Opinion
CIV-24-7-JD
04-05-2024
JARED TROTTER, Plaintiff, v. GEO GROUP INC., Defendant(s).
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AMANDA MAXFIELD GREEN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc 1).United States District Judge Jodi W. Dishman referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Doc. 4). The undersigned has reviewed the Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As explained fully below, it is recommended that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's action.
Citations to Plaintiff's filings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court's CM/ECF pagination.
I. The Court's Duty to Screen Prisoner Complaints
Federal law mandates the screening of each complaint in a civil action filed by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity and each case in which the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a), 1915(e)(2). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
The court's review of a complaint under § 1915A(b)(1) and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) mirrors that required for reviewing a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). The court must accept Plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Id. The court “review[s] the complaint for plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A complaint fails to state such a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint, however, are not assumed to be true; legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that although courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, courts “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint”). Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court's application of “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Iqbal). “A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. The court, however, may not serve as Plaintiff's advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
II. The Complaint
Plaintiff is a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Lawton Correctional and Rehabilitation Facility (“LCRF”). (Doc. 1, at 4); see also OK DOC# 512910, Oklahoma Department of Corrections OK Offender, https://okoffender.doc.ok.gov/ (last visited April 5, 2024). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following facts:
Plaintiff has been found guilty of a class X [] misconduct wherein his cellmate admitted to placing the contraband in Plaintiff's property without Plaintiff's knowledge. Defendants did not accept the statement and found Plaintiff guilty, but permitted Brandon Michum [] and Dillon Oquin [] to use the same defense.(Doc. 1, at 7). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO Group”), the private corporation that operates LCRF, has violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because Plaintiff has been
[t]reated different to similarly situated inmates with the same class of misconduct, same prison, housing unit, and circumstances consistent with the fact [that] they have been permitted to submit exculpatory statement[s] from their cellmates in order to ensure the righteous discipline of inmates in contrast to Petitioner receiving reckless disregard to his exculpatory
statement from his cellmate resulting in disproportionate or incorrect discipline to the wrong inmate/party.(Id. at Ex. 1, at 3-4). For relief, Plaintiff requests “for the court to overturn the finding of guilt on the misconduct,” compensatory damages in the amount of $200.00, and punitive damages in the amount of $1,000.00. (Id. at 7).
III. The Court Should Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to State a Claim.
A. Heck Likely Does Not Bar Plaintiff's Claim.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court recognized that a plaintiff may not seek remedy under § 1983 “for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” id. at 486, unless he or she first proves that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated through a state proceeding or a federal habeas action, id. at 487. In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the Supreme Court applied Heck to a § 1983 suit challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding, holding that the plaintiff could not proceed under § 1983 since a ruling in his favor would necessarily invalidate his disciplinary conviction, including the revocation of his good time credits. Id. at 646, 648. The Supreme Court clarified the Edwards holding in Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004), stating, “Heck's requirement to resort to state litigation and federal habeas before § 1983 is not, however, implicated by a prisoner's challenge that threatens no consequence for his conviction or the duration of his sentence.” Id. at 751. The Muhammad Court also suggested but did not decide that if a plaintiff's claim cannot be addressed through a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 - such as a claim seeking to overturn a disciplinary decision that did not affect a prisoner's duration of confinement - Heck may not apply. Id. at 752 n.2.
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the Muhammad Court's suggestion in Harrison v. Morton, 490 Fed.Appx. 988 (10th Cir. 2021), but did not squarely address it because the plaintiff had nevertheless failed to demonstrate that his constitutional rights were violated. Id. at 992. This undersigned is in the same position as the Harrison Court: Plaintiffs challenge to his disciplinary conviction does not appear to implicate the duration of his confinement. However, whether Heck bars Plaintiff's claim need not be squarely addressed because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead that Defendant GEO Group has violated his constitutional rights. See id.; see also Marshall v. Ormand, No. CIV-13-0865-HE, 2014 WL 931434, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 10, 2014) (speculating that plaintiff's disciplinary claim was not likely barred by Heck because his punishment only involved moving to restrictive housing, but dismissing the claim for failure to sufficiently plead a constitutional violation), aff'd, 572 Fed.Appx. 659 (10th Cir. 2014); Mackey v. Watson, 2017 WL 6016351, at *11-12 (D. Colo. Dec. 5, 2017) (holding that Heck does not apply when habeas relief is unavailable for a claim involving a prison disciplinary proceeding).
B. Plaintiff Has Not Sufficiently Pled Municipal Liability.
Section 1983 “creates a private right of action against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another individual of ‘any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.'” Ripley v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc., 559 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). A private entity acting under color of state law may be held liable for constitutional violations under § 1983. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003). As a private corporation that operates a variety of prisons, including LCRF, Defendant GEO Group is subject to § 1983 liability under the Monell doctrine of municipal liability. Id. (“Although the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1983 in Monell applied to municipal governments and not to private entities acting under color of state law, caselaw from this and other circuits has extended the Monell doctrine to private § 1983 defendants.”); see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Goins v. GEO Lawton Corr. Facility, No. CIV-22-1014-JD, 2023 WL 7443151, at *3 (W.D. Okla. March 8, 2023) (“Geo Group, Inc.[] is a suable entity performing a function akin to a municipal or county government.”).
Under the Monell doctrine, GEO Group cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees' alleged constitutional violations under § 1983. See Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2013). Instead, to establish Defendant GEO Group's liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish three basic elements: (1) Defendant GEO Group had an official policy or custom; (2) that caused a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights; and (3) that “was enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost inevitable” federal rights violation. Id. at 769-71. The Tenth Circuit has articulated that a municipal policy or custom may take one of five forms:
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions - and the basis for them - of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these policymakers' review and approval; or (5) the failure to adequately train or supervise
employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges no facts indicating that a written policy or failure to train or supervise caused a violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated by prison officials disregarding exculpatory evidence and finding him guilty of misconduct, but Plaintiff does not identify a GEO Group final policymaker that made or ratified such decisions. See Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009) (“where a plaintiff seeks to impose municipal liability on the basis of a single incident, the plaintiff must show the particular illegal course of action was taken pursuant to a decision made by a person with authority to make policy decisions on behalf of the entity being sued”); Lenz v. Town of Carney, No. CIV-13-1026-C, 2014 WL 359210, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 3, 2014) (dismissing municipal liability claim because, inter alia, Plaintiff failed to identify a final policymaker).
Plaintiff similarly fails to allege multiple incidences of conduct that would establish an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice. In fact, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant GEO Group singled him out by disregarding exculpatory evidence in his disciplinary proceeding when they have accepted exculpatory evidence offered in the disciplinary proceedings of other inmates. (Doc. 1, at 7). Such particularized treatment undermines the theory that an informal custom caused a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Carney v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 534 F.3d 1269, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In order to establish a custom, the actions of the municipal employees must be continuing, persistent and widespread.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Without sufficient facts to support the existence of a policy or custom causing a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Plaintiff's municipal liability claim against Defendant GEO Group must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. As discussed below, even if Plaintiff did plausibly allege the existence of a policy or custom, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that a constitutional violation occurred.
Plaintiff attempts to sue Defendant GEO Group in both an official and individual capacity. (Doc. 1, at 4). However, a municipal entity, or private entity acting under color of state law, does not possess multiple capacities in which it can be sued - the distinction between individual and official capacities is only relevant when a defendant is a government official. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 489, 493 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing the distinction between suing a government official in his or her individual capacity and official capacity).
C. Plaintiff Has Not Stated an Equal Protection Claim.
The Equal Protection clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state an equal protection claim, “plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were treated differently from others who were similarly situated to them.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1173 (10th Cir. 2011). Since Plaintiff did not allege he was treated differently because he is part of a suspect class (related to his race, religion, national origin, or gender), he “must prove that the distinction between himself and other inmates was not reasonably related to some legitimate penological purpose.” Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 371 (10th Cir. 1994); see also City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (explaining that rational basis review is applicable when the plaintiff is not part of a suspect class).
Plaintiff alleges that the prisoners who were exonerated are similarly situated to him because they reside in the same pod, had all initially received class X misconduct writeups, and all provided statements by other prisoners taking responsibility for the misconduct. (Doc. 1, at Ex. 1, at 2). However, the other inmates were written up regarding different instances of misconduct, and they each offered exculpatory statements by their own cellmates. (Id. at Ex. 1, 2-3). “Similarly situated” individuals need not be alike in all respects, but they must be alike in “all relevant respects. ” Ashaheed v. Currington, 7 F.4th 1236, 1251 (10th Cir. 2021). Here, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the underlying facts of the disciplinary proceedings, or the proceedings themselves, were similar in all relevant respects. Use of the same method of defense in different proceedings involving different allegations of misconduct and different witnesses/participants does not demonstrate requisite similarity. Therefore, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he and the other inmates were “similarly situated” and has thus failed to state an equal protection claim.
IV. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc.1). The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court on or before April 26, 2024, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to file a timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives his right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge and terminates the referral unless and until the matter is re-referred.