Opinion
2014-11781 Index No. 3369/12.
01-13-2016
Grazia RYZAK, appellant, v. Gary D. ANDERSON, et al., respondents.
Flanzig and Flanzig, LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (Cathy Flanzig of counsel), for appellant. Ryan Perrone & Hartlein, P.C., Mineola, N.Y. (Robin Mary Heaney and William T. Ryan of counsel), for respondent Gary D. Anderson. Richard T. Lau (Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale, N.Y. [Cheryl F. Korman], of counsel), for respondent William V. Parisen.
Flanzig and Flanzig, LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (Cathy Flanzig of counsel), for appellant.
Ryan Perrone & Hartlein, P.C., Mineola, N.Y. (Robin Mary Heaney and William T. Ryan of counsel), for respondent Gary D. Anderson.
Richard T. Lau (Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale, N.Y. [Cheryl F. Korman], of counsel), for respondent William V. Parisen.
Opinion
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.), dated October 30, 2014, which, upon the granting of the defendants' separate motions pursuant to CPLR 4401, both made at the close of the plaintiff's case, for judgment as a matter of law, is in favor of the defendants and against her dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
“A trial court's grant of a CPLR 4401 motion for judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where the trial court finds that, upon the evidence presented, there is no rational process by which the fact trier could base a finding in favor of the nonmoving party” (Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 664 N.Y.S.2d 252, 686 N.E.2d 1346; see Figueroa v. City of New York, 101 A.D.3d 674, 674–675, 954 N.Y.S.2d 485). “In entertaining such a motion, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opponent, affording him or her every favorable inference which reasonably may be drawn from the evidence” (Gomez v. Casiglia, 67 A.D.3d 965, 966, 890 N.Y.S.2d 81). Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Supreme Court properly determined that, upon the circumstantial evidence presented, there was no rational process by which the jury could base a finding in her favor (see generally Montas v. JJC Constr. Corp., 20 N.Y.3d 1016, 1018, 963 N.Y.S.2d 164, 985 N.E.2d 1225; Schneider v. Kings Hwy. Hosp. Ctr., 67 N.Y.2d 743, 744, 500 N.Y.S.2d 95, 490 N.E.2d 1221; Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 N.Y. 1, 7, 14 N.E.2d 828).
HALL, J.P., AUSTIN, ROMAN and BARROS, JJ., concur.