Opinion
FA166065973S
10-24-2016
Kenneth A. Reiss v. Lisa F. Reiss
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SEAL FILE (#119)
Elizabeth A. Bozzuto, J.
Before the court is the defendant's request that the court seal the parties' divorce file. Consistent with Practice Book Rule 11-20A/25-59A, the defendant posted notice of this request, along with the date and time of the hearing on the motion, on the Judicial Branch's website. No one appeared at the time of hearing to object to the defendant's request.
The plaintiff did not appear for the hearing and took no position regarding the defendant's request to seal the divorce file.
The parties to this action were divorced on August 2, 2016. At that time, the parties submitted a stipulated agreement to the court and asked the court to accept and approve the agreement and incorporate it by reference into the court's decree dissolving the parties' marriage. Paragraph 28 of the " Agreement of the Parties-Stipulation for Judgment" dated July 29, 2016, reads as follows: " As between the Parties, all aspects of this stipulation shall be confidential. To the extent that the Court will so permit, the file in this matter shall be sealed."
Counsel for the defendant asked the court to seal the matter on the date of dissolution. The court denied the request in that no notice had yet been provided to the public.
The defendant offers two reasons in support of her request to seal the court file. First, she claims that the parties' agreement contains sensitive information relative to the business enterprises owned by the parties. The defendant testified that the business is in a highly competitive industry and its disclosure to the public may render harm to their business interest. Second, the defendant expressed concern that her adult child may seek access to the court file and use information contained therein to undermine the defendant's relationship with the one remaining minor child of the parties.
P.B. § 25-59A was promulgated to specifically address documents and files in the family court. The general and overarching purpose of the rule is grounded in the premise that all family court files, despite the universally sensitive and private nature of all such matters, are open to the public.
§ 25-59A subsection (a) states, " Except as otherwise provided by law, there shall be a presumption that documents filed with the court shall be available to the public." Subsection (b) further provides " . . . except as otherwise provided by law . . . the judicial authority shall not order that any files, affidavits, documents, or other materials on file with the court or filed in connection with a court proceeding be sealed or their disclosure limited." Subsection (c) makes it clear that any form of sealing may only be ordered if " . . . the judicial authority concludes that such order is necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to override the public's interest in viewing such material."
" . . . the presumption of openness of the court proceedings . . . is a fundamental principal of our judicial system . . . This policy of openness is not to be abridged lightly. In fact, the legislature has provided for very few instances in which it has determined that, as a matter of course, certain privacy concerns outweigh the public's interest in open judicial proceedings . . . The right to have documents sealed is not a right the parties have as against each other; the court must determine the question as against the demands of the public interest." Bank of New York v. Bell, 120 Conn.App. 837, 846, 993 A.2d 1022 (2010).
As the trial court stated in Soroka v. Household Automotive Finance Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-04-4000300 (April 30, 2007, Silbert, J.) (43 Conn.L.Rptr. 481, ), " Practice Book § § 11-20 and 11-20A, and the way most courts have interpreted them, clearly stand for the proposition that courts are not to seal information simply because the parties involved wish to do so. There must be an overarching fear that the information being released will be misused and lead to harm, and this factor must outweigh the right of the public to have access to court records. If sealing is required it should be accomplished in as narrow a basis as possible." Id., 482, . " In fact, the courts have stated that in order to overcome the presumption favoring public access to judicial records, a specific injury which would unfairly harm the parties must be shown and the sealing must be narrowly tailored to it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 483, .
P.B. § § 11-20 and 11-20A is the civil court equivalent of the family court practice book § § 25-59 and 25-59A.
With respect to divorce cases, the court in Soroka pointed out that there is a precedent for sealing sensitive information, but that sensitive information is limited. The court stated that " [i]n divorce cases parties must disclose their entire financial histories along with identifying information. Arguably, [i]n no other case is a person's complete financial soul laid so bare. Thus, even those who favor complete open access to divorce cases on-line agree that personal identifiers, such as social security, credit card, bank accounts, should be deleted because of identity theft." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Soroka v. Household Automotive Finance Corp., supra, 43 Conn.L.Rptr. 483-84, at *15.
" Statutory considerations may also dictate when files can or even must be sealed. The legislature has identified several areas where, due to the sensitivity of the topic, the extremely personal nature of the issues, or the age of the participants, the policy of open proceedings has been abridged by overriding privacy concerns." Soroka v. Household Automotive Finance Corp., supra, 43 Conn.L.Rptr. 483, at *9. For example: General Statutes § 46b-11 permits closed hearings and sealing of records in a " family relations matter, " such as the case at bar, where a court determines that " the welfare of any children involved or the nature of the case so requires" and General Statutes § 46b-49 permits closed hearings in divorce, separation and annulment proceedings when " in the interests of justice and [of] the persons involved." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 483, n.3.
The defendant cites the cases of Welch v. Welch, 48 Conn.Supp. 19, 828 A.2d 707 (2003) , and Tauck v. Tauck, . The court notes the Welch matter predates the enactment of the subject practice book provisions and pertains primarily to documents produced in discovery. The file in the Tauck matter is not sealed to the public, although some documents may be under seal. Further, Tauck involved a national, if not international, multi-million dollar company and specific claims of harm relative to the children.
A review of " In Re Sealing Litigation, Reference Numbers 102-140, " February 16, 2007 (Beach, J.) [43 Conn.L.Rptr. 106, ], is instructive in that the court reviewed a number of family cases and the appropriateness of unsealing such files as a result of the court's ruling in Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 290 F.Supp.2d 265 (D.Conn. 2003), and Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 884 A.2d 981 (2005). A review of the case would indicate that generally the court didn't find that a party's private interest in confidentiality outweighed the public interest in disclosure unless there was some risk to that person's physical safety or the physical safety of a child.
In this case, other than what is gleaned from the parties' separation agreement, not much can be deciphered regarding the business enterprises of the parties. There was no evidence offered or articulation as to any real harm, specific or otherwise, relative to the parties' business by virtue of their divorce file remaining public. Similarly, the defendant's concern that some speculative and unspecified harm to her relationship with her youngest child could ensue, by virtue of the court file being available to her adult child, was vague and unestablished.
Although this court understands the defendant's claims to privacy in general, and the general sensitive nature of all files in family court, family court files have nonetheless come within the consideration of the court and legislature and are presumed to be open to the public. In the case at bar, there is insufficient evidence to overcome the clear legislative and judicial intent that family files are open to the public.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion is denied.
SO ORDERED.