Opinion
Index No. L&T 003985/20
08-25-2023
Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, P.C., for Petitioner. Bronx Legal Services, for Respondent.
Unpublished Opinion
Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, P.C., for Petitioner.
Bronx Legal Services, for Respondent.
Kisha L. Miller, J.
KISHA L. MILLER, J.H.C.
Recitation, as required by C.P.L.R. § 2219(a), of the papers considered in review of the order to show cause to vacate the stipulation.
Papers Numbered
Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed.......NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 28-37
Answering and Affidavits Annexed..NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 41-43
Petitioner commenced this summary eviction proceeding to recover possession of the premises located at 1898 Harrison Ave, Apt 7-B, Bronx, New York for nonpayment of rent. Respondent filed a pro se answer. After retaining counsel, Respondent filed an amended answer, on Petitioner's consent, interposing affirmative defenses and counterclaims including breach of warranty of habitability. The proceeding was transferred to Part X for trial, but Respondent applied for rental assistance through the COVID-19 Emergency Rental Assistance Program, which stayed the proceeding for several months. When Respondent's application and subsequent appeal were denied, Petitioner moved to vacate the stay. The court granted the motion, without opposition, and scheduled the proceeding for trial.
The court did not issue a decision/order. NYBench notes contains an entry dated March 10, 2023 vacating the stay.
During a pre-trial conference on May 12, the parties executed a stipulation of settlement. Respondent consented to a final judgment of possession in favor of Petitioner in the amount of $29,739, representing all rent owed through May 2023, with issuance of the warrant of eviction forthwith. Execution of the warrant was stayed through July 12 for Respondent to pay the arrears along with the monthly rent for June and July. The stipulation provided that the arrears totaling $29,739 reflected an abatement in the amount of $18,000.51 "in satisfaction for all claims for breach of habitability to date." Additionally, Petitioner agreed to inspect and repair alleged conditions in the apartment, including the stove, mold, holes in the floors, a clogged toilet, and a "severe rat infestation." The stipulation provided for several access dates over three months, with the first date scheduled on May 15 to address the stove/gas "by a licensed plumber or contractor."
Slightly more than one month after executing the agreement, Respondent now requests an order vacating the stipulation and restoring the proceeding to the calendar for trial. Respondent states that on the first access date, Petitioner sent an individual to address the stove who was not a licensed plumber. This individual, Respondent alleges, entered the apartment without providing identification or credentials, pulled the stove away from the wall, turned on the gas, and exited the apartment, leaving a strong gas odor that persisted until a food delivery person turned off the gas. On June 12, ConEdison placed a red tag on the stove.
Respondent contends that during negotiations settling this proceeding, she was adamant about Petitioner providing a licensed plumber because of recurring gas leaks in 2020 and 2023, Petitioner's repeated failure to address the issue with licensed plumbers, and Respondent's phobia of gas smells which has caused several panic attacks. Respondent argues that Petitioner understood the importance of her demand and that she would not have consented to a final judgment of possession and agreed to pay the balance of the arrears without Petitioner agreeing to send a licensed plumber. She further argues that since Petitioner immediately breached the stipulation, the court should not enforce the terms of the stipulation as they are inequitable and unjust, and the parties should be restored to their positions prior to the settlement.
Alternatively, Respondent requests an order directing Petitioner to immediately correct the gas leak and/or replace the gas cooker in the apartment.
On the June 30 return date of Respondent's order to show cause, Petitioner requested an adjournment for additional time to file opposition papers. During the appearance, Petitioner did not dispute Respondent's claim that a licensed plumber was not provided, describing essentially an in-house error. The court granted Petitioner's application and issued an interim order directing Petitioner to provide a licensed plumber to correct the gas leak by July 5.
Petitioner opposes vacating the stipulation on three grounds: First, that a licensed plumber replaced Respondent's stove with a new stove on July 5; second, that despite Respondent's claim that the previous leaks were severe, she agreed to the terms of the stipulation, which allowed her time to satisfy the arrears in July; and third, Respondent has not paid rent since July 2020, well before the first alleged gas leak, and has demonstrated no ability to satisfy the arrears which, to date, total $32,080.72.
Discussion
Stipulations of settlement, which are essentially contracts, are favored by the courts and are "not lightly cast aside" (Hallock v State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224 [1984]). As explained by the Court of Appeals, "strict enforcement not only serves the interest of efficient dispute resolution but also is essential to the management of court calendars and integrity of the litigation process" (id). But if a party demonstrates proof of fraud, collusion, mistake, accident or some other ground sufficient to invalidate a contract, the court may relieve the party from the consequences of the stipulation (Matter of Frutiger, 29 N.Y.2d 143 [1971] citing Campbell v Bussing, 274 AD 893 [2d Dept 1948]; Union Street Houses Owners, LLC v Kriegsman, 70 Misc.3d 143 [A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50180[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11 & 13 Jud Dists 2021]). Moreover, if it appears that a stipulation was entered into "inadvisedly or that it would be inequitable to hold the parties to its terms," the court possesses discretionary power to set aside the stipulation (1420 Concourse Corp v Cruz, 135 A.D.2d 371 [1st Dept 1987]).
Respondent does not allege the stipulation was tainted by fraud, collusion, mistake, or accident. Nor does she claim she lacked understanding of the stipulation and, thus, was ill-advised to agree to its terms. The question here is whether in the interest of justice, the two-attorney stipulation should be vacated due to Petitioner's failure to comply with one element of the stipulation - providing a licensed plumber to address the stove/gas leak.
Courts have exercised discretionary power, in some instances, to vacate two-attorney stipulations in furtherance of justice (Kahana v Gaeta, 8 Misc.3d 138 [A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51313[U] [App Term, 2d Dept 2005] [stipulation deprived elderly tenants of protections under rent control]; 1796 Nostrand Ave., LLC v Gabriel, 47 Misc.3d 141 [A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50618[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11 & 13 Jud Dists 2015] [material misstatements in the petition of the apartment's rent regulatory status prejudiced the tenant]; 130 E. 18th LLC v Mitchel, 50 Misc.3d 55, 2015 NY Slip Op 25407 [App Term, 2d Dept 2015] [monthly rent was unlawful due to rent reduction order by Department of Housing and Community Renewal]; Dawkins v Ruff, 10 Misc.3d 88, 2005 NY Slip Op 25538 [App Term, 2d Dept 2005] [tenant agreed to pay section 8 portion of rent in violation of the Williams consent decree]; Bridgeview II, LLC v Mars, 51 Misc.3d 29, 2015 NY Slip Op 25398 [App Term, 2d Dept 2015] [monthly rent did not comply with federal statutes under the National Housing Act]); and 329 Union Bldg Corp v LoGuidice, 47 Misc.3d 1, 2015 NY Slip Op 25022 [App Term, 2d Dept 2015] [tenant agreed to pay arrears when there was no agreement in effect). None of these cases, including those cited by Respondent, involve circumstances similar to those presented in this proceeding.
Respondent had the option to proceed to trial and litigate the claims and defenses, including her counterclaim alleging breach of warranty of habitability. Instead, she voluntarily and knowingly executed the stipulation with the full benefit of experienced counsel who engaged in lengthy negotiations with Petitioner's attorney, while Respondent was present, during the pre-trial conference. Petitioner agreed to address conditions in the apartment, Respondent received a sizeable abatement without the need to prove her claims at trial and, in exchange, she consented to a final judgment of possession in favor of Petitioner for the balance of the arrears. The parties freely charted their own litigation course and fashioned the basis upon which this particular proceeding would be resolved. Respondent points to no evidence suggesting Petitioner overreached in executing the agreement or that Petitioner failed to negotiate the terms in good faith. Respondent did not waive any meritorious defenses or agree to terms that violate public policy (1420 Concourse Corp v Cruz, supra). Stipulations executed in open court by parties represented by counsel will generally be enforced and Petitioner's failure to send a licensed plumber, while inexcusable, does not turn an otherwise sound agreement into one whose enforcement would be unjust or inequitable to the parties. Based on the circumstances presented, this court finds no substantive or compelling reason to vacate the stipulation.
Lastly, Petitioner complied with the interim order and Respondent's stove has been replaced. However, the other conditions listed in the stipulation have not been addressed because the June and July access dates have expired. The court declines Respondent's request to issue an order to correct at this time and encourages the parties to arrange new access dates to address the remaining conditions.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the portion of Respondent's order to show to vacate the stipulation and restore the proceeding to the calendar for an immediate trial is denied. The remaining portion requesting that Petitioner correct the gas leak was already addressed in the court's interim order.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.