Opinion
No. CV-08-5018798S
September 8, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE (#108)
This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on May 3, 2006 when the plaintiff Elizabeth Speed's vehicle was allegedly struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant Christopher M. Pryde (Pryde). Originally, a two-count complaint was filed, alleging negligence with respect to injuries sustained by Speed and her passenger, the plaintiff Elizabeth Criscuolo. On April 25, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a revised complaint alleging recklessness in the second and fourth counts and seeking statutory damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. On May 9, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to strike the second and fourth counts claiming the allegations of the complaint were insufficient to state a cause of action for recklessness.
The summons identifies the defendant as "Christopher M. Pyrde" although the complaint and the other pleadings identify him as "Christopher M. Pryde." Thus, although the court's file is captioned " Speed v. Pyrde," the defendant will be identified as Pryde in this decision.
There is no doubt that the cause of action of statutory recklessness is entirely distinct from a cause of action for negligence, see Bicio v. Brewer, 92 Conn.App. 158, 170, 884 A.2d 12 (2005), and that the factual findings of a jury must make to award punitive damages are different from those upon which a compensatory damage award is based. See Harewood v. Carter, 63 Conn.App. 199, 206-07, 772 A.2d 764 (2001). In Hopwood v. Sciarretta, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. 0075934 (July 9, 2002, Lager, J.), this court noted the split in authority within the Superior Court with respect to the degree of specificity required to plead statutory recklessness under § 14-295. However, in this court's opinion, there were a number of Supreme Court decisions addressing the pleading and proof requirements of the predecessors to § 14-295 that led to only one conclusion:
This court discussed the following opinions: Hotchkiss v. Hoy, 41 Conn. 568 (1874); Broschart v. Tuttle, 59 Conn. 1, 21 A. 925 (1890); Stevens v. Kelley, 66 Conn. 570, 34 A. 502, (1895); Tillinghast v. Leppert, 93 Conn. 247, 105 A. 615 (1919); Leone v. Knighton, 196 Conn. 494, 493 A.2d 887 (1985).
Merely alleging a deliberate or reckless violation of one of the predicate statutes does not suffice to describe the conduct which would entitle a plaintiff to the extraordinary remedy available under § 14-295. To state a cause of action under § 14-295, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts establishing that the predicate statute was violated with the requisite mental state, that is, deliberately or with reckless disregard, and that such violation was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injury.
The court must examine the allegations of the revised complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See e.g., Bhinder v. SunCo., 263 Conn. 358, 366, 819 A.2d 822 (2003). The revised complaint is spare. It alleges that on May 3, 2006 Speed and Pryde were operating their vehicles northbound on Campbell Avenue in West Haven, Connecticut when the Pryde vehicle "entered in the plaintiff's lane of travel . . . striking the plaintiff's vehicle." (First Count, ¶¶ 1-3 incorporated into the Second and Fourth Counts.) It further alleges that "Pyrde (sic) deliberately or with reckless disregard operated said vehicle in violation of . . . Section 14-218a(a) . . . in operating said vehicle at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable having regard to the width, traffic, use of the highway and intersection of streets . . . Section 14-222(a) . . . in operating said vehicle in a reckless and dangerous manner having regard to the width, traffic, use of the highway and intersection of streets . . . Section 14-224(b) . . . in that he evaded responsibility in operation of motor vehicles." (Second Count, Fourth Count ¶ 4.)
The last allegation provides no basis for a claim of statutory recklessness because § 14-224(b) is not one of the predicate statutes enumerated in § 14-295. As to the allegation of statutory recklessness under General Statutes § 14-222, that section requires allegations of conduct that "indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action . . . conduct [that] tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." (Internal quotation marks omitted; internal citation omitted.) Bolmer v. McKulsky, 74 Conn.App. 499, 503-04, 812 A.2d 869, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 954, 818 A.2d 780 (2003). Repetition of the statutory language in conclusory form without any statement of fact with respect to the nature of Pryde's conduct is insufficient to establish the state of mind required for recklessness, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the pleader. Finally, the allegation that Pryde was traveling unreasonably fast in violation of § 14-218a(a), without more, suffers from a similar infirmity.
By way of comparison, the allegations in the case relied upon by plaintiffs, Chacon v. Fuseni, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 07-5009785 (Feb. 28, 2008, Bellis, J.), were that the defendant recklessly operated a box truck in violation of §§ 14-218a(a) and 14-295 "in that he was traveling at a minimum speed of 51.31 miles per hour in the moments prior to impact, left 111.75 feet of skidmarks prior to striking plaintiff's vehicle, and was driving unreasonably fast in light of the width, traffic and use of Route 1 at the location."
Accordingly, the motion to strike the second and fourth counts of the revised complaint is granted.