Opinion
SC 165210 SC 165211COA 356954 COA 356968
05-31-2024
MAUREEN ST. CLAIR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. XPO LOGISTICS, INC., d/b/a UX ASSEMBLY AND INSTALLATION, Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee, and ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee, and CMC LOGISTICS, INC., Defendant/Cross-Defendant-Appellee.
Macomb CC: 2019-004971-NO
Elizabeth T. Clement, Chief Justice, Brian K. Zahra, David F. Viviano, Richard H. Bernstein, Megan K. Cavanagh, Elizabeth M. Welch, Kyra H. Bolden, Justices
ORDER
On March 13, 2024, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the December 1, 2022 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and REMAND this case to the Macomb Circuit Court for further proceedings. Specifically, we reverse the Court of Appeals' holding that plaintiff's action against defendant CMC Logistics, Inc., is untimely. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
In February 2015, plaintiff, Maureen St. Clair, purchased a treadmill that was manufactured and distributed by ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. ICON had contracted with XPO Logistics, Inc., to deliver and install the treadmill. XPO in turn subcontracted its services to CMC. It was CMC who delivered and installed the treadmill for plaintiff.
On March 16, 2015, plaintiff fell while using the treadmill and was injured. Consequently, on January 11, 2018, plaintiff filed suit against XPO and ICON in federal district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. She alleged a claim of negligence against XPO and a claim of products liability against ICON. On May 18, 2018, XPO filed a notice of nonparty at fault, identifying CMC as another entity at fault. Consequently, on August 9, 2018, plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint to add CMC as a defendant. On August 14, 2018, the federal district court granted that motion. The next day, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding a claim that CMC had been negligent in its installation of the treadmill. Because of the addition of CMC, however, there was no longer diversity jurisdiction, and on December 6, 2019, the federal court dismissed the suit. That same day, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Macomb Circuit Court against the three defendants, including a negligence claim against CMC.
CMC moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that the applicable three-year period of limitations had run. MCL 600.5805(2). CMC noted that the injury occurred on March 16, 2015, so the applicable limitations period expired by March 16, 2018. While plaintiff did timely file suit in federal court, plaintiff did not file suit in state court until December 2019. The court granted summary disposition in favor of CMC and dismissed plaintiff's claim against CMC with prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed that dismissal in a published, split opinion. St Clair v XPO Logistics, Inc, 344 Mich.App. 418 (2022).
This Court reviews de novo whether a motion for summary disposition based on MCR 2.116(C)(7) is properly granted. Diehl v Danuloff, 242 Mich.App. 120, 122 (2000).
MCL 600.5856, the tolling statute, provides, in relevant part:
The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled in any of the following circumstances:
(a) At the time the complaint is filed, if a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant within the time set forth in the supreme court rules. [Emphasis added.]
Under MCL 600.5856, the applicable limitations period was tolled at the time plaintiff's original complaint was filed in federal court. See Badon v Gen Motors Corp, 188 Mich.App. 430, 436 (1991) (stating that the filing of a federal action tolls the statutory limitations period until the federal action is no longer pending).
The timeliness of plaintiff's claim against CMC turns on whether MCL 600.2957(2) also applies. That statute reads:
Upon motion of a party within 91 days after identification of a nonparty, the court shall grant leave to the moving party to file and serve an amended pleading alleging 1 or more causes of action against that nonparty. A cause of action added under this subsection is not barred by a period of limitation unless the cause of action would have been barred by a period of limitation
at the time of the filing of the original action. [MCL 600.2957(2) (emphasis added).]
The key question is whether MCL 600.2957(2) applies such that the timeliness of the subsequent complaint in state court, not just the amended complaint in federal court, is judged by the timeliness of the first complaint in federal court.
We believe the statute does so apply. The use of "cause of action" as the subject in the second sentence is determinative. "Cause of action" is defined, in this instance, as "[a] legal theory of a lawsuit . . . ." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed). Because plaintiff sought to bring the same negligence cause of action against CMC in her state court complaint as she did in her amended federal complaint, MCL 600.2957(2) applies such that the state court complaint is timely as well.
In other words, the first sentence of MCL 600.2957(2) allowed plaintiff to serve her amended pleading in federal court alleging a negligence cause of action against CMC. That same negligence cause of action, regardless of what court it was brought in and whether it was first brought in federal court and then refiled in state court, is a "cause of action added under [MCL 600.2957(2)]," and is "not barred by a period of limitation unless the cause of action would have been barred by a period of limitation at the time of the filing of the original action." The original action here is plaintiff's federal complaint, which was, of course, timely. Consequently, the cause of action against CMC is timely.
For these reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals' holding that plaintiff's claims against defendant CMC were untimely and deny leave in all other respects.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
Zahra, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority's denial of leave to appeal as to plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred by ruling that defendant ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., is entitled to the statutory misuse defense. But I respectfully dissent from the majority's reversal of the Court of Appeals' holding that plaintiff's action against defendant CMC Logistics, Inc., is untimely. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue, as the panel appropriately concluded that plaintiff's action is time-barred.
The statutory limitations period for a negligence claim is three years. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered injuries on her treadmill on March 16, 2015. Thus, she had until March 16, 2018, to file her negligence claim against defendants. Plaintiff's lawsuit in this state court action was filed in the Macomb Circuit Court on December 6, 2019, undisputedly beyond the three-year statute of limitations. Thus, absent an applicable exception, plaintiff's lawsuit was untimely, and the trial court properly granted CMC's motion for summary disposition.
Plaintiff contends that her action against CMC is timely under MCL 600.5856(a) and MCL 600.2957(2) because she had previously asserted an identical timely federal cause of action against CMC. The period of limitations had not yet expired when plaintiff filed her initial complaint in federal court against ICON and XPO on January 11, 2018, and pursuant to MCL 600.2957(2), her amended complaint adding CMC as a defendant was not barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff's argument, with which a majority of this Court agrees, is that under MCL 600.5856(a) and MCL 600.2957(2), the period of limitations was tolled from the time plaintiff's federal complaint was filed on January 11, 2018, until December 6, 2019, when plaintiff's federal action was dismissed and she filed this state action.
The majority misconstrues MCL 600.2957(2), which states:
Upon motion of a party within 91 days after identification of a nonparty, the court shall grant leave to the moving party to file and serve an amended pleading alleging 1 or more causes of action against that nonparty. A cause of action added under this subsection is not barred by a period of limitation unless the cause of action would have been barred by a period of limitation at the time of the filing of the original action.
This statute is referred to as a "relation-back" provision. Indeed, the Court of Appeals in this case cited a prior case for the proposition that "[t]he second sentence of MCL 600.2957(2) dictates that 'any amendment of a pleading to add a cause of action against an identified nonparty at fault relates back to the date of the filing of the original action for purposes of assessing whether the applicable period of limitations has expired.' " But we must interpret this provision as it is plainly written and not as something it is assumed to be on the basis of a descriptive term associated with it.
St Clair v XPO Logistics, Inc, 344 Mich.App. 418, 432-433 (2022), quoting Stenzel v Best Buy Co, Inc, 320 Mich.App. 262, 269 (2017), aff'd 503 Mich. 199 (2019). This Court has likewise stated in passing that the statute allows for an amended complaint adding a party to relate back to the date of the original complaint. Stenzel v Best Buy Co, Inc, 503 Mich. 199, 204 (2019) ("Accordingly, plaintiff's amended complaint adding Samsung as a defendant relates back to her original complaint against Best Buy under MCL 600.2957(2) and was timely filed."). It does not appear that this Court has engaged in an analysis of the language of MCL 600.2957(2) to determine whether it indeed functions as a relation-back provision.
Unlike a traditional relation-back provision, MCL 600.2957(2) does not provide that an amendment adding a nonparty is deemed to be filed on the date of the original complaint. Compare MCL 600.2957(2) to MCR 2.118(D), which expressly states that "[a]n amendment that adds a claim or a defense relates back to the date of the original pleading if the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in the original pleading."Similarly, the federal provision, FR Civ P 15(c)(1), states that "an amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading" when certain conditions are satisfied. It is significant that MCL 600.2957(2) does not contain language providing that the filing date of the amended complaint should be considered the filing date of the original complaint. Instead, MCL 600.2957(2) simply precludes dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds by stating that an amended complaint cannot be dismissed as untimely unless such dismissal would have been proper at the time the original complaint was filed. In my view, MCL 600.2957(2) is better understood as a tool to prevent dismissal in limited circumstances rather than a relation-back provision.
Emphasis added.
Emphasis added.
This distinction is important. If MCL 600.2957(2) constituted a relation-back provision, with language explicitly stating that an amendment is to be considered filed on the date of the original complaint, I would be more inclined to agree with the majority's result in this case. If the amended complaint in the federal case adding CMC as a party was treated as relating back to the initial filing date of January 11, 2018, and thus the tolling of the statute of limitations began at that point, it would arguably make little sense to treat the state cause of action against CMC as starting on some other date. MCL 600.2957(2) would provide a specific benefit to the calculation of the statutory limitations period that might carry over to future lawsuits.
But, again, the wording of MCL 600.2957(2) does not affect the date on which the amended complaint should be considered to have been filed. MCL 600.2957(2) simply precluded defendant from asserting its otherwise valid statute-of-limitations defense in the federal lawsuit. Without language providing that the filing date of the amended complaint should be considered the same as the filing date of the original complaint, I see nothing in the statute to create a full relation back that could apply in successive cases. This type of exception to dismissal logically applies only to the cause of action filed in the present case, not future cases.
MCL 600.2957(2) expressly applies in a case in which a party files a motion to add a nonparty to the cause of action. Yet, no such motion was filed in plaintiff's state action and, therefore, MCL 600.2957(2) is inapplicable. A majority of this Court relies on the statute's use of the term "cause of action" to reason that plaintiff brought the same cause of action against CMC in her state court complaint as she did in her amended federal complaint, meaning that MCL 600.2957(2) applies to render the state court complaint timely. But, regardless of how broadly one defines a "cause of action," there is simply no language in MCL 600.2957(2) that alters the date on which the action was deemed timely for statute-of-limitations purposes. Nothing in the plain language of the statute indicates that the statute applies where, as here, a prior added nonparty is named as a defendant in the original complaint in a separate case. MCL 600.2957(2) does not indicate that a second lawsuit can or should be adjudged based on the date that a first lawsuit was filed.
While emphasizing the meaning of "cause of action" as used in MCL 600.2957(2), the majority does not grapple with the Court of Appeals' reasoning that "[t]he phrase 'cause of action' in [the first sentence] . . . does not mean a separate lawsuit, given that leave to file an 'amended pleading' is granted, as opposed to mandating the initiation of an entirely new suit." St Clair, 344 Mich.App. at 434. Nor does the majority consider the Court of Appeals' reasoning that the second sentence of the provision "refers back to the first" by using the language" '[a] cause of action added under this subsection . . . .'" Id. at 435, quoting MCL 600.2957(2). There is a strong argument that the "cause of action" referred to in the second sentence of MCL 600.2957(2) encompasses only one suit. Further, the majority does not consider whether "cause of action," in this context, is more naturally read as an individual suit rather than the theory of liability underlying multiple suits.
In sum, I conclude that MCL 600.2957(2) operates to prevent dismissal where a nonparty is added in the original action but has no impact on the timeliness of a separate, subsequent suit. For these reasons, I would conclude that plaintiff's claim against defendant CMC is time-barred. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals as it relates to CMC. I would deny leave to appeal in all other respects.
Viviano, J., joins the statement of Zahra, J.
Bernstein, J., did not participate because he has a family member with an interest that could be affected by the proceeding.