Opinion
Civil Action 4:22-cv-1567-RBH-TER
01-09-2023
GINA TRAHEY, Plaintiff, v. GRAND STRAND REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER/HCA HEALTHCARE, INC/PARALLON, and CYNTHIA HILTON, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
This action arises from Plaintiff's employment with Defendant Grand Strand Regional Medical Center/HCA Healthcare, Inc./Parallon (the Hospital). Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas, Horry County, South Carolina. Defendants removed it to this court. Plaintiff alleges causes of action for race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as state law causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, slander, tortious interference with a contract, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5) Plaintiff's state law causes of action. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(g), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
Defendants assert in a footnote that Parallon Enterprises, LLC was Plaintiff's sole employer, and is the sole proper corporate Defendant. Thus, they argue, Grand Strand Regional Medical Center and HCA Healthcare, Inc. should be dismissed. Plaintiff has not addressed this argument. Thus, it appears Plaintiff does not dispute that Grand Strand Regional Medical Center and HCA Healthcare, Inc. should be dismissed.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff was employed with Defendant Hospital as the Director of Health Information Management, which required her to process, provide, and index several types of information, including HIPAA investigations, complaints from patients, staff and providers, and Board of Nursing Investigations, all of which implicated important privacy concerns. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-18. Plaintiff ws supervised by Defendant Hilton. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 20. In December of 2020, the Hospital had the opportunity to implement a new document imaging project. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 22. The project required Plaintiff and her team members to relocate off-site to accommodate new equipment and personnel, which occurred in April of 2021. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25. However, there were delays in receiving the equipment and new hires were required to train back at the main hospital. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 26.
On the morning of April 13, 2021, two of Plaintiff's new hires were required to attend orientation at the same time Plaintiff was required to attend an interview. She informed the new hires as well as the rest of her team to call or text her if they needed her. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 27. When Plaintiff returned from the interview around 10:30 am, she was informed that Hilton had called and was very harsh and yelled at employees. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 28. Plaintiff immediately called Hilton, who inflicted the same bullying, yelling, and harassment upon Plaintiff. Plaintiff had the door to her office closed and others outside her office could still hear Hilton yelling at Plaintiff over the phone. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 29.
From April 27-29, 2021, the document imaging project went live. Hilton and another employee came to the department to train the team but only provided two days of training. Problems arose as a result of the lack of training and continues issues with equipment. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 31. The two new hires, who were hired for 32 hours per week, incurred 59 hours of overtime from Wednesday through Sunday due to the amount of work, lack of training, and lack of personnel. Sec. Am. Compl. 32. As a result, Hilton and the other employee were required to return the following week for further training. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 33. Plaintiff's team was upset that Hilton gloated about leaving work early when they working overtime to get the document imaging project up and running. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 33. Plaintiff was working from 6:30 am to 11:30 pm 7 days a week to process all the records, and was required to be on call when she was not working. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 35. The new hires were threatening to quite as a result of the long hours and the overall hostility created by Hilton. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 35.
On May 10, 2021, Robert Grace, the Hospital's CFO, asked Plaintiff how the roll out was going, and she informed him of all the problems within the department and the lack of concern from Hilton. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 36. The next day, Hilton called Plaintiff and gave her a corrective action. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 37.
In addition, during Plaintiff's employment, she recognized that the Hospital was not following the law with respect to privacy issues and reported the problem to the Ethics and Compliance department within the hospital. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41-42. On May 20, 2021, Plaintiff reported to “corporate” that she felt she was being retaliated against because of her report. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 43. “Corporate” failed to do anything regarding Plaintiff's report of failure to follow law and policy. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 44. Plaintiff also went to Peter Kaufman in the Ethics and Compliance department and reported the hostile work environment and harassment by Hilton towards Plaintiff and her employees, theft and violence in the workplace, violations of the code of conduct, discrimination against employees, and violations of policies, procedures, and laws. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 45.
On July 7, 2021, Plaintiff had a conversation with Kaufman regarding promoting an employee, Teona Grant. The conversation was overheard by another employee, who reported false information about the conversation to Hilton. Plaintiff explained to Hilton that what the other employed reported to her was incorrect. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 46. Hilton did not ask Kaufman about the conversation, but initiated an investigation based on what she had been told and repeated the false information to others to interfere with Plaintiff's employment with the Hospital. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47-48.
Plaintiff alleges that Hilton is unable to properly manage employees and uses bullying, manipulation, and hostility to intimidate and control. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 51. She alleges that the Hospital is aware of Hilton's propensities and failures as a manager but has negligently supervised Hilton and failed and refused to remedy her behavior. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 52
Plaintiff's employment was terminated on July 9, 2021. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 54.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, slander, tortious interference with a contract, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion examines whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Expounding on its decision in Twombly, the United States Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 570) (citations omitted); see also Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's wrongful discharge in violation of public policy cause of action is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to identify a clear mandate of public policy violated by her discharge. Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated in violation of public policy when the Hospital “terminated [her] because she internally reported violations of the law, HIP[A]A concerns, Ethics and Compliance concerns, and discrimination against one of her employees.” Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 76.
Generally speaking, South Carolina law allows an employer to discharge an employee without incurring liability for good reason, no reason, or bad reason. Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 309 S.C. 243, 245, 422 S.E.2d 91, 92 (1992). However, the South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized a “public policy” exception to this doctrine. Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 225, 337 S.E.2d 213, 216 (1985). In Ludwick, the court held that an employee has a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge where there is a retaliatory discharge of the at-will employee in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. Id. The public policy exception clearly applies in cases where the employer either (1) requires the employee to violate the law, or (2) the reason for the employee's termination is itself a violation of criminal law. Lawson v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 340 S.C. 346, 350, 532 S.E.2d 259, 260 (2000). However, “[w]hile the public policy exception applies to situations where an employer requires an employee to violate the law or the reason for the termination itself is a violation of criminal law, the public policy exception is not limited to these situations.” Barron v. Labor Finders of S.C., 393 S.C. 609, 614, 713 S.E.2d 634, 636-37 (2011). Thus, “an at-will employee may have a cause of action for wrongful termination even if the discharge itself did not violate criminal law or the employer did not require the employee to violate the law.” Id. at 614-15, 713 S.E.2d at 637. Nevertheless, the public policy exception “has not yet been extended beyond [these two situations].” McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 404 S.C. 186, 192, 743 S.E.2d 843, 846 (Ct.App.2013); see also Taghivand v. Rite Aid Corp., 411 S.C. 240, 243, 768 S.E.2d 385, 387 (2015) (“While we have made clear that the exception is not limited to these situations, we have specifically recognized no others.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff is correct that South Carolina courts have not specifically limited the public policy exception to the two circumstances discussed above. However, courts have held on more than one occasion that a plaintiff could not make a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy based upon internal reports of alleged violations of laws or regulations. In Desmarasis v. Scientific Research Corporation, 145 F.Supp.3rd 595 (D.S.C. 2015), the plaintiff asserted a cause of action for a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and alleged “the unjust wrongful discharge and termination of Plaintiff's employment with the Defendant was the response of the Defendant, their agents and servants, to Plaintiff's continuing complaints regarding Defendants' illegal actions and violations of state law.” Id. at 599. The plaintiff in Desmarasis complained internally about alleged violations of Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) regulations. Id. The court first found that the plaintiff did not “point to any law or other source that constitutes a clear mandate of public policy supporting the rights of employees to internally complain about alleged violations of FAA regulations,” and noted that “a plaintiff's failure to identify the source of a clear mandate of public policy warrants dismissal.” Id. (citing Riley v. S. Care, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00357, 2013 WL 1809788, at *6 (D.S.C. Apr. 29, 2013) (“Plaintiff does not direct the court to any other source of a clear mandate of public policy. Under these circumstances, the court finds that Plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails as a matter of law.”); Washington v. Perdue Farms, Inc., No. 4:07-cv-3552, 2009 WL 386926, at *12 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2009) (“The Plaintiff did not cite any case law to support her theory that 'requesting to see the doctor' is a public policy of South Carolina.”); Smalley v. Fast Fare, Inc., No. 8:88-cv-2185-3, 1988 WL 220237, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 1988) (“[I]n the absence of an appropriate declaration by the South Carolina courts or the General Assembly, the Plaintiff has failed to establish any public policy of South Carolina allegedly violated by the Defendant.”). The court further found that courts in this district have held that “there is no clear mandate of public policy supporting wrongful termination in violation of public policy claims of employees who report the alleged illegal conduct of their coworkers.” Id. at 600.
Likewise, in Greene v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 455 F.Supp.2d 483, 490 (D.S.C.2006), this court addressed whether to extend the recognized bounds of the public policy exception to situations in which an employee internally reports alleged illegal conduct to their superiors. The court found that the plaintiff failed to point to “any law or other source that constitutes a clear public policy supporting the rights of employees to internally report potentially illegal conduct to their superiors.” Id.; see also Migliaccio v. Boeing Co., No. 2019-CP-10-04197 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 31, 2020) (“Consistent with recent rulings in South Carolina District Court, this Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations that he was terminated for raising air safety complaints . . . do not support a clear mandate of public policy in the context of a wrongful termination claim . . . No court in South Carolina has recognized th[is] as [a] clear mandate of public policy, and this Court does not expand the definition . . .”).
As stated above, Plaintiff's wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim is based on Plaintiff's allegations that her employment was terminated in retaliation for her internal reports regarding “violations of the law, HIP[A]A concerns, Ethics and Compliance concerns, and discrimination against one of her employees.” Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 76. Plaintiff has not identified a clear mandate of public policy “supporting the rights of employees to internally complain about alleged violations” of HIPAA or other unspecified violations of the law, see Desmarasis, 145 F.Supp.3rd at 599. In addition, courts in this district and in South Carolina have specifically held that no such mandate of public policy exists to support a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy cause of action. Accordingly, dismissal of this cause of action is proper.
B. Negligent Supervision
Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff's negligent supervision cause of action. Plaintiff alleges that the Hospital breached its duty of care by not properly supervising Hilton and allowing her to harass, intimidate, bully, and inflict emotional distress on her. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 108-09, 111. She alleges that the Hospital's negligent supervision caused her significant damages. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 112.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's negligent supervision claim is subject to dismissal because such a claim by an employee against an employer is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the South Carolina Worker's Compensation Act (SCWCA).
The SCWCA provides,
The rights and remedies granted by this Title to an employee when he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this Title, respectively, to pay and accept
compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin as against his employer, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-540. The South Carolina General Assembly has, therefore, vested the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission with exclusive original jurisdiction over an employee's work-related injuries. See Sabb v. S.C. State Univ., 567 S.E.2d 231, 234 (S.C. 2002). Courts, applying Section 42-1-540, have held that claims for negligent supervision specifically are covered by the SCWCA. See Id.; Dewese v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., No. 2:11-3024-DCN-BHH, 2012 WL 1902264, at *3 (D.S.C. May 2, 2012); Palmer v. House of Blues Myrtle Beach Rest. Corp., No. 4:05-3301-RBH, 2006 WL 2708278, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2006); Dickert v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 311 S.C. 218, 428 S.E.2d 700 (S.C. 1993); Washington v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 2:07-cv-2694-CWH, 2008 WL 747792, at * 4 (D.S.C. Mar. 17, 2008); Edens v. Bellini, 359 S.C. 433, 597 S.E.2d 863 (S.C. App. 2004).
Plaintiff argues that the exclusivity provision does not apply where the injury is not personal injury but injury to reputation. However, with respect to Plaintiff's negligent supervision claim, she does not allege injury to reputation as part of her damages, though she does specifically allege such damages with respect to other causes of action. See, e.g., Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77, 83, 89 (alleging damage to reputation with respect to wrongful termination in violation of public policy and slander). Rather, she alleges that, as a result of the Hospital's failure to properly supervise Hilton and deter her from harassing, intimidating, bullying, and inflicting emotional distress on Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered “significant damages.” Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 109, 112. Therefore, her claim falls within the SCWCA exclusivity provision and dismissal is appropriate. See Stokes v. First Nat'l Bank, 306 S.C. 46, 410 S.E.2d 248 (1991) (mental injury arising from non-physical stress is within the SCWCA).
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiff asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Hilton. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state such a claim. Plaintiff alleges that Hilton harassed Plaintiff on a daily basis, and, as a result, “Plaintiff suffered irreparable injuries, including but not limited to loss of pay, other economic losses, emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, personal indignity, and other intangible injuries....” Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 119. Plaintiff alleges that on April 23, 2021, Hilton harassed and yelled at Plaintiff over the phone to the degree that other employees could hear her yelling even though Plaintiff's door was closed. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 29. She alleges that Hilton failed to sufficiently train her staff. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 31. Plaintiff alleges that Hilton gloated about being able to leave work early while her team was required to work overtime to get the document imaging project up and running. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 33. Plaintiff complained about Hilton's “overly aggressive attitude and bullying” and the hostile work environment on more than one occasion. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 45. Plaintiff alleges that both of her new hires were threatening to quit because of the amount of overtime hours they were working and the overall hostility created by Hilton. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 35. On May 11, 2021, Plaintiff was given a corrective action by Hilton. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 37. Plaintiff also alleges that Hilton initiated an investigation based on “lies” Hilton was told about Plaintiff even though Plaintiff told Hilton they were lies. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 48. Plaintiff alleges that Hilton inflicted severe emotional distress upon Plaintiff and uses bullying, manipulation and hostility to intimidate and control. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50-51. She alleges that Hilton “intentionally degraded and bullied Plaintiff with inappropriate and unprofessional comments on a daily basis” and set out to “intentionally crucify” her. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 96.
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress, or was certain, or substantially certain, that such distress would result from his conduct; (2) the conduct was so “extreme and outrageous” so as to exceed “all possible bounds of decency” and must be regarded as “atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community;” (3) the actions of the defendant caused plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was “severe” such that “no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Argoe v. Three Rivers Behavioral Health, L.L.C., 392 S.C. 462, 475, 710 S.E.2d 67, 74 (2011) (quoting Hansson v. Scalise Builders of S.C., 374 S.C. 352, 356, 650 S.E.2d 68, 70 (2007)). The question of whether a defendant's conduct may be reasonably regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to allow recovery is a question for the court to determine in the first instance. Butts v. AVX Corp., 292 S.C. 256, 355 S.E.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1987). The South Carolina Supreme Court has instructed that trial courts have a "significant gatekeeping role" in analyzing whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently outrageous and the emotional distress sufficiently severe to survive a motion to dismiss. AJG Holdings LLC v. Dunn, 392 S.C. 160, 708 S.E.2d 218 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Hansson v. Scalise Builders of S.C., 374 S.C. 352, 358, 650 S.E.2d 68, 72 (2007)).
Plaintiff has few, specific factual allegations regarding Hilton's conduct towards her. She alleges that she harassed and yelled at her over the phone on April 23, 2021, gloated about leaving work early when Plaintiff and her team were working overtime, issued her a corrective action on May 11, 2021, and initiated an investigation into Plaintiff based on lies told to her by another employee. Her other allegations are general statements that Hilton harassed and bullied her. The facts as alleged are insufficient to show conduct that was so “extreme and outrageous” so as to exceed “all possible bounds of decency” and must be regarded as “atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Argoe, 392 S.C. at 475, 710 S.E.2d at 74. Generally, “unprofessional, inappropriate,” and “extremely insensitive” behavior is insufficient to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress absent hostile or abusive encounters or coercive or oppressive conduct. Gattison v. South Carolina State College, 318 S.C. 148, 157, 456 S.E.2d 414, 419 (Ct. App. 1995). Courts have found other conduct more egregious than that alleged here insufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Wright v. Sparrow, 298 S.C. 469, 381 S.E.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that an employer plotting to build a case to justify firing plaintiff by loading her with responsibility while stripping her of authority, and by changing the way she should perform her duties and then accusing her of not following directions was not so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all bounds of decency); Callum v. CVS Health Corp., 137 F.Supp.3d 817, 856-57 (D.S.C. 2015) (granting motion to dismiss upon finding that defendant's alleged conduct-laughing at and denying Plaintiff's request for an accommodation, insulting Plaintiff with a racial slur, speaking to Plaintiff in an aggressive tone, and threatening to call the police on Plaintiff-did “not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to state a claim for [outrage]”); Moore v. Rural Health Servs., Inc., No. CIV.A.1:04 376 RBH, 2007 WL 666796, at *17 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2007) (holding that where defendant board members came to Plaintiff's workplace, called him a “racist” and threatened to fire him from the board, called a sheriff's deputy to have him escorted off the property, shouted that he was a thief, and gave a newspaper reporter material from Plaintiff's personnel file, such conduct was not sufficient “to meet the high standard for establishing Plaintiff's outrage claim under South Carolina law”); Cosby v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. CIV.A. 6:05-131-GRA, 2006 WL 4781412, at *6 (D.S.C. May 11, 2006) (citing Folkens v. Hunt, 348 S.E.2d 839 (S.C. App. 1986) for the proposition that “falsely accusing someone of criminal conduct does not amount to the tort of outrage”), affd sub nom. Cosby v. Legal Servs. Corp., 227 Fed.Appx. 279 (4th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to assert allegations sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and dismissal is appropriate.
D. Slander
Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff's slander cause of action asserted against Hilton. Slander is the spoken form of defamation. Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 334 S.C. 469, 484, 514 S.E.2d 126, 133-34 (1999) (citation omitted). The tort of defamation allows a plaintiff to recover when a defendant communicates a false message about the plaintiff to others that injures the plaintiff's reputation. McBride v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty., 389 S.C. 546, 559, 698 S.E.2d 845, 852 (Ct. App. 2010). A party asserting a claim of defamation must prove the following elements: “(1) a false and defamatory statement was made; (2) the unprivileged publication of the statement to a third party; (3) the publisher was at fault; and (4) either the statement was actionable irrespective of harm or the publication of the statement caused special harm.” Williams v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist., 369 S.C. 293, 302-03, 631 S.E.2d 286, 292 (Ct. App. 2006).
With respect to the fourth element, defamation that is actionable irrespective of special harm is defamation per se, which includes defamatory statements regarding 1) the commission of a crime, 2) contraction of a loathsome disease, 3) adultery, 4) unchastity, or 5) unfitness in one's business or profession. Fountain v. First Reliance Bank, 398 S.C. 434, 442, 730 S.E.2d 305, 309 (S.C. 2012) (citing Goodwin v. Kennedy, 347 S.C. 30, 36, 552 S.E.2d 319, 322-23 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001)).
Plaintiff alleges that Hilton “published false statements regarding Plaintiff's work performance in order to facilitate her termination.” Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 86. Plaintiff alleges that Hilton spread lies regarding a conversation Plaintiff had with Kaufman and that she “published the false statements regarding Plaintiff” to interfere with Plaintiff's employment. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48-49. Plaintiff's allegations lack the specificity necessary to state a claim for slander. She does not allege what the false statements were or to whom they were made. See Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002) (providing that, to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must "set forth facts sufficient to allege each element of his claim") (citing lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). The allegations in a complaint are insufficient to state a claim for defamation where the plaintiff does not set forth with specificity what the alleged false statements were or to whom they were made. McNeil v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 195, 743 S.E.2d 843, 848 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013) (affirming dismissal of defamation cause of action when the plaintiff could neither set forth with specificity the alleged false statements, whether defendant made allegedly defamatory statements, or to what third party such statements were published); see also Carson v. Emergency MD, LLC, 2020 WL 5077655, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2020) (“Many courts applying South Carolina law have found that a lack of specificity in a plaintiff's allegations regarding a defamation claim warrants dismissal.”); Doe v. Cannon, No. 2:16-cv-00530-RMG, 2017 WL 591121, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2017) (dismissing defamation claim because the plaintiff's allegations fail to “state with specificity the time, place, medium, and listener of the alleged defamatory statements”). Accordingly, dismissal of Plaintiff's slander cause of action is appropriate.
E. Tortious Interference with Contract
Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff's cause of action for tortious interference with a contract. To establish a cause of action for tortious interference with contract under South Carolina law, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) the wrongdoer's knowledge thereof; (3) the wrongdoer's intentional procurement of its breach; (4) the absence of justification; and (5) resulting damages. Eldeco, Inc. v. Charleston Cty. Sch. Dist., 642 S.E.2d 726, 731 (S.C. 2007).
The South Carolina Supreme Court recently held, upon a certified question from this court, that an at-will employee can maintain an action for tortious interference with contract against a third-party, reasoning, in part, that “‘an employee with an at will employment contract must be able to expect that his continued employment depends on the will of his employer and not upon the whim of a third party interferer.'” Hall v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., 435 S.C. 75, 90, 866 S.E.2d 337, 344 (2021) (quoting Bochnowski v. Peoples Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 571 N.E.2d 282 (Ind. 1991)).
Plaintiff alleges that she was an at-will employee of the Hospital, which created an “inherent implied contract.” Sec. Am. Comp. ¶ 93. She alleges that Hilton was aware of her contract of employment with the Hospital and intentionally interfered with it by providing false information, intimidation, harassment, bullying, and a hostile work environment. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 94. She alleges that Hilton lacked justification for any of the actions she took against Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff was terminated from her employment as a result of those actions. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 97, 102.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim fails because an action for tortious interference with contractual relations requires interference by a third party. “[A]n action for tortious interference protects the property rights of the parties to a contract against unlawful interference by third parties.” Threlkeld v. Christoph, 312 S.E.2d 14, 15 (S.C.Ct.App.1984). A tortious interference with contract claim does not “protect a party to a contract from actions of the other party.” Id. This court has held that supervisors, as agents of an employer, are not third parties and, thus, cannot be liable for tortious interference with a contract. See e.g. McLendon v. Horry County Police Department, No. 4:13-CV-3403-BHH, 2016 WL 1168142 (D.S.C. March 25, 2016) (“because [the plaintiff's supervisors] are agents of Plaintiff's employer, HCPD, Plaintiff cannot maintain an action against them for intentional interference with a contract”); Farley v. Goodwill Indus. of Lower S.C., Inc., No. 4:15-CV-2450, 2016 WL 408949, at *16 (D.S.C. Jan. 12, 2016) report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 398159 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2016) (finding that plaintiff did not establish “a plausible claim of tortious interference with contract against” defendant who, as an agent of plaintiff's employer, was a party to the contract between plaintiff and the employer); Wencoast Restaurants, Inc. v. Chart Capital Partners, L.P., No. 2:05-1650-18, 2006 WL 490101, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2006) (finding plaintiff could not establish an interference with contract claim against defendants who were parties to the contact, including the agents and employees of the defendants); see also Dutch Fork Dev. Grp. II, LLC v. SEL Properties, LLC, 406 S.C. 596, 605, 753 S.E.2d 840, 844 (2012) (“[T]he actions of a principal's agent are afforded a qualified privilege from liability for tortious interference with the principal's contract.”).
Plaintiff argues that such a claim still stands against Hilton because she acted outside the scope of her employment and not as an agent of the hospital when she made false statements about Plaintiff and violated the Hospital's policies and procedures. In Dutch Fork Dev. Grp. II, LLC v. SEL Properties, LLC, 406 S.C. 596, 605, 753 S.E.2d 840, 844 (2012), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that “an agent may be liable for tortious interference, just as if the agent were an outside third party, if the allegedly interfering acts were conducted outside the scope of the agent's authority.” Id. (quoting CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs., Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 385 (3d Cir.2004)). The Dutch Fork court notes that “‘[s]cope of authority' is defined as ‘[t]he range of reasonable power that an agent has been delegated or might foreseeably be delegated in carrying out the principal's business.'” Id. at 605-06, 753 S.E.2d at845 (citing Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.2009)). “What is within the scope of employment may be determined by implication from the circumstances of the case.” Wade v. Berkeley Cnty., 498 S.E.2d 684, 688 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Hamilton v. Miller, 389 S.E.2d 652, 653 (S.C. 1990)). Ultimately, “if the servant acts for some independent purpose of his own, wholly disconnected with the furtherance of his master's business, his conduct falls outside the scope of his employment. ” Crittenden v. Thompson-Walker Co., Inc., 341 S.E.2d 385, 387 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
In Leonard Bailey, v. Wellpath Recovery Solutions, Llc, & Bruce Mcclease, No. 3:22-02339-MGL, 2022 WL 17471596, at *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2022), this court held that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a cause of action for tortious interference with contract against a director of his employer where he alleged that the director had no legitimate business reasons for taking the complained of action and that the director did so for a purpose of his own and for and not at the direction of the employer. Plaintiff here has alleged similar facts. She alleges that Hilton lacked any justification for her hostility or for making false statements against Plaintiff, and that Hilton did so to avoid any consequences for her own “abhorrent behavior” and “shortfalls in management.” Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 95, 99, 102. These allegations are sufficient to allege that Hilton acted outside the scope of her employment and, therefore, Hilton can be considered a third party with respect to Plaintiff's tortious interference with contract claim. Therefore, dismissal of this cause of action is inappropriate at this stage of the litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5) be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, it is recommended that the Motion be granted as to Plaintiff's causes of action for wrongful termination, negligent supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and slander and that it be denied as to Plaintiff's cause of action for tortious interference with contract. It is further recommended that Defendants Grand Strand Regional Medical Center and HCA Healthcare, Inc. be dismissed.
Defendants note that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint seeks damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. and makes passing reference to overtime violations, though she has not alleged a cause of action under the ADEA or a cause of action for overtime violations. Plaintiff confirms in her response that she is not alleging and ADEA or overtime claims.