Opinion
2:23-cv-03532-DCC-MGB
04-26-2024
Antwon L. Scott, Plaintiff, v. Dan Malone, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Antwon L. Scott (“Plaintiff”), a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action challenging his arrest pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various South Carolina statutes. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review this case and submit a recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed in greater detail below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed an initial Complaint on July 20, 2023, alleging violations of certain constitutional rights against Defendant Dan Malone, an investigator with the Charleston Police Department who effectuated Plaintiff's arrest on June 29, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1.) Upon reviewing Plaintiff's allegations, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and was therefore subject to summary dismissal. (Dkt. No. 6 at 2-5.) In light of Plaintiffs pro se status, however, the undersigned afforded him an opportunity to submit an amended pleading that cured the deficiencies identified in his original Complaint. The undersigned warned Plaintiff that if he filed an amended pleading, it would completely replace the original Complaint and render it of no legal effect. (Id. at 5-6.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 9), which now governs the scope of the instant action. Unfortunately, the Amended Complaint mostly restates the same deficient allegations and claims raised in the original pleading.
According to the Amended Complaint, Defendant Malone lured Plaintiff to the “Toast corporate office” (Plaintiff's employer) on June 29, 2022, by using the Human Resources Manager's cell phone to send “fraudulent” texts to Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 9 at 5, 7.) The Amended Complaint states that when Plaintiff arrived at the Toast corporate office, Defendant Malone arrested him “without a warrant, writ or process.” (See id. at 5, citing a string of South Carolina cases in support of the contention that there must be a “judicial determination of probable cause” by a “neutral and detached magistrate” before a lawful arrest may occur). The Amended Complaint further asserts that Defendant Malone did not explain to Plaintiff “why [he] was being arrested/detained” and “never informed [Plaintiff] that [he] had the right to counsel during interrogation.” (Id. at 5-6, 8.) State records indicate that Plaintiff was eventually charged with burglary in the second degree (violent); murder; possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime; and attempted armed, or allegedly armed, robbery.(See Indictment Nos. 2022-GS-10-05672, -5673, -5674, -5675.)
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the filings in Plaintiff's criminal proceedings before the Charleston County Court of General Sessions. See https://www.sccourts.org/casesearch/ (limiting search to Charleston County and entering name “Antwan Scott”) (last visited February 27, 2024); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records and proceedings of other courts); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites).
Based on the above, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Malone violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as S.C. Code §§ 16-3-910, 16-3-920, 16-5-10, and 17-13-50. (Dkt. No. 9 at 4.) Plaintiff claims that he has “sustained injury to [his] reputation” and “no longer can trust the police officials of [the] Charleston Police Department because of their unlawful course of conduct and their intentional abuse of power.” (Id. at 9.) He asks that the criminal charges stemming from his arrest be “dismissed” and that Defendant Malone “be fined for committing perjury and fraud.” (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks $80,000 in damages to compensate him for the time he has spent in confinement. (Id.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Amended Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Thus, a claim based on a “meritless legal theory” or “baseless” factual contentions, such as “fantastic or delusional” scenarios, may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25, 327-28 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Wellerv. Dep'tof Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”).
DISCUSSION
The undersigned finds that despite having availed himself of the opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his original pleading, Plaintiff still fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As noted above, the Amended Complaint primarily alleges violations of Plaintiff's Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in relation to his arrest on June 29, 2022.(Dkt. No. 9 at 4.) Each of these claims falls short of a constitutional violation for the reasons set forth below.
To clarify, the Amended Complaint does not appear to allege a separate and distinct cause of action under the Due Process Clause; rather, Plaintiff seems to invoke the protections prescribed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments as applied to state action through the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 9 at 5-6.)
I. Fourth Amendment Claim
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. To establish a Fourth Amendment violation for unlawful arrest, the plaintiff must show that he was seized without probable cause. English v. Clarke, 90 F.4th 636, 646 (4th Cir. 2024); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979) (“By virtue of its ‘incorporation' into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment requires the States to provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty.”) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff seems to suggest that Defendant Malone arrested him without probable cause because he did not procure a warrant from a neutral magistrate judge before executing the arrest. (Dkt. No. 9 at 5.) It is well-established, however, that a grand jury's judgment of probable cause may “substitute for that of a neutral and detached magistrate.” See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975) (noting the grand jury's “historical role of protecting individuals from unjust prosecution”). To that end, “an indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Staggs v. Spartanburg Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:22-cv-3852-HMH-JDA, 2022 WL 17742423, at *6 (D.S.C. Nov. 30, 2022) (referencing Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012)), adopted, 2022 WL 17741327 (D.S.C. Dec. 16, 2022); see also Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 329 (2014) (“[I]f the person was arrested without a warrant, an indictment eliminates [his] Fourth Amendment right to a prompt judicial assessment of probable cause to support any detention.”).
As the undersigned previously explained to Plaintiff, the grand jury returned a true bill of indictment for each of the criminal charges pending against him in the Charleston County Court of General Sessions.(Dkt. No. 6 at 3-4.) Consequently, Plaintiff cannot show that he was arrested without probable cause simply because Defendant Malone failed to obtain a warrant before executing his arrest. See, e.g., Jordan v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 2:22-cv-3521-DCN-SVH, 2022 WL 13840029, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2022) (finding that grand jury's indictment was affirmative evidence of probable cause sufficient to defeat claims for false arrest under § 1983). Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim is therefore subject to summary dismissal.
See https://www.sccourts.org/casesearch/ (limiting search to Charleston County and entering name “Antwan Scott”) (last visited February 27, 2024). The Amended Complaint does not appear to challenge the validity of these indictments.
II. Fifth Amendment Claim
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const., amend. V; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that “the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States”). In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court concluded “that additional procedural protections were necessary to prevent the violation of this important right when suspects who are in custody are interrogated by the police.” Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134, 141 (2022). The Court therefore required that custodial interrogation be preceded by certain warnings, including “the right to consult with a lawyer.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Malone violated the Fifth Amendment and his “due process” rights by failing to inform him of his “right to counsel during interrogation.” (Dkt. No. 9 at 6.) In support, the Amended Complaint cites Miranda and suggests that “an accused” does not waive his right against self-incrimination absent evidence that he was “offered counsel but intelligently and understandably rejected [it].” (Id.) Contrary to Plaintiff's contentions, however, a Miranda violation is not “tantamount” to a violation of the Fifth Amendment, and “the exclusion of unwarned statements” is generally “a complete and sufficient remedy” to protect against compelled self-incrimination at trial. Vegas, 597 U.S. at 152; see also Little v. Cutchin, No. 4:23-cv-1697-RMG-PJG, 2023 WL 5758625, at *3 (D.S.C. July 20, 2023) (explaining that failure to Mirandize a suspect does not establish a cognizable constitutional violation under § 1983), adopted, 2023 WL 5217923 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 2023); McAllister v. Winston-Salem Police Dep't, No. 1:19-cv-13, 2023 WL 2239474, at *7 n.6 (M.D. N.C. Feb. 27, 2023) (noting that Vega forecloses a §1983 claim based on failure to inform the plaintiff of his right to counsel during custodial interrogation). Consequently, the Amended Complaint fails to state a Fifth Amendment violation.
III. Sixth Amendment Claim
The Sixth Amendment states that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation....” U.S. Const., amend. VI; see also Solis v. Prince George's Cnty., 153 F.Supp.2d 793, 802 (D. Md. 2001) (referencing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (“Because these rights are basic to our adversary system of criminal justice, they are part of the ‘due process of law' that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defendants in the criminal courts of the States.”)). Notably, a person's Sixth Amendment rights attach “only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.” See Solis, 153 F.Supp.2d at 802 (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972)).
Here, the Amended Complaint seems to suggest that Defendant Malone violated Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment rights by refusing to disclose “why [Plaintiff] was being arrested.” (See Dkt. No. 9 at 5-6, 8, stating that officers refused to tell Plaintiff what was “going on” at the time of his arrest.) As indicated above, however, “[a] defendant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation brought against him does not exist until the Government is committed to a prosecution.” Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Delph v. Prince William Cnty., No. 1:20-cv-1086-LMB-IDD, 2022 WL 1164005, at *5 (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2022) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment “notice requirement is typically accomplished through a charging document, such as an indictment or information, given to a defendant so that the defendant can prepare for trial”). To that end, “[t]he Sixth Amendment imposes no duty on an officer to give notice of the charges against the accused at the time of arrest.” Solis, 153 F.Supp.2d at 803; see also Holland v. Miller, No. 4:20-cv-227-SAL-KDW, 2020 WL 3549176, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 2020) (“[T]here is no constitutional right that the police inform an arrestee of the reasons for their arrest.”), adopted, 2020 WL 3548811 (D.S.C. June 30, 2020). Accordingly, as the undersigned previously explained, Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claim is likewise subject to summary dismissal. (Dkt. No. 6 at 4.)
IV. Dismissal of Pending Criminal Charges
It is worth noting that even if the Amended Complaint alleged a plausible constitutional violation in relation to Plaintiff's arrest on June 29, 2022, the dismissal of his pending state criminal charges is not an available remedy in this case. (Dkt. No. 9 at 9.) Indeed, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that federal courts should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. See id. at 43-44; see also Victoria v. Bodford, No. 8:21-cv-1836-JMC, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021) (“What lies behind Younger is the premise that state courts are capable of adequately protecting constitutional rights.”). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
In the instant case, the first criterion is met because Plaintiff's criminal proceedings are plainly ongoing. The second criterion is also met, as the Supreme Court has explained that “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). Finally, the third criterion is satisfied because Plaintiff can address his claims in his pending criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Dickey v. Hudson, No. 4:23-cv-2826-JD-KDW, 2023 WL 6882375, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 1, 2023) (applying the Younger abstention doctrine where plaintiff had “the opportunity to present his claims challenging Defendants lack of probable cause to arrest him during the disposition of his criminal charges”), adopted, 2023 WL 6880626 (D.S.C. Oct. 18, 2023); Vyas v. Morris, No. 7:23-cv-216, 2023 WL 3550291, at *2-3 (W.D. Va. May 18, 2023) (finding that plaintiff could bring claim regarding defendant's purported failure to advise him of his Miranda rights before custodial interview in pending state proceedings), reconsideration denied, 2023 WL 3959923 (W.D. Va. June 12, 2023); Morant v. South Carolina, No. 3:19-cv-2849-JFA-SVH, 2019 WL 5063410, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 9, 2019) (“Plaintiff may argue in state court proceedings that the charges and arrest are not supported by probable cause.”); see also Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 904 (4th Cir. 1996) (referencing Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975) (noting that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”)). Because this case meets all three criteria for abstention under Younger, this Court cannot interfere with Plaintiff's pending state court proceedings at this time.
V. State Law Claims
Although the Amended Complaint primarily alleges violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the pleading also references S.C. Code §§ 16-3-910, 16-3-920, 16-5-10, and 17-13-50 as additional bases for this action. (Dkt. No. 9 at 4.) However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning they possess only that power authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute. In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Pursuant to this limited power, there are two primary bases for original federal jurisdiction: (1) “federal question,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) “diversity of citizenship,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The Amended Complaint also alludes to a possible South Carolina “fraud” claim based on the way in which Defendant Malone “tricked” Plaintiff into going to the Toast corporate office. (Dkt. No. 9 at 5.)
If a federal district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, it may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that are “so related” to the claims under the court's original jurisdiction “that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Without original jurisdiction, however, a federal court generally cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. See id. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction). Because the Amended Complaint does not allege a valid federal cause of action or diversity of citizenship, this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (stating that “if the federal claims are dismissed . . ., the state claims should be dismissed as well”); see also Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.”) Plaintiff's state law claims are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
Moreover, several of the South Carolina statutes cited in the Amended Complaint prescribe penalties for criminal offenses, which a private citizen cannot enforce via a civil action. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (finding that a private citizen does not have a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution of another person); Hoffman v. Smart-Gittings, No. 9:18-cv-1146-RMG-BM, 2019 WL 8759417, at *10 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2019) (noting that a private citizen “has no constitutional, statutory, or common law right to require a public official to . . . prosecute a crime”) (internal citations omitted); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986) (collecting cases). To that end, insofar as Plaintiff is asking the Court to impose any criminal “fines” on Defendant Malone (Dkt. No. 9 at 9), such relief is also unavailable here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this action be summarily dismissed without further leave to amend, as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).