Opinion
Case No. 20010777-CA.
Filed December 12, 2002. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable William B. Bohling.
Ephraim H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
James Woodall, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Ann Rozycki, Salt Lake City, for Intervenor.
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bruce Silcox (Silcox) appeals from the trial court's order reducing the Commissioner's recommended judgment against Shauna Silcox Miller (Miller). We affirm.
Additionally, Silcox argues that the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) should have automatically adjusted Silcox's child support upon his daughter's emancipation. Because Silcox did not object to the Commissioner's recommendation that ORS had met all of its statutory obligations, this issue was not preserved. See Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) ("It is axiomatic in our adversary system that a party must raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings."). Therefore, we do not consider the merits of this argument.
Silcox argues that the trial court abused its discretion by reducing, by half, the Commissioner's recommended award in Silcox's favor for over-withheld child support without making findings for its decision in compliance with rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "[C]ommissioners are incapable of entering a final judgment." Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ¶ 13 n. 3, 973 P.2d 431. Therefore, trial courts are "free to reconsider the commissioner's recommendation in light of the evidence presented at trial, and disregard, alter, or adopt the commissioner's recommendation, as [they see] fit." Id. at ¶ 15. Silcox acknowledges that the recommendations of the Commissioner were not binding on the trial court but argues that because the trial court signed the interim order, adopting the findings and recommendations of the Commissioner, the trial court was required to enter findings showing that the Commissioner abused his discretion. Silcox's argument is without merit.
"The Commissioner's recommendations are the order of the court until modified by the court," Utah Code Jud. Admin. R6-401(4); however, "the fact that the judge may have signed the recommendation within the ten-day objection period does not nullify the order, nor does it close off the objection period." Hoagland v. Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). The trial court signed the interim recommendations before Miller's time to object to them had expired. Thus, the trial court was free to adopt, modify, or disregard the Commissioner's recommendations.
Next, "[i]n assessing the sufficiency of the findings, . . . [this court is] not confined to the contents of a particular document entitled `Findings'; rather, the findings may be expressed orally from the bench or contained in other documents." Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). "These findings must be adequate to ensure `the trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based.'" Lysenko v. Sawaya, 1999 UT App 31, ¶ 9, 973 P.2d 445 (citations omitted). In the trial court's order, the court stated that it based its decision on review of the parties' pleadings, affidavits, and oral arguments. In ORS's pleadings and oral argument, it explained that when the legislature removed ORS's authority to terminate child support in non IV-D cases in 1997, it became the obligee's or obligor's responsibility to take the steps necessary to have child support withholding terminated. Thus, the responsibility of having child support terminated fell upon both Silcox and Miller.
The trial court found that ORS presented Silcox with two options to have his child support obligation terminated but he never followed through with either of them. Because both Silcox and Miller were equally capable of taking some action to have child support terminated, the trial court found that it was "unfair and inequitable" to place the entire burden of terminating child support on Miller.
The trial court's written and oral findings that Silcox and Miller were equally at fault for the child support overpayments were sufficient to meet the requirements of rule 52(a). Furthermore, the trial court acted within its discretionary power in allocating financial responsibility equally between the parties. See Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) ("Where the district court may exercise broad discretion, we presume the correctness of the court's decision absent `manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of . . . discretion.'" (citation omitted)).
Because the trial court found Silcox and Miller bore equal fault for the child support overpayments, it was within the court's discretion to deny Silcox's request for prejudgment interest and attorney fees.
WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge, and Gregory K. Orme, Judge.