Opinion
Docket No. 156262 Calendar No. 2
04-22-2019
Paulette STENZEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BEST BUY CO., INC., Defendant, and Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
Nolan, Thomsen & Villas, PC, Eaton Rapids (by Lawrence P. Nolan and Gary G. Villas ) for Paulette Stenzel. Dykema Gossett PLLC (by Paul L. Nystrom, Bloomfield Hills and Jill M. Wheaton, Ann Arbor) for Samsung Electronics America, Inc. Kerr Russell and Weber, PLC, Detroit (by Daniel G. Beyer and Derek R. Boyd ) for Amicus Curiae, the Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc.
Nolan, Thomsen & Villas, PC, Eaton Rapids (by Lawrence P. Nolan and Gary G. Villas ) for Paulette Stenzel.
Dykema Gossett PLLC (by Paul L. Nystrom, Bloomfield Hills and Jill M. Wheaton, Ann Arbor) for Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
Kerr Russell and Weber, PLC, Detroit (by Daniel G. Beyer and Derek R. Boyd ) for Amicus Curiae, the Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except Cavanagh, J.)
MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff was injured after her new refrigerator began to spray water out of its water dispenser onto her kitchen floor, causing her to slip and fall. She filed a timely complaint alleging negligence, breach of contract, and breach of warranty against defendant Best Buy Co., Inc., which had sold and installed the refrigerator. Best Buy filed a notice of nonparty fault, identifying defendant-appellant Samsung Electronics America, Inc., as the refrigerator’s manufacturer. Plaintiff added a claim against Samsung in an amended complaint, and Samsung moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s claim against it was untimely because plaintiff had not first moved to amend under MCL 600.2957(2) and therefore was not entitled to the relation-back privilege set forth in that statute. The trial court granted Samsung’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
We affirm the Court of Appeals for the reasons set forth in the concurring opinion, Stenzel v. Best Buy Co., Inc. , 320 Mich. App. 262, 284, 906 N.W.2d 801 (2017) ( GLEICHER , J., concurring in result), and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Specifically, we conclude that MCL 600.2957(2) and MCR 2.112(K) do not irreconcilably conflict, a party may amend a pleading upon receipt of notice of nonparty fault pursuant to MCR 2.112(K) without filing a motion for leave to amend, and the amended pleading relates back to the original action pursuant to MCL 600.2957(2).
MCL 600.2957(2) provides:
Upon motion of a party within 91 days after identification of a nonparty, the court shall grant leave to the moving party to file and serve an amended pleading alleging 1 or more causes of action against that nonparty. A cause of action added under this subsection is not barred by a period of limitation unless the cause of action would have been barred by a period of limitation at the time of the filing of the original action.
MCR 2.112(K)(4) provides, in relevant part, that "a party served with a notice under this subrule may file an amended pleading stating a claim or claims against the nonparty within 91 days of service of the first notice identifying that nonparty."
In particular, the concurring opinion correctly concluded that the statute and the court rule "are capable of harmonious coexistence" and do not " ‘irreconcilabl[y] conflict.’ " Stenzel , 320 Mich. App. at 287, 288, 906 N.W.2d 801 ( GLEICHER , J., concurring in result), quoting People v. Watkins , 491 Mich. 450, 467, 818 N.W.2d 296 (2012) ; MCL 600.2957(2) (specifying that if a party moves to amend a pleading within 91 days after the identification of a nonparty at fault, the court shall grant it and the amended pleading will relate back to the time of the filing of the original pleading); MCR 2.112(K)(4) (affording a party served with notice of identification of a nonparty at fault the right to amend a pleading to add that nonparty to the suit). Rather, "the statute and court rule at issue here are ... complementary." Stenzel , 320 Mich. App. at 290, 906 N.W.2d 801 ( GLEICHER , J., concurring in result). The two provisions at issue
are entirely consistent with regard to the central and controlling issue: a plaintiff’s right to timely amend a complaint to add an identified nonparty at fault as a party. Read together, the two provisions permit a plaintiff to file a motion to amend, or not. Either way, the result is the same: the amendment must be permitted if it is timely. [ Id . at 289, 906 N.W.2d 801.]
Moreover, "the [Michigan] Supreme Court understood that a timely request to amend had to be granted." Id . Therefore, this Court "promulgated MCR 2.112(K)(4) ‘to implement MCL 600.2957,’ " not to supplant it. Id . at 288, 906 N.W.2d 801, quoting Holton v. A+ Ins. Assoc., Inc. , 255 Mich. App. 318, 324, 661 N.W.2d 248 (2003). For, "[t]he court rule addresses the conduct of the parties," whereas "the statute is directed at the conduct of the court." Bint v. Doe , 274 Mich. App. 232, 237-238, 732 N.W.2d 156 (2007) ( ZAHRA , P.J., concurring). Accordingly, the two provisions exist in a "consistent" and complementary fashion, and they do not conflict. Id . at 238, 732 N.W.2d 156.
As a result, "[a] plaintiff may elect to amend the complaint [without filing a motion for leave to amend]. If the plaintiff so elects, the court shall grant the amendment." Id . Alternatively, "[i]f a plaintiff wishes to file a motion to add a nonparty," the plaintiff is permitted to do so under MCL 600.2957(2). Stenzel , 320 Mich. App. at 290, 906 N.W.2d 801 ( GLEICHER , J., concurring in result). These constitute "alternative methods of accomplishing the same goal ...." Id . Therefore, in the present case, "plaintiff was permitted ... to file her amended complaint with or without first filing a motion to amend," and she properly added Samsung as a party by filing an amended complaint. Id . at 291-292, 906 N.W.2d 801. Furthermore,
[t]here being no conflict between the statute and the court rule, we are bound to implement the remainder of MCL 600.2957(2), which provides that a "cause of action added under this subsection is not barred by a period of limitation unless the cause of action would have been barred by a period of limitation at the time of the filing of the original action."
Applying this statutory provision to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the cause of action asserted against defendant[ ] ... is timely because the claim against defendant[ ], had it been asserted in the original action, would have been timely. [ Bint , 274 Mich. App. at 238, 732 N.W.2d 156 ( ZAHRA , P.J., concurring).]
Samsung disagrees, contending that the relation-back privilege in MCL 600.2957(2) is contingent upon a party filing a motion for leave to amend "under this subsection." However, we are in agreement with the concurring opinion that, because "the statute and court rule ... are ... complementary," "[t]he statute fills in for the court rules’ silence on [the] subject" of "relation back." Stenzel , 320 Mich. App. at 290, 291, 906 N.W.2d 801 ( GLEICHER , J., concurring in result). Accordingly, plaintiff’s amended complaint adding Samsung as a defendant relates back to her original complaint against Best Buy under MCL 600.2957(2) and was timely filed.
We affirm the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
McCormack, C.J., and Markman, Zahra, Viviano, Bernstein, and Clement, JJ., concurred.
Cavanagh, J., did not participate due to her prior relationship with Garan Lucow Miller, PC.