Opinion
Case No. 4:19-cr-00022-SMR-SBJ-1
2023-04-25
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Jay J. SAWATZKY, Defendant.
Mikaela J. Shotwell, Craig P. Gaumer, United States Attorney's Office, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.
Mikaela J. Shotwell, Craig P. Gaumer, United States Attorney's Office, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff. ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND THE PRE-SENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT STEPHANIE M. ROSE, CHIEF JUDGE
On March 24, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Amend pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(5). [ECF No. 152 at 1]. In the Motion, he asks that his Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") be corrected to account for expungement of his domestic abuse and drug convictions. Id. (citing Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons, 952 F.2d 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). For the reasons discussed in detail below, the Motion is DENIED.
Rehearing was granted and the cited opinion was vacated. The opinion issued after the rehearing is Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons, 959 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
I. GOVERNING LAW
A. Jurisdiction Over Dispute
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the BOP has "broad discretion to choose the location of an inmate's imprisonment." Fults v. Sanders, 442 F.3d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The statute provides the BOP "shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment" based on several considerations such as "the nature and circumstances the offense." Kern v. Fikes, Case No. 21-cv-2211 (WMW/LIB), 2022 WL 2959973, at *7 (D. Minn. June 16, 2022) (citation omitted). An inmate's classification is a condition of confinement reserved for determination by federal prison officials. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976) ("Congress has given federal prison officials full discretion to control these conditions of confinement."); United States v. Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2021) (holding that the CARES Act did not change this general rule). This means the BOP's decisions are often shielded from court review. Cottman v. Fikes, Case No. 21-cv-2393 (SRN/TNL), 2023 WL 2482878, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2023) (collecting cases); Blocher v. Eischen, Case No. 22-cv-678 (PJS/DTS), 2022 WL 17406549, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2022). The only exception is when another law changes or modifies the BOP's authority. United States v. Vang, Crim. No. 16-cr-277 (DWF/KMM), 2020 WL 4704875, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2020)
B. Asserted Exception and Its Impact on Reviewability
Defendant asserts he is entitled to relief under Sellers, which interpreted and applied the Privacy Act to the BOP's procedures. Sellers began when an inmate sued the BOP and the Parole Commission, asserting they violated his rights by "failing to maintain accurate records" and "by failing to amend inaccurate files." Sellers, 959 F.2d at 309. The plaintiff in Sellers argued that the Parole Commission used incorrect information from his PSR to deny him parole and the BOP used it to maintain his higher security classification. Id. Upon consideration of the merits, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded the Privacy Act required the BOP to verify information that is easy to ascertain. Id. at 311. This led the panel to reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the BOP. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has never applied Sellers or its reasoning to cases in the jurisdiction. Payne v. United States, No. 93-3833, 1995 WL 2909, at *2 (8th Cir. Jan. 5, 1995) (holding that Payne was not entitled to have information about vacated convictions "struck" from the PSR under Sellers); United States v. Leath, 711 F.2d 119, 120 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding district courts do not have the authority to correct information with the goal of adjusting "parole eligibility"). Although the Eighth Circuit did not provide an explanation for the decision in Payne, later case law suggests that Sellers does not apply because the BOP promulgated a regulation exempting itself from the Act. Clow v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Civil Action No. 08cv01121 (ESH), 2008 WL 2885781, at *1 (D. D.C. July 25, 2008) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 16.97(j)). Specifically, the BOP "exempted its inmate central files," which includes PSRs, from the requirements of the Privacy Act. Lopez v. Huff, 508 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D. D.C. 2007); Earle v. Holder, 815 F. Supp. 2d 176, 182 (D. D.C. 2011) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)). It exempted information on a prisoner's custody classification and security level. Harrison v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 248 F. Supp. 3d 172, 180 (D. D.C. 2017) (citing Vaden v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 79 F. Supp. 3d 207, 212 (D. D.C. 2015)). This exemption has been upheld against many challenges by inmates. Martinez v. Bureau of Prisons, 444 F.3d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (collecting cases).
II. ANALYSIS
In the Motion, Defendant explains how the PSR "indicated a number of prior convictions for drug offenses and also 'domestic abuse' offenses." [ECF No. 152 at 1]. This history led the BOP to classify him as violent and add six-points under the "Male Custody Classification Form," which he explains "is the focus of this Motion." Id. This claim fails for several reasons.
First, the Court lacks authority to hear Defendant's challenge because the BOP has broad authority with respect to classification of prisoners. Moody, 429 U.S. at 88 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 274. To the extent the challenge may be raised, it must be administratively exhausted and then brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. United States v. Barnett, No. 3:06-cr-00599-JAJ-TJS, 2010 WL 11595150, at *3 (S.D. Iowa May 10, 2010) (citing Leath, 711 F.2d at 119). Those challenges must be filed in the district in which he is incarcerated, where the BOP maintains a regional office, or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. United States v. Chappel, 208 F.3d 1069, 1070 (8th Cir. 2000). Given that Defendant is not incarcerated in the Southern District of Iowa and there is no regional BOP office present, he may not seek relief before this Court. Barnett, 2010 WL 11595150, at *3.
Second, he is not eligible for relief under Sellers because the Eighth Circuit has expressly rejected the application of the decision in the circuit. Payne, 1995 WL 2909, at *2. Even if the Eighth Circuit recognized Sellers, it would not provide him relief because the decision has been superseded by regulations that exempt the BOP from the relevant provisions of the Privacy Act. Martinez, 444 F.3d at 624; Lopez, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 77; Earle, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 182; Clow, 2008 WL 2885781, at *1. Under these regulations, the documents Defendant seeks to amend, i.e., information related to custody classification and security level, are exempted from the Privacy Act. Harrison, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 180. Therefore, this contention lacks merit.
III. CONCLUSION
Considering this discussion, the Motion to Amend or Correct the PSR is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.