Opinion
2019-1669 K C
03-05-2021
Iraida Kriegsman, appellant pro se. Rose & Rose (Jainey Samuel of counsel), for respondent.
Iraida Kriegsman, appellant pro se.
Rose & Rose (Jainey Samuel of counsel), for respondent.
PRESENT: MICHELLE WESTON, J.P., WAVNY TOUSSAINT, DONNA-MARIE E. GOLIA, JJ.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.
In this nonpayment proceeding, the parties executed a so-ordered two-attorney stipulation of settlement on July 30, 2019 which provided, among other things, that tenant pay landlord an agreed sum by August 31, 2019. On August 14, 2019, tenant, who receives a Section 8 subsidy, moved to vacate the stipulation and, separately, to relieve her attorney and proceed pro se. Tenant alleged, among other things, that she was being overcharged and that her attorney did not consult her prior to signing the stipulation. In opposition to the motions, landlord submitted an affidavit from its site manager which detailed the manner in which tenant's rent had been determined. Landlord also submitted an affirmation from its attorney stating that counsel had executed the stipulation of settlement with tenant's attorney, that he observed tenant in court consulting with her attorney on July 30, 2019, and that the stipulation was crafted, in part, based upon tenant's participation. It was also noted that tenant's attorney had stated, in court on August 22, 2019, that she had discussed the stipulation with tenant. By order dated September 12, 2019, the Civil Court stated that tenant's motion to represent herself was granted on consent and denied tenant's motion to vacate the stipulation.
To the extent that tenant's appeal, from so much of the order as denied her motion to vacate the stipulation, is based upon her claim that her attorney signed the stipulation without consulting tenant, this claim is vague and unsubstantiated. Moreover, tenant has not rebutted landlord's specific factual allegations regarding her participation. Thus, this claim is not a basis to vacate the stipulation.
Tenant's bare allegation of a rent overcharge is also unsupported by the record, which establishes that landlord adjusted tenant's rent after it received notice that tenant was no longer employed. "It is well settled that stipulations of settlement are judicially favored and will not easily be set aside ( see Hallock v State of New York , 64 NY2d 224 [1984] ; Matter of Frutiger , 29 NY2d 143 [1971] ). While stipulations of settlements may be vacated on grounds sufficient to set aside a contract, such as fraud, mistake, collusion or accident ( see Nash v Yablon-Nash , 61 AD3d 832 [2009] ), a party should not be relieved from the consequences of the stipulation, particularly one made in ‘open court,’ absent a sufficient or compelling showing of the above" ( Cach, LLC v Woodsnajac , 42 Misc 3d 129[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52165[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). Here, tenant has not offered any basis to vacate the stipulation.
Accordingly, the order insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.
WESTON, J.P., TOUSSAINT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.