Opinion
No. CV04 4000300
April 30, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a class action in which the members of the plaintiff class alleged that the defendant Household Automotive Finance Corp., also known as HSBC, had repossessed their automobiles in violation of federal and state statutes. The parties eventually agreed upon and proposed a settlement, which the Court approved on February 26, 2007. In the course of that "Fairness Hearing," the defendant filed a "Motion to Seal Documents," to which the plaintiff had no objection. That motion requested that the court seal documentary material which would be a part of the final judgment in this case and which included the names, addresses and social security numbers of the plaintiffs, the VIN numbers, makes and models of the vehicles in question, and the plaintiffs' account numbers with HSBC. The defendant appropriately "lodged" the material sought to be sealed with the court, and the court scheduled oral argument for March 9, 2006, on the Motion to Seal. The court had the time, date and place of the argument posted on the Judicial Branch website in accordance with Practice Book. Sec. 11-20A. The court heard argument as scheduled, and no one, other than counsel for the parties, responded to the published notice of the hearing.
Although the court shares the parties' concern that the combined release of all of the information covered by the motion could be misused by those with nefarious purposes, it is also aware of and supports the strong common law tradition and Judicial Branch policy favoring transparency in the legal process. Just "[a]s with other branches of government, the bright light cast upon the judicial process by public observation diminishes the possibilities for injustice, incompetence, perjury, and fraud. Furthermore, the very openness of the process should provide the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system and a better perception of its fairness." (Citation omitted.) Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988); accord, United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995). Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 218 (Conn. 2005).
Using history as a guide, it is clear that, with occasional lapses, our nation's courts have followed the path of openness in the judicial process. "The open trial . . . plays as important a role in the administration of justice today as it did for centuries before our separation from England. The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known." Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). Doe v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., 263 Conn. 39, 65 (Conn. 2003).
Court decisions to seal information have increasingly come under attack, and often properly so in those cases where judges go too far and too quickly in their effort to protect the perceived privacy interests of the parties. Amendments to the Connecticut Practice Book, the recent appeal of Hartford Courant Co. v Pellegrino, et al, 380 F.3d 83 (2d Circ. 2004) and Judge Robert Beach's current admirable efforts to untangle the problems created by the secret "Level One" sealing of files, have all served to emphasize the court's rule in assuring that, however painful or embarrassing the disclosure of information may be, such disclosure must be carefully balanced against the public's right to know . . . or at least to be able to know, if it so chooses . . . what is happening in our courthouses. At the same time, "it is important to note that none of this means the court is barred completely from sealing all trial documents from public view. In limited circumstances, courts must deny access to judicial documents — generally where open inspection may be used as a vehicle for improper purposes. See e.g., Nixon v. Time Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 597 (citing to In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 A. 259 (R.I. 1893) (court can insure that its records are not used to promote public scandal through publication of disgusting details of a divorce), and Schmedding v. Wayne County Clerk, 85 Mich. 1, 48 N.W. 201, 202 (Mich. 1891) (court refused to permit records to be used as sources of business information that might harm litigant's competitive standing). Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 21 F.3d 24 (2nd Cir. 1994)."
In 2003, the judges of the Superior Court amended the Rules of Practice as part of an ongoing effort to better enable them to balance the policy of judicial transparency against the protection of the parties' legitimate interest in having certain personal information kept out of the public eye. "Practice Book § 11-20 provides, in general terms, that the public may not be excluded from judicial proceedings, and that records of court proceedings may not be sealed, unless the court identifies, on the record and in open court, `an interest which is determined to override the public's interest in attending such proceeding or in viewing such materials.' "Practice Book § 11-20 (b). Doe v. Conn. Bar Examining Committee, 263 Conn. 39, 67-68 (2003). Similar care is devoted to the sealing of court documents by Practice Book § 11-20A. Before these significant rule changes, "the specific presumption of public access may have been the law, [but] its articulation in the rules is new. In addition, it is hard to escape the belief that many of the elaborate procedures set up in the new rules are designed to force judges to give more serious consideration to the balancing of interest required before files are sealed." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2003 Conn.Super. LEXIS 2756, 5 (Conn.Super.Ct. 2003).
(c) Upon written motion of any party, or upon its own motion, the judicial authority may order that the public be excluded from any portion of a courtroom proceeding only if the judicial authority concludes that such order is necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to override the public's interest in attending such proceeding. The judicial authority shall first consider reasonable alternatives to any such order and any such order shall be no broader than necessary to protect such overriding interest. An agreement of the parties to close the courtroom shall not constitute a sufficient basis for the issuance of such an order. Practice Book § 11-20.
In Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 (2d Circ. 2004), the dispute involved the sealing of docket sheets. The Second Circuit held that these docket sheets "enjoy a presumption of openness, and . . . the public and the media possess a qualified First Amendment right to inspect them." Of course, this presumption is rebuttable upon demonstration that suppression is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.' " Grove Fresh Distrib., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice, 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994), Hartford Courant Co. v Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 96 (2nd Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
Practice Book §§ 11-20 and 11-20A, and the way most courts have interpreted them, clearly stand for the proposition that courts are not to seal information simply because the parties involved wish to do so. There must be an overarching fear that the information being released will be misused and lead to harm, and this factor must outweigh the right of the public to have access to court records. If sealing is required, it should be accomplished on as narrow a basis as possible. Sabanosh v. Durant, 1997 Conn.Super. LEXIS 3448, 7-8 (Conn.Super.Ct. 1997).
Practice Book 11-20A dictates what must happen when a party makes a motion to seal or redact part or all of the files. The rule has not been invoked frequently enough to have produced a large body of case law, but this court has had the opportunity to construe its antecedent, Practice Book 211B, in Saundry v. Saundry, 1996 Conn.Super. LEXIS 1784, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. 253546 (July 15, 1996, Silbert, J.) ( 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 373). There, the parties to a dissolution of marriage action jointly moved to seal the file and close the hearings in their case. The plaintiff was concerned with disclosure of financial information relevant to her solo law practice, and both parties were concerned about disclosures that would affect their minor children. Citing Practice Book 211B, this court held that "the plaintiff's concern about disclosure of her financial situation is not such an overriding interest," but that the concerns regarding the children could at some point rise to the level of such an overriding interest. The court therefore denied the motion to seal the file, without prejudice, because at the stage of the proceedings of the case, merely invoking "generalized concerns" did "not outweigh our system's basic bias in favor of public courts and open records and proceedings."
"Practice Book 11-20A(c) provides that: (b) Upon motion of any party, or upon its own motion, the court may order that the public be excluded from any portion of a proceeding and may order that files, affidavits, documents or other materials on file with the court or filed in connection with a court proceeding be sealed or their disclosure limited if the court concludes that such order is necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to override the public's interest in attending such proceeding or in viewing such materials. Any such order shall be no broader than necessary to protect such overriding interest. (e) The provisions of this rule shall not apply to settlement agreements which have not been incorporated into a judgment of the court."
Statutory considerations may also dictate when files can or even must be sealed. "The legislature has identified several areas where, due to the sensitivity of the topic, the extremely personal nature of the issues, or the age of the participants, the policy of open proceedings has been abridged by overriding privacy concerns." Doe v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., 263 Conn. 39, 66 (Conn. 2003). The legislature, however, has not preempted the field, and courts are frequently and appropriately asked to seal material which is not subject to statutory protection.
See, e.g., General Statutes § 46b-11 (permitting closed hearings and sealing of records in "family relations matter" where court determines "the welfare of any children involved or the nature of the case so requires"); General Statutes § 46b-49 (permitting closed hearings in divorce, separation and annulment proceedings when "in the interests of justice and the persons involved"); General Statutes § 46b-122 (exclusion from courtroom in juvenile matters of "any person whose presence is, in the court's opinion, not necessary"); General Statutes § 54-76c (sealing of court file during investigation to determine whether defendant "is eligible to be adjudged a youthful offender"); General Statutes § 54-76h (requiring that all youthful offender proceedings except those under § 54-76c be private); General Statutes § 54-86f (holding in camera hearing concerning evidence of sexual conduct of victim in prosecution for sexual assault); General Statutes § 54-86g (permitting taking of child's testimony in child abuse cases outside of courtroom). So carefully has the legislature crafted exceptions to the policy of open proceedings that General Statutes § 51-164x(a) provides: "Any person affected by a court order which prohibits any person from attending any session of court, except any session of court conducted pursuant to section 46b-11, 46b-49, 46b-122 or 54-76h or any other provision of the general statutes under which the court is authorized to close proceedings, whether at a pretrial or trial stage, shall have the right to the review of such order by the filing of a petition for review with the Appellate Court within seventy-two hours from the issuance of such court order." See also Practice Book § 11-20(d) (same). Doe v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., 263 Conn. 39, 66-68 (Conn. 2003).
"There does exist a common-law presumption of access to judicial records. This presumption, however, may be rebutted if "countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access." Similarly, some courts have recognized a First Amendment right of access to certain court documents, such as transcripts of criminal proceedings. Like the common-law presumption, this right has not been deemed absolute by the courts. It may be refuted if: (1) closure is essential to preserve higher values than the public's right of access; (2) there is a substantial probability that, in the absence of closure, those values would be harmed; and (3) there are no reasonable alternatives to closure that would adequately protect those values. Thus, assuming (as this Comment argues) that there is a First Amendment right of access to docket sheets, if a court finds that the sealing of a docket meets the above criteria, it is within the court's authority to seal a particular docket." 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1537, 1546-47.
"In fact, the courts have stated that in order to overcome the presumption favoring public access to judicial records, a specific injury which would unfairly harm the parties must be shown and the sealing must be narrowly tailored to it. In Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1999), the court held that the trial court must require a particularized showing of the need for confidentiality in reaching a settlement agreement. The Third Circuit also required a showing that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure in order to seal a settlement agreement. Id. In SmithKline Beecham v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, 261 F.Sup.2d 1002, 1008 (N.D.Ill. 2003), the court held that even where this overriding injury has been demonstrated, only the particular provisions that need to be kept confidential should be sealed, thus leaving the remaining portions of the records available for public inspection." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2003 Conn.Super. LEXIS 2756 at 7-8 (Conn.Super.Ct. 2003) [ 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 583]. The standards for removing information from court records are quite strict and what may seem at first blush to be a good reason to redact the information may not be enough. "A [party's] desire to avoid economic and social harm as well as embarrassment and humiliation in his professional and social community is normally insufficient to permit him to appear without disclosing his identity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Bar Examining Committee, supra, 263 Conn. 70.
When considering the request of the parties in this case, it is of vital importance that the court redact only that information which is likely to cause harm to any of the parties if left unsealed. For example, the parties are asking this court to redact not only financial information, but names and addresses of class members as well. They have failed, however, to demonstrate any way in which the simple release of the plaintiffs' names and addresses could cause them harm. The considerations here are similar to those in determining whether a party to a case may proceed under a pseudonym. "The most compelling situations [for granting a motion to proceed pseudonymously] involve matters which are highly sensitive, such as social stigmatization, real danger of physical harm, or where the injury litigated against would occur as a result of the disclosure of the [party's] identity . . . There must be a strong social interest in concealing the identity of the [party]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Diocese Corp., 43 Conn.Sup. 152, 159, 647 A.2d 1067, 1071 (Conn.Super., 1994) [ 11 Conn. L. Rptr. 519]. The parties have not shown such to be present in this case. "The question of who is using the judicial system is ordinarily as much a part of [the] principle [of openness] as why it is being used." Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee, 263 Conn. 39, 68 (2003).
For this reason, our Supreme Court has stated that [t]he privilege of using fictitious names in actions should be granted only in the rare case where the nature of the issue being litigated and the interest of the parties demand it and no harm can be done to the public interest." Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 60, 156 A.2d 508 (1959), appeal dismissed sub nom. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961). Vargas v. Doe, 96 Conn.App. 399, 407 (Conn.App.Ct. 2006). Similarly, courts should not seal their names and addresses in judgment documents unless both the interests of the parties demand it and no harm will be done to the public interest. The parties have failed to establish either of these conditions.
There is, however, precedent for sealing other kinds of sensitive information. In divorce cases parties must disclose their entire financial histories along with identifying information. Arguably, "[i]n no other case is a person's complete financial soul laid so bare. Thus, even those who favor complete open access to divorce cases on-line agree that personal identifiers such as social security, credit card, bank accounts, should be deleted because of identity theft." 17 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 45, 66 (2001). This idea saw real-world application in the high profile divorce case involving former General Electric CEO Jack Welch when the court ordered certain financial information sealed. Welch v. Welch, 2003 Conn.Super. LEXIS 2312, 3-4 (Conn.Super.Ct. 2003).
The parties to this settlement provide an example in which a court sealed certain financial files related to a criminal proceeding in which the defendant had requested financial assistance to help him pay for a lawyer. The application for assistance "require[d] comprehensive financial data, including employment income of the defendant and his spouse; all other income, cash, and property; identification of the defendant's dependents; and all obligations, debts, and monthly bills." In re Boston Herald, Inc., 312 F.3d 174, 177 (1st. Cir. 2003). The court ruled against releasing the information, reasoning that "the disclosure of a defendant's sensitive personal financial information, which has no bearing on the merits of the criminal trial, could well undermine the judicial process in other ways. In itself, the invasion of privacy inherent in disclosing this data is of concern. The specter of disclosure also might lead defendants (or other sources called upon by the court) to withhold information. Public disclosure of such information may put them at risk of harm to their property or their families if the information is misused by their enemies." Id., 188.
The court in In Re Boston Herald also looked to FOIA guidelines as support for its decision and said, "Recognition of the importance of financial privacy is also enshrined in public policy. The Freedom of Information Act, applicable only to executive branch materials, exempts personal and confidential financial information from disclosure." Id., 190.
While case law provides some support for sealing portions of the record, it is important to remember that the class members and HSBC's agreement to settle and to request sealing of certain information is not enough to extinguish "the bright light cast upon the judicial process." Indeed, Practice Book 11-20A(c) specifically provides that an agreement to seal is not a sufficient basis for entering such an order, and in Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 267 Conn. 168, 216, the court said, "[w]ith respect to a court's supervisory authority over documents in its custody and control, that power is not forfeited merely because the parties have agreed to a settlement and withdrawal of the case." As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently has observed, "the court's supervisory power [over documents in its possession] does not disappear because jurisdiction over the relevant controversy has been lost. The records and files are not in limbo. [As] long as they remain under the aegis of the court, they are superintended by the judges who have dominion over the court." Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, supra, 377 F.3d 141. Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 216 (Conn. 2005). In Travelers Ins. Co., the court held a hearing on the unopposed request of the parties to confirm an arbitration award and to seal documents related to the issue. The court said, "[I]n short, the court is not convinced that confidential financial records may be sealed simply because parties have a confidentiality agreement or because the matter was initially handled in arbitration. In the instant case, there has been no specific showing that particular records require sealing." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2003 Conn.Super. LEXIS 2756, at 9 (Conn.Super.Ct. 2003).
The court finds no basis for sealing basic identifying information such as the names and addresses of class members, or the makes and models of the vehicles in question. There is, however, evidence that publication of social security numbers, account numbers and VIN (Vehicle Identification Numbers) numbers, in combination with information concerning identity of the parties and the vehicles could lead to identity theft and vehicle fraud. Based on this evidence, the court will grant the request to seal this information within the settlement and judgment documents.
"The Federal Trade Commission states that 10 million Americans had their identities stolen in 2003 and each victim spent an average of 530 hours resolving the resulting problems, while the Justice Department reports that identity theft costs United States businesses nearly $50 billion per year in fraudulent transactions. Identity theft is regarded as our country's fastest growing computer-related crime. Terry Frieden, U.S. Wraps up Net Crime Sweep, CNN Money, (Aug. 26, 2004), http://money.cnn.com/2004/08/26/technology/cybercrime/index.htm. See also Jeff Sovern, The Jewel of Their Souls: Preventing Identify Theft Through Loss Allocation Rules, 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 343 (2003). Persons involved in commission of these crimes use a variety of personally identifiable information in assuming their victim's identity, including social security numbers, financial and credit card account numbers, telephone numbers and addresses. All of this information is currently publicly available in most court records. In February 2003, seven co-conspirators who had used personal information obtained from court records, were indicted on federal fraud and identity theft charges. The seven used the federal courts' online database system, PACER, to obtain information about federal inmates and open false financial accounts. In this conspiracy alone, thirty-four inmates and twenty financial institutions were victimized. Elaine Silvestrini, Federal Prisoners' Personal Information Used in Credit Fraud, Tampa Tribune, Feb. 8, 2003, at Metro 3. In Cincinnati, Ohio, a speeding ticket posted on a court clerk's website provided an identity thief with a person's social security number, address, height, weight, birth date and his signature. The thief accumulated $11,000 in credit card theft before his arrest. Jennifer Lee, Dirty Laundry, Online for All to See, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 2002, at G1, available at
"As the jurisprudence discussing `privacy interests' has recognized, most people do not object solely to the disclosure of personal information. Rather, it is the combination of the personal information with identifying information to which people object. With the elimination of identifying information from the records also goes the privacy interest, for all intents and purposes." Landry v. Union Planters Corp., 2003 WL 21355462, at 5 (E.D.La.) (E.D.La., 2003). To the extent that that information is separable from the documents which may be disclosed, the parties may submit that information under seal; to the extent that it is not, the parties may submit redacted documents with the Social Security, account and VIN numbers removed. The necessity of preventing class members from the predatory practices of identity thieves outweighs the public's right to know information for which it would be very hard for anyone, other than the parties, to articulate a legitimate interest in seeing. Indeed, no one has articulated such an interest in connection with this case.
The Social Security Administration has warned:
Identity theft is one of the fastest growing crimes in America. When a dishonest person has your Social Security number, the thief can use it to get other personal information about you. Most of the time identity thieves use your number and your good credit to apply for more credit in your name. Then, they use the credit cards and do not pay the bills. You do not find out that someone is using your number until you are turned down for credit, or you begin to get calls from unknown creditors demanding payment for items you never bought. SSA Publication No. 05-10064, January 2006, ICN 463270.
No party, nor any member of the public in response to the posting of the date of argument on this motion on the Judicial Branch website, has suggested any legitimate purpose that the public might have in knowing the social security numbers of the plaintiffs in this case. The court thus finds that although no specific risk to any particular plaintiff has been shown, the public's right to know their security numbers, to the extent that such a right may actually exist, is outweighed by the risk such disclosure presents in the form of the potential for identity theft.
"Information that is private, personal, and can lead to identity theft (such as social security numbers, account numbers, and complete dates of birth) almost never is needed by the public for the purpose of evaluating a court's decision. This information should not be included in any documents or, if it is required for a specific purpose, it should be redacted before it is permanently placed into the court's paper file or on microfiche. For example, if a social security number is needed to do a background check on a person applying to serve as a fiduciary, then the number should be removed from the records after court personnel have performed the background check or the document containing the social security number should be excluded from the court's public file. In other words, there are certain types of information that the courts should keep out of their records in every case. Records that are sealed by a court are another example of information that is not available to the public. A court has taken testimony and considered the issues involved, and has determined that the potential harm to the parties demands that these particular records remain unavailable." 16 OHPRLJ 107A (March/April 2006).
Similarly, the parties seek to have the vehicle identification numbers of the vehicles in question shielded from disclosure. Although they spoke generally about the risk of theft, their arguments were not specific on this point. It is apparent, however, that VIN numbers can be used to "legitimize" similar looking stolen automobiles. A recent report states:
There is a new type of identity theft occurring at startling rates: Auto Identity Theft. Auto identity theft is when thieves go online and find Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) and copy them down. Then, the thief will find a similar car to the one with the original VIN and steal it, replacing the VIN numbers on the car license plate. Doing this, the car can no longer be identified as stolen. Not only can auto identity theft damage owners of the original VIN (since they can have loan payments for a car that is not theirs), but it can also damage the buyer. It is estimated that there may be 50,000 or more cars in the United States with stolen VINs. Since this is such a new crime, it is almost impossible to catch. Thieves often have VIN collecting kits, and mass networks of stolen information that makes thefts hard to track. People looking to buy new cars should protect themselves by checking the background of the car extensively and looking for anything unusual. Online car purchases are risky because one cannot see the actual number. According to WHDH TV News:
To protect yourself at car buying time, police say make sure all the VIN's on the car and the title are exact matches, and do a car history to check for anything suspicious. Experts estimate 50,000 cloned cars are on the road right now, and they fear this new numbers game may make you the loser. "It is high profit and very, very low risk and the ability or the chance of getting caught is really slim to none," Linda Lewis Pickett of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) said. http://www.identitytheftspy.com/2005/07/auto_identity_t.html.
The court has made no effort to verify such contentions independently, but in the absence of any claim of a public interest to be served by permitting access to the VIN numbers of the vehicles in question, the court concludes that the purposes served by shielding this information, when data concerning the makes and models of the vehicles are being released, outweigh any possible public interest in their release.
With respect to the HSBC account numbers, neither side has given the court a clear basis for understanding how this information could be misused. There is, however, some scholarship on the subject, and the court recognizes a possibility that damage might be done to class members by the release of such data into the stream of public information. In fact, states have begun to take action to prevent the very dangers this problem presents. "In 2000, Arizona released rules that made social security numbers, credit card account numbers and other financial account numbers confidential in both electronic and paper forms of its court records. Washington restricted these same data elements but added address and identity information to the list of protected information from its court records. At the time of this writing, the Washington Supreme Court was considering adoption of a new rule to govern access to court records." 51 S.D.L.Rev. 81, 104 (2006).
"[A New York] commission [examining the issue] recognized that some information should not be referenced in court records and will only be public information with leave of the court. This information includes social security numbers, financial account and credit card numbers, birth dates, and names of minor children. The commission found that this specific information presented such a risk of harm to privacy and personal security that it should not be maintained in court records at all." 51 S.D.L.Rev. 81, 105 (2006). One article argues that "social security numbers and bank accounts could be automatically protected by legislation while other information would have to be protected by another means, usually by a protective order. Other personally identifying information, such as addresses and telephone numbers, do not usually pose the same danger from dissemination as those categories of information previously mentioned, so the use of this information should not be prohibited." 65 Ohio St. L.J. 413, 449 (2004).
The court concludes that concerns about the release of account numbers are legitimate, and that there has been no countervailing public need for their release articulated. The court therefore grants the request to seal the class members' HSBC account numbers.
For all of the above reasons, the Motion to Seal is granted with regard to the plaintiffs' social security numbers and their HSBC account numbers, and also the vehicle identification numbers (VIN numbers) of the vehicles involved in this case. In all other respects, the motion is denied. In accordance with Practice Book Sec. 11-20A(g) any person affected by this order has the right to review by the filing of a petition for review with the appellate court within seventy-two hours from its issuance, but such an application shall not operate as a stay of this order.
http://tech2.NYTimes.com/mem/technology/techreview.html?res=9a04e4d9173ef936a3575ac0a9649c8b63 oref=login." 51 S.D.L.Rev. 81, 121 (2006).
"Information that is private, personal, and can lead to identity theft (such as social security numbers, account numbers, and complete dates of birth) almost never is needed by the public for the purpose of evaluating a court's decision. This information should not be included in any documents or, if it is required for a specific purpose, it should be redacted before it is permanently placed into the court's paper file or on microfiche. For example, if a social security number is needed to do a background check on a person applying to serve as a fiduciary, then the number should be removed from the records after court personnel have performed the background check or the document containing the social security number should be excluded from the court's public file. In other words, there are certain types of information that the courts should keep out of their records in every case. Records that are sealed by a court are another example of information that is not available to the public. A court has taken testimony and considered the issues involved, and has determined that the potential harm to the parties demands that these particular records remain unavailable." 16 OHPRLJ 107A (March/April 2006).