Opinion
Case No. 17-11934
2022-02-23
Steve SMITH, Plaintiff, v. Byron TAULTON, et al., Defendant.
Frank J. Lawrence, Jr., Bloomfield Hills, MI, for Plaintiff.
Frank J. Lawrence, Jr., Bloomfield Hills, MI, for Plaintiff.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REOPEN CASE
Sean F. Cox, United States District Judge
This is a prisoner civil rights case that the Court closed on December 23, 2019 with a Default Judgment against Defendant Byron Taulton ("Taulton"). (ECF No. 30). The matter currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Restore this Case to the Active Docket and for Leave to Serve a Third-Party Subpoena for the Purposes of Identifying John Doe. (ECF No. 51). The motion has been fully briefed and the Court concludes that a hearing is not necessary. Thus, the Court orders that the motion will be decided without a hearing. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f). For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion.
On June 16, 2017, Plaintiff Steve Smith ("Smith") initiated this § 1983 action pro se against Taulton and a John Doe alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights based on events that occurred on December 30, 2014. (ECF No. 1). On December 23, 2019, the Court entered default judgment against Taulton in the amount of $95,000.00. (ECF No. 30). As Smith never filed an amended complaint to identify the John Doe, the default judgment against Taulton closed the case.
On March 2, 2020, Smith filed a pro se Motion for Writ of Execution to Enforce Judgment and Compel Discovery Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1) & (2) and MCL 600.6104. (ECF No. 31). Smith argued that despite the Court entering default judgment against Taulton, "to date, defendant Taulton has not paid any monies to toward this Court's Judgment and has not made any good faith gestures demonstrating that he intends to do so." (ECF No. 31, at PageID 93). On November 4, 2020, the Court concluded that it would benefit the parties and the Court if Smith was given the benefit of representation by an attorney assigned under the Court's pro bono program, and the Court ordered that appointment of counsel be granted to Smith. (ECF No. 33). On November 5, 2020, Mr. Frank J. Lawrence was assigned to represent Smith. (ECF No. 34). Since then, Mr. Lawrence has diligently represented Smith in connection with his collection efforts. (ECF Nos. 35, 45, and 48).
Two years later after the Court closed the case, on November 17, 2021, Mr. Lawrence filed the matter currently before the Court: Plaintiff's Motion to Restore this Case to the Active Docket and for Leave to Serve a Third-Party Subpoena for the Purposes of Identifying John Doe. (ECF No. 51). In his brief, Mr. Lawrence argues that Smith has a cognizable § 1983 claim against John Doe. Mr. Lawrence argues that Smith timely filed his claim against John Doe: "this lawsuit was filed within the three-year statute of limitation, but it apparently was not served upon Doe within those three years." (ECF No. 51, at PageID 203).
The statute of limitations for Smith's § 1983 claims is governed by the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 272, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Under Michigan law, MCL § 600.5805(10), the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is three years. Chippewa Trading Co. v. Cox , 365 F.3d 538, 543 (6th Cir. 2004). Specifically, the Sixth Circuit has established that Michigan's three-year statute of limitations governs § 1983 claims. Scott v. Ambani , 577 F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir. 2009). Therefore, Smith's claims accrued at the time of incident at issue on December 30, 2014. Ruff v. Runyon , 258 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Under federal law the statute begins to run when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims."). Smith had three years (from December 30, 2014 until December 30, 2017) to file his § 1983 suit. Smith timely filed this action against Taulton and John Doe on June 16, 2017. (ECF No. 1). However, Smith never amended his complaint to identify the "John Doe" defendant within the three-year period.
Now, more than four years after the statute of limitations expired, Mr. Lawrence wishes to re-open the case and discover the name of the John Doe defendant for the purposes of filing an amended complaint. (ECF No. 51).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) permits an amendment that changes a defendant but arises out of the same conduct relates back to the original complaint if the new defendant "(i) received such notice of the action that [he] will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against [him], but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) ; Smith v. City of Akron , 476 Fed. App'x 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012). "A defendant's actual knowledge of the complaint and constructive knowledge that the plaintiff made a mistake in failing to name him must occur within 120 days of the filing of the original complaint." Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) ; FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) ).
The Sixth Circuit has strictly interpreted Rule 15(c). "The Rule allows relation back for the mistaken identification of defendants." Smith , 476 Fed. App'x at 69. The Sixth Circuit has specifically held that "adding new, previously unknown defendants in the place of "John Doe" defendants "is considered a change in the parties, not a mere substitution of parties," and "such amendments do not satisfy the ‘mistaken identity’ requirement of Rule 15(c)." Smith , 476 Fed. App'x at 69 (citing Cox v. Treadway , 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996) ).
Mr. Lawrence acknowledges this Sixth Circuit precedent and argues "[t]his case is an exception to the general three-year statute of limitations because of Smith's continuous and ongoing insanity." (ECF No. 51, at PageID 203). Michigan law does provide an exception to a statutory period of limitations for a person who is disabled due to insanity. MCL 600.5851(1).
[I]f the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action under this act is ... insane at the time the claim accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry or bring the action although the period of limitations has run.
MCL 600.5851(1) ; see also Black v. Hill , 2020 WL 3120263, Case No. 348849 (Mich. Ct. App. June 11, 2020).
Mr. Lawrence notes that upon entering prison, Smith was diagnosed as suffering from severe mental illness and has been treated for his mental health throughout his confinement. (ECF No. 51, at PageID 197). Further, Mr. Lawrence "believes that if given the opportunity for discovery, there will be ample evidence to support equitable tolling under MCL 600.5851." (ECF No. 51, at PageID 203-204).
However, the Court notes that Smith was sane enough to initiate this action pro se and secure default judgment against Taulton. Mr. Lawrence disputes this and argues "the fact that Plaintiff institute this action pro se and he filed litigation documents prior to the undersigned appointment does not negate his insanity claim because testimony will be provided that the legal writers in his facility prepared the paperwork for Smith's signature, without much of his involvement." (ECF No. 51, at PageID 204).
Mr. Lawrence directs the Court to an unpublished Michigan Court of Appeals opinion, Black v. Hill , 2020 WL 3120263, Case No. 348849 (Mich. Ct. App. June 11, 2020). In Black , the "plaintiff suffered a mental breakdown and was hospitalized for a number of weeks." Id. at *1. Shortly after plaintiff was discharged from the hospital, she conveyed property to the defendant. Id. Forty years later, the plaintiff brought an action claiming that defendant had unduly influenced her to convey the property. Id. The Black plaintiff argued that she had been continuously insane since the time of her breakdown and therefore MCL 600.5851 applied and tolled the statute of limitations. Id. Prior to filing the action, she and her husband met with an attorney. Id. at *3. The district court held a trial, during which "plaintiff offered extensive testimony from two expert witnesses in the field of psychiatry." Id. at *1. The district court determined that the plaintiff had been continuously insane, MCL 600.5851 applied, and her action had been timely filed. When reviewing the district court's conclusion, the Black court reasoned that conferring with an attorney is not conclusive whether plaintiff is insane under MCL 600.5851 "because the person may only be partially aware of the circumstances entitling him to maintain an action." Id. at *4. The Black court affirmed the district court's decision and held that the trial court did not clearly err by applying MCL 600.5851 and allowing the plaintiff's action to proceed.
Mr. Lawrence argues that Smith "enlisted the help of prison legal writers, who prepared legal filings on his behalf" and therefore, Smith's case is similar to the Black plaintiff who conferred with an attorney prior to filing the action. (ECF No. 51, at PageID 199). The Court does not find Black persuasive in this case.
The Black plaintiff failed to bring a claim before the statute of limitations expired due to her insanity, and once her insanity was cured, she argued for the Court to apply MCL 600.5851 and allow her to bring her claim. This is inherently different from the facts at issue in this case.
Here, Smith litigated his case pro se to its conclusion and is now trying to reopen the case to add another defendant two years later. Smith filed the Complaint (ECF No. 1), applied to proceed without prepaying fees or costs (ECF No. 2), responded to a show cause order (ECF No. 9), requested clerk's entry of default (ECF No. 20), filed a motion for default judgment (ECF No. 24), and filed a motion for writ of execution to enforce judgment, to compel discovery, and to appoint counsel (ECF No. 31).
Mr. Lawrence has not provided the Court with any authority that MCL 600.5851 applies to reopen a case that has already been litigated to its conclusion. Therefore, the Court DENIES Smith's motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.