Opinion
CIV-22-1014-JD
03-08-2023
JACOB CHRISTIAN GOINS, Plaintiff, v. GEO LAWTON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et. al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
GARY M. PURCELL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Lawton Correctional Facility (“LCF”). The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having reviewed the sufficiency of the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B), the undersigned finds this action should be dismissed.
I. Background Information
Beginning in September 2020, Plaintiff was incarcerated at LCF located in Lawton, Oklahoma. Doc. No. 15 at 7. In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names “GEO Lawton Correctional Facility” and Dr. Michael Boger as Defendants. Id. at 1, 4, 6.
Plaintiff also refers to this Defendant as “GEO Corporation LCF” and “The GEO Corporation over LCF.” Doc. No. 15 at 4, 6. The Court addresses herein the two potential Defendants that Plaintiff may have intended to name in this matter.
Based upon his Second Amended Complaint, it appears Plaintiff intends to assert Eighth Amendment claims based upon allegedly inadequate medical care. Plaintiff sets forth the following allegations:
I arrived at [LCF] in September of 2020. They housed me in a[n] area where people had scabies all over and itching. By November 2020[,] I attracted it[.] [T]hey failed to properly help me for 9 months[.] I followed all procedure.Id. at 7. He seeks compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages. Id.
Plaintiff asserted similar allegations in his initial Complaint and his Amended Complaint. Doc. Nos. 1, 12. The Court issued Orders after receiving each explaining to Plaintiff that pleading requirements mandated more specific allegations identifying who violated his constitutional rights as well as the actions or inactions of those individuals. Doc. Nos. 10, 13. In each instance, the Court afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended pleading to address these deficiencies. Id. On March 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint currently before the Court.
II. Screening of Prisoner Complaints
A federal district court must review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, or filed by parties proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). After conducting an initial review, the court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it presenting claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
In conducting this review, the reviewing court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the allegations, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Although a pro se litigant's pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “[t]he burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The allegations in a complaint must present “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Further, a claim is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact” or is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory[.]” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1989).
III. Defendant Boger
The United States Supreme Court has held that an inmate advancing an Eighth Amendment claim based on inadequate provision of medical care must establish “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs[.]” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The “deliberate indifference” standard has two components: “an objective component requiring that the pain or deprivation be sufficiently serious; and a subjective component requiring that the offending officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1569 (10th Cir. 1991). With respect to the subjective component, a prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless that official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Plaintiff's contention that he was exposed to and contracted scabies may be sufficient to establish the objective component of his claim. See, cf., Castillo v. Solano Cnty. Jail, No. 2:08-cv-3080 GEB KJN P, 2011 WL 3584318, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011) (“[T]he weight of authority supports a finding that scabies presents a serious medical need, and that the risk of exposure to scabies presents a substantial risk of harm.”) (citing Ciccone v. Sapp, 238 Fed.Appx. 487, 489 (11th Cir. 2007) (viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, “the facts . . . establish that scabies could be deemed objectively serious”); Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977) (affirming trial court's finding that permitting “persons with contagious or communicable diseases, such as scabies . . . [to be] incarcerated and left, in the midst of other inmates, without medical attention for a month or more ....would violate the required standard of adequate medical services”); Hemphill v. Hochberg, No. 07-2162 (JAG), 2008 WL 2668946, at *5 (D.N.J. June 27, 2008) (noting that allegations of the widespread presence of scabies “surely suggest that Plaintiff was exposed to an unreasonable risk of serious harm”); Mende v. Rainner, No. C 93-4514 BAC, 1994 WL 90062, at *2 (N.D. Cal. March 2, 1994) (dismissing with leave to amend for purpose of naming proper defendants upon finding that “plaintiff may well have cognizable claims for intentional exposure to a serious medical condition [scabies and/or lice] and the refusal to treat same rising to the level of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs”); but see Allen v. Gaskins, No. 0:08-1338-SB-PJG, 2010 WL 1010014, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 18, 2010) (finding the plaintiff had “presented no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that his infection presented a substantial risk to his health or safety,” noting that “[s]cabies is a non-life threatening skin condition”); Langley v. Soney, No. 99-0192 MJJ(PR), 1999 WL 102745, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999) (noting that a fivemonth delay in obtaining appropriate treatment for “a seriously aggravated scabies condition” did not rise to deliberate indifference); Samuels v. Jackson, No. 97 Civ. 2420(MBM), 1999 WL 92617, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1999) (“Plaintiff's discomfort during the period of misdiagnosis and his resulting scars [from scabies] notwithstanding, his condition does not qualify as a serious medical need for the purposes of stating a claim under the Constitution”)).
However, Plaintiff's allegations do not satisfy the subjective component of his deliberate indifference claim. Plaintiff's conclusory statement that “they failed to properly help me,” Doc. No. 15 at 7, is not sufficient to support an inference that he has suffered a “sufficiently serious deprivation” implicating Eighth Amendment concerns. See, cf., Legler v. Bruce, No. 06-3311-SAC, 2007 WL 4241845, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 27, 2007) (finding that “[the p]laintiff's statements [that] . . . he is ‘not being properly treated,' is ‘being denied meds,' the State is ‘denying prisoners adequate treatments/meds,' and ‘officials intentionally interfere with prescribed treatments,' are conclusory”).
Moreover, Plaintiff does not identify a specific action or inaction on the part of Dr. Boger. Plaintiff does not indicate Dr. Boger knew that Plaintiff suffered from scabies or the extent of Plaintiff's condition and presumed suffering. Plaintiff does not offer any allegations that establish Plaintiff's condition and suffering were communicated directly to Dr. Boger, whether from Plaintiff directly, or through a physical examination, or by some other means.
As the Court explained to Plaintiff in its previous Orders, in Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2013), the Tenth Circuit reiterated that a plaintiff's “undifferentiated contention that ‘defendants' infringed his rights” is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim because “a plaintiff must show that each defendant acted with the requisite state of mind.” Id. at 1226. Plaintiff's allegations do not indicate that Dr. Boger was both aware of and disregarded a risk to Plaintiff's health. Without specific allegations regarding an identified individual defendant that knew of and disregarded risks to Plaintiff's health, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief may be granted.
IV. Defendant GEO LCF
As previously noted, Plaintiff named “GEO Lawton Correctional Facility,” and several iterations thereof, as a Defendant in this matter. In doing so, he is seemingly referring to either or both LCF and GEO Group, Inc., the corporation that owns and operates LCF. However, LCF is merely the name of a detention facility and lacks the capacity to be sued. Carey v. Lawton Corr. Facility, No. CIV-07-944-F, 2008 WL 200053, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 2008) (citing Aston v. Cunningham, No. 99-4156, 2000 WL 796086, at *4 n.3 (10th Cir. Jun. 21, 2000) (“[A] detention facility is not a person or legally created entity capable of being sued”)). Because LCF is a detention facility, and is not a “person” with a separate identity apart from Geo Group, Inc., dismissal of LCF is warranted. Carey, 2008 WL 200053, at *3.
To the extent Plaintiff intended to name Geo Group, Inc. as a Defendant in this matter, he presumably did so only because it owns and operates LCF. Unlike LCF, Geo Group, Inc., is a suable entity performing a function akin to a municipal or county government. “The language of § 1983, however, ‘cannot easily be read to impose liability vicariously on government bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor.'” Carey, 2008 WL 200053, at *3 (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)).
As a private corporation, Geo Group, Inc., cannot be vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 723 (10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing a congressional intent to avoid vicarious liability under § 1983). A corporation is not liable for the constitutional tort of its employees unless the constitutional tort was caused by a policy or custom of the corporation. Carey, 2008 WL 200053, at *3 (citing Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 728 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[A] private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights” (citations omitted)); Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975-76 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a corporation can only incur liability under § 1983 based on its own unconstitutional policies)). Plaintiff has not identified any custom or policy that caused his alleged lack of adequate medical care. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff intended to name Geo Group, Inc. as a Defendant in this matter, the Court should dismiss the same.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing findings, it is recommended Plaintiff's action be dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B), based on his failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff is advised of the right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by March 28th, 2023, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); cf., Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.”).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter, and any pending motion not specifically addresses herein is deemed denied.