Opinion
2:24-cv-00583-JD-MGB
10-03-2024
Jeffrey Samulski, Plaintiff, v. W International SC, LLC, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this action alleging sex discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1.) Currently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 5.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(A), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge. For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 5) be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from Plaintiff's employment with Defendant, an advanced metal fabricator. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Plaintiff began working for Defendant on June 14, 2021 as a Direct Safety Coordinator and, later, an Environmental Health and Safety Coordinator. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, he was doing a safety walkthrough on June 28, 2022 when he discovered an employee, Karrie Anderson, was not wearing proper safety shoes in her welding booth. (Id.) Plaintiff “tapped her toe with his boot toe and informed her that she was not wearing the proper safety shoes.” (Id.) She became visibly upset and, on June 30, 2022, went to Human Resources about the incident. (Id.) She allegedly “accused the Plaintiff of harassment and maliciously invading her space in retaliation for being questioned about failing to wear the proper safety shoes.” (Id.)
Plaintiff claims that he received his annual performance review on July 18, 2022 and “was awarded an additional forty hours of PTO for his exemplary performance.” (Id.) Soon after, in August 2022, Plaintiff applied for a promotion to Safety Director, but was not selected. (Id.) Instead, Arthur DiFilippo was hired for the position on September 5, 2022. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, he and a coworker, Scott Wilson, informed DiFilippo on September 12, 2022 that “there was an ongoing mold issue in their new office.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that DiFilippo told Wilson he would take care of it, but never did. (Id.) Later that month, Plaintiff claims he was stopped by Defendant's Chief Operating Officer, Mark Schmitt. (Id.) He claims that Schmitt “thanked the Plaintiff for all his hard work and informed the Plaintiff that he would be receiving a $3,000.00 raise due to performance.” (Id.)
On October 6, 2022, Plaintiff went to Trident Technical College (“Trident Tech”) to conduct a Safety Presentation for Weld Students. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he “pointed out several safety issues in the Weld School Area that were concerning and needed to be addressed,” upsetting an instructor. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he “further addressed the Safety Concerns at W International as he was instructed to do,” explaining that “[t]he purpose of the Safety Presentation was to address several Safety issues at W International that the students had heard about and were concerned with working for the Defendant and if those Safety issues were being addressed.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he answered all questions and concerns from the students and employees at Trident Tech, and that many were about Defendant's safety and human resources departments. (Id.)
The next day, Plaintiff was approached by a neighbor's son, who was “a student/employee at the Weld School” at Trident Tech. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the neighbor's son told him “his visit at the school had caused quite a stir among the students in the class.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that “[a]fter the Plaintiff's discussion many of the students were ‘demotivated'” and that Abbie Reyoldscontacted W International and complained to Human Resources.” (Id.) He was then asked to meet with Human Resources. (Id.) When he arrived at the meeting, he was given a letter stating he was fired. (Id.) Plaintiff claims the letter indicated that he “violated the company conduct policy during a safety presentation at Trident Tech.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant “refused to provide evidence” of his alleged policy violations. (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that he had a second conversation with his neighbor's son after he was fired-on November 13 or 14, 2022-during which his neighbor's son informed him that “the class had not provided any written statements,” “[Plaintiff] did not state anything negative during the presentation,” and “[Plaintiff] had provided information that [the students] were not aware of and that some of the information was different from what they had been told by the HR/Recruiter.” (Id.)
The Amended Complaint does not explain who Abbie Reyolds is. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.)
Plaintiff alleges that “other employees who were female and outside the Plaintiff's protected category were treated more favorably,” and that “female employees committed worse violations of policy and were not terminated.” (Id.) He further alleges that he “was discriminated against based on his sex,” that “each of the actions against the Plaintiff were in retaliation for his complaints,” and that “Plaintiff utilized any and all policies, procedures and laws at his disposal and the Defendant failed and refused to protect him from sexual discrimination and hostile work environment.” (Id.)
Plaintiff claims that he suffered irreparable injuries, including but not limited to loss of pay, benefits and other economic losses, emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, personal indignity, and other intangible injuries as a result of Defendant's actions. (Id.) As such, Plaintiff filed the instant civil action. (Id.) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint seeks actual, consequential, compensatory, and punitive damages. (Id.)
On February 12, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's claims in full. (Dkt. No. 5.) After requesting and receiving an extension of time to respond, Plaintiff responded to Defendant's motion on March 11, 2024. (Dkt. No. 8.) Plaintiff replied to Defendant's response on March 18, 2024. (Dkt. No. 9.) Thus, the motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a “complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “In reviewing a motion to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) . . . [a court] must determine whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in the complaint are ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the district court must “take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “In considering a motion to dismiss, [the court] accept[s] the complainant's well-pleaded allegations as true and view[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Stansbury v. McDonald's Corp., 36 Fed.Appx. 98, 98-99 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). However, while a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, it need not accept “legal conclusions drawn from the facts, . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions or arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. V. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999); Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 298).
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that Plaintiff's case should be dismissed in full because the Amended Complaint fails to state any valid claim for which relief may be granted. (See generally Dkt. No. 5.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned agrees and RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 5) be GRANTED.
I. Sex Discrimination
Title VII states that employers cannot “discriminate against any individual with respect to [his or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's” race or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “Absent direct evidence, the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and[,] (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004)). “In the context of a Title VII case, ‘an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination' to survive a motion to dismiss.” Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 616 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)) (emphasis added). “Instead, a Title VII plaintiff is ‘required to allege facts to satisfy the elements of a cause of action created by that statute.'” Id. (quoting McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep't of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015)).
Plaintiff sets forth no direct evidence of discrimination in this case. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 8.)
When determining if a plaintiff has pleaded sufficient plausible facts to establish a violation of Title VII, the inquiry “is whether [the plaintiff] alleges facts that plausibly state a violation of Title VII ‘above a speculative level.'” Id. (quoting Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190). The Court, therefore, does not require proof of all the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination, but requires that plaintiffs plausibly meet these elements. See id. at 617 n.8 (recognizing the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII).
Here, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's sex discrimination claim fails because this cause of action is based entirely upon Plaintiff's female coworkers receiving more favorable disciplinary treatment, yet “Plaintiff has failed to include a single allegation that identifies the comparators, that asserts the alleged female comparators engaged in prohibited conduct of comparable seriousness, or that the alleged comparators ‘held the same position, performed the same work, and were supervised by the same individuals as Plaintiff.'” (Dkt. No. 5 at 4-5, citing Sillah v. Burwell, 244 F.Supp.3d 499, 512-13 (D. Md. 2017)).
Upon careful review of the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint, the undersigned agrees with Defendant and finds that Plaintiff's sex discrimination claim should be dismissed for failure to allege facts that similarly situated employees outside his protected class received more favorable treatment. Plaintiff makes only bare allegations that “other employees who were female and outside the Plaintiff's protected category were treated more favorably” and that “other female counterparts committed the same or worse discipline violations and were not terminated or subjected to the same treatment as Plaintiff.” (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.) He does not name any specific comparators or describe the “more favorable treatment” allegedly given to his female coworkers. (See generally id.) Without more, these allegations simply do not satisfy the pleading standard for a discrimination claim under Title VII. See Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190-91 (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Title VII claim because “the complaint fails to establish a plausible basis for believing [that the plaintiff's colleague] and [the plaintiff] were actually similarly situated or that race was the true basis for [the plaintiff]'s termination”); Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 698 Fed.Appx. 745, 748 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Aug. 11, 2017) (affirming dismissal of racial disparate treatment claim upon finding plaintiff's allegations-that, unlike plaintiff, white employees were permitted to return to work with standing restrictions-lacked sufficient factual detail regarding the alleged comparators to raise her right to relief above the speculative level); Amanda J. McGraw, Plaintiff, v. Volvo Car USA, LLC, Defendant., No. 2:22-CV-04635-BHH-MHC, 2023 WL 10950864, at *9-10 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2023) (dismissing plaintiff's Title VII disparate treatment claim where plaintiff relied upon comparators to give rise to an inference of discrimination, but did not allege sufficient facts from which the court could infer disparate treatment), adopted sub nom. McGraw v. Volvo Car USA, LLC, 2024 WL 959228 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2024); Perry v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., No. 2:22-CV-01079-BHH-MHC, 2023 WL 9065040, at *9-10 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2023) (dismissing plaintiff's Title VII race discrimination claim where plaintiff named specific comparator but failed to allege facts from which the court could infer that comparator was meaningfully similar), adopted sub nom. Hall Perry v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., No. 2:22-CV-1079-BHH, 2024 WL 38737 (D.S.C. Jan. 3, 2024); Ballew v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., No. 6:18-CV-00059-DCC-JDA, 2018 WL 5074603, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2018) (finding that plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim of gender discrimination and explaining that “the bare allegation that two male employees were promoted to full-time driver positions fails to give rise to an inference of gender discrimination because it does not rise above speculation”), adopted, 2018 WL 5043887 (D.S.C. Oct. 17, 2018); Cox v. U.S. Postal Serv. Fed. Credit Union, No. GJH-14-3702, 2015 WL 3795926, at *3 (D. Md. June 17, 2015) (dismissing Title VII disparate treatment claim because plaintiff failed to provide sufficient facts “to adequately allege that she was treated differently from similarly situated employees outside of her protected class”); Goode v. Cent. Virginia Legal Aid Soc., No. 3:14-CV-281-HEH, 2014 WL 3945870, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2014) (dismissing Title VII race discrimination claim because plaintiff “does not identify any similarly situated employees outside the protected class who received different treatment from him” and so “he fails to plausibly establish the final element”); Curry v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-609, 2010 WL 431692, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 4, 2010) (granting motion to dismiss when plaintiff did not “describe the alleged misconduct for which [other] individuals received no disciplinary action”).
Because the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fail to raise his right to relief above the speculative level, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claim be DISMISSED.
II. Retaliation
The undersigned also recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claim. As with his discrimination claim, Plaintiff need not specifically articulate every element of his prima facie case at this stage. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510 (noting that prima facie case “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement”). Still, Plaintiff is “required to allege facts to satisfy the elements of a cause of action created by [the applicable] statute.” See McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585. Thus, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that his “employer . . . discriminat[ed] against [him] . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Relevant to this showing, the Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff informed DiFilippo of a mold issue, that he “reported various safety violations to the Defendant,” and that he “was retaliated against when he reported discrimination, hostile work environment, failed to follow proper protocols, etc.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 8, 11, 12.) The Amended Complaint further claims that “the Defendant violated the law when it terminated his employment, subjected hi[m] to discrimination, hostile work environment and failed to properly handle and investigate his reports of safety violations, sexual discrimination and hostile work environment,” and that “the Defendant wrongfully terminated the Plaintiff for his safety reports in violation of the law.” (Id. at 12.) Later, the Amended Complaint claims that “Plaintiff complained of discrimination based on sexual discrimination” and “as a result of the Plaintiff's complaints the Plaintiff suffered retaliation for each of his complaints.” (Id. at 14.)
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff does not provide facts upon which the Court could reasonably infer that he suffered retaliation because he “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Instead, the Amended Complaint offers only a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of his Title VII retaliation claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. 555. Though the Amended Complaint states that Plaintiff reported discrimination and was then retaliated against because of those complaints, the Amended Complaint does not describe when Plaintiff made his complaints or to whom he made them. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.) The Amended Complaint also does not detail the substance of his discrimination complaints or provide any further information about them. (See generally id.) What is more, the Amended Complaint seems to conflate Plaintiff's complaints regarding safety violations-complaints which cannot support his Title VII retaliation claim-with his complaints regarding discrimination. (See generally id.) As such, the undersigned cannot conclude that Plaintiff has alleged a valid retaliation claim that raises his right to relief above a speculative level. See, e.g., Moore v. Pegasus Steel, LLC, No. 2:22-CV-3096-RMG-TER, 2023 WL 5002812, at *4 (D.S.C. July 11, 2023) (finding the plaintiff's general allegation that the defendant retaliated against him due to his race and in retaliation for filing reports of the discrimination constituted a “naked assertion” devoid of “further factual enhancement” that was insufficient to give rise to a plausible cause of action for retaliation (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)), adopted, 2023 WL 5000380 (D.S.C. Aug. 4, 2023); Malik v. Centennial Med. Grp., LLC, No. CV RDB-22-3356, 2023 WL 7089934, at *8 (D. Md. Oct. 26, 2023) (dismissing Title VII retaliation claim where the plaintiff alleged that she was terminated as a direct act of retaliation, but provided no further facts to support the conclusory allegation). The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that such claim be DISMISSED.
III. Hostile Work Environment
Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim similarly fails. A hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Thus, to state a valid hostile work environment claim under Title VII, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that he experienced: “(1) unwelcome conduct, (2) based on [his] . . . sex, that was (3) severe or pervasive enough to make [his] work environment hostile or abusive and (4) imputable to . . . [his] employer.” Bazemore v. Best Buy, 957 F.3d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainbleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015)). The third element of a hostile work environment claim “requires a showing that the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile and abusive[.]” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277. The degree of hostility or abuse to which Plaintiff was exposed must be determined by “examining the totality of the circumstances.” Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 184 (4th Cir. 2001) (referencing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). Relevant considerations “include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Id. Notably, the Fourth Circuit has set “a high bar in order to satisfy the severe or pervasive test.” E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008).
Here, the Amended Complaint is devoid of allegations that could support a valid Title VII hostile work environment claim. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.) The Amended Complaint does not describe any unwelcome conduct that Plaintiff experienced while working for Defendant-such as comments or actions of coworkers or superiors-and certainly does not describe unwelcome conduct that was based on his sex or was so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile work environment. (See generally id.) Instead, the Amended Complaint again provides only conclusory assertions to support Plaintiff's claim. (Id. at 12, 14.) Because such conclusory allegations cannot sustain a valid Title VII hostile work environment claim, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that such claim be DISMISSED. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to survive a motion to dismiss); see also Moore, 2023 WL 9520891, at *4 (concluding that the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim failed because the amended complaint failed to allege harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive, and did not include factual allegations regarding the frequency of the alleged conduct or whether it unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance); Cox v. Nucor Corp., No. 2:16-CV-3073-PMD, 2017 WL 3599587, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2017) (finding the plaintiff's repeated use of the word “harassment” without further detail was insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss a hostile work environment claim).
IV. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
The undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy be dismissed, as well. Absent a specific contract, employment in South Carolina is at-will. See Hobek v. Boeing Co., No. 2:16-cv-3840-RMG-MGB, 2017 WL 9250342, at *2 (D.S.C. June 8, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 3085856 (D.S.C. July 20, 2017) (referencing Mathis v. Brown & Brown of S. Carolina, Inc., 389 S.C. 299, 309 (2010)). “An at-will employee may be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason, with or without cause.” See id. (quoting Mathis, 389 S.C. at 310). However, there is a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, such that an at-will employee may bring a cause of action in tort for wrongful termination “where there is a retaliatory termination of the at-will employee in violation of a clear mandate of public policy.” Barron v. Labor Finders of S. Carolina, 393 S.C. 609, 614 (2011). Applying this principal to the case before the Court, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim fails for two reasons.
First, the public policy exception does not extend to situations where the employee has an existing statutory remedy for wrongful termination. Id. at 615; see also Stiles v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 335 S.C. 222, 228 (1999) (explaining that the public policy exception “is not designed to overlap an employee's statutory or contractual rights to challenge a discharge, but rather to provide a remedy for a clear violation of public policy where no other reasonable means of redress exists”). Here, Plaintiff claims that he was fired in retaliation for his reports of discrimination, while at the same time claiming he was fired in retaliation for reporting safety concerns. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.) The Amended Complaint brings a Title VII retaliation claim based upon Plaintiff's allegedly retaliatory termination. (See generally id.) Thus, it is worth noting that Plaintiff cannot bring a wrongful termination claim premised upon the same allegations underlying his Title VII retaliation claim. Lindblad v. J&I Servs., Inc., No. 4:18-cv-1336-RBH-TER, 2019 WL 653968, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2019) (“[B]ecause statutory remedies exist for Plaintiff's claims of discharge based on discrimination and retaliation, dismissal of Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim is proper.”), adopted sub nom. Lindblad v. J&L Servs., Inc., 2019 WL 652248 (D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2019).
Second, the Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently allege that Plaintiff's discharge fits within the public policy exception. The public policy exception clearly applies when an employer requires an employee to break the law, or when the reason for an employee's termination is a violation of criminal law in and of itself. Lawson v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 340 S.C. 346, 350 (2000). The public policy exception is not, however, limited to those situations; “an at-will employee may have a cause of action for wrongful termination even if the discharge itself did not violate criminal law or the employer did not require the employee to violate the law.” Barron, 393 S.C. at 614-15. Nevertheless, South Carolina courts have not recognized any other situations in which the public policy exception applies. See Taghivand v. Rite Aid Corp., 411 S.C. 240, 243 (2015) (“While we have made clear that the exception is not limited to these situations, we have specifically recognized no others.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Importantly, this Court has held that a plaintiff cannot make a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy based upon internal reports of alleged violations of laws or regulations. See, e.g., Trahey v. Grand Strand Reg'l Med. Ctr./HCA Healthcare, Inc./Parallon, No. 4:22-CV-1567-RBH-TER, 2023 WL 2815469, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2023) (dismissing wrongful termination cause of action where plaintiff did not identify a clear mandate of public policy in support of an employee's right to internally complain about violations of HIPPA, and noting that “courts in this district and in South Carolina have specifically held that no such mandate of public policy exists to support a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy cause of action”), adopted in relevant part sub nom. Trahey v. Grand Strand Reg'l Med. Ctr./HCA Healthcare, Inc. Parallon, 2023 WL 2643833 (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2023); Desmarasis v. Scientific Research Corporation, 145 F.Supp.3d 595, 599 (D.S.C. 2015) (finding that the plaintiff did not “point to any law or other source that constitutes a clear mandate of public policy supporting the rights of employees to internally complain about alleged violations of FAA regulations,” and noting that “a plaintiff's failure to identify the source of a clear mandate of public policy warrants dismissal”); Greene v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 455 F.Supp.2d 483, 490 (D.S.C. 2006) (declining to extend the recognized bounds of the public policy exception to situations in which an employee internally reports alleged illegal conduct to their superiors). This Court has also held that “there is no clear mandate of public policy supporting wrongful termination in violation of public policy claims of employees who report the alleged illegal conduct of their coworkers.” Desmarasis, 145 F.Supp.3d at 600.
Here, Plaintiff appears to base his wrongful termination claim on exactly such scenarios. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.) Indeed, the Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff reported purported safety violations and discriminatory practices to Defendant, and then was fired. (See generally id.) Because the public policy exception does not apply to situations in which an employee internally reports alleged violations of law and/or illegal conduct of coworkers, Plaintiff's wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim fails, and the undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that such claim be DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 5) be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. .
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).