Opinion
3:24-CV-0003 (BKS/ML)
09-18-2024
JUSTIN VALK, Plaintiff, v. JOHN L. HUBBARD, District Attorney; SHAWN SMITH, District Attorney; LESLIE BURTON, II, New York State Police Investigator; MATHEW P. BURKERT, New York State Police Investigator; and JENNIFER HAHL, New York State Police Senior Investigator, Defendants.
JUSTIN VALK Plaintiff, Pro Se
JUSTIN VALK Plaintiff, Pro Se
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Clerk has sent a pro se amended complaint in the above captioned action filed by Justin Valk (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. (Dkt. No. 8.) For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be (1) accepted in part for filing, and (2) dismissed (a) in part with leave to amend, and (b) in part without leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 8.)
I. BACKGROUND
Construed as liberally as possible, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that defendants John L. Hubbard, Shawn Smith, Leslie Burton, Mathew P. Burkert, and Jennifer Hahl (collectively “Defendants”) violated his civil rights. (See generally Dkt. No. 8.)
The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to add defendants Leslie Burton, II, Mathew P. Burkert, and Jennifer Hahl to the docket of this action.
More specifically, the Amended Complaint alleges that on or about May 4, or May 5, 2022, Plaintiff and his acquaintances-Josh King and Roger Gilbertson-left Plaintiff's home to drive to Walmart in a vehicle driven and owned by Mr. King. (Dkt. No. 8 at 6.) The Amended Complaint alleges that shortly after leaving Plaintiff's house, a white, unmarked sedan swerved into the lane of traffic that Mr. King was driving in, and stopped, blocking the lane and direction of travel. (Id.) The Amended Complaint alleges that two men exited the unmarked white sedan, wearing plain civilian clothes and made no announcement that they were law enforcement. (Dkt. No. 8 at 7.) The Amended Complaint alleges that it was not until Defendant Burton approached Mr. King's vehicle, that Plaintiff recognized him from prior encounters. (Id.) The Amended Complaint alleges that the traffic stop occurred on private property in the Mountainview mobile home park. (Dkt. No. 8 at 34.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that Mr. King was “promptly handcuffed and taken into custody” but not read his Miranda warnings or told the charges against him. (Dkt. No. 8 at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that he and Mr. Gilberston were ordered out of the vehicle and questioned about a stolen Honda four wheeler, burglaries, and involvement in the stealing of catalytic converters. (Dkt. No. 8 at 7-8.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff and Mr. Gilbertson were not read their Miranda warnings. (Dkt. No. 8 at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that “[a]fter probably 10 minutes” of being questioned, Plaintiff told Defendant Burton that he did not have answers to questions, the traffic stop had “nothing to do with” him, and that he was going to walk home, which “was only 100-150 feet away.” (Id.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Burton told Plaintiff that he was not permitted to leave until answering the questions and if he did not cooperate, he would be arrested with Mr. Gilbertson and Mr. King and they “would all spend the weekend in jail.” (Id.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff and Mr. Gilbertson sat down in Mr. King's back seat out of sight of the law enforcement officers and Mr. Gilbertson dumped heroin from his wallet into the grass. (Dkt. No. 8 at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Burton then approached he and Mr. Gilbertson and continued asking questions about the stolen Honda four wheeler. (Id.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff again expressed his desire to leave and return home and was again told that he was not permitted to leave. (Dkt. No. 8 at 9.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Burton told Plaintiff and Mr. Gilbertson that this was their “absolute last chance to tell him where the 4wheeler came from or [they] were spending the weekend in jail.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this warning from Defendant Burton prompted Mr. Gilbertson to tell Defendant Burton that the Honda four wheeler was stolen from under a carport in Harpersfield, New York. (Id.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff informed Defendant Burton that he knew the general area of the stolen four wheeler but did not know the address. (Id.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Burton told Plaintiff that if he showed Defendant Burton the location where the four wheeler was stolen from, then Plaintiff, Mr. Gilbertson, and Mr. King would not be charged or arrested. (Id.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff and Mr. Gilbertson then “agreed to [Defendant] Burton's terms.” (Id.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff and Mr. Gilbertson got into Defendant Burton's unmarked white sedan and Defendant Burton drove in the direction of Harpersfield with Mr. Gilbertson providing directions. (Dkt. No. 8 at 9.) Plaintiff alleges that eventually they arrived at 226 County Route 30, Harpersfield, New York. (Id.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff informed Defendant Burton that he was at this address previously with Mr. King and Jerry Johnson on two prior occasions “strictly to observe around the swamp, which was across the street” because Plaintiff was interested in paranormal activity. (Dkt. No. 8 at 10, 3637.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Burton then drove Plaintiff and Mr. Gilbertson back to Oneonta and dropped them off a short distance from Plaintiff's house. (Dkt. No. 8 at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that the total amount of time from the beginning of the traffic stop to his return home exceeded two hours. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that the traffic stop of Mr. King's vehicle was unconstitutional because it lacked probable cause. (Dkt. No. 8 at 11.) Plaintiff alleges that Mr. King's windshield was cracked but-contrary to Defendant Burton's testimony at Plaintiff's preliminary hearing-it had a front license plate and although the license plate was invalid, Defendant Burton “could not have known that prior to the stop.” (Id.) The Amended Complaint alleges that even if there was probable cause to stop Mr. King's vehicle, the stop was illegal because Defendant Burton made “no attempt to activate his emergency lights or siren” and the officers did not announce that they were law enforcement. (Id.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that on May 8, 2022, Plaintiff was called by Defendant Burton and told that he had to come to the trooper barracks the next day at 10 a.m. (Dkt. No. 8 at 13.) Plaintiff alleges that he arrived at the trooper barracks on May 9, 2022 at 9:45 a.m., and participated in a conversation with Defendant Burton that was not witnessed by anyone else and not audio or video recorded. (Id. at 13, 15.) Plaintiff alleges that he was not advised of his Miranda warnings during this interaction and although there is “an alleged Miranda waiver, the signature appears to be a forged representation of [Plaintiff's].” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that after about 30-45 minutes of discussing burglaries, stolen catalytic converters, and stolen vehicles, Defendant Burton stated that he wanted to “type something up”-in a question-and-answer format-documenting the conversation. (Dkt. No. 8 at 14.) Plaintiff alleges that he indicated a desire to call his father but Defendant Burton informed him that (1) Mr. Gilbertson and Jerry Odell had been arrested, charged with burglary, and implicated Plaintiff, and (2) if Plaintiff called his father and his father suggested that Plaintiff call an attorney, Plaintiff would lose his opportunity to tell his side of the story and clear his name with Defendant Burton. (Id.)
Elsewhere in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff explicitly alleges that “the signed Miranda waiver is not my signature.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 15.)
Plaintiff alleges that at the conclusion of the question-and-answer session, Defendant Burton left his office, so Plaintiff powered on his cell phone. (Dkt. No. 8 at 14.) Plaintiff alleges that his phone began ringing with a call from his wife, Stephanie, who was incarcerated at the time. (Id.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff explained to Stephanie where he was and what was going on. (Dkt. No. 8 at 15.) Plaintiff alleges that when Defendant Burton returned to his office, Plaintiff stayed on the phone with Stephanie. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Burton placed four sheets of paper in front of him, instructed him to initial each of the four pages and sign the last page. (Id.) The Amended Complaint alleges that after Plaintiff initialed the four-page statement and signed the final page, he was escorted to the building lobby and did not have any police contact for approximately three months. (Id.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Burton's typed statement that Plaintiff initialed and signed differed greatly and omitted relevant information from the actual conversation between Plaintiff and Defendant Burton. (Dkt. No. 8 at 16-17.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that on August 5, 2022, around 8 a.m., Defendants Burkert and Hahl went to Plaintiff's house to question him about the sudden and unexpected death of his wife who passed away approximately 36 hours earlier. (Dkt. No. 8 at 18.) Plaintiff alleges that he was not read his Miranda warnings before being questioned and the questioning lasted approximately 30-45 minutes. (Id.) The Amended Complaint alleges that the criminal matter related to his late wife is still ongoing so Plaintiff is not asserting claims in this action related to that matter but “mention[ed] this questioning because . . . it shows the continued misconduct by state officials.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that at the conclusion of the questioning, he was informed that he had to ride with Defendants Burkert and Hahl back to the trooper barracks and was directed to bring both of his cell phones. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that back at the trooper barracks he was brought to an interrogation room, read his Miranda warnings, and questioned by Defendants Burkert and Hahl about Stephanie's sudden passing. (Dkt. No. 8 at 18.) Plaintiff alleges that towards the end of the questioning Defendant Hahl accused him of intentionally hurting Stephanie, which angered and upset him, so he terminated the interrogation. (Dkt. No. 8 at 18-19.) Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to walk out of the interrogation room but was stopped by Defendant Hahl who placed him under arrest for second degree burglary. (Dkt. No. 8 at 19.) Plaintiff alleges that other officers came into the interrogation room, shoved him against the wall, and yanked his hands out of his pockets which caused his phones to fly through the air and fall onto the floor. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hahl directed officers to get Plaintiff's phones. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was shackled to a wooden bench for the next 10-12 hours. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that hours after being charged with second degree burglary, he was also charged with criminally negligent homicide and second degree manslaughter after investigators went through his phones. (Id.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that on August 5, 2022, Plaintiff was arraigned on the criminally negligent homicide and second degree manslaughter charges in the Hamden Village Court. (Dkt. No. 8 at 19.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was remanded to the Delaware County Jail on $30,000 cash or $70,000 bond but was not arraigned on the second degree burglary charge until the afternoon of August 9, 2022. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that the questioning at his home first without being provided his Miranda warnings tainted the subsequent interview at the trooper barracks where he was provided his Miranda warnings because it was a question first interrogation. (Dkt. No. 8 at 21.) The Amended Complaint further alleges that Plaintiff's arrest for second degree burglary was in violation of the Fourth Amendment because it lacked probable cause and any evidence relevant to establishing probable cause was obtained through the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that his rights were further violated by the fact that he was not arraigned on the second degree burglary charge until August 9, 2022. (Id.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that on August 15, 2022, Defendant Hubbard presented testimony at Plaintiff's preliminary felony hearing based on the second degree burglary charge. (Dkt. No. 8 at 22.) Plaintiff alleges that the testimony presented either (1) did not pertain to Plaintiff, (2) was presented by Defendant Burton who obtained the information by violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights, or (3) was presented by Mr. Gilbertson who was bribed by Defendant Hubbard to provide false testimony and has a history of not providing truthful testimony. (Dkt. No. 8 at 22-23.) Plaintiff alleges that the bribe offered to Mr. Gilbertson by Defendant Hubbard was that Mr. Gilbertson provide testimony implicating Plaintiff and in exchange, Mr. Gilbertson would receive a sentence of five years supervision with adult treatment court conditions. (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Smith was also involved in “procuring [the] statement from [Mr.] Gilbertson.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 24.) Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Gilbertson was released “a few days after [his] preliminary hearing” testimony and died from a drug overdose five days later. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that after Mr. Gilbertson's death, while incarcerated in the Delaware County Jail, he observed the discovery material of Adam Bright-one of his criminal co-defendants-which included the supporting deposition of Mr. Gilbertson implicating Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 8 at 25.) Plaintiff alleges that during the months of October 2022 to December 2022, Defendant Hubbard was transitioning out of his role as District Attorney and Defendant Smith was transitioning into the role as District Attorney for Delaware County. (Dkt. No. 8 at 25-26.) The Amended Complaint alleges that during this same time period-October 2022 to December 2022-Mr. Bright received his discovery materials, which included statements written by Mr. Gilbertson and the prosecution's case against Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 8 at 26.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that on January 26, 2023, Mr. Bright testified on behalf of the prosecution at Plaintiff's grand jury hearing. (Dkt. No. 8 at 26.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Smith influenced Mr. Bright to give false testimony with the promise of a reduced sentence and provided Mr. Bright with Mr. Gilbertson's statements so that Mr. Bright could memorize and recite them to the grand jury. (Id.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Smith also provided the grand jury with the false testimony of Defendant Burton and any information Defendant Burton did have was the product of police coercion and obtained by violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. (Dkt. No. 8 at 27.)
Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated by the unreasonable delay in his indictment and prosecution. (Dkt. No. 8 at 28.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was indicted for second degree burglary on January 26, 2023, and arraigned on that indictment on January 30, 2023, but did not plead guilty until May 13, 2024. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the prosecution's objective was to “wear [him] down” by making him “sit in Delaware County Jail which is known to be one of the worst county jails around.” (Id.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was being punished more severely in the second degree burglary matter-despite it being a weak criminal case-because of the ongoing criminal matter related to Plaintiff's wife's death. (Dkt. No. 8 at 29.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was convicted upon the testimony of an accomplice without the support of corroborative evidence tending to connect him with the commission of second degree burglary, which is in violation of N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 60.22(1). (Dkt. No. 8 at 32.)
Based on these factual allegations, the Amended Complaint asserts the following nine claims: (1) a claim of unlawful seizure against Defendant Burton pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the traffic stop that occurred on May 4 or 5, 2022; (2) a claim that Plaintiff's Miranda rights were violated pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant Burton and the New York State Police; (3) a claim that Plaintiff's due process rights pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were violated by Defendant Burton in fabricating and/or falsifying evidence on May 8, 2024; (4) a claim that Defendants Hubbard and Smith violated Plaintiff's due process rights to a fair trial pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by using the false/fabricated evidence produced by Defendant Burton and bribing Mr. Gilbertson and Mr. Bright to testify against Plaintiff; (5) a claim of excessive and unreasonable bail pursuant to the Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Hubbard and Smith; (6) a claim of false arrest and unlawful imprisonment against Defendants Hahl and Burkert in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (7) a claim of unlawful imprisonment against Defendants Hubbard and Smith in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the delay in Plaintiff's arraignment; (8) a claim of excessive and unreasonable sentence against Defendant Smith; and (9) a claim that Plaintiff's right against selfincrimination pursuant to the Fifth Amendment was violated by Defendant Smith by requiring that Plaintiff to implicate himself in the burglary upon Plaintiff's acceptance of a guilty plea. (Dkt. No. 8 at 49-54.)
As relief, Plaintiff seeks that his conviction of second degree burglary be vacated, the suppression of all evidence obtained against him with respect to the second degree burglary charge, a new and fair trial, and punitive and compensatory damages in the amount of $7,500,000.00. (Dkt. No. 8 at 49.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, his Amended Complaint must be reviewed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The legal standard governing review of a pleading pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b) was discussed at length in the Order and Report-Recommendation issued by the undersigned on April 3, 2024. (Dkt. No. 5 at 3-4.)
III. ANALYSIS
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's Amended Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that it be accepted in part for filing and dismissed in part.
A. Challenge to Conviction
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “established the clear principle that federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments.” Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910 F.3d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Because “federal district courts are granted original-and not appellate-jurisdiction, cases that function as de facto appeals of state-court judgments are therefore jurisdictionally barred.” Sung Cho, 910 F.3d at 644. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court lacks authority to review a final state court order or judgment where the plaintiff seeks relief that invites the federal district court to reject or overturn such a final state court order or judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005); Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257) (“[The Rooker-Feldman doctrine] bars federal district courts from hearing cases that in effect are appeals from state court judgments, because the Supreme Court [of the United States] is the only federal court with jurisdiction over such cases.”); Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (“The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine reflects the principle set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 that the Supreme Court [of the United States] is the only federal court that has jurisdiction to review state court judgments, unless otherwise provided by Congress, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (habeas corpus review).”).
District court review of claims is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when four requirements are met: (1) the plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a final state court order or judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites district court review and rejection of the final state court order or judgment; and (4) the final state court order or judgment was rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Dorce, 2 F.4th at 101 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where a plaintiff seeks relief that invites a federal district court to reject or overturn a final decision of a state court as to a conviction. See Teichmann v. New York, 769 F.3d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 2014) (dismissal of Section 1983 claims warranted under Rooker-Feldman where a plaintiff “seeks nothing more than a review of a state court judgment”); Moalawi v. James, 22-CV-6770, 2023 WL 4817618, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2023) (finding that Rooker-Feldman bars the plaintiff's challenge to state-court conviction under Section 1983); Mitchell v. New York State, 22-CV-1747, 2023 WL 2734823, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2023) (dismissing under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Section 1983 action that “necessarily invites the Court to review the judgment of [the plaintiff's state court criminal] conviction”); Molina v. James, 21-CV-3144, 2022 WL 813815, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2022) (dismissing under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, plaintiff's request for an injunction to dismiss his criminal conviction); Bobrowsky v. Yonkers Courthouse, 777 F.Supp.2d 692, 705-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding no subject-matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman, where plaintiff requested to “void . . . conviction entered by . . . state courts”).
Here, Plaintiff's claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff, who was convicted in state court before bringing this action, complains that his constitutional rights were violated in his criminal proceedings. In other words, he challenges the validity of his state court conviction and invites the Court to review the judgment of conviction. (Dkt. No. 8 at 35 [Amended Complaint indicating that it is seeking to “move to vacate my second degree burglary conviction. All information and evidence gathered against me was obtained illegally by violating my rights ....At least I pray this court grants me a new and fair trial by suppressing any and all evidence that was obtained by violating my constitutional rights.”]; Dkt. No. 8 at 46 [“I pray this court grant me relief by vacating or overturning my conviction, or by granting me a fair trial by suppressing any and all evidence gathered illegally as a result of violating my federally protected rights.”]; Dkt. No. 8 at 49 [requesting that “my burglary conviction [be] vacated or overturned to get a fair trial after suppressing evidence obtained by violating my federally protected rights.”].) The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court from reviewing such challenges. The undersigned therefore recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's challenge to his state court conviction, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291.
The Second Circuit has held that a “state-court judgment [is] not ‘rendered' for Rooker-Feldman purposes ‘before the district court proceedings commenced' [where] an appeal [is] pending in the state case” at the time the federal suit is filed. Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2023). The Amended Complaint clearly alleges that Plaintiff pleaded guilty and has been convicted (Dkt. No. 8 at 49, 54) and does not allege any facts plausibly suggesting that an appeal is pending (see generally Dkt. No. 8).
B. Claims Seeking Monetary Damages
1. Immunity
To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to sue New York, the New York State Police, the Delaware County District Attorney's Office, or Defendants in their official capacities seeking monetary damages, those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
New York State is immune from suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking either legal or equitable relief, under the Eleventh Amendment. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984); see Ognibene v. Niagara Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 03-CV-0678, 2003 WL 24243989, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2003) (“To the extent the plaintiff names various state courts as defendants and seeks either legal or equitable relief against them under § 1983, they are immune from such suit under the Eleventh Amendment.”). The Eleventh Amendment's immunity extends to the New York State Police as an agency of the State of New York. See, e.g., Riley v. Cuomo, 17-CV-1631, 2018 WL 1832929, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2018) (holding that the New York State Police, as a division in the executive department of the State, is immune from claims under § 1983); Finkelman v. New York State Police, 06-CV-8705, 2007 WL 4145456, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2007) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiff's suit seeking monetary damages under § 1983 against New York State Police). Moreover, the Delaware County District Attorney's Office is immune from suit. See Campbell v. New York State Police, 23-CV-1337, 2024 WL 1702010 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2024) (Lovric, M.J.) (citing Roark v. New York, 23-CV-1237, 2023 WL 8827185, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2023) (Lovric, M.J.) (citations omitted) (recommending that the plaintiff's claims against the Watertown District Attorney's Office be dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment), report and recommendation adopted by, 2024 WL 125512, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2024) (Hurd, J.)) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against defendant Broome County District Attorney's Office), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3063674 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2024) (Nardacci, J.).
Claims against Defendants Burton, Burkert, and Hahl in their official capacities-as employees of New York State-are to be construed as claims against New York State and thus barred pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. See Sundwall v. Leuba, 28 Fed.Appx. 11, 12 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing K & A Radiologic Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Health, 189 F.3d 273, 278 (2d Cir. 1999)) (holding that “state officers, if sued in their official capacities, are immunized from suit by private citizens under the Eleventh Amendment.”); King v. New York State, 23-CV-3421, 2023 WL 5625440, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2023) (citing Thomas v. Martin-Gibbons, 857 Fed.Appx. 36, 37 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of pro se Section 1983 claims against the State of New York and a state court judge in his official capacity based on Eleventh Amendment immunity)) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state officials acting in their official capacities, including state court judges.”). Further, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to sue Defendants Hubbard and Smith in their official capacities-as employees of the Delaware County District Attorney's Office-those claims are subject to dismissal pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. See D'Alessandro v. City of New York, 713 Fed.Appx. 1, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]f a district attorney or an assistant district attorney acts as a prosecutor, she is an agent of the state, and therefore immune from suit in her official capacity.”); Rich v. New York, 21-CV-3835, 2022 WL 992885, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (“[A]ny claims Plaintiff may raise against the DA Defendants in their ‘official capacity' would be precluded by immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”).
2. Claims Against Defendant Burton
a. Unlawful Seizure During Traffic Stop
Out of an abundance of caution, mindful of the Second Circuit's instruction that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be liberally construed, see, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191, and without expressing an opinion as to whether Plaintiff can withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, I recommend that a response be required to Plaintiff's unlawful seizure claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment against Defendant Burton in his individual capacity related to the seizure that occurred on May 4 or 5, 2022.
b. Miranda Violation
“The Fifth Amendment protects against compulsory self-incrimination by forbidding the introduction of coerced statements into evidence at trial.” Harris v. Doe, 24-CV-0151, 2024 WL 1344697, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2024). Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required and instead, were developed as a means to protect the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. Harris, 2024 WL 1344687, at *3. “Although failure to give Miranda warnings may be reason to preclude evidence against a defendant at a criminal trial, ‘the failure to give Miranda warnings does not create liability under § 1983.'” Spicer v. Burden, 564 F.Supp.3d 22, 30 (D. Conn. 2021) (quoting Neighbour v. Covert, 68 F.3d 1508, 1510 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam)); see Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment only forbids introduction of coerced statements at trial, so failure to provide Miranda warnings does not violate suspect's constitutional rights and “cannot be grounds for a § 1983 action”).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
As a result, I recommend Plaintiff's Miranda violation claim against Defendant Burton in his individual capacity be dismissed.
c. Falsification of Evidence
Out of an abundance of caution, mindful of the Second Circuit's instruction that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be liberally construed, see, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191, and without expressing an opinion as to whether Plaintiff can withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, I recommend that a response be required to Plaintiff's falsification of evidence claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment against Defendant Burton in his individual capacity related to the document created on May 9, 2022.
Although Plaintiff appears to present this claim as a due process violation pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it appears to be more appropriately fashioned as a fabrication of evidence claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. “When a police officer creates false information likely to influence a jury's decision and forwards that information to prosecutors, he violates the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial, and the harm occasioned by such an unconscionable action is redressable in an action for damages under [Section 1983].” Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). The “right to a fair trial can be violated even if the fabricated evidence that was supplied to the prosecutor was not ultimately used at trial.” Moroughan v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 514 F.Supp.3d 479, 535 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Frost v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 980 F.3d 231, 250 (2d Cir. 2020)).
3. Claims Against Defendant Hubbard
a. Due Process Claim
“It is by now well established that a state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursing a criminal prosecution is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.” Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). “Because the immunity attaches to the official prosecutorial function and because the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution are quintessential prosecutorial functions, the prosecutor has absolute immunity for the initiation and conduct of a prosecution unless he proceeds in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Shmueli, 424 F.3d at 237 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
These principles also protect a prosecutor against malicious prosecution claims brought under state law. Shmueli, 424 F.3d at 238; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 n.5 (1993) (indicating that the Court's conclusion that absolute immunity protects a prosecutor against § 1983 claims in the nature of malicious prosecution was based in part on the “commonlaw tradition of immunity for a prosecutor's decision to bring an indictment, whether he has probable cause or not”); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (same principles require conferral of absolute immunity for damages claims under § 1983 and state law).
“A prosecutor is not absolutely immune solely because she engaged in the conduct in question during her line of work.” D'Alessandro v. City of New York, 713 Fed.Appx. 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)). “A prosecutor wears many hats” including “administrat[or],” “investigator,” and “advocate[ ].” D'Alessandro, 713 Fed.Appx. at 5 (quoting Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 656 (2d Cir. 1995)). However, the prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity “when she acts as an ‘advocate.'” Id. (citing Warney v. Monroe Cnty., 587 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 2009)). “Under our case law, a prosecutor unquestionably acts as an advocate-and therefore receives absolute immunity-when she initiates and pursues a criminal prosecution.” Id. (citing Shmueli, 424 F.3d at 236). Indeed, “a prosecutor still acts within the scope of her duties even if she . . . knowingly uses false testimony, . . . engages in malicious prosecution, or attempts to intimidate an individual into accepting a guilty plea.” D'Alessandro, 713 Fed.Appx. at 5 (citing Shmueli, 424 F.3d at 237-38; Peay v. Ajello, 470 F.3d 65, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Here, the acts that Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hubbard took-presenting the evidence that was false or fabricated by Defendant Burton and offering plea bargains to Mr. Gilbertson and Mr. Bright-occurred while he engaged in acts “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that “[a] prosecutor is also entitled to absolute immunity despite allegations of his ‘knowing use of perjured testimony' and the ‘deliberate withholding of exculpatory information.'” Shmueli, 424 F.3d at 237 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.34). Further, “it has been well-settled law within this Circuit for [decades] that a prosecutor's ability to offer a plea bargain is firmly embedded within the absolute immunity doctrine.” Aretakis v. Durivage, 07-CV-1273, 2009 WL 2567781, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) (Treece, M.J.) (citing Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1984); Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Lawson v. Abrams, 863 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1998)).
As a result, I recommend that any due process claim against Defendant Hubbard in his individual capacity be dismissed because absolute immunity protects him from suit.
b. Excessive Bail
The Eighth Amendment states that, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted .” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
As discussed above, absolute immunity is available to prosecutors when they act within their prosecutorial role in the judicial process. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993); Bernard v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 503 (2d Cir. 2004); Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 660 (2d Cir. 1995). “Prosecutors act within their prosecutorial roles during bail hearings.” Phillips v. DeAngelis, 571 F.Supp.2d 347, 358 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (Hurd, J.) (citing Smith v. Garretto, 147 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir.1998); see Pinaud v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1149 (2d Cir. 1995)). Therefore, Plaintiff's claim of excessive bail against Defendant Hubbard in his individual capacity should be dismissed based on the doctrine of absolute immunity.
c. Unlawful Imprisonment - Arraignment Delay
“[T]he Fourth Amendment provides the proper analytical framework” for claims that a prosecutor's conduct “unconstitutionally prolonged [an arrestee's] postarrest detention.” Bryant v. City of New York, 404 F.3d 128, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2005). “In the context of pretrial detention, the Supreme Court has held that, when there has been a warrantless arrest, the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention.” Bryant, 404 F.3d at 135-36 . “[A] jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement.” County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). In sum, “[w]hat is constitutionally required is that, except in extraordinary circumstances, the arrestee be given a hearing into probable cause for the arrest within 48 hours.” Bryant, 404 F.3d at 138. In New York, because probable cause determinations are made at arraignments, the Fourth Amendment thus requires that an arrestee be arraigned within 48 hours. Id.
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was detained for about 96 hours before arraignment (Dkt. No. 8 at 21), so his detention was presumptively unreasonable.
Out of an abundance of caution, mindful of the Second Circuit's instruction that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be liberally construed, see, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191, and without expressing an opinion as to whether Plaintiff can withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, I recommend that a response be required to Plaintiff's unlawful imprisonment claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment against Defendant Hubbard in his individual capacity related to Plaintiff's arraignment delay.
4. Claims Against Defendant Smith
a. Due Process
As set forth above in Part III.B.3.a. of this Report and Recommendation, I recommend that Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Smith in his individual capacity alleging a due process violation be dismissed based on the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity.
b. Excessive Bail
As set forth above in Part III.B.3.b. of this Report and Recommendation, I recommend that Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Smith in his individual capacity alleging an excessive bail violation be dismissed based on the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity.
c. Unlawful Imprisonment - Arraignment Delay
As set forth above in Part III.B.3.c. of this Report and Recommendation, I recommend that out of an abundance of caution, mindful of the Second Circuit's instruction that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be liberally construed, see, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191, and without expressing an opinion as to whether Plaintiff can withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, a response be required to Plaintiff's unlawful imprisonment claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment against Defendant Smith in his individual capacity related to Plaintiff's arraignment delay.
d. Excessive and Unreasonable Sentence Claim
“State prisoners . . . must bring challenges both to the execution of a sentence and to underlying convictions under section 2254.” Blanchard v. New York, 18-CV-0448, 2018 WL 2324054, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 2018) (Suddaby, C.J.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Cook v. New York State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 278 (2d Cir. 2003)). Here, Plaintiff is incarcerated in a state correctional facility, pursuant to a state criminal conviction, asserting that the execution of his sentence is unlawful because it is both excessive and unreasonable. Hence, to the extent that Plaintiff wishes to pursue that claim, he must do so in the form of a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Moreover, “[n]o federal constitutional issue is presented where . . . the sentence is within the range prescribed by state law.” White v. Keane, 969 F.2d 1381, 1383 (2d Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he received a determinate sentence of six years incarceration for the second degree burglary conviction, which “is within the recommended guideline for that charge.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 32.)
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's excessive and unreasonable sentence claim be dismissed.
e. Violation of Self Incrimination Claim
“A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights.” Hanson v. Phillips, 442 F.3d 789, 798 (2d Cir. 2006). “A defendant who enters [a guilty] plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers.” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claim that his Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination was violated in the context of his plea allocution, be dismissed.
5. Claims Against Defendants Hahl and Burkert
Federal claims of false arrest implicate the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. See Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1991). A § 1983 claim
alleging false arrest is “substantially the same” as the tort under New York state law. Posr, 944 F.2d at 96. “To state a claim for false arrest under New York law, a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.'” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Out of an abundance of caution, mindful of the Second Circuit's instruction that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be liberally construed, see, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191, and without expressing an opinion as to whether Plaintiff can withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, I recommend that a response be required to Plaintiff's false arrest claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment against Defendants Hahl and Burkert in their individual capacities.
IV. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).
See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim”-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.
In this instance, Plaintiff has already amended the complaint once as of right pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). However, the Second Circuit has made clear that where a pro se litigant asserts new claims in an amended complaint, the district court “should . . . afford[ Plaintiff] at least one opportunity to amend th[o]se newly asserted claims before entering a sua sponte dismissal with prejudice.” Mitchell v. Annucci, 21-2978-pr, 2023 WL 8073106, at *4 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2023) (summary order).
As a result, although I have serious doubts about whether Plaintiff can replead to assert actionable claims, given that this is the Court's first review of Plaintiff's newly asserted claims and that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, out of an abundance of caution, I recommend that he be permitted to replead the Amended Complaint to the extent that it asserts claims seeking monetary damages against (1) claims against Defendant Burton in his individual capacity alleging a Miranda violation; (2) Defendant Hubbard in his individual capacity alleging (a) a due process violation, and (b) excessive bail; and (3) claims against Defendant Smith in his individual capacity alleging (a) a due process violation, (b) excessive bail, (c) excessive and unreasonable sentence, and (d) violation of the right against self-incrimination.
However, any amendments to the Amended Complaint (1) seeking to overturn Plaintiff's state court conviction, and (2) seeking monetary damages against New York State, or Defendants in their official capacities, would be futile. As a result, I recommend that those claims be dismissed without leave to amend.
If Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, he should note that the law in this circuit clearly provides that “‘complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning.'” Hunt v. Budd, 895 F.Supp. 35, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987)); accord Pourzancvakil v. Humphry, 94-CV-1594, 1995 WL 316935, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 1995) (Pooler, J.). Therefore, in any second amended complaint, Plaintiff must clearly set forth facts that give rise to the claims, including the dates, times, and places of the alleged underlying acts, and each individual who committed each alleged wrongful act. In addition, the revised pleading should allege facts demonstrating the specific involvement of any of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations alleged in sufficient detail to establish that they were tangibly connected to those deprivations. Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). Finally, Plaintiff is informed that any such second amended complaint will replace the existing Amended Complaint, and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”).
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court ACCEPT for filing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8) to the extent that it asserts: (1) a claims against Defendant Burton in his individual capacity alleging (a) an unlawful seizure on May 4 or 5, 2022, and (b) falsification of evidence on May 9, 2022; (2) claims against Defendants Hubbard and Smith in their individual capacities alleging unlawful imprisonment for the arraignment delay; and (3) claims against Defendants Hahl and Burkert in their individual capacities alleging false arrest; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8) WITHOUT LEAVE TO REPLEAD to the extent that it asserts: (1) claims seeking to challenge Plaintiff's state court criminal conviction; and (2) monetary damages against the State of New York and Defendants in their official capacities, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8) WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD to the extent that it asserts: (1) a Miranda violation claim against Defendant Burton in his individual capacity; (2) claims against Defendant Hubbard in his individual capacity alleging (a) a due process violation, and (b) excessive bail; and (3) claims against Defendant Smith in his individual capacity alleging (a) a due process violation, (b) excessive bail, (c) excessive and unreasonable sentence, and (d) violation of the right against self-incrimination, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this order, report, and recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with the local rules.
The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).