Opinion
C.A. No. 02C-04-223(CHT).
October 27, 2006.
Sidney Balick, Esquire, Bifferato, Gentilotti, Biden Balick, Wilmington, DE.
Edward F. Kafader, Esquire Ferry, Joseph Pearce, Wilmington, DE.
Dear Counsel:
Before the Court is the Defendant's motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, remittur. As you will recall, the trial of this case began on June 13, 2005. It ended June 15, 2005, when the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Syva for $30,000 in compensatory damages along with $36,000 in punitive damages. That which follows is the Court's resolution of the issues so presented.
Statement of the Case
The accident which forms the basis of the instant litigation occurred May 5, 2005. On that date, Ms. Syva, who had been traveling southbound, was stopped at a traffic signal on U.S. Route 13, also known as Philadelphia Pike. Mr. Lobozzo, proceeding northbound on that same roadway, struck the rear of the Syva vehicle, pushing the latter thirty feet from the point of impact. Ms. Syva claimed to have suffered injury to her neck and back as a result of the collision.
The accident took place during the daylight hours and there appears to have been no other environmental conditions which contributed to the incident. It was also undisputed that Mr. Lobozzo was driving under the influence of alcohol, and that his blood alcohol content, or BAC, was .2%, or twice the legal limit under Delaware law as it then existed. The record further revealed that the he pled guilty to doing so, in violation of the applicable statute.
Ms. Syva was treated by Dr. Ross Ufberg for the five years between the date of the accident and the date of the trial. He opined that she suffered permanent injuries to her lumbosacral spine and right leg caused by the May 5, 2000 accident. In reaching that conclusion, Dr. Ufberg considered Ms. Syva's medical history, which included at least on prior auto accident as well as previous complaints to areas of her body she claimed were injured in the May 5, 2000 accident.
Ms. Syva was also seen on two occasions by Dr. Lanny Edelson, a neurologist, at the behest of the defense. Dr. Edelson concluded, based upon his interaction with Ms. Syva, that she was suffering "myoligomentous injury to the neck and low back secondary to the May 5, 2005 accident superimposed upon a history of low back pain". He went on to opine that those injuries must be deemed to be permanent given the passage of time since the accident.
The Syvas commenced instant litigation on April 22, 2002. They alleged that Mr. Lobozzo was negligent and that negligence proximately caused the injuries suffered by Ms. Syva. Accordingly, the Syvas sought compensatory damages, and given what was claimed to the egregious nature of Mr. Lobozzo's conduct, punitive damages were sought as well. Notwithstanding the fact that he initially denied responsibility for the accident, Mr. Lobozzo admitted liability leaving as the only question for trial the amount of any damages suffered by the Syvas.
At the conclusion of the trial of this matter, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Syva. She was awarded $30,000 in compensatory damages and $36,000 in punitive damages. The jury did not award any compensation to Mr. Syva on his loss of consortium claim. The instant motion was filed by Mr. Lobozzo shortly thereafter. Reduced to its essence, he claims that the verdicts "shock the conscience of the Court". Consequently, he is entitled to a new trial or remittur as a result. The Plaintiffs obviously disagree.
Analysis
There is no dispute concerning the applicable legal standard. Simply put, as noted by both sides, jury verdicts are given great difference by the courts of this state. That role is described as follows:
When considering a motion for a new trial . . . the court's power to grant a new trial has been exercised cautiously with extreme deference to the findings of the jury. Further, when the case involves a controverted issue of fact in which the evidence is conflicting and out of the conflict may be gathered sufficient evidence to support a verdict for either party, the issue of fact will be left severely to the jury. The Court will not upset the verdict of a jury unless the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable juror could not have reached the result. Stated differently, a jury's award is presumed correct and just unless so grossly out of proportion to the injuries suffered as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice. . . .
Dunkle v. Prettyman, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 440, at *5; see also Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1973); Walker v. Shoprite Supermarket, Inc., 859 A.2d 620 (Del. 2004); and Wheatley v. Family Dollar Stores of Del. Inc., 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 241.
Liability having been admitted, the evidence presented focused on the damages, both compensatory and punitive, sought by the Plaintiffs. More specifically, the testimony put before the jury outlined the scope of the injuries inflicted upon Ms. Syva, the nature of her complaints and remaining life expectancy, 31.6 years. Both expert witnesses reviewed her medical history, including the medical records generated as a result of the examinations and/or treatments so rendered. And, they both concluded that Ms. Syva has suffered injury to her lower back and right leg. They further agreed that said injuries were permanent given the length of time between the accident and the trial. The only significant difference lies in the fact that Dr. Edelson believed that Ms. Syva complained about after May 5, 2000 accident were "superimposed upon a history of low back pain", while Dr. Ufberg related them solely to the aforementioned accident.
Given these circumstances, the Court concludes that an award of $30,000 in compensatory damages does not shock the conscience of the Court. The evidence is clearly sufficient to support the verdict rendered. Indeed, it could be argued that a larger award could have been rendered without bringing about such a reaction. Nor did it appear to be the product of any passion or prejudice against Mr. Lobozzo, particularly given the jury's resolution of Mr. Syva's consortium claim. It will not be disturbed as a result.
A similar conclusion is required in response to Mr. Lobozzo's challenge to the punitive damages award. The evidence clearly demonstrates that Mr. Lobozzo was driving while intoxicated at twice the legal limit when he drove his vehicle into the rear of the Syva vehicle. The accident took place in broad daylight and there were no hazards, obstructions or other impediments which contributed to the collision. Nor did the defense provide any explanation as to exactly how the accident took place. Lastly, there is no indication that Ms. Syva, legally stopped in response to a traffic signal, in any way contributed to that event.
The law regarding an award of punitive damages in the State of Delaware is not in dispute. Whether an award of punitive damages is appropriate under the circumstances as well as the amount of any such award, is within the province of the jury to decide. Among other factors, the award should be based upon the extent of the injuries and the amount of compensatory damages awarded. Most significantly, the conduct triggering the award must have been willful and outrageous, exhibiting a reckless indifference to the rights of others.
Concoors Supply Co., Inc. v. Giesecke Int'l Ltd., 1992 Del. Super. LEXIS 150, *13-14; see also Ayers v. Quillen, 2004 Del. Super LEXIS 443.
Giulianelli v. Zogby, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 134, *2; see also In re PeKala, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 78; and Eby v. Thompson, 2005 Del. SUPER LEXIS 63.
The conduct in question clearly supports an award of punitive damages. Mr. Lobozzo does not dispute that conclusion, but instead calls into question the amount of the award. His objection, however, is not persuasive. First, the conduct was clearly reckless and indifferent. Second, the injuries suffered by Ms. Syva were real and permanent. Third, the amount awarded as punitive damages, under all the circumstances, was not disproportionate to the compensatory damage award rendered generally. In short, the punitive damages awarded do not shock the conscience of the Court in any sense.
In summary, the motion filed on behalf of Mr. Lobozzo for a new trial, or in the alternative, remittur, is denied for the reasons stated above. The award of $30,000 in compensatory damages and $36,000 in punitive damages does not shock the conscience of the Court. Those awards are supported by evidence in the record and are not otherwise subject to the challenge so raised by the defense.