Opinion
ID No. 0606006590.
Submitted: August 26, 2008.
Decided: October 7, 2008.
On Defendant Gary L. Stuart's Motion for Postconviction Relief. DENIED.
Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel. DENIED.
Defendant's Motion for Transcript. DENIED AS MOOT.
Gary L. Stuart, Pro Se.
ORDER
1. On April 9, 2007, Gary L. Stuart ("Stuart") pled guilty to Murder Second Degree. He was sentenced to 50 years of Level V incarceration, followed by 6 months at Level III, with a 15-year mandatory term.
2. On July 26, 2007, Stuart filed a Motion for Modification of Sentence which was denied. On June 2, 2008, Stuart filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Because it appears Stuart did not intend for the Motion for Modification of Sentence to be a comprehensive postconviction relief motion, this Court will review the Rule 61 motion.
3. Stuart asserts two instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, he claims that his attorney "denied him all access to the evidence against him and refused to provide him an adequate evaluation of the evidence that would allow him to make a valid and knowledgeable assessment of how to proceed in his criminal case." Second, he claims the 50-year Level V sentence is greater than the 20-year sentence "promised" to him by counsel if he pled guilty.
4. In evaluating a postconviction relief motion, the Court must first ascertain if any procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 apply. If a procedural bar is found to exist, the Court should refrain from considering the merits of the individual claims. This Court will not address claims for postconviction relief that are conclusory and unsubstantiated.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 555.
5. Pursuant to Rule 61(a), a motion for postconviction relief must be based on "a sufficient factual and legal basis." According to Rule 61(i)(1), a postconviction relief motion may not be filed more than a year after judgment of conviction is final or one year after a newly-discovered, retroactively-applicable right is recognized by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court. Pursuant to Rule 61(b)(2), "the motion shall specify all the grounds for relief which are available to movant . . . and shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified."
6. Any ground for relief not asserted in a prior postconviction relief motion is thereafter barred unless consideration of the claim is necessary in the interest of justice. Grounds for relief not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction are thereafter barred, unless the movant demonstrates: (1) cause for the procedural default; and (2) prejudice from violation of movant's rights. Any formerly-adjudicated ground for relief, whether in a proceeding leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, or in a postconviction proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice. This motion was timely filed within one year after Stuart's final judgment of conviction.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
7. To prevail on a postconviction relief claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant is required to show that: (1) counsel's errors were so grievous that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The defendant must satisfy the proof requirements of both prongs in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Failure to do so as to one prong will render the claim unsuccessful, and the Court need not address the remaining prong. To show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, the defendant bears a heavy burden. He must overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's representation was professionally reasonable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).
Id. at 697.
Id. at 689.
8. The Court will address the second prong of prejudice first as it is apparent that Stuart was not prejudiced by his counsel's actions even if they were deficient. Stuart asserts he was forced to plead guilty because of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, Stuart's actions prior to entering a guilty plea negate this claim. First, Stuart executed a "Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form" ("TIS Form") which indicated that Stuart "freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in [the] written plea agreement." The TIS Form indicates that Murder Second Degree carries a minimum mandatory penalty of 15 years of incarceration and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Stuart also indicated on the TIS Form that he was "satisfied with his lawyer's representation" and was fully advised of his rights by his attorney.
9. Second, the Court conducted a plea colloquy prior to accepting the plea to ensure that the plea was voluntary, knowing and intelligent.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Stuart, I have in front of me today a plea agreement and a truth-in-sentencing guilty plea form. Have you read these documents?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: And I see that you have completed the 12th grade, so did you read them yourself?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.
THE COURT: Have you discussed these documents with Mr. Figliola and Mr. Letang?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with their representation of you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.
THE COURT: Within the last 24 hours have you taken any drugs or alcohol?
THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you taking any prescription medication?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Have you been prescribed any prescription medication which you are not taking?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: How do you feel today? Could you describe to me in terms of how you feel that you're understanding what's going on?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I don't feel too good. But, I mean, I understand what happened, and I just want to be able to go home one day and put this behind me.
THE COURT: Do you feel that your attorneys have adequately explained what's happening today to you?
THE DEFENDANT: Very much.
THE COURT: Do you understand that at the time of sentencing the Court could sentence you up to life in prison and that there is a minimum mandatory penalty of 15 years?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Now, as a convicted felon, you should be aware that you've lost your right to vote, to be a juror, and to hold public office. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: And do you understand that you never again can own or possess a deadly weapon, or a firearm, or ammunition?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Did you on or about August 20th 2006, in New Castle County, Delaware, recklessly cause the death of Stephen F. Pytko under circumstances which manifested a cruel, wicked, and depraved indifference to human life?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: How do you plead?
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
THE COURT: The Court finds the plea to be knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and accepts the plea. The Court also notes for the record that Mr. Stuart appears to be very alert. He appears to be communicating well with his counsel and does appear to the Court to be fully aware of the plea that he has just made.
10. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Stuart is bound by his answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and by his testimony prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea. Stuart has failed to proffer any facts to refute the Court's previous finding that Stuart entered a guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Any regret or second-guessing of his decision to plead is not sufficient grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Savage v. State, 815 A.2d 349, 349 (Del. 2003) (citing Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).
11. A defendant who voluntarily enters a plea of guilty waives his right to present evidence in his defense at a trial and to attack any alleged defects that preceded the entry of his guilty plea. Because of the valid guilty plea, Stuart's claims of discovery violations, incomplete investigations, and defects in the charging document are matters that may not be challenged.
Amaro v. State, 829 A.2d 935, 935 (Del. 2003) ( citing Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 311-12 (Del. 1988).
12. The Court engaged defendant in a detailed plea colloquy. Two defense counsel stated that they were convinced that defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The sentence imposed was well within Truth-in-Sentencing guidelines. Defendant clearly was aware that his sentence could have been life in prison.
13. Stuart has failed to demonstrate that his extremely competent and experienced counsel made any errors, let alone grievous errors that probably would have resulted in a different outcome. THEREFORE, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is hereby DENIED. For the same reasons, Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel is hereby DENIED. Defendant's Motion for Transcript is hereby DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.