the Department of Administrative Services sent in response to her June 1, 2004 letter, advising her that it "will not be filing a claim against the estate . . ." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.)
The defendant has also filed a "reply to plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment and defendant's memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment," in which the defendant states that both parties agree there is no disputed issue of material fact in this case and generally reiterates its previous arguments.
General Statutes § 17b-79 provides in relevant part: "The commissioner may place a lien against any property to secure the claim of the state for all amounts which it has paid or may thereafter pay to such person . . . under any such program . . . Any such lien may, at any time during which the amount secured by such lien remains unpaid, be foreclosed in an action brought in a court of competent jurisdiction by the commissioner on behalf of the state . . . Such lien shall be released by the commissioner upon payment of the amount secured by such lien, or an amount equal to the value of the beneficiary's interest in such property . . ."
General Statutes § 17b-93 provides in relevant part: "(a) If a beneficiary of aid under the state supplement program, medical assistance program . . . or state-administered general assistance program has or acquires property of any kind or interest in any property . . . the State of Connecticut shall have a claim . . . which shall have priority over all other unsecured claims and unrecorded encumbrances, against such beneficiary for the full amount paid, subject to the provisions of section 17b-94, to him or in his behalf under said programs . . ."
General Statutes § 17b-94 provides in relevant part: "(a) In the case of causes of action of beneficiaries of aid under the state supplement program, medical assistance program . . . or state-administered general assistance program . . . or of a parent of a beneficiary . . . the claim of the state shall be a lien against the proceeds therefrom in the amount of the assistance paid or fifty percent of the proceeds received by such beneficiary and shall have priority over all other claims except attorneys fees . . . and such claim shall consist of the total assistance repayment for which claim may be made under said programs." Section 17b-94 directs payment by beneficiaries to be made to the "Commissioner of Administrative Services."
General Statutes § 45a-355, under the section of claims against decedents' estates, provides in relevant part: "The application for admission of a decedent's will to probate or for administration of a decedent's estate shall state whether the defendant, or the spouse or children of the decedent received aid or care from the state . . . A copy of the application which states that the decedent . . . did receive such aid or care shall be sent . . . by the Court of Probate to the Department of Administrative Services . . . and if the Department of Administrative Services . . . fails to present its claim to the fiduciary within ninety days from the date of mailing of such notification or the date of the appointment of the fiduciary, whichever is later, the Department of Administrative Services . . . shall be forever barred from asserting or recovering on such claim from the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent or any creditor or beneficiary of the state."
The plaintiff relies on Corcoran v. Rowe, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 92 294603 (July 25, 1994, Fuller, J.), as authority for why this court should grant summary judgment in his favor. Corcoran, however, is distinguishable from the present case for several reasons. First, the suit in Corcoran was brought "under § 49-51 of the General Statutes to determine whether a lien filed against property of the plaintiff's decedent pursuant to § 17-82c . . . for public assistance and medical benefits is invalid, and to discharge the lien," not under § 45a-355 for a lien filed pursuant to § 17b-79. Id. Second, the plaintiff in Corcoran was a beneficiary of the decedent's estate who gained the property through a residuary clause in the will, unlike the non-beneficiary plaintiff here. Id. Finally, Corcoran was vacated after the appeal settled and has not been cited by any court since it was decided.
In Padula v. Padula, 138 Conn 102, 106-07, 82 A.2d 362 (1951), the Supreme Court examined the "Statute of Nonclaim," then General Statutes § 6990. The court analogized that "it is not essential for a mortgagee to present a claim to the administrator of the estate of his mortgagor in order to enforce his interest in the mortgaged property, although his right to recover on the mortgage note is barred unless a claim has been presented. Beard's Appeal, 78 Conn. 481, 483, 62 A.704 . . . Those cases . . . in our reports which hold that the presentation of a claim is essential involve claims which are the personal obligation of the decedent. In those cases in which the cause of action is for the recovery of or the determination of interests in specific property and therefore is at least quasi in rem and not in personam, it is not an essential prerequisite that a claim be presented. In other words the purpose of the Statute of Nonclaim is to make sure that an administrator is informed as to what claims there are which must be paid out of the estate as a whole. It is not to apprise him of what the apparent property of his decedent is to be inventoried or what encumbrances, if any, are on that property." Id.
In the present case, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Whether the defendant's lien must be released is a question of law for this court to decide. First, the mechanism at issue is a statutory lien, not a personal claim on the assets of the probate estate. Section 17b-79 states that "such lien may, at any time during which the amount secured by such lien remains unpaid, be foreclosed . . ." The plain and unambiguous language of § 17b-79 makes clear that a lien such as the public assistance lien at issue here may be foreclosed at any time, so long as the underlying debt amount remains unpaid. "[A] statutory lien is as binding as a mortgage, and has the same capacity to hold the land so long as the statute preserves it is in force." United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84, 74 S.Ct. 367, 98 L.Ed. 520 (1954).
Second, the plain and unambiguous language of § 45a-355 is directed towards personal claims made on a decedent's estate, not statutory liens that remain effective until payment of the underlying amount or a change in the statute allowing such. This is analogous to the situation of a creditor under General Statutes § 45a-412 who is allowed to rely on her security rather than present a claim for the value of such in probate. The plaintiff argues that § 45a-355 "bars the State from maintaining the claim on which the lien at issue is based, so the lien is invalid." The plaintiff's argument that § 45a-355 bars the claim is telling. Section 45a-355 may bar a claim against the decedent's estate for the underlying amount given in public assistance payments; it does not invalidate the statutory lien that secures such amounts, nor does it order a release of said lien. Accordingly, § 45a-355 does not provide authority, as a matter of law, for the plaintiff's requested action of an "order quieting title to the Property by declaring the Lien void and of no effect," because that statute does not invalidate such statutory liens.
Finally, even if § 45a-355 was applicable in the way the plaintiff argues, the statute only bars claims against "the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent or any creditor or beneficiary of the state." The plaintiff cites no authority nor does he submit any evidence to show that he is within one of these classes. The plaintiff only states that he is a beneficiary of the estate because he has purchased the property from it. This is not so; the plaintiff is a purchaser of real estate from the decedent's estate, not a beneficiary of the estate. Corcoran v. Rowe, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 92 294603, is distinguishable on this issue because the plaintiff there was a beneficiary of the decedent's estate, unlike the plaintiff here. Accordingly, § 45a-355 is not applicable to the present case, and an order quieting title to the property by declaring the lien void cannot be entered.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied.