Opinion
1:22-CV-00306 EAW
2023-05-31
THOMAS H., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Dennis A. Clary, Lewiston, NY, for Plaintiff. Sixtina Fernandez, Office of Program Litigation, Office 2 Office of General Counsel Social Security Administration, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant.
Dennis A. Clary, Lewiston, NY, for Plaintiff. Sixtina Fernandez, Office of Program Litigation, Office 2 Office of General Counsel Social Security Administration, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge
INTRODUCTION
Represented by counsel, Plaintiff Thomas H. ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner," or "Defendant") denying his applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and child disability benefits. (Dkt. 1). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. 12; Dkt. 14). For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 14) is granted, and Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. 12) is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for child's insurance benefits on March 6, 2019. (Dkt. 10 at 21, 153). In his application, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning September 5, 2005, due to post-traumatic stress disorder, severe depression, anxiety, attention deficit disorder, learning disability, emotional disturbance, and left knee injury. (Id. at 121). Plaintiff's application was initially denied on May 31, 2019, and upon reconsideration on September 9, 2019. (Id. at 21, 158-85). Plaintiff also filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, which was initially denied due to lack of insured status; however, Plaintiff thereafter developed insured status and was covered from the period of April 1, 2019, through June 30, 2021. (Id. at 21). His Title II application was escalated and decided with his child's insurance benefits application. (Id.).
When referencing the page number(s) of docket citations in this Decision and Order, the Court will cite to the CM/ECF-generated page numbers that appear in the upper right-hand corner of each document.
A telephone hearing was held before administrative law judge ("ALJ") Bryce Baird on February 9, 2021. (Id. at 21, 63-105). On March 24, 2021, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 21, 37-55). One day later on March 25, 2021, the ALJ issued an amended decision. (Id. at 18-36). Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review; his request was denied on March 9, 2022, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision. (Id. at 7-12). This action followed.
The ALJ issued an amended decision because the initial decision was not clear that it addressed both Plaintiff's application for child's insurance benefits and his application for DIB. (See Dkt. 10 at 21).
LEGAL STANDARD
I. District Court Review
"In reviewing a final decision of the [Social Security Administration ("SSA")], this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). It is not the Court's function to "determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence). However, "[t]he deferential standard of review for substantial evidence does not apply to the Commissioner's conclusions of law." Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984)).
II. Disability Determination
An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is "severe" within the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of "not disabled." If the claimant does have at least one severe impairment, the ALJ continues to step three.
At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the "Listings"). Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement, id. § 404.1509, the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments. See id. § 404.1520(e).
The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits the claimant to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).
DISCUSSION
I. The ALJ's Decision
In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. Initially, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Act on June 30, 2021. (Dkt. 10 at 24). Plaintiff was born on January 12, 1998, and had not attained the age of 22 as of September 1, 2017, the alleged onset date. (Id.). At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful work activity since September 1, 2017, the alleged onset date. (Id.).
At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff requested to amend his alleged onset date from September 5, 2005, to September 1, 2017. (See Dkt. 10 at 21, 104).
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of: "posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); depression; and anxiety." (Id.). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), poly substance abuse, and history of left knee ACL and meniscus tear were non-severe. (Id. at 25). With respect to Plaintiff's representation that he suffered from bipolar disorder, the ALJ concluded that this was not a medically determinable impairment. (Id. at 24-25).
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. (Id. at 25-26). The ALJ particularly considered the criteria of Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15 in reaching his conclusion. (Id. at 25-27).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c) except that:
he is limited to frequent climbing of ramps or stairs and occasional climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds; frequent balancing; frequent kneeling, frequent crouching; frequent crawling. He is limited to simple, routine tasks that can be learned after a short demonstration or within 30 days; this would be work with no production rate or pace work; work that does not require more than simple work related decisions; work that would allow for variations in productivity; work in which the claimant would not be required to independently develop work strategies or identify workplace needs; work in which the claimant would be limited to no more than superficial interaction with the public and up to occasional interactions with co-workers; this would be work that would not require teamwork, such as on a production line; and this would be work that is subject to more than occasional supervision.(Id. at 27). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (Id. at 34).
At step five, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") to conclude that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including the representative occupations of commercial cleaner, cook helper, and hospital food service. (Id. at 35). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act. (Id. at 36).
II. The Commissioner's Determination is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free from Legal Error
Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse or, in the alternative, to remand this matter to the Commissioner, arguing that the ALJ accepted the opinions of non-examining doctors over the report of Michael P. Santa Maria, Ph.D., and that therefore the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. 12-1 at 6-7). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ mischaracterized Dr. Santa Maria's report as an "administrative finding," ignored his medical findings, and gave more persuasive weight to the opinions offered by non-examining physicians S. Juriga, Ph.D. and D. Brown, Psy.D. (Id.). The Court has considered this argument and finds it to be without merit, and further finds that the RFC is supported by substantial evidence, for the reasons discussed below.
Although the ALJ assessed an RFC with both physical and mental limitations, including that Plaintiff was limited to medium level work (see Dkt. 10 at 27), Plaintiff challenges only the assessment of the mental RFC.
In deciding a disability claim, an ALJ is tasked with "weigh[ing] all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole." Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App'x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013). While an ALJ's conclusion need not "perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his decision," id., an ALJ is not a medical professional, and therefore he "is not qualified to assess a claimant's RFC on the basis of bare medical findings," Ortiz v. Colvin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 581, 586 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (quotation and citation omitted). However, at bottom, "[a]n RFC finding is administrative in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ, as the Commissioner's regulations make clear." Curry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App'x 46, 48 n.3 (2d Cir. 2021) (finding it was proper for the ALJ "pursuant to his statutory authority . . . [to] consider[ ] the medical and other evidence in the record in its totality to reach an RFC determination"); see also Monroe v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 676 F. App'x 5, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) ("Where . . . the record contains sufficient evidence from which an ALJ can assess the claimant's residual functional capacity, a medical source statement or formal medical opinion is not necessarily required." (quotations, citations, and alteration omitted)).
The Court turns first to the ALJ's assessment of Dr. Santa Maria's opinion and the regulations applicable to the ALJ's evaluation of the opinion. Under the regulations applicable to Plaintiff's claim, the Commissioner "will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [the claimant's] medical sources." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Further, when a medical source provides one or more medical opinions, the Commissioner will consider those medical opinions from that medical source together using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of the applicable sections. Id. Those factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant, including the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations, purpose and extent of the treatment relationship, and the examining relationship; (4) specialization; and (5) any other factors that "tend to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding." Id. at § 404.1520c(c).
When evaluating the persuasiveness of a medical opinion, the most important factors are supportability and consistency. Id. at § 404.1520c(a). With respect to "supportability," the new regulations provide that "[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be." Id. at § 404.1520c(c)(1). With respect to "consistency," the new regulations provide that "[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be." Id. at § 404.1520c(c)(2).
The ALJ must articulate his consideration of the medical opinion evidence, including how persuasive he finds the medical opinions in the case record. Id. at § 404.1520c(b). "Although the new regulations eliminate the perceived hierarchy of medical sources, deference to specific medical opinions, and assigning 'weight' to a medical opinion, the ALJ must still articulate how [he or she] considered the medical opinions and how persuasive [he or she] find[s] all of the medical opinions." Andrew G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020 WL 5848776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020) (quotations and citation omitted). Specifically, the ALJ must explain how he considered the "supportability" and "consistency" factors for a medical source's opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ may—but is not required to—explain how he considered the remaining factors. Id.
Plaintiff underwent a psychiatric evaluation with Dr. Santa Maria on March 21 and 26, 2019. (Dkt. 10 at 574-83). After summarizing Plaintiff's background, family history, medical/psychiatric history, academic history, and social history (id. at 574-77), Dr. Santa Maria examined Plaintiff (id. at 577-80). Dr. Santa Maria performed neurological testing, the majority of which yielded results within the "normal" or "average" range, with some "borderline," "low average," "mild deficit," and "impaired" results. (Id. at 578-80). Dr. Santa Maria noted that general screening of Plaintiff's cognitive abilities performance was in the normal range, and his overall intellectual abilities were demonstrated to be in the average to borderline range. (Id. at 580). However, the results of a Comprehensive Personality Inventory revealed that Plaintiff "endorsed significant current mood and anxiety symptoms," psychological concerns, and history of substance abuse and legal issues. (Id. at 581).
Following his examination, Dr. Santa Maria acknowledged that Plaintiff's case was "complicated" (id.), but noted, among other things:
Findings from this evaluation suggest that [Plaintiff] demonstrates adequate cognitive capacity to handle a variety of entry level competitive work roles on a part-time or full-time basis. However, findings including substance use and the abhorrent personality traits also suggest that he is an individual who remains at high-risk for difficulty maintaining employment at any one position for extended periods of time, at least at present, although mathematical abilities are limited, [Plaintiff] does appear to have adequate cognitive capacity to handle an entry level position involving use of a modern cash register, that for example calculates taxes, discounts, and the amount of change to be given, etc., particularly given the integrity of some other aspects of cognition (i.e., WAIS-4 FSIQ=90, which is in average range).(Id. at 583). Dr. Santa Maria further noted that Plaintiff has a history of concerns involving behavior and attention, and he was particularly deficient in mathematics. (Id. at 582). Dr. Santa Maria also observed that Plaintiff's mood had improved in recent months, reportedly due to the discontinuation of use of many substances, but Plaintiff remained at high risk for substance use relapse. (Id.).
The ALJ discussed Dr. Santa Maria's opinion at length in the written determination (id. at 29-30) but explained that he found the opinion "neither valuable nor persuasive" (id. at 33). The ALJ noted Dr. Santa Maria's finding that Plaintiff demonstrated adequate cognitive capacity to handle a variety of entry-level competitive work roles on a part-time or full-time basis, but that Plaintiff's substance abuse and personality traits made him an individual who remained high-risk for maintaining employment in any one position for an extended period of time. (Id.). The ALJ explained that Dr. Santa Maria's opinion regarding Plaintiff's ability to maintain employment was an issue reserved to the Commissioner. (Id. ("A doctor's statement indicating that a claimant is 'disabled,' or 'unable to work,' is not a medical opinion, but rather an administrative finding of a case.")); see also Kathryn D. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-1550-LJV, 2021 WL 195342, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2021) ("If an opinion effectively decides the ultimate issue—that is, that the claimant is disabled—it opines on a matter reserved to the Commissioner and to that extent is not considered a medical opinion.").
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ wholesale rejected Dr. Santa Maria's opinion on the basis that it represented an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner, and that the ALJ failed to consider the diagnostic findings as to Plaintiff's cognitive and behavioral functioning. (See Dkt. 12-1 at 6). However, a closer examination of the written determination reveals that this is not the case. As explained above, the ALJ discussed Dr. Santa Maria's opinion at length in the written determinations, including his findings with respect to Plaintiff's intellectual and behavioral functioning (Dkt. 10 at 29-30 (discussing Dr. Santa Maria's mental status examination of Plaintiff, results of various tests administered to Plaintiff, and Dr. Santa Maria's impressions)), and the ALJ also stated that he considered Dr. Santa Maria's opinion in determining Plaintiff's RFC (id. at 33). Notably, despite the fact that the ALJ found Dr. Santa Maria's finding with respect to Plaintiff's ability to maintain employment to be unpersuasive, the RFC—which effectively limits Plaintiff to simple, unskilled work—is consistent with Dr. Santa Maria's opinion that Plaintiff has normal cognitive abilities and that his overall intellectual abilities were demonstrated to be in the average to borderline range. Further, the RFC limits Plaintiff to superficial interaction with the public, occasional interactions with co-workers, occasional supervision, and tasks that do not involve teamwork, which is consistent with Dr. Santa Maria's findings with respect to Plaintiff's anxiety and abhorrent personality traits. Other than Dr. Santa Maria's opinion with respect to Plaintiff's ability to maintain employment which, as explained above, is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, Plaintiff fails to identify any further mental limitations supported by Dr. Santa Maria's March 2019 assessment.
Other medical opinions in the record support that Plaintiff is capable of performing the mental limitations required by the assessed RFC. For example, Todd Deneen, Psy.D., the consultative examiner, examined Plaintiff on May 21, 2019. (Dkt. 11 at 25-28). Dr. Deneen found that Plaintiff had coherent and goal-directed thought processes, anxious mood, mildly impaired concentration due to anxiety, and intact recent and remote memory skills. (Id. at 26). Plaintiff had average to below average intellectual functioning, fair insight, and poor judgment. (Id. at 27). Dr. Deneen found that Plaintiff would have "mild limitations" in using reason and judgment to make work-related decisions, sustaining concentration and performing a task at a consistent pace, sustaining a routine, and maintaining regular attendance at work. (Id.). Plaintiff would have "moderate limitations" for regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and maintaining well-being. (Id.). However, Plaintiff had no limitations for understanding and applying simple directions and instructions, understanding and applying complex directions and instructions, interacting adequately with supervisors, coworkers, and the public, maintaining personal hygiene and appropriate attire, and awareness of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions. (Id.).
The ALJ found that Dr. Deneen's opinion was "persuasive," except for his opinion with respect to Plaintiff's ability to interact with others, given that Plaintiff reported social withdrawal as a symptom of his depression, and his father reported that Plaintiff had issues with anger and interpersonal relationships. (See Dkt. 10 at 32-33). Consistent with this observation, the RFC includes limitations for Plaintiff's interaction with others. However, the RFC is otherwise supported by the opinion offered by Dr. Deneen. See, e.g., Janet L. K. v. Saul, No. 1:20-CV-0725 (GTS), 2021 WL 2592899, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. June 24, 2021) ("The ALJ's RFC limitation to simple, repetitive, one-or-two-task, low stress jobs with no more than occasional decisionmaking and occasional changes in work setting, and no more than occasional interaction in the workplace with supervisors reasonably accounts for the opined mild limitation in maintaining a regular schedule and mild-to-moderate difficulty sustaining an ordinary routine."); see also Jahmari R. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-CV-0935 (WBC), 2022 WL 875166, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2022) ("The Second Circuit has held that moderate limitations in work related functioning does not significantly limit, and thus prevent, a plaintiff from performing unskilled work." (collecting cases)).
The ALJ also found the opinions offered by Dr. Juriga and Dr. Brown to be persuasive. (Dkt. 10 at 32). Dr. Juriga and Dr. Brown opined that Plaintiff could perform work involving brief contact with others. (Id. at 127, 144). Plaintiff had some moderate limitations in areas involving social interaction, as well as with responding to changes in the work setting, and setting realistic goals and planning independently. (Id. at 131-32, 149). Dr. Brown further found that Plaintiff had some limitations in the areas of understanding and memory and concentration and persistence, but none of those limitations were significant. (Id. at 148-49). The ALJ explained that he found these opinions to be well-supported by medical evidence, including Plaintiff's mental health records and performance on the WAIS-IV evaluation, and that the opinions were consistent with the overall record, including the opinion offered by Dr. Deneen. (Id. at 32). Accordingly, as explained in the written determination, the RFC is also supported by the opinions of Dr. Juriga and Dr. Brown.
Plaintiff contends that it was error for the ALJ to credit the opinions offered by these non-examining physicians over Dr. Santa Maria's opinion. (Dkt. 12-1 at 6). However, Dr. Santa Maria's opinion is not entitled to any special deference, and it is well-settled that the opinions of state agency medical consultants may serve as substantial evidence supporting an RFC. Lewis v. Colvin, 122 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (opinion of state agency consultant "may constitute substantial evidence in support of residual functional capacity findings" (citation omitted)); see also Woytowicz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:15-CV-0906 (GTS/WBC), 2016 WL 6427787, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2016) ("It is well settled that an ALJ is entitled to rely upon the opinions of both examining and non-examining State agency medical consultants, since such consultants are deemed to be qualified experts in the field of social security disability."), adopted, 2016 WL 6426385 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2016). Accordingly, the ALJ was entitled to credit these opinions, including because they were supported by medical evidence and supported by the record. To the extent Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner's decision must be reversed because the ALJ credited the decision of non-examining medical experts over the opinion offered by Dr. Santa Maria, that argument is not supported by the law. Remand is therefore not required on that basis.
Plaintiff makes three additional arguments in connection with his motion which do not relate to the ALJ's assessment of Dr. Santa Maria's opinion. First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ ignored the fact that he had multiple jobs in the two years prior to his hearing and that he was unable to maintain employment in those positions. (Dkt. 12-1 at 7). However, the ALJ did not ignore Plaintiff's work history. At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's past employment. (Dkt. 10 at 24). Plaintiff testified at length to his employment history at his administrative hearing (see, e.g., id. at 76-80, 90-93), and the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's employment history in the written determination (id. at 31 (discussing that Plaintiff was employed and working 20 to 25 hours per week but could not work fulltime due to anxiety)). Despite Plaintiff's work history, the ALJ found that he could perform work consistent with the limitations included in the RFC.
Plaintiff's remaining two arguments pertain to the ALJ's consideration of testimony by the VE, including that the ALJ stated in the written determination that Plaintiff did not make an objection to the testimony by the VE. (Dkt. 12-1 at 7). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's statement is "misleading," because "the ALJ's second and third hypotheticals, which elicited answers from the VE eliminating all work . . . made further questions by [counsel] unnecessary, belying the ALJ's assertion." (Id.). Plaintiff further contends that the VE testified that being off-task more than ten percent of the workday would preclude all work and, since Plaintiff's school records reflected that he needed "consistent redirection and refocusing" to attend to tasks, he could not perform work on a fulltime basis. (Id.).
With respect to Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ inaccurately stated that he did not object to the testimony by the VE, Plaintiff fails to explain—and the Court cannot discern—what impact this would have on the Court's consideration of whether the RFC is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Wavercak v. Astrue, 420 F. App'x 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2011) ("Because we have already concluded that substantial record evidence supports the RFC finding, we necessarily reject Wavercak's vocational expert challenge."). Further, with respect to Plaintiff's argument regarding time off-task, Plaintiff points to no opinion in the record stating that he would be off-task more than 10 percent of the workday, and his argument that his school records support such a limitation amounts to no more than his disagreement with the ALJ's RFC determination, which is not a valid basis for remand. See Duffy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-985S, 2018 WL 4103180, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2018) ("In short, Plaintiff simply disagrees with the ALJ's assessment of the evidence in the record, but such a disagreement does not amount to the absence of substantial evidence.").
In sum, the ALJ's written determination reflects that he carefully considered the evidence in the record, including all of the opinion evidence. Further, it is clear to the Court how the ALJ arrived at the RFC, which is well-supported by the record. Accordingly, remand for further administrative proceedings is not required.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 14) is granted, and Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 12) is denied.
SO ORDERED.