Opinion
A17-1741
05-29-2018
State of Minnesota, ex rel, Robert Young, petitioner, Appellant, v. Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections, Respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Bradley Simon, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). Affirmed
Randall, Judge Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-17-3621 Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Bradley Simon, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent) Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Randall, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RANDALL, Judge
On appeal from the district court's order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from prison, appellant argues that the Department of Corrections (DOC) violated state law by revoking his release, that the revocation violated his substantive due process rights, and that the revocation violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to benefits, services, programs, and activities. Appellant was released from prison subsequent to filing this appeal. We conclude that Young's appeal is now moot. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2012, a district court convicted appellant Robert Young of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. In January 2014, the district court committed Young to the Commissioner of Corrections, under the Minnesota DOC, for 32 months, with credit for 392 days, and 10 years conditional release after confinement. Young completed his prison sentence and supervised release, and is now serving his 10-year conditional release, which will expire in 2025.
In May 2016, the DOC released Young to Alpha House, a residential program for sex-offender treatment. One month later, the program terminated Young from treatment "due to the frequency of his seizures and the medical attention required." Upon termination, the DOC revoked Young's release and re-incarcerated him. For a short time, Young resided at 180 Degrees, a halfway house, but he did not complete the program. In July 2016, the DOC's Hearings and Release Unit (HRU) held a revocation hearing. The hearing officer revoked Young's release. Young was again imprisoned until the HRU officer released Young to 180 Degrees in August 2016.
In September 2016, 180 Degrees terminated Young as a client. The manager at 180 Degrees wrote that Young's "health was a huge barrier that prevented him from success." (emphasis added). A subsequent revocation hearing was held. In his HRU report, the case manager recommended revoking Young's release until he could be placed in a facility "that can address his mental health and medical needs." (emphasis added). The HRU hearing officer revoked Young's supervised release for 90 days or less because Young committed acts requiring discipline while incarcerated, and Young "failed to complete residential program and/or aftercare as directed by agent/designee."
In December 2016, the HRU held another review hearing to extend the projected release date. The case manager reported that neither 180 Degrees nor Damascus Way programs could take Young because of the extent of his medical needs. The release attorney explained that the two largest obstacles for Young are his medical issues, including seizures, and his status as a level 3 predatory offender. The HRU hearing officer extended Young's incarceration by 90 days or less for "accountability" and "to assist in release planning."
"Incarceration" is defined as "[t]he act or process as confining someone." Black's Law Dictionary 878 (10th ed. 2004). Here, the DOC sent Young back to prison.
Young appealed the decision of the HRU hearing officer. The Executive Officer of the HRU denied it, explaining that Young's release was revoked "because he did not have adequate housing to address his multifaceted needs for mental and medical health in addition to being a level 3 sex offender on ISR supervision. [Young] was not revoked because he had epilepsy."
Young had another review hearing in March 2017. The HRU hearing officer extended the release date by 90 days or less because Young did not have an agent-approved release plan with a suitable residence that would provide services for his medical and mental health needs. The HRU hearing officer encouraged the parties involved to seek "all viable release opportunities."
Young appealed the decision of the HRU hearing officer. The Executive Officer again denied the appeal, explaining that the release review process exists "to monitor progress on the development of a release plan or completion of treatment directives and to determine whether the projected release date needs to be extended."
On July 21, 2017, Young filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that the Commissioner of Corrections denied his liberty interest in serving his conditional release term in the community, that administrative rules prohibit the DOC from incarcerating Young indefinitely because the DOC "must approve an alternative program with workable conditions of release," and that the extended release period violated the ADA, Minnesota law, and his substantive due process rights.
The district court denied Young's habeas petition. The district court concluded that Minnesota law authorized the DOC's decision to return Young to jail while on supervised release because Young did not obtain an agent-approved residence. Lack of agent-approved housing was the result of his medical and mental health issues, and his level 3 sex offender status precludes him from many of the residences and programs that are available. The district court clarified that the revocation of release was not a result of Young's medical condition, and noted that Young can only be released to a residence that can address his medical and mental health needs. The state argued, and the district court found, that there was no violation of the ADA because Young was not precluded from any program or benefit offered directly by the prison. The ADA is a real issue. But we do not need to address it at this time because of our finding that Young's appeal is moot.
This is the reoccurring issue on supervised release. Releasees get pulled back into prison, not for committing crimes, but because nobody wants to rent to them, or because municipalities enact laws to prevent them from finding a residence.
These claims are brought in civil suits either in federal court under the ADA or in state court under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). See generally Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 857-59 (8th Cir. 1999) (analyzing ADA claim separately from Missouri state law claim); Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 543-44 (Minn. 2001) (concluding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding appellant's reasonable-accommodation claim for her employer's failure to accommodate her fibromyalgia). Pursuing a habeas petition then is not the appropriate vehicle for Young to challenge his treatment or seek an accommodation.
Young filed this appeal in November 2017. At oral argument on March 8, 2018, both parties agreed that on December 18, 2017, Young was placed on intensive supervised release (ISR) and has remained in the community since that time.
DECISION
"A person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty . . . may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from imprisonment or restraint." Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2016). "[T]he function of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve one from unlawful restraint." State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). A writ of habeas corpus may also be used to challenge conditions of confinement or to raise claims involving fundamental constitutional rights or significant restraints on liberty. Guth v. Fabian, 716 N.W.2d 23, 26-27 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2006). The petitioner bears the burden of proving unlawful detention. Bedell v. Roy, 853 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Minn. App. 2014). A district court's findings on a denial of a habeas petition "are entitled to great weight." Aziz v. Fabian, 791 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. App. 2010). We review the district court's findings to determine whether "they are reasonably supported by the evidence," and we review questions of law de novo. Guth, 716 N.W.2d at 26.
I. Young's appeal is moot.
An action "should be dismissed as moot when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible." Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015). We will not dismiss a claim as moot if the claim is likely to reoccur but might evade review, or if the case is considered "functionally justiciable" and "of statewide significance." Id. at 6 (quotation omitted). When an issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," the aggrieved party must show that "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 349 (1975). We will resolve the case if it is "functionally justiciable" and is an important public issue "of statewide significance that should be decided immediately." State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Minn. 2000) (quotations omitted).
Young filed a habeas petition seeking immediate release. After filing his petition, he was released on December 18, 2017. That made his requested relief—release from prison—moot. See Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 5; Limmer v. Swanson, 806 N.W.2d 838, 839 (Minn. 2011). We have no need to provide relief on Young's habeas corpus petition. The only relief we can provide on habeas corpus is release. He received it.
Unfortunately, this issue is capable of repetition and does not evade review! See, e.g., State ex rel. Sather v. Roy, A16-2064, 2017 WL 2920361, at *2 n.2 (Minn. App. July 10, 2017) (addressing Sather's habeas petition despite being released from prison on ISR); Manska v. Fabian, A08-0025, 2008 WL 5215954, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Dec. 16, 2008) (applying the collateral consequences exception to mootness to address the merits of Manska's appeal despite having been released from custody and placed on supervised release); Johnson v. Fabian, A07-2132, 2008 WL 3290669, at *2 n.2 (Minn. App. Aug. 12, 2008) (acknowledging the inability to "grant the relief typically given to a successful habeas petitioner" but finding collateral consequences and concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Johnson's habeas petition). Unless there are changes in the law, this parade of appeals will continue.
District court and appellate court records show that this is an ongoing problem.
II. If Young had not been released from prison, Marlowe would apply.
In this appeal, Young argues that his prior ongoing detention violates Minnesota law and administrative rules. He contends that his detention violates the purpose of conditional release, which is to assist an inmate to transition into the community. He also argues that the condition requiring him to obtain agent-approved housing is unworkable given his epilepsy.
Minnesota statutes require that a person convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 309.344 (2012) is to serve a 10-year conditional-release term. Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2016). Due to the nature of the offense, an inmate may be required to serve his conditional release on ISR for the duration of the release term. Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 6 (2016).
The commissioner may impose conditions on the release of an inmate, Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 6(b), from successful completion of treatment and aftercare in a program to those that "the commissioner considers appropriate," Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 8(b). The commissioner has "broad discretion" in making conditional release decisions, including the imposition of release conditions. State v. Schwartz, 628 N.W.2d 134, 142 n.4 (Minn. 2001). Conditions of release are "based on the need for public safety," Minn. R. 2940.1900, but balance the purpose of assisting former inmates to assimilate "into society during a potentially difficult period of transition," Miller v. State, 714 N.W.2d 745, 748 (Minn. App. 2006). When the inmate violates those conditions, the commissioner is authorized to revoke the release and reimprison the inmate for an "appropriate period of time," Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 3, which may be either a part or all of the remaining portion of the conditional release term, Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 8(c). But if the release conditions are unworkable, such as having "no suitable residence . . . in [the offender's] county of commit," then the DOC must restructure the conditions of supervised release. State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792, 796-97 (Minn. App. 2008) (emphasis added).
In Marlowe, this court determined that the denial of Marlowe's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was an abuse of discretion because it extended Marlowe's incarceration after he reached his supervised-release date. Id. at 793. Marlowe was a level 3 sex offender who served his prison sentence and was released on ISR. Id. Because he could not secure agent-approved housing, Marlowe's release was revoked. Id. At the review hearing, Marlowe's agent explained "the difficulty of finding a suitable residence for a sex offender placed on ISR in Washington County." Id. Although the HRU officer wanted to release Marlowe to a correctional facility in another county, he found that Marlowe violated the so-called "no housing" term of his release and revoked it. Id. at 794.
This is part and parcel of the earlier-mentioned reoccurring issue, and the problem in resolving that issue.
Marlowe appealed the denial of his habeas petition, arguing that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest due to a violation of an impossible condition. Id. This court noted that "the DOC's own policies and rules point out that it has an obligation to assist an offender in finding residential placement," and stated that "there is a key difference between Marlowe's imprisonment for the underlying offense and the confinement that he is currently experiencing; namely, if he can find an approved residence, he will be released." Id. at 795. This court reversed and remanded, recommending that the DOC restructure the conditions of supervised release because "a suitable residential placement [was] available in a neighboring county." Id. at 796-97.
Here, the HRU officer repeatedly revoked Young's release because he violated a condition of his release—maintaining agent-approved housing. Multiple residences terminated Young as a client because "they are not able to deal with his seizures and they interfere with his treatment. They are willing to take him back if he can get his seizures under control." But Young suffers from epilepsy, a medical condition generating frequent seizures beyond his control. Young's medical condition cannot be the basis for a violation. Because Young suffers frequent seizures that require hospitalization, the conditions of his supervised release must be modified, such as to allow for admission to an inpatient institution for medical treatment. Except for our ruling on mootness, this case is controlled by Marlowe. The commissioner's process of determining release conditions and releasing offenders on ISR to serve the remainder of their sentences is hampered by the informal policy of giving local communities almost a de facto veto in the community. We believe that both the DOC and the Youngs to follow are entitled to legislative relief and common-sense guidance.
Same as footnote 3.
As evident by Young's case, the community, not the DOC, most controls the return to prison of individuals simply by refusing to allow housing.
Young's habeas petition is moot. He has been released.
Affirmed.