Opinion
No. 30702-2-II.
Filed: June 2, 2004. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Clark County. Docket No: 03-8-00351-0. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 07/23/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Diane M Woolard.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Anne Mowry Cruser, Attorney at Law, PO Box 1670, Kalama, WA 98625.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Ricky W. Olson, Attorney at Law, 500 W 11th St, PO Box 5000, Vancouver, WA 98666-5000.
Adrian James Warith appeals an order revoking his Chemical Dependency Disposition Alternative (CDDA) imposed following his adjudication of unlawful possession of methamphetamine. He argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion because (1) it relied on probation violations for which he had already received sanctions; and (2) the circumstances leading to his lack of treatment progress mandated sanctions, not revocation. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Facts
On April 30, 2003, Warith pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. On May 16, 2003, the juvenile court granted Warith a CDDA disposition. Under the CDDA disposition, (1) Warith had to attend inpatient treatment every Friday from the date of sentencing and visit his probation officer other day of each week; and (2) after his 18th birthday, June 20, 2003, Warith had three required weekly appointments.
On July 16, 2003, the State filed a motion to revoke the CDDA disposition. At the July 23, 2003 hearing, the State recited two grounds for revocation: (1) Warith's probation violations under a different cause number; and (2) Warith's failure to make satisfactory treatment progress.
In support of the first ground, the prosecutor asked the court to take judicial notice of the other probation violations (R095 and R100) and to find, as a matter of law, that they satisfied RCW 13.40.165 for purposes of the CDDA revocation.
In support of the second ground, Karen Lucas, Warith's probation counselor, testified that (1) she monitored his program attendance; (2) she provided him with bus passes for transportation; (3) between May 16 and the July 23 hearing, Warith attended only one group treatment (on July 11) and had missed multiple appointments with her; and (4) Warith would have begun inpatient treatment in June if he had attended the required meetings and returned the necessary paperwork to her. Lucas acknowledged that Warith had difficulty attending treatment because of transportation problems, and that because he had turned 18, she had to start his inpatient treatment process anew. Because he was incarcerated, Warith could not attend the regular pre-bed appointments prerequisite to inpatient treatment.
The juvenile court ruled that (1) the statute allows sanctions or revocation for each adjudication; (2) Warith's probation violations justified revocation; and (3) Warith had made no progress, had not cooperated, and had not taken any of the steps necessary for treatment. The juvenile court revoked Warith's CDDA disposition and imposed the agreed sentence of 15 to 36 weeks.
II. ANALYSIS A. Revocation Standard
Just as the juvenile court has authority to impose a CDDA under RCW 13.40.165(1), it also has authority to revoke it. RCW 13.40.165(6) prescribes two grounds for revocation:
If the offender violates any condition of the disposition or the court finds that the respondent is failing to make satisfactory progress in treatment, the court may impose sanctions pursuant to RCW 13.40.200 or revoke the suspension and order execution of the disposition. The court shall give credit for any confinement time previously served if that confinement was for the offense for which the suspension is being revoked.
(Emphasis added.) We review a trial court's revocation decision for abuse of discretion. State v. Crabtree, 116 Wn. App. 536, 545-46, 66 P.3d 695 (2003) (CDDA manifest injustice disposition reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
B. Probation Violations
Warith first argues that the trial court erred in using his probation violations in another cause number as a basis for revoking his CDDA for his current unlawful meth possession offense. He acknowledges that no published authority prohibits using probation violations as a basis for revocation, but he argues that the Legislature is `very leery of juveniles being sanctioned for the same conduct more than once.' Br. of Appellant at 7.
See State v. Tran, 117 Wn. App. 126, 131, 69 P.3d 884 (2003) (`RCW 13.40.070(3) prohibits the State from filing both a motion to modify a juvenile's community supervision and a criminal charge based on the same criminal offense.') (adopting rationale of State v. Murrin, 85 Wn. App. 754, 756, 934 P.2d 728 (1997)); State v. J.J., 96 Wn. App. 452, 456, 980 P.2d 262 (1999) (`[W]hen a juvenile on community supervision as a condition of a deferred disposition commits a new crime, the State is not required to elect between moving to revoke the deferred disposition and charging the juvenile with the new crime.'), review denied, 139 Wn.2d 1017 (2000).
He argues that (1) because he was already sanctioned for the same probation violations in the other cause number, the court could not use them as a basis for revocation in the current case; (2) it was especially inappropriate to consider his having missed a required treatment appointment, which was relevant to his treatment progress, not his probation progress; and (3) the juvenile court's reliance on this factor, in light of the Legislature's express requirement that juvenile courts consider CDDA dispositions, was an abuse of discretion because the record does not show he failed to make treatment progress. See RCW 13.40.165(1). These arguments fail.
Warith violated the treatment condition of his CDDA for this current offense. RCW 13.40.165(6) allows revocation on this basis alone. That this conduct also violated his probation conditions for other cause numbers is irrelevant. Unlike the cases cited in n. 1, the State did not also file criminal charges for these violations. Warith having violated his community supervision conditions, the juvenile court could either impose sanctions or revoke the CDDA. The juvenile court's choice to revoke was within its discretion.
C. Lack of Treatment
Warith argues that the juvenile court should have exercised its discretion to impose sanctions and allowed him to obtain treatment because (1) the Legislature expressly favors treatment for chemically dependent juveniles; (2) he had significant transportation problems that thwarted his treatment attendance; (3) he needed to be reevaluated once he turned 18; (4) characterizing missed treatments as a probation violation was error because these deficiencies were really a treatment-progress issue; and (5) in light of his willingness to obtain treatment, the court should have imposed sanctions instead of revoking his CDDA. Again, we find no abuse of trial court discretion.
Warith attended only one required session in a two-month period. His treatment was not progressing or even on-going. The trial court explained that revocation was appropriate because Warith's actions showed that he was not going to make treatment progress until he was ready, he was not ready, and allowing him to continue with a CDDA would simply allow him to manipulate the system further when there was little or no chance of success.
The record supports the trial court's assessment: Warith made little effort to succeed and presented no evidence showing that the circumstances prevented his success or that he tried to work out a solution with his probation counselor. Rather, the record shows that Warith's failure to make treatment progress was self-inflicted. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in revoking Warith's CDDA.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
ARMSTRONG, P.J., and ELLINGTON, J.P.T., Concur.