Opinion
No. MMX CV09 500 6796 S
October 20, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
In this case the plaintiff filed a four-count complaint containing a fourth count in relevant part as follows:
FOURTH COUNT:
1. On or about May 21, 2007, at approximately 3:52 p.m., the Plaintiff, Gary Partelow, was a passenger in a motor vehicle operated by Christine Partelow, which vehicle was proceeding in a southerly direction on Connecticut Route 81 and had reached a point approximately one-tenth of a mile south of Brault Hill Road, both public streets or highways located in Haddam, Connecticut.
2. At said time and place, the Defendant, Brian Hing, was the owner and operator of a motor vehicle which was proceeding in a northerly direction on said Connecticut Route 81.
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5. At said time and place, the Defendant, Daniel Mullane a/k/a David Mullane, was the operator of a motor vehicle owned by the Defendant, GMAC, which vehicle was proceeding in a southerly direction on said Connecticut Route 81, immediately ahead of the Plaintiff's vehicle, and which, in making a left turn into a private driveway, crossed over into the northbound lane of said Connecticut Route 81 and into the path of the vehicle operated by the Defendant, Brian Hing, thereby causing the Hing vehicle to swerve into the southbound lane and come into collision with the Plaintiff's vehicle, all of which caused the Plaintiff to sustain and suffer the severe personal injuries and losses hereinafter set forth.
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8. Said injuries and losses were caused by the carelessness and negligence of the Defendant Operator in one or more of the following ways:
a. in that he operated said vehicle in a reckless and dangerous manner having due regard for the width, traffic and use of said highway, and the weather condition, in violation of Section 14-222 of the Connecticut General Statutes made and provided in such cases.
9. As a result of the carelessness and negligence of the Defendant operator, the Plaintiff, Garry Partelow, was violently hurled in and about said motor vehicle.
10. As a further result of the carelessness and negligence of the Defendant, the Plaintiff was forced to incur financial obligations for hospital and medical care, medicines and x-rays, and he will be forced to incur further such obligations for the same in the future.
11. As a further result of the carelessness and negligence of the Defendant operator, the Plaintiff, Garry Partelow, was and in the future will be unable to pursue his usual course of employment, thereby sustaining a financial loss.
12. The Defendant operator operated said vehicle within reckless disregard in violation of the aforesaid statutes, and such violations were a substantial factor in causing the aforesaid injuries.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On August 21, 2009, the defendant Brian Hing moved to strike the fourth of the complaint and the corresponding prayer for relief pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295, and he asserted that they fail to sufficiently allege facts to support a claim for recklessness. On October 13, 2009, the plaintiff objected to such motion.
As set forth, infra, at best this count sets forth a second cause of action for negligence against the defendant Brian Hing, a result presumably not intended by the plaintiff, and not a properly pled cause of action for statutory recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295.
The general issues pertaining to alleging a properly pled cause of action for statutory recklessness may arise from the seemingly well-entrenched practice of pleading negligence claims prior to pleading recklessness, and then using such prior count as a basis for the statutory recklessness count(s), or from lack of pre-discovery information about specific facts supporting a recklessness count.
A motion to strike one or more counts of a complaint challenges the legal sufficiency of each such cause of action. As set forth in Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 667, 668, 748 A.2d 834 (2000), because the issue is one of legal sufficiency, this court's decision on a motion to strike is subject to plenary review on appeal:
We begin by setting out the well established standard of review in an appeal from the granting of a motion to strike. "Because a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court's ruling on the [plaintiff's motion] is plenary. See Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 232-33, 680 A.2d 127 (1996) [cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S.Ct. 1106, 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997)] . . . We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. Bohan v. Last, 236 Conn. 670, 674, 674 A.2d 839 (1996); see also Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108-09, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. Waters v. Autuori, 236 Conn. 820, 826, 676 A.2d 357 (1996). Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged. Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 33 n. 4, 675 A.2d 852 (1996)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knight v. F.L. Roberts Co., 241 Conn. 466, 470-71, 696 A.2d 1249 (1997). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80, 83, 438 A.2d 6 (1980). Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically . . . Edwards v. Tardif, 240 Conn. 610, 620, 692 A.2d 1266 (1997)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 100, 700 A.2d 655 (1997) (Berdon, J., concurring and dissenting).
General Statutes § 14-295 provides:
In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle.
In his fourth count the plaintiff has alleged in part that the defendant Brian Hing operated his vehicle in a reckless and dangerous manner having due regard for the width, traffic and use of said highway, and the weather condition, in violation of General Statutes § 14-222, but also that as a result of the carelessness and negligence of such defendant the plaintiff suffered injury and financial loss.
General Statutes § 14-222 provides in part as follows:
(a) No person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state . . . recklessly, having regard to the width, traffic and use of such highway, . . . the intersection of streets and the weather conditions. The operation of a motor vehicle upon any such highway . . . such a rate of speed as to endanger the life of any person other than the operator of such motor vehicle . . . shall constitute a violation of the provisions of this section . . .
As noted by Judge Bellis in Alibrandi v. Romero, No. CV08 501 73 80 S, 2008 Ct.Sup. 17332, 17333, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport (Bellis, J., November 7, 2008), "[t]here has been a split of authority in Superior Court decisions as to what degree of specificity is required in pleading recklessness."
In Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 342-43, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003), the Supreme Court stated that
[a]lthough there is a difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, a complaint is not deficient so long as it utilizes language explicit enough to inform the court and opposing counsel that both negligence and reckless misconduct are being asserted. See Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 81, 14 A.2d 713 (1940).
In the Craig case, the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff had actually alleged facts supporting a cause of action for wanton and reckless misconduct:
As set forth previously, the plaintiffs' complaint alleges conduct that constitutes an extreme departure from ordinary care in a situation that involves a high degree of danger. The allegation of a specific policy to continue to serve alcohol to a particular patron, who is known to have an excessive drinking problem, while that patron already is intoxicated, with the knowledge that that patron would be operating a motor vehicle upon leaving the bar reflects wilful, wanton and reckless conduct sufficient to survive a motion to strike.
Craig v. Driscoll, supra, 262 Conn. at 343 (footnotes omitted). See also Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 849, 836 A.2d 394 (2003) ("After the jury began its deliberations, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to substitute the word `recklessness' for the word `negligence' . . . The trial court stated that the amendment could not possibly surprise or otherwise prejudice the defendants in light of the other allegations in count two that so clearly and unambiguously alleged recklessness").
In Craig v. Driscoll, the Supreme Court set forth the plaintiffs' factual allegations as follows:
The plaintiffs' complaint, in the counts for reckless infliction of bystander emotional distress, alleged the following facts: "The collision, the injuries to Sarah Craig, and the severe emotional injury sustained by [the plaintiffs], were caused by the willful, wanton and/or reckless actions of the [defendants] in one or more of the following ways: (a) in that [Davis] instituted a policy in which he required one or more of his employees or the employees of The Pub or [Hawk's Nest] to continue to serve alcohol to patrons who were intoxicated and instructed them not to refuse service to such patrons, said policy resulting in the service of alcohol to [Driscoll] on May 21, 1996, while he was in an intoxicated state . . . (b) in that [Davis] instituted a policy with regard to [Driscoll] in particular in which he required one or more of his employees, or the employees of The Pub or [Hawk's Nest] to continue to serve alcohol to Driscoll even if intoxicated and not to refuse service to Driscoll, said policy resulting in the service of alcohol to [Driscoll] on May 21, 1996, while he was in an intoxicated state . . . (c) in that [the defendants] served alcoholic beverages to [Driscoll] when [they] knew that [Driscoll] was intoxicated and that he would be operating a motor vehicle subsequent to consuming said liquor . . . (d) in that [the defendants] were in particular aware of the excessive drinking habits of [Driscoll] and the fact that [Driscoll] had driven while intoxicated in the past, yet they continued to serve alcohol to him on May 21, 1996, while in an intoxicated state . . . [and] (e) in that [the defendants] provided liquor to [Driscoll] when he was visibly intoxicated, and knowing that by doing so, [Driscoll] would be placing others, such as the [plaintiffs'] decedent, at risk."
Craig v. Driscoll, supra, 262 Conn. at 341-42.
Two recent Appellate Court cases also discuss the differences between recklessness and negligence and provide some guidance with respect to pleading requirements.
In this case the plaintiff's third count, entitled "negligence," is the same as his fourth count, entitled "recklessness," except for paragraph 8. In the third count, paragraph 8 is as follows:
8. Said injuries and losses were caused by the carelessness and negligence of the Defendant operator in one or more of the following ways:
a. in that he operated said vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed having due regard for the weather, traffic, width and use of said highway and the intersection of streets, in violation of § 14-218a of the Connecticut General Statutes, made and provided in such cases;
b. in that he failed to have his motor vehicle under proper and reasonable control;
c. in that he failed to keep a reasonable and proper lookout for other vehicles lawfully upon said highway;
d. in that he failed to apply his brake in time to avoid said collision, although by a proper and reasonable exercise of his faculties, he could and should have done so;
e. in that he failed to turn his vehicle so as to avoid a collision;
f. in that he failed to sound his horn or give any other warning of this impending collision;
g. in that he failed to operate said vehicle in the right hand lane of traffic, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes Section 14-230, made and provided in such cases;
h. in that he failed to keep to the right of a vehicle proceeding in the opposite direction, in violation of Section 14-231 of the Connecticut General Statutes, made and provided in such cases;
i. in that he failed to operate said vehicle within the southbound lane of traffic, but instead moved said vehicle into the northbound lane of said highway when such movement could not be made with safety, all in violation of Section 14-236 of the Connecticut General Statutes, made and provided in such cases; and
j. in that he failed to properly position his vehicle for a left-hand turn, in violation of Section 14-241 of the Connecticut General Statutes, made and provided in such cases.
Compare the allegation set forth in paragraph 8 of the fourth count set forth at page 2, supra. In addition to General Statutes § 14-222, General Statutes § 14-218a is included in General Statutes § 14-295.
In Angiolillo v. Buckmiller, 102 Conn.App. 697, 705, 927 A.2d 312 (2007), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 927, 934 A.2d 243 (2007), a decision involving allegations of common-law recklessness, the Appellate Court held that the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiffs' claims of common-law recklessness against a defendant and its employees were insufficient as a matter of law because the conduct alleged to have been reckless did not rise to the extreme departure from ordinary care necessary to support a legally cognizable claim of recklessness. The Appellate Court noted that in their complaint the plaintiffs simply incorporated their allegations of negligence and labeled the conduct recklessness, and that "[m]erely using the term `recklessness' to describe conduct previously alleged as negligence is insufficient as a matter of law . . ."
Next, the court properly concluded that the plaintiffs' claims of common-law recklessness were insufficient as a matter of law. The conduct alleged to have been reckless does not rise to the level of conduct necessary to support a legally cognizable claim for recklessness, which requires an extreme departure from ordinary care. See Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988). The plaintiffs, in the complaint, simply incorporated their allegations of negligence and labeled the conduct recklessness. "[N]egligence and wilful and wanton misconduct are separate and distinct causes of action . . . There is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kostiuk v. Queally, 159 Conn. 91, 94, 267 A.2d 452 (1970). Merely using the term "recklessness" to describe conduct previously alleged as negligence is insufficient as a matter of law. Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 91, 139 A.2d 58 (1958). Thus, the court properly rendered summary judgment as to this count.
In Bicio v. Brewer, 92 Conn.App. 158, 159-60, 884 A.2d 12 (2005), the plaintiff pled two causes of action, one in negligence and one allegedly for common-law recklessness. The basis for her claims was a January 6, 2001, accident. She alleged that she was operating her motor vehicle in Canton and the defendant was operating an ambulance owned by the state that collided with her vehicle. She alleged that the defendant failed to stop at a red traffic signal, thereby causing the accident and her resulting injuries. Id.
The Appellate Court set forth the trial court proceedings on the second count as follows:
Both parties submitted proposed jury instructions. The plaintiff requested that the court charge the jury with respect to both common-law and statutory recklessness on the basis of § 14-222. The court did not give the charge requested by the plaintiff and instructed the jury solely with respect to common-law recklessness.
On March 2, 2004, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. On April 6, 2004, after the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, the court issued its decision in the defendant's favor and rendered judgment accordingly. This appeal followed.
Bicio v. Brewer, supra, 92 Conn.App. at 161 (footnotes omitted).
The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss the first negligence count and determined that the jury verdict for defendant on the second count which went to the jury on a theory of common-law recklessness should be affirmed, despite the plaintiff's claim that there should have been a jury charge on statutory recklessness:
As we noted in part I, the court properly dismissed the first count of the plaintiff's complaint sounding in negligence. The plaintiff argues that count two of the complaint incorporated paragraph nine of the first count so as to be paragraph nine of count two. We agree with the plaintiff as to that general proposition and set forth the exact language of paragraph nine as incorporated into count two: Paragraph nine states in relevant part: " The Plaintiff's injuries and losses were caused directly by the Defendant Brewer's negligence and carelessness in one or more of the following respects . . . (d) The Defendant was operating the State vehicle recklessly, having no regard to the width, traffic and use of such highway, the intersection of streets and weather conditions and at such a rate of speed as to endanger the life of the Plaintiff in violation of § 14-222 of the [General] Statutes." (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff's argument focuses solely on a portion of the incorporated language that mentioned the reckless driving statute, § 14-222.
The problem, however, lies in the fact that the entire paragraph must be read as incorporated into count two. That incorporated language clearly indicated a claim sounding in negligence. Of course, "[a] cause of action claiming wanton and reckless misconduct is separate and distinct from a cause of action alleging negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Belanger v. Village Pub I, Inc., 26 Conn.App. 509, 513, 603 A.2d 1173 (1992); Brown v. Branford, 12 Conn.App. 106, 109, 529 A.2d 743 (1987); D. Wright, J. Fitzgerald W. Ankerman, Connecticut Law of Torts (3d Ed. 1991) § 61, p. 158.
Bicio v. Brewer, supra, 92 Conn.App. at 169. Thus, the Appellate Court read the language of the complaint the way it was actually pleaded, and not as shorthand for a cause of action of statutory recklessness as ultimately claimed by the plaintiff in Bicio. In support of its analysis, the Appellate Court looked to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kostiuk v. Queally:
We are guided by our Supreme Court's decision in Kostiuk v. Queally, 159 Conn. 91, 267 A.2d 452 (1970). In Kostiuk, the plaintiff sought recovery following a motor vehicle accident, and alleged in his one-count complaint several acts of negligence and one claim of recklessness in violation of § 14-222. Id., 92-93. The trial court instructed the jury on both negligence and recklessness as alternative theories of liability. Id., 93. On appeal, following the verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the defendant claimed that the court improperly instructed the jury because the allegations contained in the complaint did not warrant a charge on reckless and wanton misconduct. Id., 93-94. In agreeing with the defendant and reversing the judgment, our Supreme Court stated: "[T]he plaintiff alleged in one paragraph all of the defendant's acts which were claimed to have caused the injury. That paragraph set forth eight ways in which the defendant allegedly caused the plaintiff's injuries by his carelessness and negligence. Seven of the specified acts refer only to negligence; the other refers to the defendant's operation of his vehicle in a reckless manner . . . in violation of Section 14-222 of the General Statutes. We do not think that such a brief reference to recklessness, contained within a count which otherwise is clearly limited to ordinary negligence, is sufficient to raise a claim of reckless and wanton misconduct. Simply using the word reckless or recklessness is not enough." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 94.
Bicio v. Brewer, supra, 92 Conn.App. at 170-71. See also Brown v. Branford, 12 Conn.App. 106, 109-10, 529 A.2d 743 (1987); Speed v. Pyrde, 2008 Ct.Sup. 15115, No. CV-08-5018798S, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven (Lager, J., September 8, 2008).
In Kostiuk v. Queally, 159 Conn. 91, 92, 267 A.2d 452 (1970), the plaintiff had filed a one-count complaint and he alleged in one paragraph of his complaint eight acts of carelessness and negligence. Seven of the alleged acts referred only to negligence, and the eighth specification referred to the defendant's operation of his motor vehicle in a reckless manner in violation of General Statutes § 14-222. The Supreme Court determined that read as a whole, the complaint set forth a count of ordinary negligence, and the eighth specification of violation of General Statutes § 14-222 was not sufficient to raise a claim of reckless and wanton misconduct. The Supreme Court thus determined that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to what constituted reckless and wanton misconduct and in charging that a finding of such conduct would permit recovery by the plaintiff notwithstanding any contributory negligence. The Supreme Court, id. at 93-95, emphasized that ". . . negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct are separate and distinct causes of action . . .;" there is ". . . a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on . . .;" "[s]imply using the word `reckless' or `recklessness' [was] not enough . . .;" and "[c]learly the plaintiff had to do more in the complaint under consideration to bring reckless and wanton misconduct into the case . . .;"
The case was submitted to the jury by the court upon the theory that the plaintiff had stated by the allegations in his complaint two distinct grounds of recovery: first, a case of negligence against the defendant, and second, one of reckless and wanton misconduct. No error is assigned in the instructions which the court gave as to what constituted negligence and contributory negligence under the circumstances. The court also instructed the jury as to what constituted "reckless and wanton misconduct." The court further instructed the jury that a finding of reckless and wanton misconduct would permit recovery notwithstanding contributory negligence. The defendant claims that the trial court erred in giving these instructions on the ground that the allegations of the complaint did not support a charge of reckless and wanton misconduct. We agree for the reasons hereinafter set forth.
Ordinarily, "[w]here several acts of negligence cause but one injury, the plaintiff may allege all the acts of negligence in one count and aver that they were the cause," as was done in the instant case. Hoffman v. Mohican Co., 136 Conn. 392, 395, 71 A.2d 921. But negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct are separate and distinct causes of action. Bordonaro v. Senk, 109 Conn. 428, 432, 147 A. 136; see Heslin v. Malone, 116 Conn. 471, 474, 165 A. 594.
"There is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on." Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 81, 14 A.2d 713; Begley v. Kohl Madden Printing Ink Co., 157 Conn. 445, 450, 254 A.2d 907; see Mooney v. Wabrek, 129 Conn. 302, 306, 307, 27 A.2d 631. In the instant case, the plaintiff alleged in one paragraph all of the defendant's acts which were claimed to have caused the injury. That paragraph set forth eight ways in which the defendant allegedly caused the plaintiff's injuries by his "carelessness and negligence." Seven of the specified acts refer only to negligence; the other refers to the defendant's operation of his vehicle "in a reckless maoner . . . in violation of Section 14-222" of the General Statutes. We do not think that such a brief reference to recklessness, contained within a count which otherwise is clearly limited to ordinary negligence, is sufficient to raise a claim of reckless and wanton misconduct. "Simply using the word `reckless' or `recklessness' is not enough." Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 91, 139 A.2d 58. "In Puza v. Hamway, 123 Conn. 205, 211, 193 A. 776, where a complaint alleged that a collision was caused solely by the `negligence' of the defendant while driving his automobile in a careless, reckless and negligent manner, and several specifications of negligence followed, we held that the gravamen of the complaint was negligence." Mooney v. Wabrek, supra, 306. Where a complaint is one sounding in negligence and that negligence is alleged to consist in part in a violation of the statute forbidding the reckless operation of motor vehicles, the action will remain purely one of negligence. In such an action "contributory negligence of the plaintiff would be a defense, even though the negligence alleged consisted in part of a violation of that statute." Heslin v. Malone, supra, 475. Clearly the plaintiff had to do more in the complaint under consideration to bring reckless and wanton misconduct into the case. Because we hold that reckless and wanton misconduct was not properly in the case, it was harmful error for the court below to charge on it and to charge that the jury might permit recovery notwithstanding contributory negligence if they found that the defendant had acted recklessly.
In Frillici v. Westport, 264 Conn. 266, 277-78, 823 A.2d 1172 (2003), the Supreme Court explained the elements of recklessness:
"Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts . . . It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action . . .
"While we have attempted to draw definitional distinctions between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing. The result is that willful, wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent . . . It is at least clear . . . that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 342-43, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003).
With respect to General Statutes § 14-295 the Supreme Court has referred to the elements of deliberate or reckless disregard necessary to establish common-law recklessness:
Taken together, these decisions provide a judicial gloss for 14-295 under which the statute is sufficiently specific to afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know when double damages will be imposed. An award of double damages is appropriate when the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the statutes to which 14-295 refers. The statute thus incorporates standards that have long been recognized at common law. See, e.g., Kowal v. Hofher, 181 Conn. 355, 361-62, 436 A.2d 1 (1980). Recklessness "`requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man,' and the actor `must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater . . . than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.'" Begley v. Kohl Madden Printing Ink Co., 157 Conn. 445, 450-51, 254 A.2d 907 (1969), quoting 2 Restatement, Torts 500, comment g. We conclude that 14-295, as judicially construed, is not so vague as to violate the requirements of due process.
Bishop v. Kelly, 206 Conn. 608, 614-15, 539 A.2d 108 (1988).
As set forth above, because of pleading a second count (the fourth count) that sounds in negligence instead of in statutory recklessness, and because of a lack of pleading of specific allegations of fact demonstrating, if proved, that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-222, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, death or damage to property, the plaintiff's fourth count does not state a cause of action for statutory recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. The motion to strike the fourth count is granted.