Opinion
2208005255
08-30-2024
STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff, v. SHAWN N. WILLIAMS, Defendant.
Jeffrey M. Rigby, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State Shawn N. Williams, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution Wilmington, Delaware, pro se. Michael M. Modica, Esquire
Submitted: July 26, 2024
Jeffrey M. Rigby, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State
Shawn N. Williams, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution Wilmington, Delaware, pro se.
Michael M. Modica, Esquire
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT DEFENDANT'S RULE 61 MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF AND MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF SENTENCE SHOULD BE DENIED
Lynne M. Parker, Commissioner
This 30th day of August 2024, upon consideration of Defendant's Rule 61 Motion for Postconviction Relief and Motion for Modification of Sentence, it appears to the Court that:
BACKGROUND, FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Defendant Shawn N. Williams was arrested on August 10, 2022, and charged with Possession of a Firearm by Person Prohibited after having been previously convicted of a violent felony ("PFBPP"), receiving stolen firearm, receiving stolen property (a car), resisting arrest, and a civil marijuana violation.
2. The incident which led to these charges occurred on August 10, 2022. On August 10, 2022, at approximately 11:00 a.m., members of the Safe Streets Task Force responded to 6 Dunning Court, New Castle, Delaware to conduct a home visit for Defendant Williams who was on Level II probation at the time.
D.I. 1- Affidavit of Probable Cause attached as Exhibit B to Justice of Peace Court No. 11 Commitment filed in the Superior Court on August 31, 2022.
3. The police officers saw a black Dodge Charger parked in the driveway of Williams' residence and observed damage consistent with bullet holes and a bullet projectile lodged in the frame of the vehicle. The vehicle had a fictions Tennessee tag on it.
Id.
4. When asked about the vehicle, Williams claimed it belonged to someone else and that he was working on the upholstery in the car for that person. Williams advised that he removed the original tag and placed the fictions Tennessee tag on it to record for Instagram. Williams further claimed he did not have a key to the vehicle, which the officers found to be inconsistent with the claim that he was supposed to be working on the interior of the car.
Id.
5. Williams said the client would bring the keys over when Williams was going to work on it. However, Williams was unable to provide the name of the owner. Williams initially told the police that the car had been driven to his house to be worked on and then changed his answer stating a tow truck dropped off the vehicle.
Id.
6. The officers began to run searches in the databases based on the VIN number when Williams showed signs of nervousness and started to walk away from the vehicle. When Williams was told he was going to be detained he attempted to run away but was apprehended immediately.
Id.
7. During the search incident to his arrest, Williams had the key to the vehicle in his pocket. The vehicle inquiry revealed that the vehicle was stolen out of Howard County, Maryland.
Id.
8. Williams' wallet including his drivers license was found on the driver's seat of the vehicle. Also found in the vehicle was a .45 caliber Glock handgun. The Glock handgun was found to be stolen out of New Castle County, Delaware. Also found were small baggies containing marijuana.
Id.
9. Due to a prior conviction of a violent felony, Williams was a person prohibited from the possession of firearms. If convicted of the PFBPP charge, Williams faced a minimum mandatory five-year prison sentence based upon his prior conviction in 2022 for Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon ("CCDW").
10. After extensive negotiations, the State agreed to offer a plea to Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony ("PFDCF") so that Williams faced a three-year minimum mandatory sentence instead of a five-year minimum mandatory sentence on the PFBPP charge.
11. The parties agreed to seek immediate sentencing and further agreed to jointly recommend that Williams be sentenced to the 3-year minimum mandatory unsuspended prison term, followed by 6 months at Level IV DOC discretion, followed by 1 year at Level III probation.
12. On June 26, 2023, Williams pled guilty to PFDCF. The Court followed the parties' joint sentence recommendation and immediately sentenced Williams to a total of three years unsuspended Level V prison time, followed by 6 months at Level IV DOC discretion, followed by 1 year at Level III probation.
13. Williams did not file a direct appeal.
14. On January 5, 2024, Williams filed the pending Rule 61 Motion for Postconviction Relief.
15. Before ruling on the motion, the record was enlarged, and Williams' trial counsel was directed to submit an Affidavit responding to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Thereafter, the State filed a response to the motion and Williams was permitted to file a reply thereto.
Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(f) and 61(g).
16. On May 21, 2024, Williams filed a motion to amend his Rule 61 motion. The Court granted Williams' motion to amend and allowed Williams to file whatever additional amendments/claims to his pending Rule 61 motion as he so desired. The Court advised Williams that his amendments/new claims as well as any reply to trial counsel's and the State's responses to his pending Rule 61 motion were due by July 26, 2024.
D.I. 26.
Id.
17. Williams did not file any amendments to his pending Rule 61 motion, nor did he file a reply to his trial counsel's and/or the State's responses by July 26, 2024, or at any time thereafter. Instead, on July 25, 2024, Williams filed a motion for modification of sentence.
18. For the reasons detailed below, Williams' Rule 61 motion and motion for modification of sentence should be denied.
THE PLEA WAS KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY
19. Williams contends that his plea was not properly entered into due to the ineffectiveness of his counsel and other irregularities, errors and deficiencies with the plea.
20. Williams' present contentions are directly at odds with the record.
21. A defendant is bound by his answers on the guilty plea form and by his testimony at the plea colloquy in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In the subject action, the Plea Agreement and plea colloquy establish that Williams entered into his guilty plea intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily.
State v. Harden, 1998 WL 735879, *5 (Del.Super.); State v. Stuart, 2008 WL 486858, *3 (Del. Super.).
June 27, 2023 Plea and Sentence Transcript, at pgs. 9- 16; Plea Agreement filed June 27, 2023.
22. The record unequivocally established that Williams entered into his plea voluntarily and that he was not operating under any misapprehension or mistake as to the terms of his plea agreement and/or his legal rights.
23. At the time of the plea, Williams represented that he had reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney, that he understood the terms of the plea agreement, that he understood the consequences of entering into the plea, that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation, and that he understood there was a joint sentence recommendation. Williams' representations to the Court at his plea colloquy are are presumed to be truthful. In fact, Williams expressly represented to the Court that his answers were truthful.
June 27, 2023 Plea and Sentence Transcript, at pgs. 9- 16; Plea Agreement filed June 27, 2023.
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).
June 27, 2023 Plea and Sentence Transcript, at pg. 13.
24. At the plea hearing, Williams further represented that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charge of PFDCF, that nobody made any promises as to what his sentence would be, and that nobody forced or threatened him to enter into the plea. At the plea hearing, Williams admitted that he was guilty of the PFDCF charge.
June 27, 2023 Plea and Sentence Transcript, at pgs. 9-13; Plea Agreement filed June 27, 2023.
June 27, 2023 Plea and Sentence Transcript, at pgs. 15-16.
25. Williams represented to the Court that he was satisfied with his counsel's representation, that his counsel fully advised him of his rights, and that he understood the consequences of entering into his guilty plea.
June 27, 2023 Plea and Sentence Transcript, at pgs. 9-13; Plea Agreement filed June 27, 2023.
26. Williams represented that by entering into his guilty plea he knew he was waiving his right to test the strength of the State's evidence, the right to hear and question witnesses, the right to present evidence in his own defense, and the right to appeal, if convicted.
June 27, 2023 Plea and Sentence Transcript, at pgs. 11- 12; Plea Agreement filed June 27 2023.
27. Following the plea colloquy with Williams, the Court stated: "I find that your plea is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and I will accept it."
June 27, 2023 Plea and Sentence Transcript, at pg. 16.
28. As confirmed by the plea colloquy and Plea Agreement, Williams entered into his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Williams' present contentions to the contrary are without merit.
WILLIAMS' MOTION FOR SENTENCE MODIFICATION
29. In his motion for sentence modification, Williams seeks to have the Level IV portion of his sentence removed.
30. As part of the heavily negotiated plea agreement, the parties agreed to a mutually recommended sentence. The Court followed the joint sentence recommendation of the parties.
31. Williams now seeks to unilaterally change the terms of the mutually agreed upon sentence.
32. Williams cannot contractually agree to a mutual joint sentence recommendation as part of a plea agreement, and then after the plea deal is completed, seek to unilaterally change the terms of that agreement. Williams is contractually obligated and bound by the terms of his plea agreement.
33. The sentence imposed was agreed to by the parties and jointly recommended to the Court. The Court found the mutually recommended sentence to be fair and reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case and imposed the recommended sentence. No extraordinary circumstance exists that would warrant a unilateral deviation from the mutual agreed upon sentence. Williams' motion for a sentence modification is without merit and should be denied.
WILLIAMS' RULE 61 MOTION
34. Williams raises various claims in his Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief. He raises claims of: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) coerced guilty plea; and 3) illegal search and seizure.
35. All of Williams' claims raised herein were waived at the time he freely and voluntarily entered into his guilty plea. In addition, all of these claims are also without merit.
36. Each of Williams' claims will be addressed in turn.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
37. Williams' claims that his plea was impaired due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.
38. Specifically, Williams complains that counsel was ineffective because: 1) counsel incorrectly informed him about statements made to the police by his child's mother and by hastily presenting the plea to him so that counsel could go on vacation; 2) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress to preclude the evidence obtained from the illegal search and seizure of the vehicle; 3) counsel coerced him into entering a plea agreement by failing to inform him of the rights he would be relinquishing and by not showing or discussing discovery with him; and 4) counsel falsely informed him that his child's mother provided incriminating information to the police and that he relied upon this misinformation in entering the plea agreement. Williams also claims that counsel was ineffective when counsel advised Williams that if he refused to sign the plea, he would receive 5 years of imprisonment instead of just 3 years.
39. As previously noted, a defendant is bound by his answers on the guilty plea form and by his testimony at the plea colloquy in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In the subject action, as discussed above, Williams knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered into his plea agreement.
State v. Harden, 1998 WL 735879, *5 (Del.Super.); State v. Stuart, 2008 WL 4868658, *3 (Del.Super. 2008).
40. Williams' valid guilty plea waived his right to challenge any alleged errors, deficiencies or defects occurring prior to the entry of his plea, even those of constitutional proportions
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997); Modjica v. State, 2009 WL 2426675 (Del. 2009); Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2004).
41. All of Williams' ineffective assistance of counsel claims involve allegations of deficiencies, shortcomings and errors prior to the entry of the plea. All of these claims were waived at the time Williams validly entered into his plea.
42. Moreover, in addition to having waived these claims, they are also without merit.
43. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must meet the two-pronged Strickland test by showing that: (1) counsel performed at a level "below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that, (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. The first prong requires the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that defense counsel was not reasonably competent, while the second prong requires him to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for defense counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984).
Id. at 687-88, 694.
44. In the context of a plea challenge, it is not sufficient for the defendant to simply claim that his counsel was deficient. The defendant must also establish that counsel's actions were so prejudicial that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficiencies, the defendant would not have taken a plea but would have insisted on going to trial. The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the defendant. Mere allegations of ineffectiveness will not suffice; instead, a defendant must make and substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997); Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733, 739-744 (2011).
Oliver v. State, 2001 WL 1751246 (Del.).
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990).
45. The United States Supreme Court has reiterated the high bar that must be surmounted to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The United States Supreme Court cautioned that in reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context of a plea bargain, the court must be mindful of the fact that "[p]lea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused with uncertainty, and defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices in balancing opportunities and risks."
Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733, 739-744 (2011).
Id., at pg. 741.
46. In the subject case, the evidence against Williams was overwhelming. Defense counsel recognized that "it was almost a certainty [Williams] would be convicted of all of the charges." If convicted of the PFBPP charge, which seemed to be a certainty, Williams was facing a 5-year minimum mandatory prison term due to his prior CCDW conviction.
D.I. 20-Affidavit of Defense Counsel, at pgs. 4-5.
Id.
47. Throughout the ongoing plea negotiations, the plea offer was always to the PFBPP charge with a 5-year minimum mandatory sentence recommendation. After extensive negotiations, the State finally agreed to offer a plea to PFDCF so that Williams faced a 3-year minimum mandatory prison sentence instead of the 5-year minimum mandatory sentence.
D.I. 20-Affidavit of Defense Counsel, at pgs. 4-6, Exhibit B (detailing plea negotiations).
48. Williams' acceptance of the plea represented a prudent choice given the pending charges, the evidence against him, and the possible sentences he was facing if convicted at trial.
49. Before delving into Williams' specific ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it is noted at the onset that it is hard to envision how trial counsel's representation of Williams could be deemed deficient in any respect given the ultimate result achieved in light of the facts and circumstances presented herein.
Decision to Accept the Plea Agreement
50. Williams claims that counsel was ineffective due to counsel's advice that if he refused to accept the plea, he would receive 5 years of imprisonment instead of just 3 years.
51. Defense counsel was not ineffective in any regard by advising Williams that if he refused to accept the plea offer he would, in all likelihood, receive a 5-year minimum mandatory prison sentence instead of the 3-year minimum mandatory prison sentence being offered. Defense counsel was accurately communicating the likely outcome if the plea offer was not accepted.
52. Defense counsel recognizing the strength of the State's evidence and urging Williams to accept the plea was exactly the counseling that defense counsel should have been doing. Defense counsel encouraging Williams to take the plea was sound advice and was not deficient or ineffective in any respect. Defense counsel was not ineffective by realistically conveying to Williams the likely outcome if he declined to take the plea and proceed to trial.
53. This claim is without merit.
Hastily Presenting the Plea
54. Williams claims that counsel was ineffective by hastily presenting the plea to him so that counsel could go on vacation.
55. As counsel explains, his vacation schedule had nothing to do with the need to make a quick decision regarding the plea offer. The plea offer to PFDCF with a 3-year minimum mandatory sentence (instead of the 5-year minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP) was only open for one day as per the terms of the offer by the State.
D.I. 20-Affidavit of Defense Counsel, at pgs. 4-6.
56. Indeed, the email exchange between the parties confirms that the State's plea offer was made on June 20, 2023 and was only open for one day, until June 21, 2023.
D.I. 20-Affidavit of Defense Counsel, Exhibit B (email exchange between State and Defense Counsel on June 20, 2023).
57. The prosecutor explained that he would not provide any better plea that the one being offered. The Prosecutor explained that he had already allowed Williams to plead to CCDW in 2022 rather than seeking the conviction of PFDCF at that time. "I will come down for 1 day only on the PFBPP". The Prosecutor stated: "3 years instead of 5 years. This is as good as it is going to get." The Prosecutor noted that as to this pending case, Williams was found to be in possession of a stolen car that had a bullet hole in it, after he had already just been given a break as to his recent 2022 CCDW conviction.
Id.
Id.
Id.
58. The plea offer was accepted on June 21, 2023, within the one-day window, and the plea was entered by the Court on June 27, 2023.
D.I. 20-Affidavit of Defense Counsel, at pgs. 4-6.
59. Defense counsel's vacation schedule had nothing to do with the need for Williams to make a quick decision regarding the plea offer. This claim of ineffective assistance is without merit.
Claims of Coerced/Uninformed Guilty Plea
60. Williams claims that his guilty plea was coerced because his trial counsel falsely informed him that the mother of his child had provided a statement to the police that would be used at trial to convict him. Williams contends this false information directly led to Defendant entering into a plea agreement rather than going to trial. Williams further contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of the rights he would be relinquishing by entering into the plea, and by not showing or discussing discovery with him.
61. In addition to having waived these claims at the time he entered into his plea,these claims are also without merit.
See, Mills v. State, 2016 WL 97494, at *3 (Del.); Day v. State, 2011 WL 3617797 (Del.) (voluntary guilty plea waives any claims of error occurring prior to the entry of the plea); Hickman v. State, 1994 WL 590495 (Del.).
62. Williams' present contentions are belied by the record in this case. The record reflects that the Court conducted a thorough plea colloquy to determine that Williams' decision to plead guilty was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The record unequivocally established that Williams entered into his plea voluntarily and that he was not operating under any misapprehension or mistake as to his legal rights.
63. At the plea colloquy, Williams represented that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charge of PFDCF. Williams represented that he had an opportunity to discuss the matter fully with his counsel, that he knew he was waiving his constitutional trial rights, and that he knew the consequences of entering into his plea
June 27, 2023 Plea and Sentencing Transcript, at pg. 9-16.
64. Williams represented that by entering into his guilty plea he knew he was waiving his right to test the strength of the State's evidence, the right to hear and question witnesses, the right to present evidence in his own defense, and the right to appeal, if convicted.
June 27, 2023 Plea and Sentence Transcript, at pgs. 11- 12; Plea Agreement filed June 27, 2023.
65. Williams represented that nobody forced him into entering the plea. That he was satisfied with his lawyer's representation of him and that his lawyer fully advised him of his rights.
66. Williams further represented that all his answers were truthful.
June 27, 2023 Plea and Sentence Transcript, at pg. 9-16.
67. Likewise, defense counsel advises that he did show and discuss the discovery obtained from the State with Williams. They reviewed the Affidavit of Probable Cause, which included the statements made by the child's mother, the police report, as well as the police video showing Williams attempting to flee from the police
D.I. 20-Affidavit of Defense Counsel, at pgs. 5-6.
68. Contrary to Williams' present contention, trial counsel did not "falsely inform" Williams that statements were made by the mother of Williams' child. The statements were made and were contained in the Affidavit of Probable Cause. These statements, along with the State's other evidence, were all discussed with Williams, prior to his decision to enter into the plea.
D.I. 20-Affidavit of Defense Counsel, at pgs. 5-8 & Exhibit A (Affidavit of Probable Cause).
69. Moreover, the State's case was not based on the statements of the mother of Williams' child. The State's case was based on the lawful search of the stolen vehicle in which a gun was found. The totality of the circumstances linked the gun to Williams (ie. the key to the vehicle was in his pocket, his wallet was found inside the vehicle, etc.). Even if the statements by the mother of Williams' child were eliminated completely, the strength of the State's case remained the same and remained overwhelming
D.I. 20-Affidavit of Defense Counsel, at pgs. 5-8.
70. Williams fails to establish how counsel's representation was deficient in any regard or that he was somehow prejudiced as a result thereof. The record is devoid of any evidence to support Williams' present contention that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered.
71. Williams failed to make any concrete allegation of deficient conduct, let alone, deficient conduct that resulted in actual prejudice. Williams' unsubstantiated ineffective assistance of counsel claims were waived at the time of the plea and are without merit.
Claim of Illegal Search and Seizure
72. Williams' final claim is that the search and seizure by law enforcement of the vehicle was somehow unlawful, and that counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress the gun found as a result thereof.
73. These claims were waived at the time of the plea, and are also without merit.
See, Mills v. State, 2016 WL 97494, at *3 (Del.); Day v. State, 2011 WL 3617797 (Del.)(claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion was waived when defendant voluntarily entered into his guilty plea).
74. As discussed above, Williams waived these claims at the time of the plea. He could have elected to proceed to trial thereby preserving the right to test the State's case and preserving the right to raise any defenses that may have existed but if he elected to do so he would then have been exposed to substantially more prison time if convicted. Instead, he chose to waive those rights and accept the plea offer. Williams' plea represented a prudent choice given the evidence against him and the possible sentences he was facing if convicted at trial.
75. These claims are also without merit. As defense counsel explains, there was no legal basis to file a motion to suppress.
D.I. 20-Affidavit of Defense Counsel, at pgs. 6-7.
76. Williams contends that because he was not the owner of the vehicle, and was not in it or driving it, and claimed to have no association with the vehicle, then the search of the vehicle was illegal. Williams does not appear to understand that if he had no association with the vehicle then he had no standing to object to the legality of the search of the vehicle.
77. The search of the vehicle was performed pursuant to the approval of an administrative search by the probation officer's supervisor. Even if the administrative search was not valid, the stolen status of the vehicle provided an independent basis for the legal search. Williams did not have an expectation of privacy for the stolen vehicle, so he had no standing to contest the search. Alternatively, the stolen vehicle would have been towed by the police and subject to an inventory search which would have led to the inevitable discovery of the contents of the vehicle.
D.I. 20-Affidavit of Defense Counsel, at pgs. 6-7.
78. Williams' trial counsel advises that he did not file a motion to suppress the evidence in the case because he did not see any basis to do so.
D.I. 20- Affidavit of Defense Counsel, at pgs. 6-7.
79. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the failure to object to evidence is without merit if trial counsel lacked a legal or factual basis to object to the evidence.
State v. Exum, 2002 WL 100576, at *2 (Del.Super.), affirmed, 2002 WL 2017230, at *1 (Del.).
80. There was no good faith legal basis to contest the search of the stolen vehicle. Williams has failed to make any concrete allegations of deficient conduct, let alone deficient conduct that resulted in actual prejudice. These claims were waived at the time of the plea and are without merit.
CONCLUSION
81. Following a careful review of the record, and for the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that the claims raised in Williams' Rule 61 Motion for Postconviction Relief and Motion for Modification of Sentence were waived at the time he entered into his valid plea and are also without merit. Williams' pending postconviction motions should be DENIED.