Summary
noting that the court had previously certified a class that specifically included all past, present, and future employees
Summary of this case from Austin v. Metro. Council Through Its Operating Div.Opinion
Cause No. TH00-0099-C-M/H
December 4, 2000
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs allege that Indiana's long-term disability program discriminates against employees with mental disabilities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court has fully considered the parties' arguments and, for the reasons discussed below, GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment and DENIES plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff has sued D. Sue Roberson in her official capacity as Director of the Indiana State Personnel Department. Because such a suit is actually a suit against the State, the Court has referred to the defendant as the "State" throughout this opinion. In addition, because this matter has been certified as a class action, the Court will refer to the class as "plaintiffs."
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties have not disputed the material facts. The State of Indiana provides a range of benefits to its employees, including vacation leave with pay, sick leave with pay, personal leave with pay, and short- and long-term disability benefits. In addition, employees are provided with a Public Employees Retirement Fund ("PERF") disability plan, which permits an employee to retire on disability if he or she has been actively employed prior to disability, has at least five years of creditable service, and has qualified for Social Security disability. There are 721 employees currently participating in the long-term disability program. The annualized salaries of those employees total $18,796,358.18. An additional 450 employees are currently participating in the short-term disability program. The annualized salaries of those employees total $11,345,114.99.Before the Indiana legislature passed the long-term disability plan for state employees, it commissioned a study of the potential financial impact and appropriate scope of a short- and long-term disability program. The study by Milliman Roberson, Inc. surveyed other disability programs in the public and private sectors to assist the State in designing coverage limitations. It found that one of the common limitations for disability plans was providing shorter coverage for long-term mental disabilities. The report found that certain types of disabilities are subjective in nature, and that in order to limit exposure and to cut costs, plans generally limit long-term benefits to two years for mental or nervous conditions. Studies have revealed a correlation between generous benefits and the frequency of disability claims that are based upon subjective symptoms. According to the State, the Milliman report also suggested that the more generous mental disability benefits are, the greater number of fraudulent claims. In addition, the State contends that adjudicating disputed mental disability claims can be more difficult because of the subjective nature of the evidence. These factors, in addition to cost reduction, were considered by the State in providing different coverage limits for mental and physical disabilities. Based in part on this study, the State designed its own long-term disability program that covers all full-time state employees with six months of continuous state service.
Indiana Code § 5-10-8-7 governs the provision of disability benefits to state employees. The statute requires the Indiana State Personnel Department to adopt rules to establish long-term and short-term disability plans for Indiana employees. Pursuant to this mandate the State Personnel Department has established rules which provide, among other things, that:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, long term disability benefit payments are limited to a maximum duration of four (4) years.
(b) Benefits will only be provided as long as the employee is deemed disabled.
(c) The maximum short term and long term benefit period for a mental and/or nervous disability is limited to twenty-four (24) months.
(d) The maximum short term and long term benefit period for drug and/or alcohol dependency rehabilitation is limited to twenty-four (24) months.
Ind. Admin. Code tit. 31, r. 3-1-12.
After the first two years of disability benefits, a person who continues to be disabled by physical impairments can qualify for an additional two years of benefits only if the employee is unable to perform work of any occupation for which he or she is reasonably qualified by reason of education, training, or experience. Id.; Ind. Admin. Code tit. 31, r. 3-1-9(b). Group health, dental, and life insurance is continued in force for employees on short- and long-term disability. Ind. Admin. Code tit. 31, r. 3-1-22.
In 1997, the Employee Benefit Research Institute ("EBRI") published an Issue Brief discussing mental health care benefits. The brief noted that a number of recent studies have examined the effect of mental health parity on health insurance premiums in a preferred provider organization and on the uninsured. In general, the studies concluded that mental health parity could increase health insurance premiums, decrease health insurance coverage for non-mental health related illnesses, and increase the number of uninsured individuals. The EBRI study also noted that all studies of mental health parity and mandated benefits in general assume that there is a strong likelihood that increased health benefit costs would be passed along to workers in the form of higher cost sharing for health insurance, lower wage growth, or lower growth in other employer benefits. The EBRI study further noted:
Unfortunately, it is still difficult to measure the benefits of providing mental health care. There has been little research assessing the relative merits of the numerous treatments available for each type of mental illness. A number of studies show that the specific therapy chosen is much less important in determining effectiveness than the characteristics of the therapist and the context of the treatment (Custer, 1990). Researchers still do not understand how to measure quality accurately. In order to accurately evaluate the benefits of offering mental health care, researchers need more feedback on outcomes, costs, and value.
Because of the social stigma attached to mental health care and the subjectivity inherent in the patient's assessment of the need for this care, the demand for it is much more price sensitive than that for other forms of health care. This price sensitivity is apparent not only in the overall demand for care but also in the demand for specific providers and sites of care.
Individuals seeking treatment for mental health and substance abuse problems are thus influenced in large part by financial considerations. . . . Additionally there is a good deal of evidence that the design of treatment programs itself is determined by the design of private or public health insurance plans. The challenge is to develop an insurance plan that provides access to, and financial assistance for, necessary care while minimizing and discouraging the frivolous use of mental health services.
The EBRI study found that prior to the 1980s many employers extended coverage to include mental health benefits under the same terms as other health care services, until cost pressures required them to re-examine all health care benefits that were offered. The EBRI study reports that employers found that, while only a small proportion of the beneficiaries used mental health care services, the costs associated with this care were very high. In fact, the study determined that the costs of an episode of mental health care are two to three times the cost of an episode of care for other types of ailments. As a result, employers placed limits on mental health benefits in an attempt to make the insurance risk more manageable.
The plaintiff in this case, Deborah Thompson, worked as an employee of the State of Indiana as a caseworker for the Clay County Division of Family and Children Services. Effective February 23, 1998, Thompson became eligible for long-term disability leave. Thompson suffers from Tourette's Disorder.
Thompson received short-term disability benefits until August 23, 1998, when she began to receive long-term disability benefits. During the period Thompson received short-term benefits, her benefits consisted of a percentage of her former salary as well as continuation of her health, dental, vision, and life insurance benefits. Pursuant to Indiana Code § 5-10-8-7(d)(6), however, the cash benefits were decreased when Thompson began to receive Social Security Disability benefits and her PERF benefits. Once she began receiving long-term disability benefits, Thompson's health, dental, and vision insurance continued at a minimal charge. Because she is disabled by mental impairments, she is not eligible for an additional two years of benefits. Thompson will continue to receive PERF disability retirement benefits and Social Security disability benefits.
The State's disability benefits are extremely important to Thompson. She currently takes 12 to 15 prescription medications daily for her mental impairments. She relies upon her health insurance to purchase these medications which, without insurance, would cost her approximately $800 per month. Thompson also visits a psychiatrist once a month and uses her insurance to pay for those visits. Without insurance, these visits would cost her $65 per month.
Thompson currently resides in low-income housing in Vincennes, Indiana, where she pays $12 per month in rent and approximately $75 per month in utilities. Thompson is solely responsible for paying her COBRA, which costs approximately $275.53 each month for continuation of her health, dental, and vision insurance. Her COBRA coverage will terminate in the fall of 2001. Thompson's sole income is her PERF and Social Security Disability, which total $636.48 per month, and her current expenses exceed her income. She recently qualified for Qualified Medicare Beneficiary, which pays her Medicare premium and allows her approximately $46 additional income each month. She has been informed, however, that once she receives this additional income her monthly rent payment will increase. Thompson recently qualified for food stamps, and given her limited income, she has not paid her mortgage and home equity loan in recent months so that she can afford her COBRA payment.
Plaintiffs filed this action seeking a declaration that Indiana's program is unconstitutional. On September 5, 2000, this Court certified this matter as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. The class consists of all past, present, and future employees of the State of Indiana who (1) received long-term disability benefits for a mental or nervous disability within two years before March 24, 2000, (2) who are currently receiving such benefits, or (3) who will in the future receive such benefits, and whose said disability benefits were or will be terminated after two years under Indiana law. The Indiana Civil Liberties Union previously brought a class action in state court raising similar claims on behalf of other members of the class in this case. The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction because plaintiff had failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. See Tilley v. Roberson, 725 N.E.2d 150 (Ind.App. 2000).
II. STANDARDS A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1317 (1991). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997). It is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which he relies. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment — even when in dispute. Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
B. EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARDS
Plaintiffs have challenged Indiana's alleged distinction between mentally and physically disabled employees with respect to the provision of disability benefits. Plaintiffs contend that the State's benefit program, which provides up to four years of benefits for physically disabled employees and only two years for mentally disabled employees, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. In analyzing an equal protection claim, the Court must first determine whether the claim involves a suspect class or a fundamental right. Pryor v. Brennan, 914 F.2d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 1990). Disabled individuals — including the mentally disabled — are not members of a suspect class. United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870, 876 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1546 (2000) (the disabled "are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class"), citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (mentally retarded persons, a subset of the disabled class, were neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class). Accord, Lavia v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Corrections, 224 F.3d 190, 199 (3rd Cir. 2000) (same). In addition, plaintiffs do not contend that their case involves a suspect class or the deprivation of a fundamental right. Accordingly, the Court will apply the rational basis standard of review to plaintiffs' claims. Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 424 (7th Cir. 2000).
The question before us is whether Indiana's stated reasons for its actions are a sufficient justification to survive rational basis review. Id. The rational basis test is applied quite deferentially by courts reviewing social and economic legislation. Illinois Health Care Ass'n. v. Illinois Dept. of Public Health, 879 F.2d 286, 288-289 (7th Cir. 1989). "Courts may not arrogate to themselves the prerogative of the legislature in addressing social and economic matters. Rather, if the court can hypothesize plausible reasons for legislation that are within the legitimate goals of a government, nothing else is required to validate the governmental classification and it does not matter whether the reasons advanced actually motivated the legislative action." Id. at 89. In the area of social and economic regulation, "it is only invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. In addition, Indiana's legislature may adopt laws which "only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and defer complete elimination of the evil to future regulations." Id.
Legislative bodies are presumed to have acted constitutionally, even in the absence of an express policy favoring the enactment of a law. The state or municipal interest is presumed to be legitimate. Accordingly, a classification need not be justified by the government; instead, plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that no conceivable legitimate public interest is furthered by the classification. Id. This is no small burden. Rational basis review "is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." Glickman, 207 F.3d at 424. Instead, the Court will uphold a challenged classification if "there is a rational relationship between the disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose." Id. With these standards in mind, the Court will now turn to plaintiffs' claims.
III. DISCUSSION A. HAS THE STATE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST THE MENTALLY DISABLED?
As discussed, Indiana decided to provide all state employees with up to two years of benefits for mental disabilities and up to four years of benefits for physical disabilities. Plaintiffs claim that this scheme impermissibly discriminates against those with mental disabilities.
Both parties cite to the Supreme Court's decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) to support their positions. In Geduldig, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a provision of a California program that, in defining "disability," excluded from coverage certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy. Id. at 486. The specific issue before the Supreme Court was whether the California disability insurance program invidiously discriminated against the plaintiff by not paying insurance benefits for disability that accompanies normal pregnancy and childbirth. Id. at 492. In deciding there was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court reasoned as follows:
Both parties also cite numerous cases involving a similar issue under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), many of which have upheld insurers' distinctions between coverage for mental and physical disabilities. See E.E.O.C. v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000); E.E.O.C. v. Aramark Corp., Inc., 208 F.3d 266 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000); Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1999); Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 978 (2000); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1998); and Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084 (1998). Because the Court concludes that Geduldig is on point, however, it need not discuss those ADA decisions.
We cannot agree that the exclusion of this disability from coverage amounts to invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. California does not discriminate with respect to the persons or groups which are eligible for disability insurance protection under the program. The classification challenged in this case relates to the asserted underinclusiveness of the set of risks that the State has selected [to] insure. Although California has created a program to insure most risks of employment disability, it has not chosen to insure all such risks, and this decision is reflected in the level of annual contributions exacted from participating employees. This Court has held that, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, a State `may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind . . . The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others . . .' Particularly with respect to social welfare programs, so long as the line drawn by the State is rationally supportable, the courts will not interpose their judgment as to the appropriate stopping point. `The Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.'Id. at 494-495 (internal citations omitted). Not surprisingly, plaintiffs and the State have different interpretations as to Geduldig's effect on this case.
Attempting to distinguish Geduldig, Plaintiffs contend that the California program simply excluded from coverage a particular risk: complications during normal pregnancy. The program did not, however, exclude all pregnant people from eligibility for the program. According to plaintiffs, Indiana's program does not simply exclude certain risks. Instead, it discriminates against an entire group of persons with mental disabilities. According to plaintiffs, once an employee of the State of Indiana becomes disabled due to a mental illness, he or she is similarly situated to all other physically disabled employees. Because Indiana's program limits benefits for those employees with mental disabilities — as opposed to physical disabilities — the program discriminates against an entire group of people.
Plaintiffs believe that it would be acceptable for the State to limit disability benefits to all disabled persons to the extent that they used their benefits in a manner related exclusively to combat mental illness. According to plaintiffs, this would be an example of the State choosing to limit coverage for a particular illness or injury and not discriminating on the basis of a person's disability — as Indiana's program allegedly does.
The State contends that the similarly situated people in this case are all of the State's employees. Accordingly, because all state employees receive the same benefit package and the same coverage, there simply is no disparate treatment whatsoever. Because plaintiffs received the same benefits and coverage as all other state employees, and because "all eligible state employees have equal access to the same smorgasbord of benefits," there is no equal protection issue.
The Court agrees with the State. In Geduldig, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that "although she had received insurance protection equivalent to that provided all other participating employees, she has suffered discrimination because she encountered a risk that was outside the program's protection. For the reasons we have stated, we hold that this contention is not a valid one under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 497. In the instant case, the plaintiffs have also received benefits equivalent to those provided to all other state employees. They were not denied eligibility in the program because of their mental disabilities; instead, they happen to suffer from a condition that is outside the state program's protection. Like the plaintiffs' claims in Geduldig, this is not a valid claim under the Equal Protection Clause.
Indeed, upon becoming eligible to participate in Indiana's long-term disability plan, all state employees are entitled to the same level of benefits. All employees are entitled to up to four years of coverage for physical disabilities, and all employees are entitled to up to two years of coverage for mental disabilities. In Geduldig, California's insurance program "did not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical condition — pregnancy — from the list of compensable disabilities." Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n. 20. Indiana's program also does not exclude employees from benefit eligibility because of a mental disability but merely removes one condition — mental illnesses of longer than 26 weeks in duration — from the list of compensable disabilities. Accordingly, because the State's program does not treat its employees differently with respect to the benefits offered, the State's motion for summary judgment must be GRANTED. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
B. EVEN IF THE STATE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST EMPLOYEES WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES, DID IT HAVE A RATIONAL BASIS FOR DOING SO?
Even if the Court were to accept plaintiffs' argument that the State discriminated against employees with mental disabilities, that would not end the inquiry. Disabled individuals, like any class, are protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Stevens v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 210 F.3d 732, 738-739 (7th Cir. 2000). As earlier discussed, the Seventh Circuit has previously held that the level of protection afforded to this class is that of rational basis review. "Under traditional equal protection analysis, it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for the State to discriminate against disabled persons in an irrational manner or for an illegitimate reason. However, the Fourteenth Amendment allows the State to single out the disabled for different treatment so long as it has a rational or legitimate purpose." Id. In addition, it is presumed that distinctions made by the State that are based on disability are rational and legitimate. The burden rests on the individual to demonstrate that the government's claimed purpose is illegitimate or that the means used to achieve that purpose are irrational. Id. In addition, plaintiffs must show that "the facts on which the legislature may have relied in shaping the classification `could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the government decisionmaker.'" Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 459 (7th Cir. 1992), citing Sutker v. Illinois Dental Soc'y., 808 F.2d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1985).
One of the reasons the State decided to limit benefits to the mentally disabled to two years was its desire to save costs. Plaintiffs maintain saving costs is not a rational basis for discriminating against people with mental disabilities. Citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) and Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966), plaintiffs contend that classifications based upon cost saving alone will not justify an otherwise invidious classification. Neither case is on point.
In Shapiro, the invidious classification was a length of residence requirement to qualify for welfare benefits. The reason the classification was invidious was because it interfered with the plaintiffs' right to travel. No such interference with a constitutional right exists in this case. In Rinaldi, the Court found that a New Jersey statute that initially provided every indigent criminal defendant with a free trial transcript for the purpose of his direct appeal, but then required only defendants who lost their appeals and who were sentenced to prison to reimburse the state for the cost of the transcript, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court noted that legislation may impose special burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible ends, but the Equal Protection Clause requires that in defining a class subject to legislation the distinctions drawn have some relevance to the purpose for which classification is made. In that case, the Court held that the statute discriminated irrationally against unsuccessful appellants who were prisoners — as compared to unsuccessful appellants who received a suspended sentence, or probation, or were fined. Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 308-09. The Court found that if the purpose of the statute was to allow the State to seek reimbursement for the cost of transcripts, there was no rational basis for seeking reimbursement only from those appellants that were confined to state institutions. According to the Court, the State's distinction between successful and unsuccessful appellants bore no rational relationship to the purpose of the repayment provision. Id.
In response, the State cites Geduldig as support for its contention that its desire to save costs was a rational basis for limiting coverage for mental disabilities to two years. Although neither party cited the decision, at least one other federal court has accepted a similar argument. In Doe v. Devine, 545 F. Supp. 576 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd. 703 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the plaintiffs challenged on equal protection grounds the Office of Personnel Management's ("OPM") decision to accept mental health benefit cutbacks in the federal health insurance plan. OPM had negotiated a contract with Blue Cross/Blue Shield that reduced both inpatient and outpatient mental health benefits below the benefit levels provided for physical illnesses. For example, under the new contract the plan provided coverage for inpatient hospitalization for physical illness for unlimited days, while cutting off coverage for inpatient hospitalization for mental illness after 60 days. Id. at 578. In upholding the OPM's decision the court found that it had offered, among other reasons, "the completely neutral rationale of reducing health care costs to the government." Id., citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 (minimizing costs is "an objective and wholly noninvidious basis for the state's decision not to create a more comprehensive insurance program than it has here"). Similarly, one of the reasons Indiana limited coverage for mental disabilities was to control its costs. Indeed, the State has submitted evidence from studies indicating that while only a small proportion of the beneficiaries used mental health care services, the costs associated with such care were very high. In fact, the study determined that the costs of an episode of mental health care are two to three times the cost of an episode of care for other types of ailments.
Indiana's desire to control its costs and to control the expenditure of public funds is a rational basis for its classification scheme. Whether the Court agrees with its reasoning or rationale is irrelevant. The Court cannot hold legislation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause simply because it believes a better solution exists. Whether the State should provide longer coverage for mental disabilities is the type of policy judgment that the Court simply is not allowed to impose under rational basis scrutiny. Instead, such decisions are entrusted to the Indiana legislature. Accordingly, because the State has identified at least one rational basis for its action, its motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence from which the Court could find a genuine issue of material fact on their claim for denial of equal protection. Accordingly, the State's motion for summary judgment on those claims is GRANTED, and the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.